Roukaya Ali v. Alliance Home Health Care, LLC, L.J.L. Enterprises, Inc., and Larry J. Logsdon , 53 N.E.3d 420 ( 2016 )

FILED
Mar 24 2016, 9:47 am
CLERK
Indiana Supreme Court
Court of Appeals
and Tax Court
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Swaray Edward Conteh ALLIANCE HOME HEALTH
The Law Office of Swaray Conteh CARE, LLC
Indianapolis, Indiana John D. Papageorge
Jeffrey D. Stemerick
Taft Stettinius & Hollister, LLP
Indianapolis, Indiana
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEES
L.J.L. ENTERPRISES, INC., AND
LARRY J. LOGSDON
John W. Mervilde
Rick D. Meils
William M. Berish
Meils Thompson Dietz & Berish
Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
Roukaya Ali, March 24, 2016
Appellant-Plaintiff, Court of Appeals Case No.
49A02-1507-CT-986
v. Appeal from the Marion Superior
Court
Alliance Home Health Care, The Honorable Cynthia J. Ayers,
LLC, L.J.L. Enterprises, Inc., Judge
and Larry J. Logsdon, Trial Court Cause No.
Appellees-Defendants 49D04-1301-CT-1068
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 49A02-1507-CT-986 | March 24, 2016 Page 1 of 21
Crone, Judge.
Case Summary
[1] Roukaya Ali appeals a summary judgment in favor of Alliance Home Health
Care, LLC (“Alliance”), L.J.L. Enterprises, Inc. (“LJL”), and LJL’s sole owner
Larry J. Logsdon (collectively “Appellees”) on her claims of defamation,
malicious prosecution, false imprisonment, intentional infliction of emotional
distress, and vicarious liability, all stemming from Appellees’ claims that she
stole jewelry from two of her home healthcare patients. 1 We affirm.
Facts and Procedural History
[2] The undisputed facts are as follows. Alliance is a home healthcare company in
the business of providing skilled home nursing, therapy, and companion
services for senior adults who often cannot care for themselves. Ali, a certified
nurse’s aide (“CNA”) and certified home health aide (“CHHA”), began her
employment as an in-home health worker at Alliance in 2007.
[3] On January 31, 2011, Alliance patient Albert Barnes and his wife discovered
that twelve pieces of jewelry were missing from their home. Among the
1
In her complaint, Ali also alleged negligent supervision and negligent infliction of emotional distress. She
withdrew her negligent supervision claim, and the trial court entered summary judgment in favor of
Appellees on that claim. With respect to her claim of negligent infliction of emotional distress, she
acknowledges Indiana’s rule requiring that the plaintiff in such cases sustain a “direct physical impact.” Bah
v. Mac’s Convenience Stores, LLC, 37 N.E.3d 539, 546-47 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015), trans. denied (2016). Admitting
that she has not suffered any physical impact, she now withdraws this claim for appellate review. Appellant’s
Br. at 38. Thus, we affirm summary judgment on those claims.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 49A02-1507-CT-986 | March 24, 2016 Page 2 of 21
missing items was Barnes’s unique ring with Greek letters, small diamonds, and
an anchor pin attached to it. The Barneses notified the Indianapolis
Metropolitan Police Department (“IMPD”), which began an investigation.
Barnes’s wife told IMPD that she remembered seeing the jewelry on January
28, and Barnes said that he wore some of the rings on January 29. The couple
also reported the theft to their insurance company, which in turn notified
Alliance. Alliance’s human resources department began an internal
investigation and subsequently hired an outside company, LJL, to conduct the
investigation. LJL’s sole owner and president is Logsdon, a retired sheriff’s
department investigator. Logsdon checked the employee schedule and found
that only two Alliance employees had worked at the Barnes residence between
January 28 and January 31, 2011. One of those was Ali, who did not regularly
work for Barnes but had worked at his home as a fill-in on January 30 and 31
from 11:00 a.m. to 5:00 p.m.
[4] On February 7, 2011, Betty McIntyre, the regular fulltime nurse for another
Alliance patient, Jack Morris, discovered that Morris was not wearing his
Masonic ring. Morris was elderly and needed 24/7 care, and McIntyre knew
that he never took off his Masonic ring. She noticed that he was wearing a
different ring, one with Greek letters, diamonds, and an anchor pin attached.
Morris’s son reported the theft of the Masonic ring to IMPD. When Alliance
received word of the Morris theft, Logsdon went to interview McIntyre, who
told him that she last remembered seeing the Masonic ring on Morris’s finger
on February 4, 2011, and that she had heard Morris say, on February 7, 2011,
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 49A02-1507-CT-986 | March 24, 2016 Page 3 of 21
that his ring was missing and had been replaced with a different one. Logsdon
also interviewed Theresa Azikiwe, the Alliance employee who worked for
Morris on February 9, 2011. Azikiwe reported that Morris had pointed to the
ring with the Greek letters, diamonds, and anchor pin and said that he wanted
his son to have it.
[5] The Barneses subsequently identified the unique anchor ring found on Morris’s
finger as one of the items stolen from their residence. Logsdon consulted the
Alliance schedules and discovered that Ali had worked as fill-in at Morris’s
residence on February 6, 2011. Six other Alliance employees had worked for
Morris, but a comparison of the schedules showed that Ali was the only
employee who had worked for both Barnes and Morris during the timeframes
that they had pinpointed for the thefts. Barnes and Morris lived about fourteen
miles apart and were not acquainted.
[6] Alliance terminated Ali’s employment on February 27, 2011. When Ali
applied for unemployment benefits, the Department of Workforce
Development (“DWD”) sent Alliance a form inquiring as to the reason for her
termination. Alliance responded that the reason was theft. Alliance also
contacted the Indiana State Department of Health (“ISDH”) concerning the
results of its theft investigation against Ali. ISDH conducted an evidentiary
hearing and determined that Ali had misappropriated the jewelry from Barnes
and Morris. As a result, ISDH revoked Ali’s healthcare certifications.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 49A02-1507-CT-986 | March 24, 2016 Page 4 of 21
[7] IMPD conducted an investigation of both thefts and interviewed numerous
witnesses and suspects, including Ali. Alliance and Logsdon cooperated by
providing IMPD with the information gathered during Logsdon’s investigation.
IMPD Detective Michael Schollmeier executed a probable cause affidavit
implicating Ali as the perpetrator of both thefts.
[8] Marion County Deputy Prosecutor Robert Reel reviewed the evidence
submitted by IMPD and concluded that probable cause existed to charge Ali
with both thefts. A Marion Superior Court judge made a determination of
probable cause and issued a warrant for Ali’s arrest. The State charged her with
two counts of class D felony theft. She is an African immigrant subject to
deportation for a felony conviction. She was acquitted following a bench trial.
[9] Ali filed a civil action against Appellees, alleging defamation, malicious
prosecution, false imprisonment, negligent supervision (subsequently
withdrawn), vicarious liability, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and
negligent infliction of emotional distress. Appellees sought summary judgment,
which the trial court granted. The trial court subsequently issued an order
clarifying that its summary judgment order pertained to LJL and Logsdon as
well as to Alliance. Ali now appeals. Additional facts will be provided as
necessary.
Discussion and Decision
[10] Ali maintains that the trial court erred in granting summary judgment in favor
of Appellees. We review a summary judgment de novo, applying the same
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 49A02-1507-CT-986 | March 24, 2016 Page 5 of 21
standard as the trial court and drawing all reasonable inferences in favor of the
nonmoving party. Hughley v. State, 15 N.E.3d 1000, 1003 (Ind. 2014). In
conducting our review, we consider only those matters that were designated at
the summary judgment stage. Haegert v. McMullan, 953 N.E.2d 1223, 1229
(Ind. Ct. App. 2011). Summary judgment is appropriate if the designated
evidence shows that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that
the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Hughley, 15 N.E.3d
at 1003; Ind. Trial Rule 56(C).
[11] The moving party bears the initial burden of demonstrating the “absence of any
genuine issue of fact as to a determinative issue.” Williams v. Tharp, 914 N.E.2d
756, 761 (Ind. 2009). Then the burden shifts to the nonmoving party to “come
forward with contrary evidence” showing a genuine issue for the trier of fact.
Id. at 762. The nonmoving party cannot rest upon the allegations or denials in
the pleadings. Syfu v. Quinn, 826 N.E.2d 699, 703 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005). In
Hughley, our supreme court emphasized that the moving party bears an onerous
burden of affirmatively negating the opponent’s claim. 15 N.E.3d at 1003. This
approach is based on the policy of preserving a party’s day in court, thus erring
on the side of allowing marginal cases to proceed to trial on the merits rather
than risking the short-circuiting of meritorious claims. Id. at 1003-04. A trial
court’s grant of summary judgment arrives on appeal clothed with a
presumption of validity. Williams, 914 N.E.2d at 762.
[12] We note that the trial court issued findings of fact and conclusions thereon as
part of its summary judgment order. Special findings are neither required nor
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 49A02-1507-CT-986 | March 24, 2016 Page 6 of 21
binding on appeal of a summary judgment. New Albany Preservation Comm’n v.
Bradford Realty, Inc., 965 N.E.2d 79, 84 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012). However, the
findings offer valuable insight into the trial court’s rationale and are helpful in
facilitating our review. Id.Section 1 – The trial court did not err in granting summary
judgment on Ali’s defamation claims.
[13] Ali submits that the trial court erred in granting summary judgment in favor of
the Appellees on her defamation claims.
Defamation is that which tends to “injure reputation or to
diminish esteem, respect, good will, or confidence in the plaintiff,
or to excite derogatory feelings or opinions about the plaintiff.”
To recover in an action for defamation, “that which caused the
alleged defamation must be both false and defamatory.”
Moreover, a plaintiff must establish the basic elements of
defamation: (1) a communication with a defamatory imputation;
(2) malice; (3) publication; and (4) damages. The determination
of whether a communication is defamatory is a question of law
for the court.
Haegert, 953 N.E.2d at 1230 (citations omitted).
[14] “[A] plaintiff who sues for defamation must set out the alleged defamatory
statement[s] in the complaint.” Id. “When specific statements that are alleged
to be defamatory have not been sufficiently identified in a plaintiff’s complaint,
an award of summary judgment for the defendant is proper.” Miller v. Cent. Ind.
Cmty. Found., Inc., 11 N.E.3d 944, 956 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014), trans. denied (2015).
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 49A02-1507-CT-986 | March 24, 2016 Page 7 of 21
[15] In Counts II and III of her complaint, 2 Ali averred:
From February 1, 2011, through July 17, 2012, and on numerous
other occasions, in conversations which Logsdon, Roselyn
Howard, Deborah Rood, Alicia Epler, Janice Roberts and other
agents of Alliance had with and in the hearing and presence and
presence [sic] of certain persons, maliciously made certain
slanderous, false, malicious, and defamatory statements about
Plaintiff stating that Plaintiff stole from Client One and Client
Two pieces of jewelry on several occasions.
Appellant’s App. at 32-33. This allegation does not specifically identify the
statements alleged to have been made by each of the several named individuals
“or other agents.” Id. Nor does it specify the persons to whom (or in front of
whom) the alleged defamatory statements were published. We find that it lacks
the specificity necessary to state a claim for defamation. Ali’s subsequent
attempts in both her brief in opposition to summary judgment and her
appellant’s brief to add specific examples of allegedly defamatory statements are
not sufficient to salvage her claims. Notwithstanding, we address her
supplemental allegations of defamatory statements as best we can discern them.
2
Count II was titled “Slander Per Quod,” and Count III was titled “Slander Per Se.” Appellant’s App. at
32-33. We address these together, as our analysis does not require us to discuss the elements that
differentiate the two torts. See, e.g., Kelley v. Tanoos, 865 N.E.2d 593, 596 (Ind. 2007) (stating that
communication is defamatory per se if it imputes criminal conduct, loathsome disease, misconduct in
person’s trade, profession, office, or occupation, or sexual misconduct and emphasizing that damages are
presumed in defamation per se cases).
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 49A02-1507-CT-986 | March 24, 2016 Page 8 of 21
[16] Appellees assert that the communications cited by Ali in her brief and in her
motion in opposition to summary judgment are protected by qualified privilege
or by statute.
[Qualified] privilege is a defense against a defamation action and
protects “communications made in good faith on any subject
matter in which the party making the communication has an
interest or in reference to which he has a duty ... if made to a
person having a corresponding interest or duty.” The privilege
may be overcome when the plaintiff demonstrates an abuse of the
privilege.
[17] Trail v. Boys & Girls Clubs of Nw. Ind., 845 N.E.2d 130, 136 (Ind. 2006) (citations
omitted). A communication may lose its privileged character upon a showing
of abuse where “(1) the communicator was primarily motivated by ill will in
making the statement; (2) there was excessive publication of the defamatory
statements; or (3) the statement was made without belief or grounds for belief in
its truth.” Williams, 914 N.E.2d at 763-64 (quoting Bals v. Verduzco, 600 N.E.2d
1353, 1356 (Ind. 1992)).
Section 1.1 – Appellees’ communications with law enforcement are
qualifiedly privileged.
[18] Appellees claim that their statements to law enforcement concerning Ali’s
connection to the thefts are subject to the qualified privilege exception. It is
well established that “communications made to law enforcement to report
criminal activity are qualifiedly privileged.” Williams, 914 N.E.2d at 763
(quoting Kelley v. Tanoos, 865 N.E.2d 593, 600 (Ind. 2007)). This furthers the
compelling public interest of encouraging citizens not only to report suspected
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 49A02-1507-CT-986 | March 24, 2016 Page 9 of 21
wrongdoing but also to assist law enforcement in investigating and
apprehending persons who engage in criminal activity. Id. at 762-63.
If this purpose is to be met, the privilege must offer a robust
defense against liability. Protecting unverified and even
speculative reports of suspected wrongdoing to law enforcement
is, in our view, supported by ample reasons of social advantage.
It is important that citizens not opt for inaction, chilled from
communicating with police in all but the most certain of
situations.
Id. at 765.
[19] Significantly, it was Barnes’s and Morris’s relatives, not Appellees, who
initiated the contact with IMPD by reporting the thefts. Appellees simply
cooperated with IMPD by sharing the results of their internal investigation. Ali
now claims Appellees acted with ill will based on her race and immigrant
status. She relies on our recent decision in Bah v. Mac’s Convenience Stores, LLC,
claiming that this renders summary judgment inappropriate because her claim
hinges on state-of-mind and witness credibility. 37 N.E.3d 539, 548-49 (Ind.
Ct. App. 2015), trans. denied (2016).
[20] We find Bah distinguishable. There, the plaintiff/employee had a contentious
relationship with her supervisor that included his giving her a negative
evaluation, his transferring her to a smaller store over her objection, her
attempts to go over his head to report malfeasance, and her refusal to resign.
Id. In contrast, here, Ali designated no evidence of any history of a negative
relationship with Alliance personnel. Logsdon did not know her or even know
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 49A02-1507-CT-986 | March 24, 2016 Page 10 of 21
of her until he began his investigation, and his conclusions were based largely
on information contained in the employee schedules showing that she was the
link between the two unacquainted victims. None of this implicates her race or
immigrant status, and she neither raised such an allegation in her complaint nor
designated evidence to that effect. Nor has she designated evidence
substantiating her claim that Logsdon essentially commanded IMPD to arrest
her. In short, she failed to designate evidence to overcome the qualified public
interest privilege concerning Appellees’ communications with law enforcement.
Section 1.2 – Alliance’s communications to its insurance agent are
protected by the common interest qualified privilege.
[21] Ali also claims that Alliance’s correspondence with its insurance agent is
defamatory. Alliance asserts that these communications are protected by the
common interest privilege.
A communication is protected by a qualified privilege of
common interest if the communication was made “in good faith
on any subject matter in which the party making the
communication has an interest or in reference to which he has a
duty, either public or private, either legal, moral, or social, if
made to a person having a corresponding interest or duty.” The
privilege exists because of “the necessity for full and unrestricted
communication on matters in which the parties have a common
interest or duty.” The existence of a qualified privilege does not
change the actionable nature of the words spoken. Rather the
privilege “rebuts the element of malice implied by law for the
making of a defamatory statement.” The elements of the defense
are: (1) good faith, (2) an interest to be upheld, (3) a statement
limited in its scope to this purpose, (4) a proper occasion, and (5)
publication in a proper manner to the appropriate parties only.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 49A02-1507-CT-986 | March 24, 2016 Page 11 of 21
The defendant has the burden to produce evidence establishing
the existence of the privilege. Whether the privilege exists is
generally a question of law.
Cortez v. Jo-Ann Stores, Inc., 827 N.E.2d 1223, 1232-33 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005)
(citations omitted).
[22] Here, Alliance’s human resource manager Roselyn Howard sent an email titled
“Liability Claim” to the company’s insurance agent. Appellant’s App. at 281.
The email briefly explained that a family member of Morris had inquired about
whether Alliance’s insurer would reimburse Morris the cost of replacing his
stolen ring. In the email, Howard indicated her intent to fax the applicable
police reports. She also provided contact information for Morris’s son in case
the insurer needed additional information. The email included a standard
“CONFIDENTIALITY NOTICE” indicating that the communication was
“proprietary, privileged, confidential and/or exempt from disclosure under
applicable law.” Id.[23] We conclude that the communication between Alliance and its insurer was a
good faith attempt to discern whether the insurer would cover its client’s loss,
an issue of common interest to both insurer and insured. The communication
was limited in scope and nature and included an adequate admonition
regarding its confidential nature. As such, it was protected by the qualified
common interest privilege as a matter of law.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 49A02-1507-CT-986 | March 24, 2016 Page 12 of 21
Section 1.3 – Appellees’ communications with ISDH are protected by
statute.
[24] Ali asserts that Appellees defamed her to ISDH, thereby causing her to lose her
licenses to practice as a CNA and CHHA. Indiana Code Section 16-28-13-9(3)
states, “A person … who in good faith … makes a report to the state
department [of health] or the nurse registry[] is immune from both civil and
criminal liability arising from those actions.” Importantly, Alliance did not
submit its report to ISDH until after IMPD and Logsdon had completed their
independent investigations and concluded that Ali had committed the thefts.
ISDH then conducted a hearing and made an independent determination that
Ali had taken the jewelry from the victims. Logsdon’s testimony was merely
part of that hearing. Ali did not designate evidence indicating that Appellees
had ill will or a lack of belief in the truth of the findings contained in their report
to ISDH. This is exactly the type of information protected by the statute.
Section 1.4 – Alliance’s communications with DWD are protected by
statute.
[25] Similarly, Alliance’s communications with DWD are privileged pursuant to
statute. Indiana Code Section 22-4-17-9 states in pertinent part,
Any testimony or evidence submitted in due course before the
board, the department, the review board, an administrative law
judge, or any duly authorized representative of any of them shall
be deemed a communication presumptively privileged with
respect to any civil action except actions to enforce the provisions
of this article.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 49A02-1507-CT-986 | March 24, 2016 Page 13 of 21
Here, Alliance did not initiate contact with DWD. Rather, DWD initiated
contact with Alliance after Ali sought unemployment benefits. As required by
law, Alliance filled out a form responding to DWD’s inquiry concerning the
reason for Ali’s termination, theft. The record is devoid of any designated
evidence indicating that Alliance acted with ill will or a lack of good faith in
simply complying with this statutory obligation. Rather, this is precisely the
type of communication that the statute is intended to protect.
Section 1.5 – Logsdon’s communications in furtherance of his
investigation are not defamatory as a matter of law.
[26] The designated evidence shows that Logsdon made statements to IMPD, the
victims, and certain Alliance healthcare workers as part of his investigation. As
discussed, his communications to IMPD are protected by the qualified
privilege. As for his communications to the theft victims concerning the results
of his investigation, we conclude that they do not amount to defamation
because they were not false and defamatory. Haegert, 953 N.E.2d at 1230(stating that in a defamation action, plaintiff must establish that defendant
made statements that were both “false and defamatory”). Instead, he was
simply reporting that the evidence led him to conclude that Ali was the thief
and that IMPD was charging her as such. This is also true of his statement to
another Alliance employee previously under suspicion. Ali characterizes these
statements as direct accusations that she stole the jewelry rather than merely
recitations of Logsden’s investigation results. Even assuming that Logsdon’s
statements were so direct, Ali has designated no evidence to support an
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 49A02-1507-CT-986 | March 24, 2016 Page 14 of 21
inference that his statements were knowingly false when made. Rather, she
simply relies on her subsequent criminal acquittal and launches an
unsubstantiated claim of bigotry against a person who had no history with her
and did not even know of her prior to the investigation. Based on the
foregoing, we conclude that the trial court did not err in granting summary
judgment on this or any of Ali’s defamation claims.
Section 2 – The trial court did not err in granting summary
judgment on Ali’s malicious prosecution claim.
[27] Ali maintains that the trial court erred in granting summary judgment on her
malicious prosecution claim. To establish a case for malicious prosecution, the
plaintiff must prove that “(1) the defendant instituted or caused to be instituted
an action against the plaintiff; (2) the defendant acted maliciously in so doing;
(3) the defendant had no probable cause to institute the action; and (4) the
original action was terminated in the plaintiff’s favor.” Crosson v. Berry, 829
N.E.2d 184, 189 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005), trans. denied. “[A] judicial determination
of probable cause in a criminal proceeding constitutes prima facie evidence of
probable cause in a subsequent civil lawsuit alleging malicious prosecution.”
Glass v. Trump Ind., Inc., 802 N.E.2d 461, 467 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004). The
plaintiff may overcome such a prima facie showing of probable cause only by
demonstrating that it was induced by false testimony, fraud, or other improper
means. Id.[28] Here, the designated evidence shows the following: (1) Barnes’s and Morris’s
relatives initiated contact with IMPD concerning the victims’ missing jewelry;
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 49A02-1507-CT-986 | March 24, 2016 Page 15 of 21
(2) IMPD conducted an independent investigation concerning the thefts, only
part of which involved consulting with Appellees concerning the results of their
internal investigation; (3) the deputy prosecutor analyzed the evidence and,
having determined in his discretion that probable cause existed to file an
information charging Ali with theft, initiated criminal proceedings against her;
and (4) the criminal court judge made a judicial determination of probable
cause. To the extent that Ali suggests that her eventual acquittal conclusively
establishes that no probable cause existed to charge her with theft in the first
place, we emphasize that “the amount of evidence necessary to meet the
probable cause requirement ... is less than the level of proof necessary to
establish guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.” Wells v. Bernitt, 936 N.E.2d 1242,
1253 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010), trans. denied (2011).
[29] In short, the prosecutor, not Appellees, initiated the action based on IMPD’s
investigation, and Ali failed to designate evidence to rebut the prima facie
judicial determination of probable cause. Thus, her malicious prosecution
claim fails as a matter of law.
Section 3 – The trial court did not err in granting summary
judgment on Ali’s false imprisonment claim.
[30] Ali contends that the trial court erred in granting summary judgment on her
false imprisonment claim. The tort of false imprisonment amounts to an
“unlawful restraint upon one’s freedom of movement or the deprivation of
one’s liberty without consent.” Miller v. City of Anderson, 777 N.E.2d 1100,
1104-05 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002), trans. denied (2003). Below, Ali never alleged that
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 49A02-1507-CT-986 | March 24, 2016 Page 16 of 21
Appellees unlawfully detained or restrained her. 3 Instead, she predicated her
false imprisonment claim on Appellees’ assistance to authorities in conducting
their investigation and pursuing criminal charges, which resulted in her being
jailed pending her release on bond.
[31] Where the plaintiff claims false arrest, she must demonstrate the absence of
probable cause to make the arrest. Id. at 1104. “Probable cause for arrest is
demonstrated by facts and circumstances known to the arresting officer which
would warrant a person of reasonable caution and prudence in believing that
the accused had committed or was committing a criminal offense.” Id. Where
“the plaintiff in a false arrest action fails to demonstrate the absence of probable
cause, or if the record as a whole reflects probable cause for the arrest, then the
plaintiff’s case must fail.” Id.[32] Ali alleges that she never would have been arrested in the first place had
Appellees not provided false information to IMPD. In other words, her claim
flows from what she deems a false arrest and imprisonment based on false
information. Acting on evidence from IMPD, the prosecutor determined that
probable cause existed to charge Ali with theft, and the criminal court made a
determination to the same effect. A judicial determination amounts to a prima
3
Ali now alleges that Logsdon falsely imprisoned her in giving her a ride to the police station for her
polygraph. However, she failed to list this allegation in her complaint. Even so, this new false imprisonment
allegation cites the length of time consumed by the polygraph itself and not the ride to and from it. IMPD
was in charge of the polygraph, and Logsdon agreed to drive Ali to the polygraph site as an accommodation
because she did not want her neighbors to see her in a marked patrol car. In short, this belated allegation is
meritless.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 49A02-1507-CT-986 | March 24, 2016 Page 17 of 21
facie showing of probable cause rebuttable only by evidence showing that the
finding of probable cause was induced by fraud or false testimony. Street v. Shoe
Carnival, Inc., 660 N.E.2d 1054, 1057-58 (Ind. Ct. App. 1996).
[33] Nothing in the designated evidence shows malicious or fraudulent intent on the
part of Appellees. The peculiar circumstances of Barnes’s ring ending up on the
finger of Morris, a perfect stranger living fourteen miles away, as a replacement
for Morris’s missing ring led Appellees to check for a link between the two
patients. Documentary evidence in the form of employee schedules showed
that link to be Ali, the only home healthcare worker who cared for each man
immediately before his jewelry was discovered missing. Simply put, Ali failed
to designate evidence indicating a malicious or fraudulent motive. Thus, the
trial court did not err in granting summary judgment on Ali’s false
imprisonment claim.
Section 4 – The trial court did not err in granting summary
judgment on Ali’s intentional infliction of emotional distress
claim.
[34] The tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress (“IIED”) occurs when the
defendant “(1) engages in extreme and outrageous conduct (2) which
intentionally or recklessly (3) causes (4) severe emotional distress to another.”
Bah, 37 N.E.3d at 549 (quoting Curry v. Whitaker, 943 N.E.2d 354, 361 (Ind. Ct.
App. 2011)). The requirements to prove this tort are rigorous, and at its
foundation is “the intent to harm the plaintiff emotionally.” Id. at 550. As
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 49A02-1507-CT-986 | March 24, 2016 Page 18 of 21
often quoted from Comment d of the Restatement (Second) of Torts Section 46
(1965),
The cases thus far decided have found liability only where the
defendant’s conduct has been extreme and outrageous. It has not
been enough that the defendant has acted with an intent which is
tortious or even criminal, or that he has intended to inflict
emotional distress, or even that his conduct has been
characterized by “malice,” or a degree of aggravation which
would entitle the plaintiff to punitive damages for another tort.
Liability has been found only where the conduct has been so
outrageous in character, and so extreme in degree, as to go
beyond all possible bounds of decency, and to be regarded as
atrocious, and utterly intolerable in a civilized community.
Generally, the case is one in which the recitation of the facts to
an average member of the community would arouse his
resentment against the actor, and lead him to exclaim,
“Outrageous!”
Id. The question of what amounts to extreme and outrageous conduct depends
in part on prevailing cultural norms and values, and “[i]n the appropriate case,
the question can be decided as a matter of law.” Id.[35] This is one of those cases. Ali designated no evidence to indicate that Alliance
intended to cause her emotional harm. Instead, the designated evidence shows
that she had no past incidents during her four-year employment that would
have caused her superiors to single her out for detrimental treatment. Cf. Bah,
37 N.E.3d at 548-49 (where employee and supervisor had contentious
relationship that included employee’s objection to her transfer to smaller store,
refusal to resign, negative evaluation, and going over supervisor’s head to report
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 49A02-1507-CT-986 | March 24, 2016 Page 19 of 21
concerns). Similarly, Ali designated no evidence indicating that Logsdon, an
independent contractor hired to conduct Alliance’s internal theft investigation,
knew or even knew of Ali before interviewing her. Rather, Ali was just one of
several Alliance home healthcare employees interviewed as part of the
investigation. Logsdon simply followed the evidence, which showed that a ring
reported stolen from one patient ended up on the finger of a totally unrelated
patient fourteen miles away. Based on Alliance’s documentation of work
schedules, he then concluded that, as Ali was the only employee who had
worked for both patients during the time of the alleged thefts, she was the link
between the two patients in this bizarre set of circumstances. From an objective
viewpoint, this conduct was not outrageous; it was reasonable. Based on the
foregoing, we conclude that the trial court properly granted summary judgment
on Ali’s IIED claim.
Section 5 – The trial court did not err in granting summary
judgment on Ali’s vicarious liability claim.
[36] Finally, Ali asserts that the trial court erred in granting summary judgment on
her vicarious liability claim. Under the doctrine of respondeat superior,
vicarious liability will be imposed upon an employer whose employee commits
a tort while acting within the scope of employment. Barnett v. Clark, 889
N.E.2d 281, 283 (Ind. 2008). By definition, respondeat superior requires that
there be an underlying tort in the first place and that the underlying tort be
incidental to the employee’s authorized conduct or, to an appreciable extent,
done to further the employer’s business. Id.Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 49A02-1507-CT-986 | March 24, 2016 Page 20 of 21
[37] Here, Ali did not allege any tort by an individual employee of Alliance. As for
whether Logsdon’s conduct can be attributed to Alliance, we observe that
Logsdon was not an employee of Alliance. He was sole owner and employee
of LJL and was merely hired as an independent contractor to conduct an
investigation of alleged thefts committed against Alliance’s home healthcare
patients. We have long held that, subject to specific exceptions, a principal is
not liable for the torts of independent contractors. Carie v. PSI Energy, Inc., 715
N.E.2d 853, 855 (Ind. 1999). The exceptions, none of which apply here, are:
(1) where the contract requires the performance of intrinsically
dangerous work; (2) where the principal is by law or contract
charged with performing the specific duty; (3) where the act will
create a nuisance; (4) where the act to be performed will probably
cause injury to others unless due precaution is taken; and (5)
where the act to be performed is illegal.
Id.[38] As previously discussed, Logsdon did not commit a tort. Thus, respondeat
superior does not apply against any Appellees as a matter of law. Even if
Logsdon’s conduct had amounted to an actionable tort, it would not be
chargeable to Alliance. The trial court did not err in granting summary
judgment on this issue. Accordingly, we affirm.
[39] Affirmed.
Vaidik, C.J., and Bailey, J., concur.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 49A02-1507-CT-986 | March 24, 2016 Page 21 of 21