Alexander Zschunke v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.) ( 2018 )


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  • MEMORANDUM DECISION
    Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D),
    this Memorandum Decision shall not be                                         FILED
    regarded as precedent or cited before any                                Nov 07 2018, 8:59 am
    court except for the purpose of establishing                                  CLERK
    Indiana Supreme Court
    the defense of res judicata, collateral                                      Court of Appeals
    and Tax Court
    estoppel, or the law of the case.
    ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT                                  ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
    Gregory Bowes                                           Curtis T. Hill, Jr.
    Greg Bowes Legal Services, P.C.                         Attorney General
    Nashville, Indiana
    Matthew B. Mackenzie
    Deputy Attorney General
    Indianapolis, Indiana
    IN THE
    COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
    Alexander Zschunke,                                     November 7, 2018
    Appellant-Defendant,                                    Court of Appeals Case No.
    18A-CR-902
    v.                                              Appeal from the Brown Circuit
    Court
    State of Indiana,                                       The Honorable Judith A. Stewart,
    Appellee-Plaintiff                                      Judge
    Trial Court Cause No.
    07C01-1709-F5-578
    Crone, Judge.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-CR-902 | November 7, 2018                   Page 1 of 14
    Case Summary
    [1]   Alexander Zschunke appeals his convictions for level 5 felony possession of
    methamphetamine, level 6 felony unlawful possession of a syringe, and class C
    misdemeanor possession of paraphernalia, and his adjudication as a habitual
    offender. He argues that the trial court’s denial of his motion to exclude
    evidence that the State disclosed the day before trial was improper because it
    forced him to choose between a speedy trial and a fair trial. He also challenges
    the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his convictions. We conclude that he
    abandoned his speedy trial request, he received a fair trial, and the evidence is
    sufficient to support his convictions. Therefore, we affirm.
    Facts and Procedural History
    [2]   The facts supporting the verdicts show that on September 21, 2017, at
    approximately 8:07 a.m., Nashville Police Officer Tim True was dispatched to
    a private parking lot on Old School Way regarding a suspicious silver Blazer.
    Officer True, who was not in uniform, parked his car away from the lot and
    walked south on Old School Way. As he passed the parking lot, he observed a
    man, later identified as Zschunke leaning in the Blazer’s passenger-side front
    window. Zschunke was wearing a red hat, a red t-shirt, khaki pants, black
    shoes, and a black backpack. Officer True continued walking to a public
    restroom just south of the parking lot. He attempted to enter the restroom, but
    the door was locked. He walked back north on Old School Way and observed
    Zschunke talking to the driver of the Blazer. Officer True saw Nashville Police
    Chief Ben Seastrom pull up to the parking lot guard house. He also saw
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-CR-902 | November 7, 2018   Page 2 of 14
    Zschunke, wearing the black backpack, walk south toward Pittman House
    Lane, which is across from the public restroom. Tr. Vol. 3 at 79.1 Chief
    Seastrom and Officer True spoke to two of the Blazer’s occupants, who
    provided information leading to Zschunke’s identification. Id. at 81.
    [3]   After the Blazer departed, the officers remained in the parking lot, and Chief
    Seastrom saw a man wearing a red hat and red shirt, but without a black
    backpack, walk from Pittman House Lane toward the public restroom and go
    inside. Id. 154. Officer True walked toward Pittman House Lane. Chief
    Seastrom remained in the parking lot and while there did not see anyone else go
    in or out of the public restroom.
    [4]   As Officer True walked toward Pittman Lane, he observed the restroom
    attendant, whom he knew, exit the mechanical room between the men’s and
    women’s restrooms, get in her car, and drive away. It was the attendant’s habit
    to clean the bathrooms, empty the trash cans, and replace the trash can liners in
    the evening, and open the restroom in the mornings between 8:15 and 9:00 a.m.
    Officer True also observed a truck pull in and “[s]omebody exit[] the truck,
    walk[] towards the restrooms and then moments later walk[] back and [leave] in
    the truck.” Id. at 106.2 Officer True did not see whether that individual went in
    the restroom. Id. at 115, 122. Officer True walked down Pittman House Lane
    1
    The transcript volumes are paginated separately as required by Indiana Appellate Rules Appendix A, but
    the table of contents does not reflect the separate pagination.
    2
    It is not clear from the transcript where the truck pulled in or where the individual walked because Officer
    True showed the jury these locations by pointing at a map. Tr. Vol. 3 at 107.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-CR-902 | November 7, 2018                    Page 3 of 14
    away from the restroom and discovered a black backpack under a bench near
    the road. While on Pittman House Lane, Officer True estimated that he lost
    visual contact with the public restroom for two or three minutes. Id. at 87.
    [5]   Chief Seastrom drove his vehicle to Pittman House Lane and met Officer True
    near the bench. Id. at 86. Brown County Sheriff’s Department Officer Andrew
    Eggebrecht also arrived to assist. Officer True walked to the restroom to verify
    whether Zschunke was inside. Chief Seastrom estimated that five or six
    minutes passed between the time he lost sight of the restroom and when Officer
    True walked back to the restroom. Id. at 156. Chief Seastrom and Officer
    Eggebrecht opened the black backpack and discovered a digital scale with a
    white powder on it, clothing, hygiene items, and sunglasses.3 Id. at 108, 156-7.
    Based on his training and experience, Officer Eggebrecht believed that the
    powder’s color and consistency were consistent with methamphetamine. Id. at
    200. They returned all the items to the backpack and took it to Chief
    Seastrom’s truck, from which they could observe the public restroom and wait
    for Officer True. Id. at 159. While waiting, they did not see anyone go in or
    out of the restroom. Id. at 160.
    [6]   Meanwhile, Officer True entered the restroom and observed a person in the first
    stall wearing khaki pants and black tennis shoes. Officer True washed and
    dried his hands and returned to Chief Seastrom and Officer Eggebrecht. About
    3
    The State asserts that Zschunke’s ID was found in his black backpack, but the record does not support that
    assertion. Tr. Vol. 3 at 166-67, 168-70.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-CR-902 | November 7, 2018                 Page 4 of 14
    eight to ten minutes later, they saw Zschunke come out of the bathroom
    wearing a black shirt and khaki pants and no hat.4 Id. at 106. Officer True
    called to Zschunke to come over to the officers, and he complied. Id. at 89.
    The officers observed that Zschunke was “sweating profusely,” and at
    Zschunke’s trial Officer True testified that increased body temperature is an
    early sign of methamphetamine use. Id. at 128, 161.
    [7]   While Zschunke remained with Chief Seastrom, Officer True returned to the
    restroom and observed a red hat on the counter and a black and gray bandana
    on the toilet paper dispenser in the bathroom stall that had been previously
    occupied. Officer True testified that bandanas are often used as tourniquets to
    expose veins. Id. at 91. Officer True also discovered “an alcohol prep pad” and
    an orange syringe cap in the trash can and two bags of syringes and sharps
    (needles) containers underneath the trash can liner. Id. at 92-93. The single
    orange syringe cap matched the orange syringe caps in the bags. One of the
    bags of syringes was opened; it was missing some syringes and contained
    another clear plastic bag with a crystal. Testing revealed that the crystal was
    3.22 grams of methamphetamine. Id. at 96.
    [8]   The State charged Zschunke with level 5 felony possession of
    methamphetamine, level 6 felony unlawful possession of a syringe, and class C
    misdemeanor possession of paraphernalia, and alleged that he was a habitual
    offender. On December 1, 2017, Zschunke filed a motion for an early trial
    4
    Officer True believed that the red shirt was in one of Zschunke’s pants pockets. Tr. Vol. 3 at 113.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-CR-902 | November 7, 2018                     Page 5 of 14
    pursuant to Indiana Criminal Rule 4(B), and the trial court issued an order
    granting his motion and setting his trial for February 21, 2018. The date was
    outside the seventy-day period provided by Criminal Rule 4(B), but Zschunke
    did not object.
    [9]   From February 21-23, 2018, Zschunke’s jury trial was held. The day before
    trial, the prosecutor became aware of 172 recordings of Zschunke’s jail
    conversations and notified Zschunke’s attorney. On the morning of trial,
    Zschunke filed a motion in limine to exclude the recorded conversations. The
    trial court held a preliminary hearing, at which Zschunke argued that the
    recordings should be excluded because he did not know what was in the
    recordings and had not had a chance to prepare any defense. Tr. Vol. 2 at 31.
    The prosecutor explained that he had not yet listened to the recordings, but that
    Brown County Sheriff’s Department Detective Paul Henderson had informed
    him that they revealed Zschunke taking ownership of the black backpack and
    attempting to coordinate the testimony of witnesses. The prosecutor argued
    that the recordings were newly discovered evidence and that, barring
    malfeasance, the appropriate remedy was a continuance rather than exclusion
    of the evidence. Id. at 33-34. The trial court offered either to continue the trial
    to allow Zschunke additional time to respond to the recordings, or if Zschunke
    was confident that he did not want a continuance, “they could get started and
    address admissibility of different aspects of it when it’s offered.” Id. at 65-66.
    Zschunke decided to go forward with trial. Id. at 66. He was afforded an
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-CR-902 | November 7, 2018   Page 6 of 14
    opportunity to question Detective Henderson, listen to the recordings, and
    make objections. Only portions of two conversations were ultimately admitted.
    [10]   The jury found Zschunke guilty as charged and that he was a habitual offender.
    The trial court sentenced him to an aggregate term of ten years. This appeal
    ensued.
    Discussion and Decision
    Section 1 – Zschunke was not forced to choose between a
    speedy trial and a fair trial.
    [11]   Zschunke contends that the trial court’s denial of his motion to exclude the
    evidence of his recorded jail conversations improperly forced him to choose
    between a speedy trial and a fair trial. As for any speedy trial rights, we note
    that Zschunke filed his motion for an early trial pursuant to Indiana Criminal
    Rule 4(B), which provides, “If any defendant held in jail on an indictment or an
    affidavit shall move for an early trial, he shall be discharged if not brought to
    trial within seventy (70) calendar days from the date of such motion.”
    Zschunke concedes that the seventy-day period ended February 9, 2018, and he
    did not object when the trial court set the trial date outside that period. It is
    well established that a defendant’s failure to object to a trial setting outside the
    seventy-day period constitutes an abandonment of the request for a speedy trial.
    See McKay v. State, 
    714 N.E.2d 1182
    , 1189 (Ind. Ct. App. 1999) (“McKay’s
    failure to object to the trial setting … ten days beyond the seventy-day period,
    … constituted an abandonment of his request for a speedy trial.”); Townsend v.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-CR-902 | November 7, 2018   Page 7 of 14
    State, 
    673 N.E.2d 503
    , 506 (Ind. Ct. App. 1996) (defendant abandoned early
    trial motion by failing to object to trial setting scheduled just one day outside
    seventy-day period); James v. State, 
    622 N.E.2d 1303
    , 1306 (Ind. Ct. App. 1993)
    (same). Accordingly, we conclude that Zschunke abandoned his request for a
    speedy trial by acquiescing to the setting of the trial beyond the seventy-day
    limit.
    [12]   Even if we were to conclude that Zschunke did not abandon his speedy trial
    request, we are unpersuaded that he was deprived of a fair trial. We observe
    that
    [t]rial courts have broad discretion in dealing with discovery
    violations by the State in the alleged late disclosure of evidence to
    the defense. We may reverse the manner in which the trial court
    deals with such an alleged violation only for an abuse of that
    discretion involving clear error and resulting prejudice.
    Alcantar v. State, 
    70 N.E.3d 353
    , 356 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016). Generally, “the
    proper remedy for a discovery violation is a continuance.” Warren v. State, 
    725 N.E.2d 828
    , 832 (Ind. 2000). However, “exclusion of evidence may be
    appropriate where the violation ‘has been flagrant and deliberate, or so
    misleading or in such bad faith as to impair the right of fair trial.’” Dye v. State,
    
    717 N.E.2d 5
    , 11 (Ind. 1999) (quoting Kindred v. State, 
    524 N.E.2d 279
    , 287
    (Ind. 1988)), cert. denied (2000).
    [13]   Zschunke did not argue to the trial court, nor does he argue on appeal, that the
    State flagrantly or deliberately violated the discovery rules. Further, Zschunke
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-CR-902 | November 7, 2018   Page 8 of 14
    cannot show that his right to a fair trial was impaired. Out of the presence of
    the jury, Zschunke was given the opportunity to cross-examine Detective
    Henderson and listen to the recorded conversations. Ultimately, only portions
    of two conversations were admitted, and on appeal Zschunke draws our
    attention solely to the September 25, 2017 conversation, during which he states
    that his backpack was seized as evidence. However, the only objection to this
    evidence that Zschunke’s counsel raised at trial was that it was cumulative of
    other evidence. Tr. Vol. 3 at 246. Because the evidence was cumulative,
    Zschunke suffered no prejudice. See Iqbal v. State, 
    805 N.E.2d 401
    , 406 (Ind. Ct.
    App. 2004) (“Any error caused by the admission of evidence is harmless error
    for which we will not reverse a conviction if the erroneously admitted evidence
    was cumulative of other evidence appropriately admitted.”). We find no abuse
    of discretion in the trial court’s denial of Zschunke’s motion to exclude
    evidence regarding the recordings of his jail conversations.
    Section 2 – The evidence is sufficient to support Zschunke’s
    convictions.
    [14]   Zschunke challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting all three
    convictions. In reviewing a claim of insufficient evidence, we do not reweigh
    the evidence or judge the credibility of witnesses, and we consider only the
    evidence that supports the verdict and the reasonable inferences arising
    therefrom. Bailey v. State, 
    907 N.E.2d 1003
    , 1005 (Ind. 2009). “We will affirm
    if there is substantial evidence of probative value such that a reasonable trier of
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-CR-902 | November 7, 2018   Page 9 of 14
    fact could have concluded the defendant was guilty beyond a reasonable
    doubt.” 
    Id.
    [15]   We begin by addressing Zschunke’s convictions for possession of
    methamphetamine and unlawful possession of a syringe because one of
    Zschunke’s sufficiency claims applies to both. To convict Zschunke of level 5
    felony possession of methamphetamine, the State was required to prove beyond
    a reasonable doubt that he knowingly or intentionally possessed
    methamphetamine within five hundred feet of school property. 
    Ind. Code § 35
    -
    48-4-6.1(a), -(b)(2). To convict Zschunke of level 6 felony unlawful possession
    of a syringe, the State was required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he
    knowingly with intent to violate the Indiana Legend Drug Act or an offense
    described in Indiana Code Chapter 35-48-4 possessed or had under his control a
    hypodermic syringe. 
    Ind. Code § 16-42-19-18
    (a), -(b). Zschunke argues that the
    State failed to prove the element of possession beyond a reasonable doubt.
    Specifically, he argues that the State failed to prove that he was the person who
    left the methamphetamine and syringes in the restroom.
    [16]   The evidence shows that the restroom attendant cleaned the restrooms, emptied
    the trash cans, and replaced the trash can liner in the evening and unlocked the
    restrooms between 8:15 and 9:00 in the morning. When Officer True first went
    to the restroom, it was locked. Chief Seastrom saw Zschunke enter the
    restroom. Officer True saw the restroom attendant leave the janitor’s room, get
    in her car, and depart. This supports a reasonable inference that Zschunke
    entered the restroom shortly after it was opened and that the trash can was
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-CR-902 | November 7, 2018   Page 10 of 14
    empty at that time. Chief Seastrom watched the restroom for two or three
    minutes and did not see anyone go in or out. Officer True returned to the
    restroom and observed a person wearing Zschunke’s tan pants and black shoes
    in the only occupied bathroom stall. Officer True then joined Chief Seastrom
    and Officer Eggebrecht, and they waited within clear view of the restroom,
    during which time no one entered or exited. Tr. Vol. 3 at 88, 159. When
    Zschunke did exit, he was antsy and “sweating profusely,” which Officer True
    recognized as a sign of methamphetamine use. Id. at 128. After Zschunke
    exited, Officer True discovered a gray and black bandana in the stall Zschunke
    had occupied, his red hat on the counter, and an alcohol swab, two packages of
    syringes, sharps containers, and methamphetamine in the trash can. From this
    evidence, a reasonable trier of fact could have concluded that Zschunke put the
    methamphetamine and syringes in the trash can.
    [17]   Nevertheless, Zschunke directs us to evidence that the police did not have the
    restroom in sight from anywhere between two to six minutes and that Officer
    True at one point observed a man in a red pickup truck drive up to the restroom
    and walk toward the restroom. According to Zschunke, the State failed to
    exclude the reasonable hypothesis that the man in the red truck placed the
    contraband in the trash can. However, the jury was instructed, “In
    determining whether the guilt of the accused is proven beyond a reasonable
    doubt, you should require that the proof be so conclusive and sure as to exclude
    every reasonable theory of innocence.” Appellant’s App. Vol. 2 at 84. The jury
    heard the evidence and determined that Zschunke’s hypothesis was not
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-CR-902 | November 7, 2018   Page 11 of 14
    reasonable. Zschunke conflates the standard that the jury is required to apply in
    determining guilt at trial with the standard this Court applies in determining the
    sufficiency of the evidence on appeal. See Drane v. State, 
    867 N.E.2d 144
    , 147
    (Ind. 2007) (In reviewing sufficiency of evidence to support conviction, “[i]t is
    … not necessary that the evidence ‘overcome every reasonable hypothesis of
    innocence.’”) (quoting Moore v. State, 
    652 N.E.2d 53
    , 55 (Ind. 1995)). His
    argument is merely a request to reweigh the evidence, which we must decline.
    [18]   Regarding his unlawful possession of a syringe conviction, Zschunke also
    argues that the State failed to prove that he possessed the syringe with the intent
    to violate the Indiana Legend Drug Act or an offense described in Indiana Code
    Chapter 35-48-4. Zschunke contends that the State failed to determine whether
    he had track marks on his arms and used no fingerprint or DNA analysis to tie
    the syringes to him. In Berkhardt v. State, 
    82 N.E.3d 313
    , 317 (Ind. Ct. App.
    2017), another panel of this Court reviewed our case law regarding sufficient
    evidence of unlawful intent and observed, “Cases in which courts have found
    sufficient evidence of unlawful intent generally include evidence of prior
    narcotics convictions; admissions to drug use; the presence of illegal drugs or
    drug residue on the paraphernalia; track marks on the defendant’s arms or
    hands; or withdrawal symptoms showing recent drug use.” Here, there was an
    opened bag of syringes; syringes were missing from the bag, and there was
    methamphetamine in the bag. A single orange cap that matched that of the
    bagged syringes was found in the trash can, indicating that a syringe had been
    used and discarded. There was a bandana in the bathroom stall occupied by
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-CR-902 | November 7, 2018   Page 12 of 14
    Zschunke, which could have been used as a tourniquet to inject drugs, and
    Zschunke exhibited signs of methamphetamine use when he exited the
    restroom. From this evidence, a reasonable jury could conclude that Zschunke
    possessed the syringes with the intent to use them unlawfully.
    [19]   Last, we address Zschunke’s conviction for class C misdemeanor possession of
    paraphernalia. To convict Zschunke of that crime, the State was required to
    prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he knowingly or intentionally possessed
    an instrument, device, or object used for testing the strength, effectiveness, or
    purity of a controlled substance. 
    Ind. Code § 35-48-4-8
    .3(b)(2); Appellant’s
    App. Vol. 2 at 47. The offense encompasses knowing or intentional possession
    of an instrument, device, or object used to measure the weight of a controlled
    substance for purchase. McIlquham v. State, 
    992 N.E.2d 904
    , 911 (Ind. Ct. App.
    2013), aff’d in relevant part, 
    10 N.E.3d 506
    , 510-11 (Ind. 2014). Zschunke
    contends that the State failed to identify the powder on the digital scale, and
    therefore failed to prove that the scale was intended to be used with a controlled
    substance. He notes that Chief Seastrom attempted to conduct a field test on
    the powder to determine whether it was methamphetamine but was unable to
    gather a sufficient sample. Tr. Vol. 3 at 179. He also asserts that the State may
    have contaminated the scale and confused the source of the powder because at
    some point Officer True used the scale to weigh the crystal from the open
    syringe bag recovered from the restroom trash can. Id. at 109.5 We easily
    5
    The record does not indicate exactly when Officer True used the digital scale.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-CR-902 | November 7, 2018      Page 13 of 14
    dispense with his second assertion because the digital scale had white powder
    on it when Chief Seastrom and Officer Eggebrecht initially took it from the
    backpack, which was before Officer True even discovered the crystal. As to the
    identity of the white powder, Officer Eggebrecht testified that it had a texture
    and consistency that was consistent with methamphetamine, and significantly,
    Zschunke possessed methamphetamine and an open package of syringes and
    showed physical symptoms of methamphetamine use. Therefore, the State
    introduced evidence from which a reasonable jury could conclude that
    Zschunke used the digital scale to weigh his methamphetamine. Based on the
    foregoing, we conclude that Zschunke’s convictions are supported by sufficient
    evidence. Accordingly, we affirm.
    [20]   Affirmed.
    Najam, J., and Pyle, J., concur.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-CR-902 | November 7, 2018   Page 14 of 14
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 18A-CR-902

Filed Date: 11/7/2018

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 11/7/2018