Kelli Greene v. State of Indiana ( 2014 )

Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D),
this Memorandum Decision shall not be
regarded as precedent or cited before
Nov 03 2014, 10:09 am
any court except for the purpose of
establishing the defense of res judicata,
collateral estoppel, or the law of the case.
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT: ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE:
TIMOTHY J. BURNS GREGORY F. ZOELLER
Indianapolis, Indiana Attorney General of Indiana
J.T. WHITEHEAD
Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
KELLI GREENE, )
)
Appellant-Defendant, )
)
vs. ) No. 49A02-1404-CR-241
)
STATE OF INDIANA, )
)
Appellee-Plaintiff. )
APPEAL FROM THE MARION SUPERIOR COURT
The Honorable Christina Klineman, Judge Pro-Tempore
Cause No. 49F10-1306-CM-29704
November 3, 2014
MEMORANDUM DECISION - NOT FOR PUBLICATION
BRADFORD, Judge
CASE SUMMARY
Brent Darden has been romantically involved and has daughters with both Latina
Wade and Appellant-Defendant Kelli Greene. On April 14, 2013, Greene was involved in an
altercation with Wade. During the altercation, Greene hit, bit, and punched Wade. As a
result of the altercation, on June 12, 2013, Appellee-Plaintiff the State of Indiana (the
“State”) charged Greene with Class A misdemeanor battery.
On February 24, 2014, the trial court conducted a bench trial. Greene did not dispute
during trial that she had been involved in an altercation with Wade on April 14, 2013.
Greene argued, however, that Wade was the instigator of and aggressor during the altercation
and that she merely acted in self-defense. Contrary to Greene’s assertion, Wade testified that
Greene was the instigator of and aggressor during the altercation. At the conclusion of trial,
the trial court found Greene guilty as charged. The trial court subsequently sentenced Greene
to 365 days of imprisonment, with credit for time served and the remainder suspended to
probation. On appeal, Greene contends that the evidence is insufficient to sustain her
conviction because the State failed to rebut her claim of self-defense. Concluding that the
evidence presented by the State was sufficient to sustain Greene’s conviction and to rebut her
claim of self-defense, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
The facts most favorable to the judgment of the trial court are as follows: Wade and
Darden have a daughter together. As of April of 2013, Wade and Darden did not have
contact with each other and “had not been talking for about a year.” Tr. p. 20. When Darden
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exercised visitation with his and Wade’s then seven-year-old daughter, Wade would make
arrangements to drop her daughter off with members of Darden’s family. Wade would also
make arrangements with members of Darden’s family to pick up her daughter at the end of
the visitation period. At the time of the altercation, Darden and Greene were involved in a
romantic relationship. Darden and Greene also have a daughter together.
Darden and Greene held a birthday party for their daughter’s first birthday during the
afternoon or early evening hours of April 14, 2013. Later that day, Wade, a registered nurse,
went to Darden’s mother’s residence to pick up her daughter. Wade and Darden’s mother,
Carol, had previously arranged that Wade would do so. When Wade arrived at Carol’s
residence, Wade saw Greene. Greene was standing “in the only parking space that [Wade]
could pull in.” Tr. p. 13. Wade also saw her daughter standing on the porch of the residence.
When Wade got out of her vehicle to tell her daughter to “come on,” tr. p. 14, Greene
displayed an angry demeanor, “came up to [Wade’s] car,” and started yelling. Tr. p. 15.
Darden “also came to [Wade’s] car.” Tr. p. 15. Greene and Darden “started pushing [Wade]
towards [her] car.” Tr. p. 15. After Wade asked “what’s going on,” Greene and Darden
responded “this is what you get, this is what you deserve” and attacked Wade. Tr. p. 15.
Greene and Darden grabbed, pushed, and hit Wade. When Wade and Greene fell to
the ground, Darden “held [Wade]’s legs while [Greene] was on top of [her].” Tr. p. 17.
Wade attempted to get up. When Wade tried to get back into her vehicle, Greene attacked
her again. Wade described the altercation as going “back and forth” with both Greene and
Darden attacking her. Tr. p. 17. Darden went to the passenger side of Wade’s vehicle and
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held her wrists while Greene “was on top of” Wade, hitting, biting, and punching her. Tr. p.
17. Greene was on top of Wade when Officer Katrina Robinson arrived at the scene. Officer
Robinson then “got [Greene] off the top of [Wade].” Tr. p. 17. Wade, who “was exhausted”
after completing a twelve hour shift, “just wanted to get [her] daughter” and “didn’t know
what the problem was.” Tr. p. 16. As a result of the altercation, Wade suffered pain,
bruising, and scratches.
On June 12, 2013, the State charged Greene with Class A misdemeanor battery. On
February 24, 2014, the trial court conducted a bench trial. During trial, both Greene and
Wade testified. Wade testified that Greene initiated the altercation, while Greene testified
that she acted in self-defense. At the conclusion of the presentation of evidence, the trial
court found Greene guilty. The trial court subsequently sentenced Greene to 365 days of
imprisonment, with credit for time served and the remainder suspended to probation. This
appeal follows.
DISCUSSION AND DECISION
Greene contends that the evidence is insufficient to sustain her conviction for Class A
misdemeanor battery.
When reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence to support a conviction,
appellate courts must consider only the probative evidence and reasonable
inferences supporting the verdict. It is the fact-finder’s role, not that of
appellate courts, to assess witness credibility and weigh the evidence to
determine whether it is sufficient to support a conviction. To preserve this
structure, when appellate courts are confronted with conflicting evidence, they
must consider it most favorably to the trial court’s ruling. Appellate courts
affirm the conviction unless no reasonable fact-finder could find the elements
of the crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt. It is therefore not necessary
that the evidence overcome every reasonable hypothesis of innocence. The
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evidence is sufficient if an inference may reasonably be drawn from it to
support the verdict.
Drane v. State, 867 N.E.2d 144, 146-47 (Ind. 2007) (citations, emphasis, and quotations
omitted). “In essence, we assess only whether the verdict could be reached based on
reasonable inferences that may be drawn from the evidence presented.” Baker v. State, 968
N.E.2d 227, 229 (Ind. 2012) (emphasis in original). Upon review, appellate courts do not
reweigh the evidence or assess the credibility of the witnesses. Stewart v. State, 768 N.E.2d
433, 435 (Ind. 2002).
On the date in question, the offense of battery was governed by Indiana Code section
35-43-1-2, which provided, in relevant part, that “(a) A person who knowingly or
intentionally touches another person in a rude, insolent, or angry manner commits battery, a
Class B misdemeanor. However, the offense is: (1) a Class A misdemeanor if: (A) it results
in bodily injury to any other person.” “A person engages in conduct ‘knowingly’ if, when he
engages in the conduct, he is aware of a high probability that he is doing so.” Ind. Code §
35-41-2-2(b). “A person engages in conduct ‘intentionally’ if, when he engages in the
conduct, it is his conscious objective to do so.” Ind. Code § 35-41-2-2(a).
In arguing that the evidence is insufficient to sustain her conviction, Greene contends
that the State failed to provide sufficient evidence to rebut her claim of self-defense.
“Self-defense is recognized as a valid justification for an otherwise criminal
act.” Miller v. State, 720 N.E.2d 696, 699 (Ind. 1999). The elements of self-
defense are defined by statute:
A person is justified in using reasonable force against another
person to protect himself or a third person from what he
reasonably believes to be the imminent use of unlawful force.
However, a person is justified in using deadly force only if he
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reasonably believes that that force is necessary to prevent
serious bodily injury to himself....
Ind. Code § 35-41-3-2(a). Force is not justified if the defendant enters into
combat with another person or is the initial aggressor, unless the defendant
communicates an intent to withdraw and the other person nevertheless
continues or threatens to continue unlawful action. Ind. Code § 35-41-3-
2(d)(3).
Essentially, self-defense is established if a defendant: (1) was in a place
where the defendant had a right to be; (2) did not provoke, instigate, or
participate willingly in the violence; and (3) had a reasonable fear of death or
great bodily harm. See Wallace v. State, 725 N.E.2d 837, 840 (Ind. 2000);
Jordan v. State, 656 N.E.2d 816, 817 (Ind. 1995). The State carries the burden
of disproving self-defense. Brown v. State, 738 N.E.2d 271, 273 (Ind. 2000).
Thus, once a defendant claims self-defense, the State bears the burden of
disproving at least one of the elements beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. The
State may meet its burden of proof by rebutting the defense directly, by
affirmatively showing that the defendant did not act in self-defense, or by
simply relying upon the sufficiency of its evidence in chief. Id.
Brand v. State, 766 N.E.2d 772, 777 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002).
In the instant matter, the State, relying on the sufficiency of its evidence in chief,
sufficiently rebutted Greene’s claim of self-defense. In support of her self-defense claim,
Greene testified that during the early evening hours of April 14, 2013, she was standing
outside Carol’s residence smoking a cigarette when Wade pulled her vehicle into the
driveway. Greene claimed that Wade’s vehicle was traveling at a high rate of speed and that
she had to jump out of the way to avoid being hit by Wade’s vehicle. Greene claimed that
she and Wade then exchanged words, after which Wade hit Greene in the left eye with a
closed fist.
Wade, however, testified that she did not touch Greene first. Specifically, Wade
testified that shortly after she arrived at Carol’s residence, Greene and Darden began to grab,
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push, and hit her. At some point she and Greene fell to the ground, after which Darden “held
[her] legs while [Greene] was on top of [her].” Tr. p. 17. When Wade tried to get back into
her vehicle, Greene attacked her again. Wade described the altercation as going “back and
forth” with both Greene and Darden attacking her. Tr. p. 17. Darden went to the passenger
side of Wade’s vehicle and held her wrists while Greene “was on top of” Wade, hitting,
biting, and punching her. Tr. p. 17. Greene was on top of Wade when officers arrived and
“got [Greene] off the top of [Wade]. Tr. p. 17. Wade further testified that while she did
attempt to defend herself and push Greene off of her, she did not hit Greene.
Consistent with Wade’s testimony, Officer Robinson testified that when she arrived at
the scene, she observed Greene “on top of [Wade], and they were both in [Wade’s] vehicle.”
Tr. p. 36. Even after Officer Robinson separated Wade and Greene, Greene remained very
agitated and continued to attempt to provoke Wade. Specifically, Officer Robinson testified
that Greene again approached Wade and began yelling at her when Officer Robinson briefly
returned to her vehicle.
It is well-established that the trial court, acting as the trier-of-fact, was free to believe
or disbelieve the varying accounts regarding the altercation and to weigh said testimony
accordingly. See Thompson v. State, 804 N.E.2d 1146, 1149 (Ind. 2004); McClendon v.
State, 671 N.E.2d 486, 488 (Ind. Ct. App. 1996); Moore v. State, 637 N.E.2d 816, 822 (Ind.
Ct. App. 1994), trans. denied. The guilty finding indicates that the trial court found Wade’s
account of the altercation to be more believable. Again, Wade’s testimony, as corroborated
by Officer Robinson, demonstrates that Greene was the instigator of and aggressor during the
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altercation. As such, we conclude that Wade’s testimony is sufficient to both prove that
Greene committed the charged offense and to rebut Greene’s claim of self-defense. Greene’s
claim to the contrary effectively amounts to an invitation for this court to reweigh the
evidence, which we will not do. See Stewart, 768 N.E.2d at 435.
The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
BARNES, J., and BROWN, J., concur.
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