Mickey Diaz v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.) ( 2018 )


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  • MEMORANDUM DECISION
    Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D),
    this Memorandum Decision shall not be                                         FILED
    regarded as precedent or cited before any                                Oct 11 2018, 9:09 am
    court except for the purpose of establishing                                  CLERK
    the defense of res judicata, collateral                                   Indiana Supreme Court
    Court of Appeals
    estoppel, or the law of the case.                                              and Tax Court
    ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT                                   ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
    Thomas B. O’Farrell                                      Curtis T. Hill, Jr.
    McClure / O’Farrell                                      Attorney General of Indiana
    Indianapolis, Indiana
    Laura R. Anderson
    Deputy Attorney General
    Indianapolis, Indiana
    IN THE
    COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
    Mickey Diaz,                                             October 11, 2018
    Appellant-Defendant,                                     Court of Appeals Case No.
    18A-CR-1165
    v.                                               Appeal from the Hamilton
    Superior Court
    State of Indiana,                                        The Honorable David K. Najjar,
    Appellee-Plaintiff                                       Judge
    Trial Court Cause No.
    29D05-1706-CM-4285
    Baker, Judge.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-CR-1165 | October 11, 2018                  Page 1 of 6
    [1]   Mickey Diaz appeals her conviction for Class A Misdemeanor Conversion, 1
    arguing that the evidence is insufficient to support the conviction. Finding the
    evidence sufficient, we affirm.
    Facts
    [2]   On June 16, 2017, Gloria Jackson and her son went to Home Depot in
    Noblesville. After they had finished shopping, Jackson’s son took their cart to
    the cart return without realizing that Jackson’s purse was still in the cart.
    [3]   Diaz, her husband, and their two children had also been shopping at Home
    Depot. When Diaz returned their cart to the cart return, she found the purse in
    another cart, looked around, did not see anyone, and took the purse with her
    when she and her family left the store.
    [4]   Jackson and her son quickly realized that they had left Jackson’s purse; they
    returned to Home Depot to retrieve it. Jackson went inside the store to see if
    anyone had turned in her purse, but no one had. Jackson’s iPhone was in her
    purse; therefore, Jackson’s son used the Find My iPhone application to locate
    and track the phone and the purse. They called the police, who began
    searching for the phone and the purse using the tracking information provided
    by Jackson’s son.
    1
    
    Ind. Code § 35-43-4-3
    (a).
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-CR-1165 | October 11, 2018   Page 2 of 6
    [5]   Initially, the iPhone was at a McDonald’s in Cicero, but it then began traveling
    northbound on State Road 19 north of Cicero. Eventually, the officers began
    following Diaz’s vehicle. They followed the vehicle into a subdivision and
    conducted a traffic stop.
    [6]   Hamilton County Sheriff’s Deputy Jeff Wright approached Diaz, who was
    sitting in the passenger seat, and asked for her identification. When Diaz
    picked up her purse to retrieve her identification, Deputy Wright noticed a
    second purse matching the description of Jackson’s purse sitting partially under
    Diaz’s seat. Deputy Wright asked Diaz if the purse was hers, and Diaz
    responded that it belonged to a friend and that she was taking the purse to her
    friend at a middle school. The deputy asked Diaz if he looked inside that purse
    whether he would find identification belonging to her friend.
    [7]   At that point, Diaz stated that she found the purse in a shopping cart at Home
    Depot and planned to turn it in to the owner when she had time. Diaz claimed
    that she was running late in getting her two children to school. She stated that
    her husband was abusive, that she was scared of him, and that she was scared
    to tell him at Home Depot that she had picked up the purse because they were
    already running late to take the children to school. Another deputy asked Diaz
    why, if they were in such a hurry, they had stopped at McDonald’s, driven into
    a subdivision, and failed to take the most direct route to the school. Diaz
    responded that they had stopped at McDonald’s because she was thirsty.
    Jackson responded to the traffic stop, identified the purse as hers, and verified
    that nothing had been taken from the purse.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-CR-1165 | October 11, 2018   Page 3 of 6
    [8]    On June 22, 2017, the State charged Diaz with Class A misdemeanor
    conversion. At the conclusion of Diaz’s April 19, 2018, bench trial, the trial
    court found her guilty as charged, imposing a sentence of court costs totaling
    $185. Diaz now appeals.
    Discussion and Decision
    [9]    Diaz argues that the evidence is insufficient to support her conviction. When
    reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence to support a conviction, we must
    consider only the probative evidence and reasonable inferences supporting the
    conviction and will neither assess witness credibility nor reweigh the evidence.
    Drane v. State, 
    867 N.E.2d 144
    , 146 (Ind. 2007). We will affirm unless no
    reasonable factfinder could find the elements of the crime proved beyond a
    reasonable doubt. 
    Id.
    [10]   To convict Diaz of Class A misdemeanor conversion, the State was required to
    prove beyond a reasonable doubt that she knowingly or intentionally exerted
    unauthorized control over Jackson’s property. I.C. § 35-43-4-3(a).2 Diaz
    argues, essentially, that the evidence does not support a conclusion that she
    acted with the requisite intent to commit the crime.
    2
    Diaz complains that the language of the conversion statute renders it a strict liability crime. We disagree, as
    it requires knowing and intentional conduct, but even if we disagreed, it is for the General Assembly rather
    than for the judiciary to consider whether statutory language should be amended.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-CR-1165 | October 11, 2018                     Page 4 of 6
    [11]   Diaz emphasizes the evidence in the record that her husband has been abusive
    to her in the past and that her fear of him is what kept her from returning the
    purse to the store immediately. She claims that she always intended to return
    the purse to the store but was just unable to do so immediately. 3
    [12]   These arguments, however, amount to a request that we reweigh the evidence,
    which we may not do. It is undisputed that Diaz took the purse, knowing that
    it did not belong to her and that she did not have permission to do so. Diaz
    claims that the reason she did not immediately return the purse was because she
    was afraid of her husband’s reaction given that they were allegedly running late
    to take their children to school. But after they left the store, they went to
    McDonald’s because Diaz was thirsty and then drove to a subdivision, rather
    than driving immediately to school from Home Depot. Moreover, when asked
    by a deputy about Jackson’s purse, Diaz lied, claiming that it belonged to a
    friend to whom she was taking it. These inconsistencies and shifting
    explanations support the trial court’s conclusion that Diaz knowingly and
    intentionally exerted unauthorized control over Jackson’s property.4
    3
    Diaz directs our attention to a statute providing that “[a] person who receives, retains, or disposes of
    personal property that has been the subject of theft with the purpose of restoring it to the owner, does not commit
    a crime under this chapter.” 
    Ind. Code § 35-43-4-5
    (d) (emphasis added). This defense does not apply to this
    case because Jackson’s property had not been the subject of theft when Diaz took it. Moreover, as noted
    above, a reasonable factfinder could conclude from the evidence that Diaz did not intend to restore the
    property to Jackson.
    4
    Diaz directs our attention to certain comments made by the trial court at the close of the bench trial. It is
    well established, however, that “the focus of our inquiry is not upon the remarks the trial court makes in a
    bench trial after having reached the conclusion that a defendant is guilty. Rather the question is whether the
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-CR-1165 | October 11, 2018                       Page 5 of 6
    [13]   The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
    May, J., and Robb, J., concur.
    evidence presented to the trial court as fact-finder was sufficient to sustain the conviction.” Dozier v. State,
    
    709 N.E.2d 27
    , 30 (Ind. Ct. App. 1999).
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-CR-1165 | October 11, 2018                        Page 6 of 6
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 18A-CR-1165

Filed Date: 10/11/2018

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 10/11/2018