Parkview Memorial Hospital, Inc. v. Pepple , 483 N.E.2d 469 ( 1985 )

HOFFMAN, Judge.

Appellant - Parkview - Memorial Hospital, Inc., (Parkview herein) brings this interlocutory appeal from the trial court's order which in effect denied Parkview's motion in limine. The underlying action in this case was brought by appellee Dr. David Pepple (Pepple herein) against Park-view, seeking judicial review of Parkview's adverse recommendation with respect to Pepple's recredentialing. Parkview filed a motion in limine seeking an order:

"directing that all parties, witnesses, and counsel in this action shall not refer to, mention, or give any testimony concerning nor make any nontestimonial statement concerning any proceedings of a Peer Review Committee or communications, records, or determinations of such Committee or any opinion recommendation or evaulation [sic] made by such Committee or any member or person appearing before such Committee."

Parkview's motion was based upon the confidentiality and privilege of peer review committee proceedings provision of IND. CODE § 34-4-12.6-2, The trial court granted this motion, and subsequent thereto, Pepple filed a motion to reconsider that ruling. The trial court did reconsider its decision and vacated the prior ruling,. The court also certified the issue for immediate review by this Court. Thus, this Court must determine whether the confidentiality and privilege provisions of IND.CODE § 34-4-12.6-2 apply in a civil action brought by a doctor challenging a private hospital's decision with respect to his surgical privileges.

This Court may not interpret or construe the statute in question unless it is ambiguous or unclear. Figg & Muller Engineers, Inc. v. Petruska (1985), Ind.App., 477 N.E.2d 968. Subsection (c) of the statute provides:

"(c) Except in cases of required disclosure as authorized in this chapter no records of determinations of, or communications to, a peer review committee shall be:

(1) subject to subpoena or discovery; or

(2) admissible in evidence;

in any judicial or administrative proceeding, ... without a prior waiver executed by the committee."

This provision is neither unclear or ambiguous. The limitation which Pepple urges this Court to apply does not appear. Had the Legislature intended to limit this statute to only medical malpractice actions, it could have so stated.

Therefore, the trial court's order granting Pepple's motion to reconsider is reversed and the trial court is ordered to reinstate its original order granting Park-view's motion in limine.

Reversed.

STATON, P.J., concurs. GARRARD, J., concurs with opinion.