James E. Chalfant v. Lana Lods , 994 N.E.2d 740 ( 2013 )

FOR PUBLICATION
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT: ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE:
JON R. PACTOR CHRISTINE A. DESANCTIS
Indianapolis, Indiana Lafayette, Indiana
IN THE Aug 13 2013, 7:17 am
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
JAMES E. CHALFANT, )
)
Appellant-Plaintiff, )
)
vs. ) No. 79A02-1212-CT-986
)
LANA LODS, )
)
Appellee-Defendant. )
APPEAL FROM THE TIPPECANOE SUPERIOR COURT
The Honorable Thomas H. Busch, Judge
Cause No. 79D02-1008-CT-32
August 13, 2013
OPINION - FOR PUBLICATION
BARTEAU, Senior Judge
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
James E. Chalfant appeals the trial court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of
Lana Lods upon his complaint for malicious prosecution. We reverse and remand.
ISSUE
Chalfant raises two issues, one of which we find dispositive and restate as:
whether the trial court erred in granting summary judgment to Lods.1
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Pursuant to our standard of review, the facts most favorable to Chalfant are as
follows. Chalfant and Lods married in 2000, and two children were born during the
marriage. Lods filed for divorce in June 2007, and she had possession of the marital
home during the divorce. Chalfant and Lods disagreed on custody arrangements for the
children. Both parties agreed to joint legal custody, but Lods wanted sole physical
custody, subject to visitation by Chalfant. By contrast, Chalfant wanted joint physical
custody with Lods.
On August 14, 2007, Chalfant, Lods, and the children spent the day undergoing a
custody assessment in Brown County. The parties agreed that Chalfant would drive the
children back to Lods’s home while Lods drove home separately. Lods told Chalfant not
to buy any toys because one of the children had misbehaved that day. Despite her
request, he bought toys for the children on the way back to Lods’s home.
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Chalfant also claims that the trial court erred by denying his requests to strike portions of affidavits Lods
designated in support of her motion for summary judgment. It is unnecessary to address this claim due to
the manner in which we resolve this appeal.
2
When Chalfant brought the children to Lods’s home, the children went inside.
Lods learned from them that Chalfant had bought toys. She became upset and
approached his car. Lods “verbally attacked” Chalfant. Appellant’s App. p. 70. Next,
she reached into his car, grabbed a file of papers, and threw the papers into the driveway.
As Chalfant picked up the papers, Lods kicked him. Chalfant “defended himself”
without striking, kicking, or choking her, until she calmed down. Id. Chalfant did not
see any sign of injury on Lods, and he left. Later, a friend of Lods went to the residence
with pizza. Lods told her friend about the incident with Chalfant. They searched her
driveway and found an earring.
On the next morning, August 15, Chalfant returned to the marital home because
one of the children was preparing to leave for the first day of kindergarten. Chalfant had
previously informed Lods he wanted to be present, and she did not direct him to stay
away. Chalfant took photographs of their child and left. Lods and Chalfant did not
quarrel, and he saw no signs of injury on Lods.
After Chalfant left, Lods called the police to report that Chalfant had battered her
on the previous day. She also requested a protective order.2 A police officer interviewed
Lods. Lods told the officer that on August 14, she and Chalfant had a verbal altercation
at the residence regarding whether she would grant him “50% child visitation rights.” Id.
at 33. Lods further stated that when she refused to sign a settlement agreement, Chalfant
grabbed her by the neck, lifted her off the ground, and said he would “f*****g kill her” if
2
Although the trial court’s judgment states that Lods obtained a protective order, the record on appeal
does not reflect whether that actually occurred.
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she did not sign the papers. Id. In addition, she told the officer that her neck hurt and her
lip bled as a result of Chalfant’s attack, but the officer did not note in the report that he
independently observed any injuries.
Also on August 15, custody evaluator Theresa Slayton interviewed Lods. Slayton
observed that Lods had a cut lip and a bruise on her right temple. Lods told Slayton that
on the previous day, August 14, she became angry at Chalfant over the toys, threw his
file of papers onto the driveway, and kicked him. Next, Lods told Slayton that Chalfant
choked her, said that he wanted to kill her, and pulled her earrings out of her ears.
On August 17, a detective spoke with Lods about her prior police interview. She
reviewed and corrected the initial police report at that time, stating that Chalfant had
shouted “I want to f*****g kill you for not signing” as he choked her. Id.
On August 20, Lods called Chalfant to ask him to come to her home. At her
request, he moved furniture around inside the house to minimize flood damage from a
storm. No disputes occurred.
On August 28, the State charged Chalfant with strangulation, a Class D felony,
intimidation, a Class D felony, and two counts of domestic battery, one as a Class D
felony and one as a Class A misdemeanor. The charges were based upon the officers’
interviews with Lods. The case was tried to a jury in June 2008, and Lods testified for
the State. The jury determined that Chalfant was not guilty of any of the charges.
The current case began when Chalfant sued Lods, alleging malicious prosecution.
Lods filed a motion for summary judgment. Chalfant filed a response and also asked the
court to strike portions of affidavits that Lods had designated in support of her motion.
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After oral argument, the court granted Lods’s motion, determining that Chalfant had
failed to establish a dispute of material fact as to whether the criminal case against him
was unsupported by probable cause. The court did not rule upon Chalfant’s requests to
strike. This appeal followed.
DISCUSSION AND DECISION
Chalfant argues that the trial court should not have granted summary judgment to
Lods because he established a dispute of material fact regarding the lack of probable
cause for criminal charges.
When reviewing the entry or denial of summary judgment, our standard of review
is the same as that of the trial court: summary judgment is appropriate only where there
is no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a
matter of law. Ind. Trial Rule 56(C); Dreaded, Inc. v. St. Paul Guardian Ins. Co., 904
N.E.2d 1267, 1269-70 (Ind. 2009). All facts established by the designated evidence and
reasonable inferences drawn from those facts are construed in favor of the nonmoving
party. Naugle v. Beech Grove City Sch., 864 N.E.2d 1058, 1062 (Ind. 2007). We
therefore do not resolve issues of fact on appeal; rather, we determine if the designated
materials establish that there are issues of material fact.
The essence of malicious prosecution rests on the notion that the plaintiff has been
improperly subjected to legal process. Ziobron v. Crawford, 667 N.E.2d 202, 208 (Ind.
1996), trans. denied. A plaintiff must prove the following four elements: (1) the
defendant instituted or caused to be instituted a prosecution against the plaintiff; (2) the
defendant acted with malice in doing so; (3) the prosecution was instituted without
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probable cause; and (4) the prosecution was terminated in the plaintiff’s favor. Waldrip
v. Waldrip, 976 N.E.2d 102, 116-17 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012).
The determination of probable cause is normally an issue of fact for the jury’s
determination. Exec. Builders, Inc. v. Trisler, 741 N.E.2d 351, 357 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000),
trans. denied. A judicial determination of probable cause in a criminal proceeding
constitutes prima facie evidence of probable cause in a subsequent suit for malicious
prosecution. Lazarus Dep’t Store v. Sutherlin, 544 N.E.2d 513, 520 (Ind. Ct. App. 1989),
trans. denied. However, evidence of the judicial determination may be rebutted by
evidence that shows the finding of probable cause was induced by false testimony, fraud,
or other improper means such as the withholding of material facts. Kroger Food Stores,
Inc. v. Clark, 598 N.E.2d 1084, 1089 (Ind. Ct. App. 1992), trans. denied.
Here, the parties agree that the court in Chalfant’s criminal case determined that
probable cause existed for the charges against Chalfant. Thus, the key question is
whether Chalfant provided evidence in this case to rebut the prima facie evidence of
probable cause and to identify a dispute of material fact. We determine that he did. In
response to Lods’s motion for summary judgment, Chalfant designated a detailed
affidavit asserting that on August 14, Lods physically attacked him, and he merely
defended himself without striking, kicking, or choking her. Considering the facts most
favorable to Chalfant, as we must at this stage of the case, then this evidence shows that
Lods presented a false version of events to the police.
In addition, Chalfant took Lods’s deposition during the criminal case. During her
deposition, Lods admitted that after learning that Chalfant had bought toys for the
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children, she approached Chalfant’s car, removed a file of papers, and threw the papers
onto the driveway. Lods had also told Slayton on August 15 that she had thrown
Chalfant’s papers on the driveway and kicked him. Lods did not share this information
with the police during her interviews. She also did not tell the officers that Chalfant went
to the marital home on the morning of August 15 to send their child off to kindergarten,
and that no conflicts arose during that visit. Thus, Lods withheld material information
from the police that was relevant to a determination of probable cause and inconsistent
with the version of events she provided the police.
Furthermore, after Lods called the police and requested a protective order, but
before the State charged Chalfant with the offenses, she asked Chalfant to come to her
home to move furniture around. No disputes occurred. Viewing the facts and all
inferences drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to Chalfant, this evidence tends to
indicate that the events of August 14 did not occur as Lods described them to the officers,
because it is reasonable to infer that she would not have invited him to her house if she
had been attacked by him and was frightened enough to seek a protective order.
Lods’s statements to the officers were the sole basis for the charges against
Chalfant. However, Chalfant’s designated evidence shows that she made false statements
to the officers and omitted material facts. Chalfant has therefore rebutted the
presumption that arose from the prior judicial finding of probable cause and has
established a dispute of material fact as to the lack of probable cause. See Kroger, 598
N.E.2d at 1090 (holding that the plaintiff, claiming malicious prosecution, rebutted a
determination of probable cause in a prior criminal case by establishing that the probable
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cause affidavit in the criminal case was based on a “blatant misrepresentation” and a lack
of corroborating circumstances).
Lods argues that the “exact nature” of the altercation between her and Chalfant is
not a material fact. Appellee’s Br. p. 8. She further argues that Chalfant’s claim of self-
defense does not establish a dispute of material fact because she believes the mere fact
that “there was an argument and a physical altercation,” regardless of who was at fault,
established probable cause for criminal charges. Id. at 9. We cannot agree. If the
version of events that Lods shared with the police is correct, Chalfant may well have
committed crimes. If Chalfant’s version of events is correct, then he did not commit any
crimes but rather passively defended himself from Lods’s physical attacks upon him.
This is a significant point of factual disagreement, and Chalfant’s designated evidence
shows that Lods made false statements to the police and omissions of material fact
sufficient to rebut the judicial determination of probable cause in Chalfant’s criminal
case.
Lods also argues that we should not consider her deposition because: (1) the State
subsequently amended the charging information to correct inaccuracies revealed in the
deposition; and (2) Chalfant could have moved to dismiss the criminal case for lack of
probable cause after the deposition but did not do so. We disagree. Chalfant designated
Lods’s deposition in response to Lods’s motion for summary judgment. Lods did not
object to the designation of the deposition or seek to strike it. Thus, the deposition was
part of the record presented to the trial court, and we may also consider it on appeal.
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We express no opinion on the merits of Chalfant’s complaint. The trial court
stated that its ruling was based, in part, on “Indiana’s public policy which encourages
victims of domestic violence to seek orders of protection,” Appellant’s App. pp. 14-15,
and we share the trial court’s interest in furthering that policy. Nevertheless, another
public policy is also at issue here, specifically ensuring that people submit truthful
complaints to law enforcement. Under the circumstances of this case, Lods is not entitled
to summary judgment because there are disputes of material fact as to Chalfant’s claim.
The parties’ dispute must be submitted to a trier of fact for resolution.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, we reverse the judgment of the trial court and
remand for further proceedings.
Reversed and remanded.
VAIDIK, J., and CRONE, J., concur.
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