Coby Crowe v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.) ( 2016 )


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  • MEMORANDUM DECISION
    FILED
    Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D),                           Jun 23 2016, 9:27 am
    this Memorandum Decision shall not be                                 CLERK
    regarded as precedent or cited before any                         Indiana Supreme Court
    Court of Appeals
    and Tax Court
    court except for the purpose of establishing
    the defense of res judicata, collateral
    estoppel, or the law of the case.
    ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT                                   ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
    Susan D. Rayl                                            Gregory F. Zoeller
    Smith Rayl Law Office, LLC                               Attorney General of Indiana
    Indianapolis, Indiana
    Eric P. Babbs
    Deputy Attorney General
    Indianapolis, Indiana
    IN THE
    COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
    Coby Crowe,                                              June 23, 2016
    Appellant-Defendant,                                     Court of Appeals Cause No.
    49A05-1509-CR-1485
    v.                                               Appeal from the Marion Superior
    Court
    State of Indiana,                                        The Honorable William Nelson,
    Appellee-Plaintiff.                                      Judge
    Trial Court Cause No.
    49F18-1403-FD-15204
    Barnes, Judge.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 49A05-1509-CR-1485 | June 23, 2016      Page 1 of 6
    Case Summary
    [1]   Coby Crowe appeals his convictions for Class D felony dealing in a sawed-off
    shotgun and Class A misdemeanor pointing a firearm. We affirm.
    Issue
    [2]   Crowe raises one issue, which we restate as whether his convictions for Class D
    felony dealing in a sawed-off shotgun and Class A misdemeanor pointing a
    firearm violate the prohibition against double jeopardy.
    Facts
    [3]   On March 24, 2014, Donesha Jackson was retrieving an item from her car
    when Crowe stopped his car near her. Crowe pointed a large gun at Jackson,
    said, “What’s up now, m-f’er,” and pulled the trigger several times. Tr. p. 10.
    Jackson could see Crowe’s finger moving and could hear the gun clicking, but
    the gun did not fire. Jackson ran and hid behind a dumpster, and Crowe drove
    his vehicle near the dumpster. Jackson heard the clicking noise again, but the
    gun did not fire. She then ran into the house and called 911.
    [4]   The police located Crowe, and he had a sawed-off shotgun in the vehicle and
    marijuana in his pocket. The State charged Crowe with Class D felony dealing
    in a sawed-off shotgun, Class A misdemeanor pointing a firearm, and Class A
    misdemeanor possession of marijuana. After a bench trial, the trial court found
    Crowe guilty as charged. The trial court sentenced him to 1095 days in the
    Department of Correction with 365 days suspended to probation. Crowe now
    appeals.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 49A05-1509-CR-1485 | June 23, 2016   Page 2 of 6
    Analysis
    [5]   Crowe argues that his convictions for Class D felony dealing in a sawed-off
    shotgun and Class A misdemeanor pointing a firearm violate the prohibition
    against double jeopardy. According to Crowe, he “would have to commit the
    lesser offense of possession of a sawed-off shotgun in order to commit the
    greater offense of pointing a sawed-off shotgun.” Appellant’s Br. p. 11. Crowe
    requests that we vacate his conviction for Class D felony dealing in a sawed-off
    shotgun.
    [6]   Article 1, Section 14 of the Indiana Constitution prohibits double jeopardy,
    providing that “[n]o person shall be put in jeopardy twice for the same offense.”
    In Richardson v. State, 
    717 N.E.2d 32
     (Ind. 1999), our supreme court concluded
    that two or more offenses are the same offense in violation of Article 1, Section
    14 if, with respect to either the statutory elements of the challenged crimes or
    the actual evidence used to obtain convictions, the essential elements of one
    challenged offense also establish the essential elements of another challenged
    offense. Garrett v. State, 
    992 N.E.2d 710
    , 719 (Ind. 2013). “In addition to the
    instances covered by Richardson, ‘we have long adhered to a series of rules of
    statutory construction and common law that are often described as double
    jeopardy, but are not governed by the constitutional test set forth in
    Richardson.’” Guyton v. State, 
    771 N.E.2d 1141
    , 1143 (Ind. 2002) (quoting Pierce
    v. State, 
    761 N.E.2d 826
    , 830 (Ind. 2002)). “Even where no constitutional
    violation has occurred, multiple convictions may nevertheless violate the ‘rules
    of statutory construction and common law that are often described as double
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 49A05-1509-CR-1485 | June 23, 2016   Page 3 of 6
    jeopardy, but are not governed by the constitutional test set forth in
    Richardson.’” Vandergriff v. State, 
    812 N.E.2d 1084
    , 1088 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004)
    (quoting Pierce, 761 N.E.2d at 830), trans. denied. These rules fall under broader
    categories set forth by Justice Sullivan in his concurring opinion in Richardson
    and include the “[c]onviction and punishment for a crime which is a lesser-
    included offense of another crime for which the defendant has been convicted
    and punished.” Id.
    [7]   Indiana Code Section 35-38-1-6 “reinforces” the double jeopardy rule that
    prohibits a trial court “from sentencing a defendant for an offense and a lesser
    included offense charged in separate counts.” Hopkins v. State, 
    759 N.E.2d 633
    ,
    639 (Ind. 2001). Specifically, Indiana Code Section 35-38-1-6 provides that if a
    defendant is charged with an offense and an included offense in separate counts
    and is found guilty of both counts, “judgment and sentence may not be entered
    against the defendant for the included offense.” “Included offense” means an
    offense that:
    (1)      is established by proof of the same material elements or
    less than all the material elements required to establish the
    commission of the offense charged;
    (2)      consists of an attempt to commit the offense charged or an
    offense otherwise included therein; or
    (3)      differs from the offense charged only in the respect that a
    less serious harm or risk of harm to the same person,
    property, or public interest, or a lesser kind of culpability,
    is required to establish its commission.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 49A05-1509-CR-1485 | June 23, 2016   Page 4 of 6
    
    Ind. Code § 35-31.5-2
    -168. A lesser-included offense is necessarily included
    within the greater offense if it is impossible to commit the greater offense
    without first having committed the lesser offense. Zachary v. State, 
    469 N.E.2d 744
    , 749 (Ind. 1984). If the evidence indicates that one crime is independent of
    another crime, it is not an included offense. Iddings v. State, 
    772 N.E.2d 1006
    ,
    1017 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002), trans. denied.
    [8]   At the time of Crowe’s offense, Indiana Code Section 35-47-5-4.11 provided that
    a person who possessed “any sawed-off shotgun commits dealing in a sawed-off
    shotgun, a Class D felony.” On the other hand, Indiana Code Section 35-47-4-
    3(b) provided: “A person who knowingly or intentionally points a firearm at
    another person commits a Class D felony. However, the offense is a Class A
    misdemeanor if the firearm was not loaded.” We conclude that dealing in a
    sawed-off shotgun is not a lesser included offense of pointing a firearm. The
    dealing in a sawed-off shotgun offense required proof that Crowe possessed a
    sawed-off shotgun while the pointing a firearm offense required proof that
    Crowe pointed a firearm at someone. The dealing in a sawed-off shotgun
    offense is not established by proof of the same material elements or less than all
    the material elements required to establish the commission of the pointing a
    firearm offense. Crowe’s argument fails. See, e.g., Armstrong v. State, 
    742 N.E.2d 972
    , 978 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001) (holding that no double jeopardy
    violation occurred by the defendant’s conviction for Class D felony pointing a
    1
    Repealed by Pub. L. No. 84-2015, § 4 (eff. July 1, 2015).
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 49A05-1509-CR-1485 | June 23, 2016   Page 5 of 6
    firearm and Class A misdemeanor carrying a handgun without a license);
    Mickens v. State, 
    742 N.E.2d 927
    , 931 (Ind. 2001) (“Carrying the gun along the
    street was one crime and using it was another.”).
    Conclusion
    [9]    The prohibition against double jeopardy is not violated by Crowe’s convictions
    for Class D felony dealing in a sawed-off shotgun and Class A misdemeanor
    pointing a firearm. We affirm.
    [10]   Affirmed.
    Vaidik, C.J., and Mathias, J., concur.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 49A05-1509-CR-1485 | June 23, 2016   Page 6 of 6
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 49A05-1509-CR-1485

Filed Date: 6/23/2016

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 6/23/2016