Chad E. Smith v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.) ( 2019 )

MEMORANDUM DECISION
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D),
this Memorandum Decision shall not be FILED
regarded as precedent or cited before any May 16 2019, 6:33 am
court except for the purpose of establishing CLERK
the defense of res judicata, collateral Indiana Supreme Court
Court of Appeals
and Tax Court
estoppel, or the law of the case.
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
John Kindley Curtis T. Hill, Jr.
South Bend, Indiana Attorney General of Indiana
Samantha M. Sumcad
Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
Chad E. Smith, May 16, 2019
Appellant-Defendant, Court of Appeals Case No.
19A-CR-68
v. Appeal from the Parke Circuit
Court
State of Indiana, The Honorable Samuel A. Swaim,
Appellee-Plaintiff Judge
Trial Court Cause Nos.
61C01-1806-F5-191
61C01-1807-CM-260
Baker, Judge.
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[1] Chad Smith appeals the sentence imposed by the trial court after he pleaded
guilty to Level 5 Felony Criminal Confinement, Level 6 Felony Strangulation,
and Class A Misdemeanor Invasion of Privacy, arguing that the trial court erred
when it denied his motion to withdraw his guilty plea and that the sentence is
inappropriate in light of the nature of the offenses and his character. Finding no
error and that the sentence is not inappropriate, we affirm.
Facts
[2] On or about June 19, 2018, Sondra Knight came home after work to find
Smith, her ex-boyfriend, waiting for her. Knight and Smith did not live
together. Smith had been contacting Knight repeatedly to try to convince her
that they should get back together. Knight invited Smith inside, and after taking
shots of alcohol, the two began to argue. Smith became aggressive, grabbing
Knight by the hair and forcing her onto her bed. Smith proceeded to smother
Knight by pressing his chest and stomach onto her body while placing his hands
on her mouth and nose. After Smith released her, Knight ran into the
bathroom. Smith followed her and pushed her into the toilet, breaking the lid.
Smith then used a nearby pair of sweatpants to strangle Knight.
[3] Next, Smith forced Knight outside and into his truck. As they drove to Smith’s
house, he warned her that if she screamed, he would kill her. Once at Smith’s
house, Smith tied Knight up and stated that he was going to kill her and then
commit suicide. Smith ordered Knight to write a note to her children in which
she told them that she was going to die. Over the course of the evening, Smith
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unplugged all the lights in his home, repeatedly tied up and untied Knight,
boarded up the front and back doors of his house, and placed a solid object up
against Knight’s head so that she believed it was a gun. Knight pleaded for her
life multiple times, asking Smith to let her go. Later that night, after Smith fell
asleep, Knight tried to escape. She discovered that the doors were boarded, but
she was able to pull back enough wood to squeeze through. She then ran down
the street to a nearby house and called the police. Soon after, officers arrived at
Smith’s house and arrested him.
[4] On June 20, 2018, the State charged Smith with Level 5 felony criminal
confinement, Level 6 felony intimidation, and Level 6 felony domestic battery
resulting in moderate bodily injury. On June 21, 2018, the trial court issued a
no contact order, barring Smith from making any sort of contact with Knight
until trial. Yet, leading up to Smith’s jury trial, he called Knight more than
twenty times. On June 25, 2018, the State also charged Smith with Level 5
felony kidnapping, Level 6 felony strangulation, and one additional count of
Level 5 felony criminal confinement. Smith has a long criminal history and had
previously been convicted of kidnapping, criminal confinement, battery
resulting in bodily injury, and invasion of privacy “involving women and
domestic stuff[.]” Tr. Vol. II p. 95-96. On July 9, 2018, under a separate cause
number, the State charged Smith with one count of Class A misdemeanor
invasion of privacy based on his violations of the no contact order.
[5] On the morning of Smith’s October 9, 2018, jury trial, pursuant to an open plea
agreement, Smith pleaded guilty to one count of Level 5 felony criminal
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confinement, one count of Level 6 felony strangulation, and one count of Class
A misdemeanor invasion of privacy in exchange for dismissal of the other
charges. Before accepting Smith’s plea, the trial court advised Smith of the
rights he was waiving by pleading guilty. The trial court also informed Smith of
the crimes to which he would be pleading guilty and of the potential sentences
that would be imposed. Smith stated that he understood and accepted the terms
of the plea agreement, the potential sentences to be imposed, and the rights he
was waiving. Id. at 37-41.
[6] At the December 7, 2018, sentencing hearing, Smith filed a motion to withdraw
his guilty plea. During a separate hearing on that motion, Smith argued that he
was not aware of the potential sentences he would face by pleading guilty and
that he did not know he was pleading guilty to Class A misdemeanor invasion
of privacy. The trial court denied his motion.
[7] The trial court sentenced Smith to an aggregate term of eight and one-half years
to be served in the Department of Correction. Of that sentence, the trial court
imposed the maximum sentence (six years) for the criminal confinement count
and the maximum sentence (two and one-half years) for the strangulation
count. The trial court gave Smith credit for the 170 days served in the Parke
County jail, appellant’s app. vol. II p. 44, thereby leaving him with no time left
to serve for the invasion of privacy count. Smith now appeals.
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Discussion and Decision
I. Guilty Plea
[8] First, Smith argues that the trial court erred when it denied his motion to
withdraw his guilty plea.
[9] There is a presumption in favor of the trial court’s ruling on a motion to
withdraw a guilty plea. Coomer v. State, 652 N.E.2d 60, 62 (Ind. 1995). In
determining whether the trial court erred in its ruling, we examine statements
made by the defendant at his guilty plea hearing to decide whether his plea was
offered freely and knowingly. Brightman v. State, 758 N.E.2d 41, 44 (Ind. 2001).
[10] Indiana Code section 35-35-1-4(b) establishes when a defendant can move to
withdraw a guilty plea:
(b) After entry of a plea of guilty, or guilty but mentally ill at the
time of the crime, but before imposition of sentence, the court may
allow the defendant by motion to withdraw his plea of guilty, or
guilty but mentally ill at the time of the crime, for any fair and just
reason unless the state has been substantially prejudiced by
reliance upon the defendant’s plea. . . . [T]he court shall allow the
defendant to withdraw his plea of guilty[] . . . whenever the
defendant proves that withdrawal of the plea is necessary to
correct a manifest injustice.
Therefore, the trial court must grant a defendant’s motion to withdraw his
guilty plea if the defendant can prove that withdrawal will correct a manifest
injustice.
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[11] Here, though Smith claims that he did not know he was pleading guilty to Class
A misdemeanor invasion of privacy and that he was unaware of the potential
sentencing ranges for his offenses, the record shows otherwise. Smith explicitly
stated that he understood that he was waiving certain constitutional rights by
pleading guilty and that he accepted the terms of his plea agreement.
Furthermore, the trial court asked Smith numerous times if he understood that
he was pleading guilty to specific charges, including invasion of privacy. Once
again, Smith stated that he understood the nature of his guilty plea, the offenses
listed therein, and the potential sentences to be imposed. Tr. Vol. II p. 37-41. As
such, Smith’s direct testimony undermines any argument that he lacked
knowledge of the sentence he would receive or that he was unaware of the
crimes to which he was pleading guilty. There is no indication that Smith did
not offer his plea freely and knowingly and at no point would Smith’s
withdrawal have corrected a manifest injustice. Thus, the trial court did not err
in denying Smith’s motion to withdraw his guilty plea.
II. Appropriateness
[12] Next, Smith argues that the sentence imposed by the trial court is inappropriate
in light of the nature of the offenses and his character.
[13] Indiana Appellate Rule 7(B) states that a “Court may revise a sentence . . . if,
after due consideration of the trial court’s decision, the Court finds that the
sentence is inappropriate in light of the nature of the offense[s] and the
character of the offender.” The defendant bears the burden of persuading us
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that his sentence is inappropriate. Childress v. State, 848 N.E.2d 1073, 1080 (Ind.
2006). In determining whether a sentence is inappropriate, we will consider
numerous factors such as culpability of the defendant, the severity of the crime,
the damage done to others, and a “myriad [of] other factors that come to light
in a given case.” Cardwell v. State, 895 N.E.2d 1219, 1224 (Ind. 2008).
[14] The maximum sentence for a Level 5 felony criminal confinement conviction is
six years and the minimum sentence is one year. Ind. Code § 35-50-2-6(b). The
advisory sentence is three years. Id. The maximum sentence for a Level 6 felony
strangulation conviction is two and one-half years and the minimum sentence is
six months. I.C. § 35-50-2-7(b). The advisory sentence is one year. Id. For a
Class A misdemeanor invasion of privacy conviction, the defendant “shall be
imprisoned for a fixed term of not more than one (1) year[.]” Ind. Code § 35-50-
3-2. Here, the trial court imposed an aggregate sentence of eight and one-half
years, of which the trial court ordered the maximum six years for the criminal
confinement count, the maximum two and one-half years for the strangulation
count, and credit given for time served for the invasion of privacy count.
[15] First, as to the nature of the offenses, Smith committed particularly heinous and
brutal criminal acts against Knight. After Knight allowed him into her home,
Smith smothered her face and pressed hard on her body after grabbing her and
forcing her onto a bed. Then, after chasing Knight into the bathroom, slamming
her into the toilet, and strangling her with a pair of sweatpants, Smith forced
Knight into his car so they could drive to his home. There, Smith continued to
tie up, untie, berate, threaten, and essentially torture Knight for the rest of the
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evening, even going so far as to order Knight to write a note telling her children
that she was going to die. Moreover, Smith unplugged all the lights in his home
and boarded up the doors to prevent Knight from escaping. This experience has
caused Knight severe psychological trauma, and the record evidences Smith’s
deliberate attempt to harm Knight without any justification. Therefore, we find
that the nature of the offenses does not render Smith’s sentence inappropriate.
[16] Second, as to Smith’s character, Smith’s actions following his arrest are telling.
After the trial court issued a no contact order against him, Smith nevertheless
called and harassed Knight more than twenty times before the time of trial.
Additionally, the record shows that this is not his first criminal conviction.
Smith had previously been convicted of the very crimes (criminal confinement
and invasion of privacy) to which he pleaded guilty in this case, demonstrating
poor and reprehensible character. See Bailey v. State, 763 N.E.2d 998, 1004 (Ind.
2002) (holding that a history of criminal activity, even if those criminal actions
did not lead to convictions, reflects poorly on a defendant’s character at
sentencing). Moreover, while Smith contends that the trial court
inappropriately imposed the maximum sentences for two counts, the trial
court’s reasoning is explicit:
Ms. Knight was subject to a night of torture and terror for several
hours[.] . . . The Court also finds that [Smith] does have a history
of criminal behavior as outlined in the presentence report. The
Court would also note the evidence presented today that [Smith]
attempted to contact . . . the victim in excess of twenty times after
a No Contact Order was issued. Now, the Court has considered
the fact that [Smith] has not been in trouble, as argued by Defense
counsel, for sixteen years and, I guess, the Court would’ve been
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willing to give you, Mr. Smith, some credit for that time, until
today’s hearing, when you continued to try to shame the victim
after you’ve already pled guilty. So, really, none of --- nothing you
said today makes much sense. There was no reason presented for
the victim to lie about any of this. There’s no motive for her to do
any of this. In fact, there would be every reason for a lot of women
not to have the courage to come forward with any of this. So
you’re not taking any responsibility for the crimes that you
committed and pled guilty to. Convictions have already been
entered. I know you’re not low intelligence. You graduated high
school. I see no reason why you wouldn’t understand what’s going
on. Your conduct in the Courtroom, continually shaking your
head, looking at the victim, also I find that to be threatening[.] . . .
I don’t think you have any remorse whatsoever for the acts you’ve
committed.
Tr. Vol. II p. 99-100. Even though Smith pleaded guilty, the trial court had
ample reasons to impose the maximum sentences for those two counts.
Therefore, we find that Smith’s character does not render the sentence
inappropriate. In sum, we will not revise Smith’s sentence pursuant to Indiana
Appellate Rule 7(B).
[17] The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
Najam, J., and Robb, J., concur.
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