Mark Yoder and Barbara Yoder v. Capital One Bank, (USA), N.A. ( 2012 )

Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), this
Memorandum Decision shall not be
regarded as precedent or cited before any
court except for the purpose of
establishing the defense of res judicata,
collateral estoppel, or the law of the case.
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT: ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE:
BRYON J. BERRY BRIAN P. O’MEARA
Warsaw, Indiana McGuire Woods LLP
Chicago, Illinois
FILED
Feb 29 2012, 9:33 am
IN THE CLERK
of the supreme court,
court of appeals and
tax court
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
MARK YODER and BARBARA YODER, )
)
Appellants-Defendants, )
)
vs. ) No. 43A05-1103-CC-128
)
CAPITAL ONE BANK, (USA), N.A., )
)
Appellee-Plaintiff. )
APPEAL FROM THE KOSCIUSKO SUPERIOR COURT
The Honorable James C. Jarrette, Judge
Cause No. 43D02-1002-CC-39
February 29, 2012
MEMORANDUM DECISION – NOT FOR PUBLICATION
BAKER, Judge
Appellants-defendants Mark Yoder and Barbara Yoder (collectively, the Yoders)
appeal the trial court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of appellee-plaintiff Capital
One Bank, (USA), N.A. (Capital One). Essentially, the Yoders argue that the trial court
erred by applying Indiana’s statute of limitations because their contract with Capital One
provided that Virginia law governed the contract and, consequently, Virginia’s three-year
statute of limitations applies and has barred Capital One’s claim. Finding no error, we
affirm.
FACTS
On February 4, 2010, Capital One filed suit against the Yoders in Indiana, seeking
a judgment for $10,839 based on a credit card balance accumulated by the Yoders and
pursuant to their credit card agreement with Capital One (the Agreement). The complaint
also sought unpaid fees and finance charges of $3,045.49, attorney fees of $125, and
costs and post-judgment interest.
On July 2, 2010, Capital One filed a motion for summary judgment that included
an affidavit establishing the balance due on the Yoders’ account. On August 24, 2010,
the Yoders filed their response, asserting that “[w]ith the application of the laws of the
Commonwealth of Virginia, a strict statute of limitations of three years upon suits
involving open account exists.” Appellant’s App. p. 25. The Yoders based their
assertion on the following provision of the Agreement:
This Agreement is to be construed in accordance with and governed by the
laws of the United States of America and by the internal laws of the
Commonwealth of Virginia without giving effect to any choice of law rule
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that would cause the application of the laws of any jurisdiction other than
the laws of the United States of America or the internal laws of the
Commonwealth of Virginia to the rights and duties of the parties.
Appellant’s App. p. 3. According to the Yoders, the three -year statute of limitations had
already passed, inasmuch as the last bill they received on their account was dated
November 6, 2006.
On January 10, 2011, the trial court granted Capital One’s motion for summary
judgment. On February 9, 2011, the Yoders filed a motion to correct error, raising the
same statute of limitations argument that they asserted in response to Capital One’s
motion for summary judgment. The trial court denied the Yoders’ motion on February
24, 2011. The Yoders now appeal.
DISCUSSION AND DECISION
The Yoders appeal the trial court’s grant of summary judgment in favor Capital
One. When reviewing a grant of summary judgment, an appellate court employs the
same standard of review as the trial court. Dreaded, Inc. v. St. Paul Guardian Ins. Co.,
904 N.E.2d 1267, 1269 (Ind. 2009). A reviewing court must consider “only those facts
that the parties designated to the trial court,” and determine whether there are no genuine
issues of material fact such that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of
law. Id. at 1269-70. Additionally, we must construe all factual inferences in favor of the
nonmoving party, and all doubts as to the existence of a material issue must be resolved
against the moving party. Scribner v. Gibbs, 953 N.E.2d 475, 479 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011).
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The essential issue on appeal is whether to apply the statute of limitations of
Virginia or Indiana to Capital One’s claims. A panel of this Court addressed this issue in
Smither v. Asset Acceptance, LLC, 919 N.E.2d 1153 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010). In Smither,
Asset Acceptance filed a complaint against Smither seeking damages in the amount of an
unpaid credit card balance and interest. Id. at 1155. Smither argued that New
Hampshire’s three-year statute of limitations applied to the claim because the credit card
agreement specified that it was governed by federal law and by New Hampshire law. Id.
at 1157.
A panel of this court noted that “[i]t is well-settled . . . that contractual choice of
law provisions govern only the substantive law of any claims arising out of the contract;
the law of the forum state where the suit is filed still governs procedure.” Id. at 1157-58.
The panel emphasized that a “statute of limitation is a procedural constraint on when suit
may be filed,” and concluded that Indiana provided the appropriate statute of limitations.
Id. at 1158.
Likewise, in this case, although the Agreement stated that it was “governed by the
laws of the United States of America and by the internal laws of the Commonwealth of
Virginia,” appellant’s app. p. 3, that provision governs only the substantive law of any
claims arising out of the contract. Because we have determined that a statute of
limitation is a procedural constraint, the trial court did not err by applying Indiana’s
statute of limitations and granting summary judgment in favor of Capital One.
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The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
DARDEN, J., and BAILEY, J., concur.
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