Michael T. Barnett v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.) ( 2020 )

MEMORANDUM DECISION
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), FILED
this Memorandum Decision shall not be
Feb 07 2020, 10:31 am
regarded as precedent or cited before any
court except for the purpose of establishing CLERK
Indiana Supreme Court
the defense of res judicata, collateral Court of Appeals
and Tax Court
estoppel, or the law of the case.
APPELLANT PRO SE ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Michael T. Barnett Curtis T. Hill, Jr.
Carlisle, Indiana Attorney General of Indiana
J.T. Whitehead
Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
Michael T. Barnett, February 7, 2020
Appellant-Petitioner, Court of Appeals Case No.
18A-PC-3010
v. Appeal from the Madison Circuit
Court
State of Indiana, The Honorable Thomas Newman,
Appellee-Respondent. Jr., Judge
Trial Court Cause No.
48C03-1312-PC-54
Sharpnack, Senior Judge.
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Statement of the Case
[1] Michael Barnett appeals the post-conviction court’s denial of his petition for
post-conviction relief. We affirm.
Issues
[2] Barnett presents four issues for our review, which we restate as:
I. Whether the post-conviction court erred by denying
Barnett’s claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel.
II. Whether the post-conviction court erred by denying
Barnett’s claim of ineffective assistance of appellate
counsel.
III. Whether the post-conviction court erred by adopting the
State’s proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law.
IV. Whether the trial court abused its discretion in sentencing
Barnett and whether his sentence is manifestly
unreasonable.
Facts and Procedural History
[3] The underlying facts, as stated in Barnett’s direct appeal, are as follows:
Barnett was married to Lisa Williams, and they lived together
with Williams’s two children. During the early morning hours of
September 21, 2003, Barnett instructed his eleven-year-old step-
daughter, E.G., to remove her clothes and lie on the floor in the
family room. Barnett then inserted his penis into E.G.’s anus.
Williams entered the room and caught Barnett during this act.
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During the confrontation that ensued, Barnett grabbed Williams
and beat her in the head with a metal figurine.
On September 24, 2003, the State charged Barnett with one count
of Class A felony child molesting and one count of Class C
felony battery with a deadly weapon. Barnett pleaded guilty to
the charged offenses on May 17, 2004. A sentencing hearing was
held on June 7, 2004, at the conclusion of which the trial court
sentenced Barnett to the maximum term of fifty years for the A
felony and the maximum term of eight years for the C felony and
ordered the sentences to be served consecutively for a total
executed sentence of fifty-eight years. On July 21, 2004, Barnett
filed a motion to file a belated notice of appeal, which the trial
court granted the same day.
Barnett v. State, No. 48A02-0410-CR-905, slip op. *2 (Ind. Ct. App. May 3,
2005) (internal footnotes omitted).
[4] On direct appeal, Barnett challenged his fifty-eight year aggregate sentence as to
aggravating and mitigating circumstances and inappropriateness. This Court
affirmed the judgment of the trial court. See id.
[5] In December 2013, Barnett filed his pro se petition for post-conviction relief,
which he later amended. An evidentiary hearing was held on Barnett’s petition
on March 27, 2017. The court took the matter under advisement and allowed
the parties to submit proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law. On
October 29, 2018, the court issued its order adopting the proposed findings and
conclusions of the State and denying Barnett’s petition. This appeal ensued.
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Discussion and Decision
[6] To the extent the post-conviction court has denied relief, the petitioner appeals
from a negative judgment and faces the rigorous burden of showing that the
evidence, as a whole, leads unerringly and unmistakably to a conclusion
opposite that reached by the post-conviction court. Harris v. State, 762 N.E.2d
163, 166 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002), trans. denied. A post-conviction court’s findings
and judgment will be reversed only upon a showing of clear error — that which
leaves us with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made.
Kistler v. State, 936 N.E.2d 1258, 1261 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010), trans. denied. In this
review, findings of fact are accepted unless they are clearly erroneous, and no
deference is accorded to conclusions of law. Id. The post-conviction court is
the sole judge of the weight of the evidence and the credibility of witnesses.
Witt v. State, 938 N.E.2d 1193, 1196 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010), trans. denied.
[7] Barnett alleges ineffective assistance of both trial and appellate counsel. To
prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant is required to
establish both (1) that counsel’s performance was deficient and (2) that
counsel’s deficient performance prejudiced the defendant. Johnson v. State, 948
N.E.2d 331, 334 (Ind. 2011) (citing Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-
96, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674 (1984)). To satisfy the first element, the
defendant must show that counsel’s representation fell below an objective
standard of reasonableness and that counsel’s errors were so serious that the
defendant was denied the counsel guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment. Bethea
v. State, 983 N.E.2d 1134, 1138 (Ind. 2013). In order to satisfy the second
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element, the defendant must show prejudice; that is, a reasonable probability
that, but for counsel’s errors, the result of the proceeding would have been
different. Id. at 1139. There is a strong presumption that counsel rendered
effective assistance and made all significant decisions in the exercise of
reasonable professional judgment, and the defendant has the burden of
overcoming this presumption. Harris, 762 N.E.2d at 168-69.
I. Assistance of Trial Counsel
[8] Barnett first contends he received ineffective assistance from his trial counsel,
claiming that counsel coerced him into accepting an illusory plea agreement.
Particularly, he asserts that trial counsel performed deficiently by
recommending he accept the plea offer to avoid the State’s threat of filing
additional charges, even though the State was foreclosed from filing additional
charges because the statutory deadline had passed. See Ind. Code § 35-34-1-
5(b)(1) (1993) (providing that information could be amended upon written
notice to defendant any time up to thirty days before omnibus date if defendant
is charged with felony).
[9] There are two main types of ineffective assistance of trial counsel claims made
in the context of guilty pleas: (1) the failure to advise the defendant on an issue
that impairs or overlooks a defense, and (2) an incorrect advisement of penal
consequences. Arnold v. State, 61 N.E.3d 1171, 1179 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016).
Barnett’s claim seems to fall within the first category, where, in order to
establish that the guilty plea would not have been entered if counsel had
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performed effectively, the petitioner must show that a defense was overlooked
or impaired and that the defense would likely have changed the outcome of the
proceeding. Id.
[10] During the pendency of this case, certain facts came to light supporting
additional charges of child molesting. The State was willing to accept Barnett’s
open plea, and in return, it would not file additional charges which would
expose him to a significantly longer sentence if convicted. Pursuant to the
prevailing case law at the time of Barnett’s charges and plea, amendments to a
charging information that were related to matters of substance were regularly
permitted as long as the substantial rights of the defendant were not prejudiced,
regardless of whether the amendments were untimely under Section 35-34-1-
5(b). See, e.g., Wright v. State, 593 N.E.2d 1192 (Ind. 1992); Kindred v. State, 540
N.E.2d 1161 (Ind. 1989); Haymaker v. State, 528 N.E.2d 83 (Ind. 1988); Hegg v.
State, 514 N.E.2d 1061 (Ind. 1987); Laughner v. State, 769 N.E.2d 1147 (Ind. Ct.
App. 2002), trans. denied; Townsend v. State, 753 N.E.2d 88 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001);
Tripp v. State, 729 N.E.2d 1061 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000); Todd v. State, 566 N.E.2d
1
67 (Ind. Ct. App. 1991); State v. Gullion, 546 N.E.2d 121 (Ind. Ct. App. 1989).
1
In his brief to this Court, Barnett mentions Fajardo v. State, 859 N.E.2d 1201 (Ind. 2007), where our
Supreme Court held that an amendment of substance to a charging information will be allowed no later than
thirty days prior to the omnibus date, regardless of lack of prejudice to the defendant. However, that case
was decided several years after Barnett’s charges and plea in this case. It does not constitute ineffective
assistance of counsel for an attorney to fail to anticipate changes in the law that have not yet occurred at the
time of representation. Frasier v. State, 267 Ind. 24, 27, 366 N.E.2d 1166, 1167 (1977). Moreover, we have
held that Fajardo does not apply retroactively on collateral review. See Leatherwood v. State, 880 N.E.2d 315
(Ind. Ct. App. 2008), trans. denied.
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Further, in certain circumstances, the State can dismiss the initial information
and then refile it with additional charges after the omnibus date has passed.
See, e.g., Mendoza v. State, 869 N.E.2d 546 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007), trans. denied
(State’s dismissal of original charges and refiling of new charges after omnibus
date had passed was permissible where State was not attempting to circumvent
an adverse ruling and defendant had adequate time to prepare for trial on new
charge).
[11] Barnett has failed to point to any evidence demonstrating anything other than
that his trial counsel logically and reasonably evaluated the circumstances at the
time when he advised Barnett with respect to his plea, and he has failed to show
that a defense was overlooked or compromised and that the defense would
likely have changed the outcome of the proceeding. Accordingly, we cannot
say the post-conviction erred in concluding that Barnett’s trial counsel was not
ineffective.
II. Assistance of Appellate Counsel
[12] Next, Barnett asserts that his appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to
raise issues that were stronger than the ones raised. Because the strategic
decision regarding which issues to raise on appeal is one of the most important
decisions to be made by appellate counsel, counsel’s failure to raise a specific
issue on direct appeal rarely constitutes ineffective assistance. Brown v. State,
880 N.E.2d 1226, 1230 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008), trans. denied. “For countless years,
experienced advocates have ‘emphasized the importance of winnowing out
weaker arguments on appeal and focusing on one central issue if possible, or at
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most a few key issues.’” Walker v. State, 988 N.E.2d 1181, 1191 (Ind. Ct. App.
2013) (quoting Bieghler v. State, 690 N.E.2d 188, 194 (Ind. 1997)), trans. denied.
Accordingly, on review, we should be particularly deferential to appellate
counsel’s strategic decision to exclude certain issues in favor of other issues
more likely to result in a reversal. Id. To evaluate whether appellate counsel
performed deficiently by failing to raise an issue on appeal, we apply a two-part
test: (1) whether the unraised issue is significant and obvious from the face of
the record, and (2) whether the unraised issue is “clearly stronger” than the
raised issues. Walker, 988 N.E.2d at 1191.
[13] Barnett first alleges his appellate counsel failed to raise a violation of Blakely v.
Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 124 S. Ct. 2531, 159 L. Ed. 2d 403 (2004). Under
Blakely and Indiana’s former sentencing scheme, trial courts could enhance a
sentence above the presumptive based only on those facts that were established
in one of several ways: (1) as a fact of prior conviction; (2) by a jury beyond a
reasonable doubt; (3) when admitted by a defendant; and (4) in the course of a
guilty plea where the defendant waived his or her Sixth Amendment rights and
stipulated to certain facts or consented to judicial factfinding. Trusley v. State,
829 N.E.2d 923, 925 (Ind. 2005).
[14] In sentencing Barnett, the trial court noted as aggravating circumstances that he
had a criminal history; that repeated attempts to reform had failed; that he fled
the jurisdiction; that he violated his position of trust with both victims; that the
victims were impacted by this crime, and that he had molested one of the
victims on numerous other occasions. Barnett claims that, with the exception
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of the violation of trust, he admitted nothing else and was sentenced in
violation of Blakely, which his appellate counsel should have raised in his
appeal.
[15] On direct appeal, counsel raised two issues: the inappropriateness of Barnett’s
sentence and the court’s failure to consider the significant mitigating
circumstances of acceptance of responsibility and remorse. At the evidentiary
hearing on the post-conviction petition, appellate counsel testified that Barnett’s
criminal history, failed reformation attempts, and fleeing were included in his
presentence investigation report and that counsel did not believe there were any
Blakely issues because those factors were admitted in the presentence report.
Indeed, the presentence report contains Barnett’s criminal history, reveals
numerous failed rehabilitation opportunities, and indicates he fled from the
state following his commission of these offenses and he had molested the victim
several times in the past, as well as containing comments concerning the lasting
impact of these offenses upon the victims. At sentencing, the court asked
Barnett if he had read the presentence report and whether he had any additions
or corrections. Barnett stated that he had read the report and that he had no
additions or corrections. If a defendant confirms the accuracy of a presentence
report when given an opportunity to contest it, such confirmation amounts to
an admission of information contained in the report for Blakely purposes.
Sullivan v. State, 836 N.E.2d 1031, 1036 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005). Moreover,
Barnett admitted his violation of trust at his sentencing hearing. Thus, any
claim on appeal that these aggravating factors were not proper under Blakely
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would have failed. In short, the unraised Blakely issue was not clearly stronger
than the issues raised by appellate counsel. Accordingly, Barnett has failed to
demonstrate that his appellate counsel performed deficiently in this respect.
[16] Barnett also claims his appellate counsel was ineffective for not asserting certain
sentencing issues he alleges are stronger than those raised by counsel on appeal,
including the trial court’s use of an improper aggravator and its consideration of
his criminal history as a significant aggravator.
[17] First, Barnett argues his appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to raise the
issue of the abuse of the trial court’s discretion in identifying victim impact as
an aggravating factor because the court did not explain how the harm suffered
by the victims exceeded that which other victims of child molesting and battery
with a deadly weapon would endure.
[18] Generally, the impact that a victim or a family experiences as a result of a
particular offense or offenses is accounted for in the advisory sentence.
Simmons v. State, 746 N.E.2d 81, 91 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001), trans. denied.
Therefore, to validly use victim impact evidence to enhance a sentence, the trial
court must explain why the impact in the particular case exceeds that which is
normally associated with the offense or offenses. Id.
[19] The trial court heard the testimony of Williams and E.G. at sentencing and
considered the impact these offenses had on them as an aggravating factor but
did not explain why the impact suffered by them exceeded that which is
normally associated with these crimes. Therefore, we agree with Barnett that
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the trial court improperly relied upon that impact as an aggravating factor when
it sentenced him. However, even when a trial court improperly applies an
aggravator, a sentence enhancement may be upheld if other valid aggravators
exist. Edrington v. State, 909 N.E.2d 1093, 1097 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009), trans.
denied. Moreover, a single aggravating factor is sufficient to support an
enhanced sentence. Williams v. State, 891 N.E.2d 621, 633 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008).
Despite the trial court’s improper reliance on the victim impact, it found several
other valid aggravating circumstances to warrant an enhanced sentence. This
unraised issue concerning a single aggravator was not clearly stronger than the
issues raised by appellate counsel; Barnett has not met his burden of
demonstrating that his appellate counsel performed deficiently.
[20] Barnett’s second argument appears to be that appellate counsel should have
raised the allegedly stronger argument that his criminal history is not a
significant aggravator because, although lengthy, his criminal history contains
no sex offense arrests or convictions.
[21] Barnett’s adult criminal history includes a misdemeanor conviction in 1991 as
well as a reckless driving conviction in West Virginia; two misdemeanor
convictions in 1993; two misdemeanor convictions and a probation violation in
1994; a conviction in 1995 of a felony that he committed while on probation in
another cause; a failure to appear in 1995; an infraction of driving while
suspended in 1999; a misdemeanor conviction and home detention privileges
revocation in 2000; service of jail time twice in 2001 for contempt of court; one
felony conviction, for which he was originally sentenced to twelve years in the
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DOC, and one misdemeanor conviction in 2002; conviction of possession of
cocaine and failure to identify in Texas in 2003; and fleeing the jurisdiction in
2003 after committing the instant offenses. This criminal history was detailed
in the presentence report, the accuracy of which Barnett admitted at his
sentencing hearing.
[22] In total, Barnett has two felony convictions and at least seven misdemeanors.
Moreover, his record indicates he has been undeterred by punishment for his
criminal behavior. Even a limited criminal history can be considered a valid
aggravator. Atwood v. State, 905 N.E.2d 479, 488 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009), trans.
denied. In light of this, we cannot say that Barnett’s proposed issue is clearly
stronger than the issues raised by appellate counsel. Consequently, counsel’s
representation on appeal was not ineffective.
III. Adoption of Findings and Conclusions
[23] In his brief, Barnett asserts the post-conviction court erred when it adopted the
State’s proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law. Appellant’s Br. p. 11.
Barnett provides no further argument or citations to authority in support of this
contention. Our Supreme Court has observed, “[i]t is not uncommon for a trial
court to enter findings that are verbatim reproductions of submissions by the
prevailing party.” Prowell v. State, 741 N.E.2d 704, 708 (Ind. 2001). And
Indiana courts are not prohibited from this practice. See id. at 709. Moreover,
we accept the findings of fact unless they are clearly erroneous. Kistler, 936
N.E.2d at 1261. Here, the post-conviction court’s findings of fact are supported
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by the evidence, and the findings support the conclusions of law. Barnett has
not demonstrated error on this issue.
IV. Sentencing
[24] In his final issue, Barnett presents argument on the trial court’s abuse of its
discretion when it sentenced him. However, Barnett’s appellate counsel raised
sentencing issues in his direct appeal; accordingly, these claims are not available
in a post-conviction proceeding. See Sweet v. State, 10 N.E.3d 10, 13 (Ind. Ct.
App. 2014) (if issue was known and available, but not raised on direct appeal, it
is waived; if it was raised on appeal, but decided adversely, it is res judicata).
Furthermore, Barnett raised, and this Court addressed, the same issues in the
current appeal under the umbrella of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel.
Conclusion
[25] Based on the foregoing, we conclude the post-conviction court properly denied
Barnett’s petition for relief.
[26] Affirmed.
Kirsch, J., and Mathias, J., concur.
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