In the Matter of K.P.G. (Minor Child), a Child in Need of Services, K.P. (Mother) v. The Indiana Department of Child Services , 99 N.E.3d 677 ( 2018 )


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  •                                                                                       FILED
    Apr 09 2018, 6:01 am
    CLERK
    Indiana Supreme Court
    Court of Appeals
    and Tax Court
    ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT                                      ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
    Daniel G. Foote                                             Curtis T. Hill, Jr.
    Indianapolis, Indiana                                       Attorney General
    David E. Corey
    Deputy Attorney General
    Indianapolis, Indiana
    IN THE
    COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
    In the Matter of K.P.G. (Minor                              April 9, 2018
    Child), a Child in Need of                                  Court of Appeals Case No.
    Services,                                                   49A05-1709-JC-2053
    Appeal from the Marion Superior
    K.P. (Mother),                                              Court
    The Honorable Marilyn A.
    Appellant-Respondent,
    Moores, Judge
    v.                                                  The Honorable Danielle Gaughan,
    Magistrate
    The Indiana Department of                                   Trial Court Cause No.
    Child Services,                                             49D09-1703-JC-891
    Appellee-Petitioner
    Crone, Judge.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 49A05-1709-JC-2053 | April 9, 2018                          Page 1 of 13
    Case Summary
    [1]   K.P. (“Mother”) appeals a trial court order adjudicating her son, K.P.G., a
    child in need of services (“CHINS”). She asserts that the trial court lacked
    personal jurisdiction over her and K.P.G. and raises several other issues, all of
    which amount to a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence to support the
    trial court’s CHINS determination. Finding that she waived her jurisdiction
    challenge and that the evidence is sufficient to support the CHINS
    determination, we affirm.
    Facts and Procedural History
    [2]   On March 14, 2017, acting on a report of child neglect, Marion County
    Department of Child Services (“DCS”)1 sent family case manager (“FCM”)
    Olivia Payne to the local bus station. There, Payne encountered Mother and
    eighteen-month-old K.P.G., who reportedly had been in the bus station all day
    without food. Payne attempted to speak to Mother, who was largely
    noncommunicative. She learned that Mother and K.P.G. (New Jersey
    residents) had been traveling from Iowa back to New Jersey, had missed their
    connecting bus, and had been in the Indianapolis bus station for nearly eighteen
    1
    Mother has filed a motion to strike certain portions of DCS’s brief as outside the record. See Appellee’s Br.
    at 15 (paragraph 2 line 2, and footnotes 6 and 7). DCS filed an objection, pointing out that Mother had
    included the challenged information (affidavit and medical report) in her appendix and affirmed the accuracy
    of the appendix. We grant Mother’s motion to strike, noting that the information was not part of the trial
    court record, and order that the information be stricken not only from DCS’s brief but also from Mother’s
    appendix. See Appellant’s App. Vol. 2 at 56-61 (affidavit and accompanying medical report). That said, we
    note that our order to strike the information has no bearing on the ultimate outcome of this appeal.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 49A05-1709-JC-2053 | April 9, 2018                           Page 2 of 13
    hours. During the hour or so that Payne was with them, K.P.G. cried virtually
    the entire time, appeared unclean and tired, and looked like he did not feel well.
    Payne also noticed that each time K.P.G. tried to lean on Mother, Mother
    pushed him away. When Payne picked up K.P.G. to console him, he seemed
    feverish and was “breathing rapidly” and “really hard.” Tr. Vol. 2 at 29. After
    observing a hospital band on his wrist, Payne took him to a local children’s
    hospital, where he was evaluated and admitted. Mother said that a doctor in
    New Jersey had told her that K.P.G. had a heart murmur and that if a certain
    area did not close on its own, he would need surgery. She later testified that
    she did not want the New Jersey doctor performing surgery “cause I don’t like
    surgery.” Id. at 58.
    [3]   Shortly after K.P.G. was removed and hospitalized, Mother was admitted to
    the secured mental health unit at a different Indianapolis hospital. She reported
    that she suffered from mental illness, was trying to wean herself from her
    medication, and had not taken any medication for two months. She told FCM
    Carol Davis that she was from New Jersey and had been living with relatives
    there.
    [4]   On March 16, 2017, DCS filed a petition seeking to have K.P.G. adjudicated a
    CHINS. The trial court gave wardship of K.P.G. to DCS and ordered his
    placement in foster care (after hospitalization). Mother did not appear for the
    initial detention hearing, and the court ordered that she not have visitation with
    K.P.G. until she appeared in court. A week later, she appeared for the
    continued initial hearing, and pauper counsel entered an appearance on her
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 49A05-1709-JC-2053 | April 9, 2018   Page 3 of 13
    behalf. The next day, DCS amended the petition to include K.P.G.’s putative
    father. DCS sought an expedited interstate compact placement with New
    Jersey, which the trial court granted but which ultimately was not accepted by
    New Jersey.
    [5]   K.P.G. remained hospitalized, and on June 6, 2017, DCS sought and was
    granted permission for K.P.G. to undergo surgery to repair his heart defect.
    That same day, Mother filed a memorandum of law, unaccompanied by a
    motion, alleging that the trial court lacked personal jurisdiction over Mother
    and K.P.G. On June 16, 2017, DCS filed an objection to Mother’s
    memorandum, claiming that it was not properly filed, that Mother had
    appeared in person and by counsel, and that the trial court had found probable
    cause for the CHINS proceedings in March. The trial court never ruled on
    Mother’s memorandum. Following the factfinding hearing on July 11, 2017,
    the trial court issued an order accompanied by findings of fact and conclusions
    thereon adjudicating K.P.G. a CHINS. One month later, the court held a
    dispositional hearing and issued a dispositional and parental participation
    order, for K.P.G. to remain in foster care and Mother to participate in services.
    Mother now appeals. Additional facts will be provided as necessary.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 49A05-1709-JC-2053 | April 9, 2018   Page 4 of 13
    Discussion and Decision
    Section 1 – Mother failed to properly contest the issue of
    personal jurisdiction and therefore has waived it for
    consideration on appeal.
    [6]   Mother claims that the trial court lacked personal jurisdiction over her and
    K.P.G. because they are New Jersey residents who were present in Indiana
    merely because of a layover during a bus trip. “Personal jurisdiction refers to a
    court’s power to impose judgment on a particular defendant.” Boyer v. Smith,
    
    42 N.E.3d 505
    , 509 (Ind. 2015). A challenge to personal jurisdiction is a
    question of law, which we review de novo. 
    Id. at 508
    .
    [7]   Indiana Trial Rule 12(B)(2) permits a party to raise lack of personal jurisdiction
    as a defense. “A party can waive lack of personal jurisdiction and submit
    himself to the jurisdiction of the court if he responds or appears and does not
    contest the lack of jurisdiction.” Heartland Res., Inc. v. Bedel, 
    903 N.E.2d 1004
    ,
    1007 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009). Trial Rule 12(B) provides a mechanism for raising
    defenses such as a lack of jurisdiction or insufficient service of process by
    requiring that the defenses or objections be asserted in the responsive pleading
    (where one is required) or by motion. The rule further states,
    A motion making any of these defenses shall be made before
    pleading if a further pleading is permitted or within twenty [20]
    days after service of the prior pleading if none is required. If a
    pleading sets forth a claim for relief to which the adverse party is
    not required to serve a responsive pleading, any of the defenses in
    section (B)(2), (3), (4), (5) or (8) is waived to the extent
    constitutionally permissible unless made in a motion within
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 49A05-1709-JC-2053 | April 9, 2018   Page 5 of 13
    twenty [20] days after service of the prior pleading. No defense
    or objection is waived by being joined with one or more other
    defenses or objections in a responsive pleading or motion.
    [8]   Here, Mother was not required to file a responsive pleading to the CHINS
    petition. As such, she had twenty days from the date of service of the petition
    to file a motion challenging personal jurisdiction. The chronological case
    summary shows the following: on March 16, 2017, DCS filed the CHINS
    petition; on March 24, 2017, Mother appeared before the trial court; on March
    27, 2017, counsel entered an appearance on Mother’s behalf; on March 28,
    2017, DCS amended the CHINS position to include K.P.G.’s putative father;
    and on June 6, 2017, Mother submitted a memorandum (without an
    accompanying motion) raising for the first time the defense of lack of personal
    jurisdiction. Claiming that minimum contacts were lacking, Mother stressed in
    her memorandum that she and K.P.G. were just passing through Indiana and
    had never paid taxes, received government benefits, attended school, or resided
    in Indiana. Appellant’s App. Vol. 2 at 79. Eighty-two days elapsed between
    the filing of the CHINS petition and Mother’s submission of her memorandum
    first addressing the defense of lack of personal jurisdiction. More than seventy
    days elapsed from Mother’s appearance in person and by counsel to the time of
    her personal jurisdiction memorandum and from the date of DCS’s amended
    petition and Mother’s memorandum. Simply put, Mother submitted herself to
    the trial court’s jurisdiction by appearing in court and failing to contest personal
    jurisdiction at that time or within the time limitations found in Trial Rule 12(B).
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 49A05-1709-JC-2053 | April 9, 2018   Page 6 of 13
    As a result, she may not contest the issue on appeal. See Heartland Res., 
    903 N.E.2d at 1007
    .
    Section 2 – The evidence is sufficient to support the CHINS
    determination.
    [9]    Mother raises several arguments that essentially are challenges to the sufficiency
    of the evidence to support the CHINS determination. When reviewing the
    sufficiency of evidence, we give due regard to the trial court’s ability to assess
    the credibility of witnesses. In re Des.B., 
    2 N.E.3d 828
    , 836 (Ind. Ct. App.
    2014). We neither reweigh evidence nor judge witness credibility; rather, we
    consider only the evidence and reasonable inferences most favorable to the trial
    court’s decision. In re K.D., 
    962 N.E.2d 1249
    , 1253 (Ind. 2012). Where the
    trial court issues findings of fact and conclusions thereon, we apply a two-tiered
    standard of review. In re R.P., 
    949 N.E.2d 395
    , 400 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011). We
    consider first whether the evidence supports the findings and then whether the
    findings support the judgment. 
    Id.
     We will set aside the trial court’s findings
    and conclusions only if they are clearly erroneous and a review of the record
    leaves us firmly convinced that a mistake has been made. 
    Id.
     “Findings are
    clearly erroneous only when the record contains no evidence to support them
    either directly or by inference.” K.B. v. Ind. Dep’t of Child Servs., 
    24 N.E.3d 997
    ,
    1001-02 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015) (citation omitted). “A judgment is clearly
    erroneous if it relies on an incorrect legal standard.” Id. at 1002.
    [10]   In a CHINS proceeding, DCS bears the burden of proving by a preponderance
    of the evidence that a child meets the statutory definition of a CHINS. In re
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 49A05-1709-JC-2053 | April 9, 2018   Page 7 of 
    13 N.E., 919
     N.E.2d 102, 105 (Ind. 2010). To meet its burden of establishing
    CHINS status, DCS must prove that the child is under age eighteen,
    (1) the child’s physical or mental condition is seriously impaired
    or seriously endangered as a result of the inability, refusal, or
    neglect of the child’s parent, guardian, or custodian to supply
    the child with necessary food, clothing, shelter, medical care,
    education, or supervision; and
    (2) the child needs care, treatment, or rehabilitation that:
    (A) the child is not receiving; and
    (B) is unlikely to be provided or accepted without the
    coercive intervention of the court.
    
    Ind. Code § 31-34-1-1
    .
    [11]   Although the acts or omissions of one or both parents can cause a condition
    that creates the need for court intervention, the CHINS designation focuses on
    the condition of the children rather than on an act or omission of the parent(s).
    N.E., 919 N.E.2d at 105. In other words, despite a “certain implication of
    parental fault in many CHINS adjudications, the truth of the matter is that a
    CHINS adjudication is simply that – a determination that a child is in need of
    services.” Id. (citations omitted).
    [12]   Mother maintains that the trial court erred in concluding that K.P.G. has been
    seriously impaired or endangered due to any inability, refusal, or neglect on her
    part to provide him with necessities or adequate supervision absent the court’s
    coercive intervention. She does not specifically challenge any of the court’s
    findings, and as such, we simply determine whether the unchallenged findings
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 49A05-1709-JC-2053 | April 9, 2018   Page 8 of 13
    are sufficient to support the judgment. T.B. v. Ind. Dep’t of Child Servs., 
    971 N.E.2d 104
    , 110 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012), trans. denied.
    [13]   The trial court’s unchallenged findings of fact include the following:2
    4. Mother and K.P.G. came to the attention of DCS in March of
    2017 when DCS was called to investigate a report of Mother and
    K.P.G. being in the Indianapolis Greyhound Bus Station for
    approximately 18 hours after Mother had missed a bus to return
    back to New Jersey where her family, including her mother,
    lives. K.P.G. was wearing a hospital band and it was reported
    that he had not eaten all day and that Mother was not responsive
    to his needs.
    5. When the DCS assessment worker arrived at the Greyhound
    bus station, she observed K.P.G. to be crying the whole first hour
    that she was there and Mother never tended to him. K.P.G.
    would lean up against Mother and Mother would bump him
    away with her arm. Additionally, K.P.G. felt warm to the touch,
    was breathing rapidly and was wearing a hospital band.
    6. The police were called as well as DCS and Mother was taken
    to the secured mental health unit at Methodist Hospital and held
    for 72 hours. K.P.G. was taken to Riley Hospital because he
    appeared lethargic, was breathing rapidly and was wearing a
    hospital band.
    7. When Mother was released from Methodist she contact[ed]
    DCS. DCS offered to refer mental health services but Mother
    declined. Mother stated that she “was grown and did not need
    help.” DCS offered to refer home based case management to
    assist Mother with housing, transportation and to facilitate the
    2
    The findings refer to K.P.G. by his first name. We refer to him by his initials.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 49A05-1709-JC-2053 | April 9, 2018               Page 9 of 13
    treatment of mental health needs but Mother declined that
    service as well.
    8. K.P.G. has a heart condition and had heart surgery on June
    23, 2017 and K.P.G. is currently hospitalized.
    9. At the time of the incident in the Greyhound Bus Station,
    Mother was aware that K.P.G. had a heart condition.
    10. By her own admission, Mother has “had mental illness for a
    while” and “is trying to wean” herself off of the medicine.
    11. Mother has not stayed in recent contact with DCS and DCS
    is not aware of where Mother is living.
    12. Mother has not seen K.P.G. since before his surgery on June
    23, 2017.
    13. Throughout the trial Mother was very agitated, snorting at
    times, laughing, shaking her head and muttering to herself while
    others testified. Mother’s testimony was difficult to follow as
    Mother rambled and went off on tangents. Mother frequently
    muttered, “desperate, how desperate” shaking her head. On one
    occasion Mother randomly stated to the DCS attorney who was
    questioning her, “You got kids, I got kids. You got feelings, I got
    feelings.”
    l4. The child’s physical or mental condition is seriously impaired
    or seriously endangered as a result of the inability, refusal, or
    neglect of the child’s parent to supply the child with necessary
    food, clothing, shelter, medical care, education, or supervision.
    By her own admission, Mother has mental health issues and is
    not consistent with treatment and has been “weaning” herself off
    of the medication. Mother was observed in the Greyhound Bus
    Station to be non-responsive to K.P.G.’s needs. Mother had
    been in the bus station for quite some time and K.P.G. did not
    appear well. Mother was observed in the courtroom today to be
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 49A05-1709-JC-2053 | April 9, 2018   Page 10 of 13
    agitated and talking to herself. Mother’s responses to questions
    were rambling and non-responsive. Though there was no stated
    mental health diagnosis, Mother’s behavior in Court during trial
    indicate[s] mental health issues that impair her ability to care for
    K.P.G., especially because of his young age and medical needs.
    15. The child needs care, treatment, or rehabilitation that the
    child is not receiving and is unlikely to be provided or accepted
    without the coercive intervention of the Court. Mother needs
    mental health treatment so that she can appropriately care for her
    child and Mother lacks the insight into her mental health issues
    to seek treatment without the coercive intervention of the Court.
    K.P.G. has serious medical needs and the coercive intervention
    of the Court is necessary to ensure that K.P.G. receives the
    appropriate treatment.
    Appellant’s App. Vol. 2 at 102-04.
    [14]   Mother claims that the trial court’s findings fail to support its conclusion that
    K.P.G. was endangered by her inability or unwillingness to provide him with
    care and treatment absent its coercive intervention. Emphasizing that she and
    K.P.G. were merely passing through Indiana, she relies heavily on our decision
    in M.K. v. Indiana Department of Child Services, 
    964 N.E.2d 240
    , 242 (Ind. Ct.
    App. 2012). There, we reversed a CHINS determination for three young
    children whose mother brought them to Indiana to look up relatives after smoke
    damage from a fire in their building had temporarily displaced them from their
    Maryland apartment. 
    Id. at 245
    . There, we emphasized the unusual
    circumstances, which included not only the fire in an adjacent apartment but
    also a blizzard that resulted in their predawn arrival in Indiana, and the father’s
    emergency trip to Texas to tend to his sick mother. 
    Id. at 245-46
    . Both parents
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 49A05-1709-JC-2053 | April 9, 2018   Page 11 of 13
    were employed and had a savings account, and the mother had brought cash for
    food and lodging in Indiana. 
    Id.
     She asked a police officer to take her and the
    children to an inexpensive motel, but the officer took them to a shelter instead.
    
    Id. at 246
    . The evidence simply did not support the trial court’s finding that the
    mother had relocated to Indiana without a plan for housing and that she was
    unwilling or unable to provide the children with stable housing.
    [15]   We find M.K. distinguishable. While both cases involved mothers and children
    who are not Indiana residents, the trial court’s findings in M.K. emphasized a
    perceived housing deficiency as its basis for the CHINS adjudication, where the
    evidence showed that the mother in fact had cash and a plan for lodging, and
    that she had simply fallen prey to a “series of unfortunate and unforeseen
    events.” 
    Id.
     In contrast, here, the trial court based its decision on K.P.G.’s
    serious health problems and Mother’s mental illness, both of which were
    unfortunate but not unforeseen. Mother knew that K.P.G. had a serious heart
    defect that would likely require surgery, yet she admitted that she had not
    consented to surgery in New Jersey because she did not like surgery. FCM
    Payne’s astute and prompt response to K.P.G.’s labored breathing at the bus
    station resulted in his hospitalization, treatment, and eventual surgery. As for
    Mother’s mental illness, she admitted that she was trying to wean herself from
    her prescribed medication and that she had not taken it for the two months
    preceding the CHINS proceedings. In short, her untreated mental illness left
    her unable to make critical decisions concerning K.P.G.’s care and treatment.
    FCM Payne’s potentially lifesaving intervention underscores Mother’s need for
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 49A05-1709-JC-2053 | April 9, 2018   Page 12 of 13
    the programs and services ordered by the CHINS court. Based on the
    foregoing, we conclude that the evidence is sufficient to support the CHINS
    determination. Accordingly, we affirm.
    [16]   Affirmed.
    Bailey, J., and Brown, J., concur.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 49A05-1709-JC-2053 | April 9, 2018   Page 13 of 13
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 49A05-1709-JC-2053

Citation Numbers: 99 N.E.3d 677

Filed Date: 4/9/2018

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 1/12/2023