Larry A. Conn v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.) ( 2016 )

MEMORANDUM DECISION
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), FILED
this Memorandum Decision shall not be Dec 29 2016, 8:36 am
regarded as precedent or cited before any
CLERK
court except for the purpose of establishing Indiana Supreme Court
Court of Appeals
the defense of res judicata, collateral and Tax Court
estoppel, or the law of the case.
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Barbra A. Stooksbury Gregory F. Zoeller
LaPorte, Indiana Attorney General of Indiana
Tyler G. Banks
Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
Larry A. Conn, December 29, 2016
Appellant-Petitioner, Court of Appeals Case No.
46A03-1604-CR-1007
v. Appeal from the LaPorte Circuit
Court
State of Indiana, The Honorable Thomas J.
Appellee-Respondent Alevizos, Judge
Trial Court Cause No.
46C01-1508-F5-712
Baker, Judge.
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[1] Larry Conn appeals his convictions for Operating a Vehicle After a Lifetime
Suspension,1 a Level 5 Felony; and False Informing,2 a Class B Misdemeanor.
He argues that one of his statements should not have been admitted into
evidence, that there is insufficient evidence supporting his convictions, and that
his sentence is inappropriate in light of the nature of the offenses and his
character. Finding no error and that the sentence is not inappropriate, we
affirm.
Facts
[2] On August 7, 2015, around noon, Police Officer Aaron Stobaugh was driving in
a southbound lane in LaPorte County when he noticed that a driver heading
north, later identified as Conn, was not wearing a seatbelt. Officer Stobaugh
turned his car around, caught up to Conn, and pulled him over.
[3] When asked for his license, Conn said that he had lost it. He identified himself
as “Daryl Conn,” and said that he was born in 1956. When asked his date of
birth, he could not remember. Eventually, he revealed that he was Larry Conn
and gave the correct date of birth. He explained to the officer that he had lied
because his license was suspended. The officer returned to his car to check
Conn’s records; the database revealed that Conn’s license was suspended and
that Conn was a habitual traffic violator with a lifetime suspension. When the
1
Ind. Code § 9-30-10-17(a)(1).
2
Ind. Code § 35-44.1-2-3(d)(1).
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officer walked back to Conn’s car, Conn confirmed that his license had been
suspended because he was a habitual traffic violator.
[4] The officer ordered Conn out of his car. As Conn exited, the officer noticed the
smell of alcohol. Conn was swaying as he walked and slurring his speech, and
his eyes were red. The officer asked Conn to perform a field sobriety test but
Conn refused, explaining “that he didn’t want to perform the test because he
thought that his drinking the night prior would cause him to fail the test on that
particular date and time.” Tr. p. 153. Another officer arrived, and a search of
the car and the area around it revealed a water bottle filled with a cold liquid
that smelled like alcohol that had been thrown out the window, along with a
mason jar filled with ice cubes and a clear liquid that smelled like alcohol under
one of the seats.
[5] On August 11, 2015, the State charged Conn with operating a vehicle after a
lifetime suspension, a Level 5 felony; giving a false identity statement, a Class A
misdemeanor; and operating a vehicle while intoxicated, a Class C
misdemeanor. The State later amended the second charge to be false
informing, a Class B misdemeanor.
[6] At his February 29 and March 1, 2016, trial, Conn testified in his defense. He
testified that his mother, who suffers from Alzheimer’s disease and dementia,
called him on the morning of August 7 and told him that she could see her late
husband standing outside her house. He sought to prove that he feared for his
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mother’s safety and only decided to drive that day because it was an
emergency.
[7] The jury found Conn guilty of operating a vehicle after a lifetime suspension
and false informing, but not guilty of operating a vehicle while intoxicated.
Following a March 31, 2016, sentencing hearing, the trial court sentenced Conn
to three years for operating a vehicle after a lifetime suspension and ninety days
for false informing, with those sentences running concurrently. Conn now
appeals.
Discussion and Decision
[8] Conn has three arguments on appeal. He argues the following: (1) that the trial
court erred by admitting his statement to the police that he was a habitual traffic
offender; (2) that there was insufficient evidence supporting his convictions; and
(3) that Conn’s sentence is inappropriate in light of the nature of the offense and
his character.
I. Conn’s Statement to Police
[9] Conn argues that the trial court should not have permitted the police officer to
testify about Conn’s admission that he was a habitual traffic offender. He
believes that this testimony violates Indiana Rule of Evidence 403, which
provides that “[t]he court may exclude relevant evidence if its probative value is
substantially outweighed by a danger of one or more of the following: unfair
prejudice, confusing the issues, misleading the jury, undue delay, or needlessly
presenting cumulative evidence.”
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[10] Generally, admission of evidence is a matter of discretion for the trial court.
Pribie v. State, 46 N.E.3d 1241, 1246 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015). Such decisions will
be reversed only when admission is clearly against the logic and effect of the
facts and circumstances and the error affects a party’s substantial rights. Id.Moreover, reversible error cannot be predicated upon a trial court’s erroneous
admission of evidence that is merely cumulative of other evidence that has
already been properly admitted. Davis v. Garrett, 887 N.E.2d 942, 947 (Ind. Ct.
App. 2008).
[11] We cannot agree that Conn’s statement was unfairly prejudicial. His statement
to the officer that his license was suspended because he was a habitual traffic
offender is not the type of information that might inflame the passions of the
jury or cause it to judge him on inappropriate standards. Indeed, whether he
was driving with a suspended license was one of the central issues of his trial.
Moreover, his admission was merely cumulative of the evidence that he was a
habitual traffic offender, evidence that included a certified driving record with
the words “habitual traffic violator—life.” State’s Ex. 1. The trial court did not
err by allowing the officer’s testimony.
II. Sufficiency of the Evidence
[12] Conn argues that there is insufficient evidence to support his convictions.
When reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence supporting a conviction, we will
neither reweigh the evidence nor assess witness credibility. Harbert v. State, 51
N.E.3d 267, 275 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016). We will consider only the evidence
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supporting the judgment and any reasonable inferences that may be drawn
therefrom, and we will affirm if a reasonable trier of fact could have found the
defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Id.[13] The State was required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Conn
“operate[d] a motor vehicle after [his] driving privileges [were] forfeited for life .
. . .” I.C. § 9-30-10-17. The State presented evidence of both at trial, and Conn
does not seem to argue otherwise.
[14] Rather, he points to Indiana Code section 9-30-10-18(a), which provides that “it
is a defense that the operation of a motor vehicle was necessary to save life or
limb in an extreme emergency.” He argues that “[a] reasonable person could
determine that Larry drove the vehicle because he felt his Mother was in
immediate danger, an extreme emergency.” Appellant’s Br. p. 23.
[15] Conn has the standard on review exactly backwards: the question is not
whether a jury could have reasonably believed him; the question is whether a
reasonable jury could have reasonably disbelieved him. His statutory defense
places the burden of proof on the defendant to prove the existence of an
extreme emergency. Ind. Code § 9-30-10-18(a). Because the jury was free to
wholly disregard his credibility, Knox v. State, 13 N.E.3d 899, 902 (Ind. Ct. App.
2014), we cannot say that no reasonable jury could have disbelieved his self-
serving assertions. There is sufficient evidence supporting his driving with a
suspended license conviction.
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[16] Conn also argues that there is insufficient evidence to support his conviction for
false informing. The State was required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt
that Conn gave “a false report . . . in the official investigation of the
commission of a crime, knowing the report to be false.” I.C. § 35-44.1-2-3.
Because the officer testified that Conn gave the wrong name and birthday
during the course of the investigation, tr. p. 147, there is sufficient evidence that
Conn committed this crime.
III. Appropriateness of the Sentence
[17] Finally, Conn argues that his sentence is inappropriate in light of the nature of
the offense and his character.3 Indiana Appellate Rule 7(B) provides, “The
Court may revise a sentence authorized by statute if, after due consideration of
the trial court’s decision, the Court finds that the sentence is inappropriate in
light of the nature of the offense and the character of the offender.” The
principal role of such review is to attempt to leaven the outliers, but not to
achieve a perceived “correct” sentence. Cardwell v. State, 895 N.E.2d 1219,
1225 (Ind. 2008). Sentencing is principally a discretionary function in which
the trial court’s judgment should receive considerable deference. Id. at 1222.
3
Conn also purports to argue that the trial court abused its discretion in its sentencing, but does so by arguing
that “the trial court abused its discretion by outweighing its aggravating factor from its mitigating factors
while sentencing Larry.” Appellant’s Br. p. 20. However, because under our current statutory sentencing
regime “a trial court can not now be said to have abused its discretion in failing to ‘properly weigh’ such
factors,” Anglemyer v. State, 868 N.E.2d 482, 491 (Ind. 2007), clarified on other grounds on reh’g, 875 N.E.2d 218(Ind. 2007), this argument is not available on appeal.
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The defendant bears the burden of showing us that his sentence is
inappropriate. Kennedy v. State, 934 N.E.2d 779, 788 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010).
[18] Conn faced between one and six years for his driving after a lifetime suspension
conviction, with the advisory sentence being three years. Ind. Code § 35-50-2-
6(b). The trial court sentenced him to the advisory term for this conviction. He
faced up to 180 days for his false informing conviction. Ind. Code § 35-50-3-3.
The trial court sentenced him to ninety days.
[19] Turning to the nature of the offenses, Conn drove his vehicle after his license
had been suspended for life. Although he claimed that he was responding to an
emergency, the jury did not find this claim credible. Then, when pulled over by
the police, Conn relayed the wrong name and birthdate in an attempt to avoid
the consequences of his actions. No aspect of his offenses persuades us to revise
his sentence.
[20] Turning to Conn’s character, we find a man with sixteen criminal convictions,
including multiple offenses relating to operating a vehicle while intoxicated and
multiple offenses relating to driving with a suspended license. His actions in the
present case are not outliers but repeat a persistent trend of behavior. In short,
Conn’s character does not persuade us to revise his sentence. We find that
Conn’s sentence is not inappropriate in light of the nature of the offenses and
his character.
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[21] The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
Mathias, J., and Pyle, J., concur.
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