Nancy A. Regula, as Administrator of the Estate of Daniel G. Young v. HPG Corp., doing business as Cohen Brothers Metals Co. and Integrity Metals ( 2012 )

Pursuant to Ind.Appellate Rule 65(D),
this Memorandum Decision shall not be
regarded as precedent or cited before
any court except for the purpose of
establishing the defense of res judicata,
collateral estoppel, or the law of the case.
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT: ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE:
DAVID W. CRAIG THOMAS C. HAYS
SCOTT A. FAULTLESS LEWIS L. WOOTON
Craig Kelley & Faultless Lewis Wagner, LLP
Indianapolis, Indiana Indianapolis, Indiana
FILED
Apr 30 2012, 9:33 am
IN THE CLERK
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA of the supreme court,
court of appeals and
tax court
NANCY REGULA, as Administrator of the )
Estate of Daniel G. Young, Deceased, )
)
Appellant-Plaintiff, )
)
vs. ) No. 89A01-1109-CT-402
)
HPG CORPORATION, doing business as )
Cohen Brothers Metals Company and )
Integrity Metals, )
)
Appellee-Defendant. )
APPEAL FROM THE WAYNE SUPERIOR COURT
The Honorable Gregory A. Horn, Special Judge
Cause No. 89D01-0803-CT-5
April 30, 2012
MEMORANDUM DECISION - NOT FOR PUBLICATION
MAY, Judge
Nancy Regula, as the administrator of Daniel G. Young’s estate, appeals the grant of
summary judgment in favor of HPG Corporation. We affirm.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On May 26, 2006, Young drove a semi-tractor and fifty-three foot cargo trailer to
Integrity Metals, a company owned by HPG. Integrity employees loaded twenty-seven bales
of scrap metal weighing a total of 39,177 pounds onto Young’s trailer. Young was present
during the time the trailer was loaded. Approximately ten miles from Integrity, Young
crashed the semi-tractor and the trailer loaded with metal on a curve known as “Stant’s
Curve.” Young died as a result of the accident.
On March 11, 2008, Regula, as the administrator of Young’s estate, filed an action
against HPG alleging negligence. On May 16, HPG filed its answer to the complaint, and on
August 27, 2009, HPG filed an amended answer.
On August 16, 2010, HPG filed a motion for summary judgment, claiming it did not
owe a duty to Young or, in the alternative, did not breach a duty to Young, and claiming no
action it took was the proximate cause of Young’s death. Regula filed her objection and
brief in opposition to HPG’s motion for summary judgment on April 27, 2011. The trial
court held a hearing on June 1, and on August 8 it granted HPG’s motion for summary
judgment.
DISCUSSION AND DECISION
Summary judgment is appropriate if the “designated evidentiary matter shows that
there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to
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judgment as a matter of law.” Indiana Trial Rule 56(C). The moving party bears the burden
of making a prima facie showing that there are no genuine issues of material fact and that it
is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Huntington v. Riggs, 862 N.E.2d 1263, 1266 (Ind.
Ct. App. 2007), trans. denied. If the moving party meets these two requirements, the burden
shifts to the non-movant to set forth specifically-designated facts demonstrating there is a
genuine issue of material fact for trial. Id. “A genuine issue of material fact exists where
facts concerning an issue which would dispose of the litigation are in dispute or where the
undisputed material facts are capable of supporting conflicting inferences on such an issue.”
Id.
“On appeal, we are bound by the same standard as the trial court, and we consider
only those matters which were designated at the summary judgment stage.” Id. We will
liberally construe the non-movant’s designated evidence to ensure he is not improperly
denied his day in court. Ind. Dept. of Rev. v. Caylor-Nickel Clinic, 587 N.E.2d 1311, 1313
(Ind. 1992).
In granting HPG’s motion for summary judgment, the trial court relied in part on
Standard Oil Co. v. Soderling, 112 Ind. App. 437, 42 N.E.2d 373 (1942), in which Soderling,
the driver of the truck transporting the cargo, was injured when an employee of Standard Oil
attempted to unload an air compressor. A jury awarded Soderling damages for his injuries,
and Standard Oil appealed, arguing it owed no duty to Soderling to provide a person to help
unload the air compressor, and thus the injury Soderling sustained was not the fault of
Standard Oil. We held, based on long-standing precedent, Soderling had a duty to load and
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unload the freight he was responsible for transporting, and thus he was not entitled to
damages. Standard Oil Co., 112 Ind. App. at 446, 42 N.E.2d at 377.
However, as the trial court in the instant case noted, the facts here differ from those of
Standard Oil because Young was not injured in the process of loading or unloading the scrap
metal, and no Indiana case addresses a similar fact pattern.
Faced with an issue of first impression in Indiana, the trial court adopted the Savage
Rule, which states:
The primary duty as to the safe loading of property is therefore upon the
carrier. When the shipper assumes the responsibility of loading, the general
rule is that he becomes liable for the defects which are latent and concealed
and cannot be discerned by ordinary observation by the agents of the carrier;
but if the improper loading is apparent, the carrier will be liable
notwithstanding the negligence of the shipper.
U.S. v. Savage Truck Line, Inc., 209 F.2d 442, 445 (4th Cir. 1953). A latent defect is one not
discoverable through reasonable inspection. Deckard v. Ratliff, 553 N.E.2d 523, 524 (Ind.
Ct. App. 1990).
The trial court found:
Regula acknowledges in her Brief in Opposition that Integrity Metals only had
a duty to remedy latent defects in the load Young was carrying. It is Regula’s
burden, then, to come forward with evidence of a latent loading defect. . . .
However, no such evidence is produced. Regula contends that because Young
had never been to Integrity Metals prior to the date of the tragic accident that
Young was entitled to rely upon Integrity’s representatives to load the trailer in
a proper and safe manner for transit. The only evidence properly designated is
that Young would look occasionally and observe the Trailer being loaded. If
that is true, then Young would have observed that the bales of scrap metal
were stacked on top of each other and were not bound together nor bound to
their pallets. They were placed inside the Trailer in a manner that allowed free
movement without any blocking or bracing. The “defect” if one exists, is
open, obvious, and therefore, “patent” not “latent.”
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(App. at 19) (emphasis in original). Based on that finding, the trial court granted HPG’s
motion for summary judgment.
Regula argues the trial court abused its discretion because whether the alleged loading
defect was latent or patent was a question for the jury. 1 We disagree.
The Maine Supreme Court, in interpreting the Savage rule, held:
The policy behind the Savage rule is well founded. The everyday
practice and understanding in the trucking industry, as aptly reflected in the
federal regulations on the subject, reflect that carriers logically should have the
final responsibility for the loads they haul. No shipper, such as NEPW, can
force a driver to accept a load that the driver believes is unsafe. See 49 C.F.R.
§ 392.9(b)(1) (2000). By the same token, a driver must take responsibility for
the safety of his or her cargo by inspecting and securing the load. See §
392.9(b)(2). The Savage rule does not absolve shippers from all responsibility
as they bear the onus when cargo has been loaded improperly and that defect is
latent. The Savage rule simply extends the industry’s reasonable
understanding to negligence suits involving carriers and shippers.
Initially, the Savage rule applied solely to damage caused to the cargo
being shipped. See generally M.C. Dransfield, Annotation, Liability of Carrier
by Land or Air for Damage to Goods Shipped Resulting from Improper
Loading, 209 F.2d 442, 44 A.L.R. 2d 984 (1953). In subsequent years, courts
extended the Savage reasoning to include personal injuries to employees of
carriers caused by the negligent loading of goods. See General Electric Co. v.
Moretz, 270 F.2d 780, 785-87 (4th Cir.1959); Georgia Kraft Co. v. Terminal
Transport Co., 343 F. Supp. 1240, 1247 (E.D.Tenn. 1972). Most courts now
accept the rationale of Savage and require carriers to take responsibility for the
loads they carry, even if those loads have been improperly loaded by others.
1
In support of her contention, Regula cites cases from other jurisdictions, all of which are distinguishable from
the facts of the instant case. See Smart v. American Welding and Tank Co., Inc., 149 N.H. 536, 826 A.2d 570,
575 (2003), (summary judgment not appropriate because question whether federal or state law should be
applied existed; the language regarding the Savage rule was dicta), reh’g denied; see also Ebasco Services,
Inc. v. Pacific Intermountain Express Co., 398 F. Supp. 565, 568 (D.C.N.Y. 1975) (summary judgment was not
appropriate because there was a question of material fact regarding representations made by the shipper’s
employees); see also W. J. Casey Trucking & Rigging Co., Inc. v. General Elec. Co., 151 N.J.Super. 151, 159,
376 A.2d 603, 607 (1977) (summary judgment not appropriate because shipper and carrier disagreed whether
the cargo was loaded properly).
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See id.
The reasoning in Savage comports with the established duty of care
notion that an injury must be foreseeable before a duty attaches. See Colvin v.
A R Cable Services-ME, Inc., 1997 ME 163, ¶ 7, 697 A.2d 1289, 1290-91.
Here, the carrier has the opportunity to intercept any problem through
inspection. In fact, the carrier’s driver is under the obligation to conduct such
a safety inspection pursuant to federal law. See § 392.9(b)(2). Carriers,
through their drivers, must ensure the safety of their own loads, even when
cargo is loaded by shippers. The Savage rule that imposes liability on carriers
for the loading done by shippers, even when negligent, has been accepted by
the majority of modern courts and by federal regulators.
Decker v. New England Pub. Warehouse, Inc., 749 A.2d 762, 766-67 (Me. 2000).
Similar to Decker, Young had the opportunity to inspect the load, and testimony
indicated Young was “in and out of the truck. He was both. He was in the truck, and he’s
get out, and he’d come back and look, and he would go back to the truck.” (App. at 164.)
The manner in which the bales of scrap metal were loaded into Young’s truck was
undisputed – the bales were “placed in fifteen (15) staggering rows, with twelve (12) of the
rows being double stacked and three (3) of the bails being single stacked.” (Id. at 56.) In her
response to HPG’s motion for summary judgment, Regula stated the bales were “stacked on
top of each other and were not bound together nor bound to their pallets.” (Id. at 167.) This
method of loading “allowed free movement of the bales, without any blocking or bracing.”
(Id. at 167-68.)
There is no evidence Young was forced to take the load in an unsafe condition, nor
that he attempted to question the manner in which the truck was loaded. Regula has not
demonstrated Young was unaware of the condition of the bales and the possibility they could
shift, which could result in an uneven weight distribution in his trailer. Rather, had Young
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inspected the load, as apparently is required by law, he would have seen the patent defect in
the loading of the bales of scrap metal. Therefore, HPG owed no duty to protect Young from
injuries resulting from that patent defect, and summary judgment was appropriate.
Accordingly, we affirm.
Affirmed.
CRONE, J., and BROWN, J., concur.
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