Jeffery Thompson v. State of Indiana , 120 N.E.3d 1066 ( 2019 )


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  •                                                                                FILED
    Mar 15 2019, 9:23 am
    CLERK
    Indiana Supreme Court
    Court of Appeals
    and Tax Court
    ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT                                    ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
    Stacy R. Uliana                                           Curtis T. Hill, Jr.
    Bargersville, Indiana                                     Attorney General
    Caroline G. Templeton
    Deputy Attorney General
    Indianapolis, Indiana
    IN THE
    COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
    Jeffery Thompson,                                         March 15, 2019
    Appellant-Defendant,                                      Court of Appeals Case No.
    18A-CR-1947
    v.                                                Appeal from the Marion Superior
    Court
    State of Indiana,                                         The Honorable Helen W. Marchal,
    Appellee-Plaintiff                                        Judge
    Trial Court Cause No.
    49G15-1604-F6-13322
    Crone, Judge.
    Case Summary
    [1]   Jeffery Thompson appeals the trial court’s denial of his motion to credit his
    sentence with 240 days that he served on pretrial home detention. The State
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 18A-CR-1947 | March 15, 2019                           Page 1 of 9
    does not oppose the motion. We conclude that the trial court erred in denying
    Thompson’s motion and therefore reverse and remand with instructions to
    credit that time to Thompson’s sentence.
    Facts and Procedural History
    [2]   In April 2016, the State charged Thompson with one count of level 6 felony
    operating while intoxicated endangering another person and one count of level
    6 felony operating while intoxicated with an alcohol concentration equivalent
    of .15 or more. On June 26, 2018, pursuant to a written plea agreement,
    Thompson agreed to plead guilty to the first charge. The State agreed to
    dismiss the second charge and all the charges that Thompson had pending in
    cause number 49G15-1512-F6-45853 and cause number 49G15-1701-F6-3764
    (“Cause 3764”). In Cause 3764, Thompson had been ordered to serve pretrial
    home detention from January 31, 2017, through September 28, 2017, a total of
    240 days. He completed the home detention with no violations. Thompson
    and the State agreed to a total sentence of 730 days and also agreed that the
    credit time earned in Cause 3764 would be applied to that sentence.
    [3]   The trial court accepted the plea agreement and sentenced Thompson to 730
    days, with ten days executed and the rest suspended to probation. The court
    awarded Thompson sixty days of good time credit for his pretrial home
    detention in Cause 3764. See Ind. Code § 35-50-6-3.1(f) (providing that a
    person placed on pretrial home detention “earns one (1) day of good time credit
    for every four (4) days the person serves on pretrial home detention awaiting
    trial.”). Thompson requested additional credit for the 240 days that he actually
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 18A-CR-1947 | March 15, 2019       Page 2 of 9
    served on home detention. The State did not object to this request, and the trial
    court took it under advisement. On June 27, 2018, Thompson filed a motion to
    apply the 240 days against his sentence, which the trial court summarily denied.
    This appeal ensued.
    Discussion and Decision
    [4]   Thompson contends that the trial court erred in denying his motion for credit
    for time that he served on pretrial home detention. The State does not oppose
    Thompson’s motion. For the reasons given below, we agree with Thompson.
    [5]   “To say that the case law has been murky on the issue of credit time for home
    detainees would be an understatement.” Barker v. State, 
    994 N.E.2d 306
    , 313
    (Ind. Ct. App. 2013), trans. denied (2014). Home detention may be imposed
    before trial, as a post-conviction placement in a community corrections
    program, or as part of probation. 
    Id. In Capes
    v. State, 
    634 N.E.2d 1334
    , 1335
    (Ind. 1994), our supreme court considered whether the defendant was entitled
    to credit for time served in pretrial home detention. At that time, Indiana Code
    Section 35-50-6-4 provided, “A person imprisoned for a crime or imprisoned
    awaiting trial or sentencing is initially assigned to Class I.” And Indiana Code
    Section 35-50-6-3(a) provided, “A person assigned to Class I earns one (1) day
    of credit time for each day he is imprisoned for a crime or confined awaiting
    trial or sentencing.” For the Capes court, “[t]he essential questions [were]
    whether [Capes] was a member of Class I and whether in-home detention
    constitu[ed] ‘confinement’ for purposes of accruing” credit for time served. 634
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 18A-CR-1947 | March 15, 2019        Page 3 
    of 9 N.E.2d at 1335
    . The court answered both questions in the affirmative, noting
    that the legislature had specifically provided credit for time served to post-
    conviction home detainees in community corrections programs and that there
    was “no good reason” to treat pretrial home detainees differently. See 
    id. (citing Ind.
    Code § 35-38-2.6-6, which stated, “A person who is placed in a community
    corrections program under this chapter is entitled to earn credit time under IC
    35-50-6.”).
    [6]   Three years later, the court was confronted with the same issue in Franklin v.
    State, 
    685 N.E.2d 1062
    (Ind. 1997). This time, however, the court reached a
    different result based on the legislature’s post-Capes amendment to Section 35-
    38-2.6-6, which stated, “A person who is placed in a community corrections
    program under this chapter is entitled to earn credit time under IC 35-50-6 unless
    the person is placed in the person’s home.” (Emphasis added.) The Franklin court
    concluded “that the amendment to the post-conviction home detention statute
    evinces legislative intent that credit time [i.e., credit for time served] can no
    longer be awarded to pretrial home 
    detainees.” 685 N.E.2d at 1064
    .
    [7]   Just two years later, in Purcell v. State, 
    721 N.E.2d 220
    (Ind. 1999), the court
    determined that the “credit time” mentioned in Section 35-38-2.6-6 was actually
    “good time credit” (i.e., the “additional credit a prisoner receives for good
    behavior and educational attainment”) and not credit for time served, 
    id. at 222,
    and therefore overruled Franklin to the extent it held that the statute “prohibits
    an offender sentenced to home detention under a community corrections
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 18A-CR-1947 | March 15, 2019           Page 4 of 9
    program from earning credit for time served[.]” 
    Id. at 224.
    The court went on
    to say,
    We recognize that this conclusion casts doubt on the continued
    viability of the holding in Franklin itself, to wit, that pre-trial time
    served on home detention does not count as credit toward a
    sentence subsequently imposed. Although not directly before us
    today, we have revisited the question and conclude that a trial
    court is within its discretion to deny a defendant credit toward
    sentence for pre-trial time served on home detention. Absent
    legislative direction, we believe that a defendant is only entitled
    to credit toward sentence for pre-trial time served in a prison, jail
    or other facility which imposes substantially similar restrictions
    upon personal liberty.
    
    Id. at n.6.
    [8]   Many legislative changes have been made in the nearly two decades since
    Purcell. For example, the legislature has specifically defined the various types of
    “credit” available to imprisoned or confined persons. Enacted in 2015, Indiana
    Code Section 35-50-6-0.5 provides,
    The following definitions apply throughout this chapter:
    (1) “Accrued time” means the amount of time that a person is
    imprisoned or confined.
    (2) “Credit time” means the sum of a person’s accrued time,
    good time credit, and educational credit.
    (3) “Educational credit” means a reduction in a person’s term of
    imprisonment or confinement awarded for participation in an
    educational, vocational, rehabilitative, or other program.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 18A-CR-1947 | March 15, 2019                   Page 5 of 9
    (4) “Good time credit” means a reduction in a person’s term of
    imprisonment or confinement awarded for the person’s good
    behavior while imprisoned or confined.
    [9]    The legislature has also revamped the statutes governing credit time classes.
    Persons convicted before July 1, 2014, were assigned to one of four classes: I,
    II, III, or IV. Ind. Code § 35-50-6-3. Persons convicted after June 30, 2014,
    have been assigned to one of four new classes: A, B, C, or D. Ind. Code § 35-
    50-6-3.1. And, effective July 1, 2016, persons “placed on home detention
    awaiting trial,” such as Thompson, have been assigned to Class P. Ind. Code §
    35-50-6-4(i). “This subsection does not apply to any other person placed on
    home detention[,]” and “[a] person assigned to Class P may not be reassigned
    to another credit time class while the person is on pretrial home detention
    awaiting trial.” 
    Id. [10] In
    addition, the legislature has amended Section 35-38-2.6-6, which now
    provides,
    (a) As used in this subsection, “home” means the actual living
    area of the temporary or permanent residence of a person.
    (b) A person confined on home detention in a community
    corrections program receives one (1) day of accrued time for each
    day the person is confined on home detention, plus any earned
    good time credit.
    (c) In addition to accrued time under subsection (b), a person
    who is placed in a community corrections program under this
    chapter is entitled to earn good time credit under IC 35-50-6-3
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 18A-CR-1947 | March 15, 2019          Page 6 of 9
    and IC 35-50-6-3.1. A person confined on home detention as
    part of a community corrections program may not earn
    educational credit under IC 35-50-6-3.3.
    (d) A person who is placed in a community corrections program
    under this chapter may be deprived of earned good time credit as
    provided under rules adopted by the department of correction
    under IC 4-22-2.
    Thus, the statute allows post-conviction home detainees in community
    corrections programs to earn both accrued time (calculated at a day for a day)
    and good time credit.
    [11]   And finally, Section 35-50-6-3.1 now provides,
    (a) This section applies to a person who commits an offense after
    June 30, 2014.
    (b) A person assigned to Class A earns one (1) day of good time
    credit for each day the person is imprisoned for a crime or
    confined awaiting trial or sentencing.
    (c) A person assigned to Class B earns one (1) day of good time
    credit for every three (3) days the person is imprisoned for a
    crime or confined awaiting trial or sentencing.
    (d) A person assigned to Class C earns one (1) day of good time
    credit for every six (6) days the person is imprisoned for a crime
    or confined awaiting trial or sentencing.
    (e) A person assigned to Class D earns no good time credit.
    (f) A person assigned to Class P earns one (1) day of good time
    credit for every four (4) days the person serves on pretrial home
    detention awaiting trial.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 18A-CR-1947 | March 15, 2019           Page 7 of 9
    [12]   Thompson correctly observes that, “[d]espite the statute’s silence, every other
    credit time classification listed in [Section 35-50-6-3.1] earns accrued time in
    addition to good time credit.” Appellant’s Br. at 7 (citing Abney v. State, 
    79 N.E.3d 942
    , 955 (Ind. Ct. App. 2017) (defendant assigned to Class B received
    295 days of accrued time for 295 days of confinement in jail awaiting trial and
    sentencing)). He argues that “[i]t was unnecessary for the legislature to
    specifically state that a person in Class P receives accrued time because like
    those in the other credit time classes, it is implied.” 
    Id. at 8.
    He also argues
    that “[i]f the legislature intended to treat those on pretrial home detention and
    those incarcerated awaiting trial differently for purposes of accrued time, it
    would have so specified.” 
    Id. We agree
    on both counts. See Abney v. State, 
    811 N.E.2d 415
    , 419 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004) (“It is just as important to recognize what
    the statute does not say as it is to recognize what it does say.”), adopted by 
    821 N.E.2d 375
    (Ind. 2005).
    [13]   Thompson further observes that he “was unable to find any situation in the
    Indiana Code where a defendant can earn ‘good time credit’ without also
    earning accrued time.” 
    Id. at 8.
    We were also unable to find any such
    situation, which leads us to conclude that the legislature could not have
    intended such an absurd result. See Study v. State, 
    24 N.E.3d 947
    , 956 (Ind.
    2015) (courts will not presume that legislature intended statutory language to
    bring about an absurd result), cert. denied. Finally, we point out that there is no
    indication that the legislature intended to treat pretrial and post-conviction
    home detainees differently under the current statutory scheme.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 18A-CR-1947 | March 15, 2019          Page 8 of 9
    [14]   Based on the numerous substantive legislative changes regarding credit time
    that have been enacted since Purcell, we conclude that Purcell is no longer good
    law with respect to accrued time for pretrial home detention. See Horn v.
    Hendrickson, 
    824 N.E.2d 690
    , 694 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005) (noting that supreme
    court precedent is binding on this Court “until it is changed either by that court
    or by legislative enactment.”) (quoting Dragon v. State, 
    774 N.E.2d 103
    , 107
    (Ind. Ct. App. 2002), trans. vacated). We hold that a person placed on pretrial
    home detention earns accrued time (calculated at a day for a day) pursuant to
    the unmistakable implications of Section 35-50-6-3.1 and that the trial court has
    no discretion to deny it. See Maciaszek v. State, 
    75 N.E.3d 1089
    , 1092 (Ind. Ct.
    App. 2017) (“Good time credit under [Section 35-50-6-3] is a ‘matter of
    statutory right, not a matter of judicial discretion.’”) (quoting Weaver v. State,
    
    725 N.E.2d 945
    , 948 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000)), trans. denied; see also Purdue v. State,
    
    51 N.E.3d 432
    , 436 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016) (“Credit time statutes, as remedial
    legislation, should be liberally construed in favor of those benefitted by the
    statute.”). Therefore, we reverse the trial court’s denial of Thompson’s motion
    and remand with instructions to apply the 240 days of accrued time to his
    sentence.
    [15]   Reversed and remanded.
    Vaidik, C.J., and Mathias, J., concur.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 18A-CR-1947 | March 15, 2019           Page 9 of 9