K.B. v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.) ( 2020 )


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  • MEMORANDUM DECISION
    Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D),                                               FILED
    this Memorandum Decision shall not be                                           Apr 08 2020, 11:18 am
    regarded as precedent or cited before any
    CLERK
    court except for the purpose of establishing                                     Indiana Supreme Court
    Court of Appeals
    the defense of res judicata, collateral                                               and Tax Court
    estoppel, or the law of the case.
    ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT                                    ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
    Michael G. Moore                                          Curtis T. Hill, Jr.
    Indianapolis, Indiana                                     Attorney General of Indiana
    Myriam Serrano
    Deputy Attorney General
    Indianapolis, Indiana
    IN THE
    COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
    K.B.,                                                     April 8, 2020
    Appellant-Respondent,                                     Court of Appeals Case No.
    19A-JV-2135
    v.                                                Appeal from the Knox Superior
    Court, Juvenile Division
    State of Indiana,                                         The Honorable Gara U. Lee,
    Appellee-Petitioner.                                      Judge
    Trial Court Cause No.
    42D01-1902-JD-11
    Pyle, Judge.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-JV-2135 | April 8, 2020                   Page 1 of 12
    Statement of the Case
    [1]   K.B. (“K.B.”)—following his admission to the allegation that he had
    committed an act that would constitute Class B misdemeanor criminal mischief
    if committed by an adult and his subsequent unsuccessful placement in a
    residential program—appeals the juvenile court’s modified disposition order
    awarding wardship to the Indiana Department of Correction with placement at
    a juvenile facility. He also argues that the juvenile court erred by ordering
    payment of costs and fees without inquiring into the ability to pay. Concluding
    that the juvenile court did not abuse its discretion by modifying the
    dispositional order and that the juvenile court improperly imposed costs and
    fees without inquiring into an ability to pay, we affirm the juvenile court’s
    modified disposition order, reverse the juvenile court’s imposition of costs and
    fees, and remand for further proceedings.
    [2]   We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand.
    Issues
    1. Whether the juvenile court abused its discretion by modifying
    the dispositional order to award wardship of K.B. to the
    Department of Correction.
    2. Whether the juvenile court erred by ordering payment of costs
    and fees without inquiring into the ability to pay.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-JV-2135 | April 8, 2020   Page 2 of 12
    Facts
    [3]   In February 2019, then fifteen-year-old K.B. lived with his stepmother, Sara
    Letts (“Stepmother”),1 while his father was incarcerated. K.B.’s mother did not
    have regular contact with K.B. Apparently another relative had had a
    guardianship over K.B. since 2014, but that guardian did not have contact with
    K.B.
    [4]   On February 24, 2019, K.B. damaged a door frame at Stepmother’s house.
    Thereafter, the State filed a petition alleging that K.B. was a delinquent child
    for committing an act that would constitute Class B misdemeanor criminal
    mischief if committed by an adult. K.B.’s juvenile history included an
    adjudication in September 2018 for battery resulting in moderate bodily injury
    and referrals for disorderly conduct and habitual disobedience.
    [5]   On March 14, 2019, the juvenile court held a combination
    admission/disposition hearing, during which K.B. admitted to the delinquency
    allegation. Stepmother was present at the hearing.2 The juvenile court
    determined that K.B. was a delinquent child and then moved to determining the
    disposition. The juvenile court ordered a “90-day suspended sentence to secure
    detention, suspended to one year of formal probation[.]” (Tr. Vol. 2 at 10). As
    1
    The record on appeal refers to Stepmother as Sara Letts, Sarah Letts, Sara Lett, or Sara Baughn.
    2
    The record on appeal indicates that K.B.’s “sister” was present at the hearing. (App. Vol. 2 at 8, 53).
    However, the record further indicates that this “sister” who was present was Sara Letts, who is K.B.’s
    stepmother.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-JV-2135 | April 8, 2020                       Page 3 of 12
    a condition of probation, the juvenile court ordered K.B. to complete a
    residential treatment program at White’s Residential and Family Services
    (“White’s”). During that hearing, the juvenile court advised K.B. as follows:
    [W]hen you’re at White’s, how long you are there is going to be
    dependent on you and your progress in that program[.] . . . So
    the sooner you get on board and take things seriously and take
    things to heart, and make some real change, the sooner you’re
    going to be able to come home.
    (Tr. Vol. 2 at 11). Additionally, the juvenile court imposed the “typical fines,
    costs, and fees[,]” which included a court cost of $185, a probation
    administration fee of $100, a public defender fee of $50, initial probation fee of
    $25, and a monthly user fee of $15. Upon the imposition of these costs and
    fees, K.B.’s counsel, the probation officer, and the juvenile court had the
    following discussion:
    [K.B.’s Counsel]: Just one administrative question, Your Honor.
    With regard to the fees, this is the situation where we have the
    guardianship in place for [K.B.] with a guardian that doesn’t
    have any contact with [K.B.], Dad’s incarcerated, and Mom’s
    not involved on a regular basis. Who would normally be
    responsible for the payment of those fees to your office?
    [Probation Officer]: It would be [K.B.].
    [K.B.’s Counsel]: And he’s 15, and going to placement, so I
    assume that will be something we will work out. Okay.
    THE COURT: Yup.
    [Probation Officer]: And that the monthly fee part?
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-JV-2135 | April 8, 2020   Page 4 of 12
    THE COURT: While he’s in placement - -
    [Probation Officer]: Is waived?
    THE COURT: - - won’t accrue.
    [K.B.’s Counsel]: Okay. Okay.
    (Tr. Vol. 2 at 11-12).
    [6]   On June 3, 2019, the juvenile court held a review hearing. K.B.’s probation
    officer submitted a report prior to the hearing, and K.B.’s case manager at
    White’s, Miranda Sipe (“Case Manager Sipe”), testified during the hearing.
    Case Manager Sipe informed the juvenile court that K.B. had initially done well
    when he had arrived at White’s and that he was doing well academically.
    However, at the end of April and beginning of May, K.B. had been having
    behavioral issues, including anger issues, trying to manipulate staff, and
    problems with accepting consequences. The case manager also explained that
    K.B. was participating in, but had not yet completed, various treatment
    programs and that he was working on some family therapy with Stepmother.
    Before setting another review hearing for October, the juvenile court
    emphasized the importance of K.B.’s treatment participation at White’s:
    So [K.B.], you understand that, you know, how long you’re in
    treatment depends on you and your progress there. . . . [W]e
    want to make sure that you benefit from this program, and that
    when you’re released, you’re in a position that you won’t be
    coming back here to see me again. We want you to be
    successful, sounds like you’re doing great in school, I’m going to
    encourage you to keep up that, but really, you know, focus on
    your treatment and that type of thing because everybody wants
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-JV-2135 | April 8, 2020   Page 5 of 12
    you to be successful and we’re trying to get you in the best
    position for that.
    (Tr. Vol. 2 at 18).
    [7]   K.B., however, did not heed the juvenile court’s advice when he returned to
    White’s. Beginning the day after the review hearing through the end of July,
    K.B. engaged in a host of aggressive and inappropriate behaviors that led
    White’s to request for K.B.’s immediate removal from its program on July 30.
    These behaviors included repeated verbal aggression, physically assaulting staff
    members and other children at the facility, destruction of facility property,
    watching pornography and showing pornography to other children, and
    possessing a vape pen and a shank made from a toothbrush.
    [8]   On July 31, 2019, the State filed a modification report, setting forth all of K.B.’s
    behavioral issues while at White’s and requesting that his disposition be
    modified. On August 1, 2019, K.B. was removed from White’s and placed in
    Southwestern Indiana Regional Youth Village (“Youth Village”) until an
    August 14 modification hearing. During the short period that K.B. was at the
    Youth Village, he continued to display aggressive behavior. For example, he
    engaged in defiant behavior, intimidation, and destruction of property, such as
    “flipping the dayroom” and throwing a chair at a television. (Tr. Vol. 2 at 36).
    [9]   On August 14, 2019, the juvenile court held a modification hearing. K.B.’s
    mother was present at the hearing. K.B.’s mother informed the juvenile court
    that she had been awarded custody of K.B. when she divorced his father but
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-JV-2135 | April 8, 2020   Page 6 of 12
    that an aunt currently had a guardianship over K.B. At the end of the hearing,
    the juvenile court modified the disposition order and awarded wardship of K.B.
    to the Department of Correction with placement at the juvenile facility. The
    juvenile court did not modify its order for the payment of costs or fees. K.B.
    now appeals.
    Decision
    1. Modified Disposition
    [10]   K.B. first argues that the juvenile court abused its discretion by modifying his
    disposition. Specifically, he contends that the juvenile court should have
    continued his placement at White’s or should have considered another less
    restrictive placement instead of ordering his placement with the Department of
    Correction. We disagree.
    [11]   The choice of the specific disposition of a juvenile adjudicated a delinquent
    child is a matter within the sound discretion of the juvenile court subject to the
    statutory considerations of the welfare of the child, the safety of the community,
    and the policy of favoring the least harsh disposition. J.S. v. State, 
    881 N.E.2d 26
    , 28 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008). A juvenile disposition will not be reversed absent a
    showing of an abuse of discretion.
    Id. An abuse
    of discretion occurs when the
    juvenile court’s action is clearly erroneous and against the logic and effect of the
    facts and circumstances before the court or the reasonable, probable, and actual
    inferences that can be drawn therefrom.
    Id. Thus, the
    juvenile court is
    accorded wide latitude and great flexibility in its dealings with juveniles.
    Id. Court of
    Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-JV-2135 | April 8, 2020   Page 7 of 12
    [12]   INDIANA CODE § 31-37-18-6 provides:
    If consistent with the safety of the community and the best
    interest of the child, the juvenile court shall enter a dispositional
    decree that:
    (1) is:
    (A) in the least restrictive (most family like) and most
    appropriate setting available; and
    (B) close to the parents’ home, consistent with the best
    interest and special needs of the child;
    (2) least interferes with family autonomy;
    (3) is least disruptive of family life;
    (4) imposes the least restraint on the freedom of the child and the
    child’s parent, guardian, or custodian; and
    (5) provides a reasonable opportunity for participation by the
    child’s parent, guardian, or custodian.
    [13]   Under this statute, the juvenile court “is only required to consider the least
    restrictive placement if that placement comports with the safety needs of the
    community and the child’s best interests.” J.B. v. State, 
    849 N.E.2d 714
    , 717
    (Ind. Ct. App. 2006) (citing I.C. § 31-37-18-6) (emphasis in original). “Thus,
    the statute recognizes that in certain situations the best interest of the child is
    better served by a more restrictive placement.” K.A. v. State, 
    775 N.E.2d 382
    ,
    387 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002), trans. denied.
    [14]   Here, this case presents such a situation where a more restrictive placement was
    not an abuse of discretion. K.B., who has a history of juvenile delinquency,
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-JV-2135 | April 8, 2020   Page 8 of 12
    was already given an opportunity to be in a less restrictive residential placement
    at White’s, and he was unsuccessful in that placement. Indeed, his behavior
    while in that residential placement was so frequent and abhorrent that White’s
    sought to have him immediately removed its facility. Moreover, after K.B.’s
    removal from White’s, he continued his aggressive behavior while in the Youth
    Village. K.B.’s behavior showed a defiance and lack of respect for authority.
    Given the facts and circumstances of this case, we cannot say that the juvenile
    court abused its discretion by modifying its disposition order and ordering the
    placement of K.B. with the Department of Correction. See, e.g., 
    K.A., 775 N.E.2d at 387
    (concluding that there was no abuse of discretion by the juvenile
    court when it modified the juvenile’s disposition to commitment to the
    Department of Correction after the juvenile had failed to reform her behavior at
    other placements); M.R. v. State, 
    605 N.E.2d 204
    , 208 (Ind. Ct. App. 1992)
    (explaining that “[t]here are times in juvenile proceedings when the best interest
    of the juvenile and society require commitment” to a juvenile facility).
    2. Payment of Costs and Fees
    [15]   Additionally, K.B. challenges the juvenile court’s imposition of costs and fees
    without inquiring into his or his parents’ ability to pay.
    [16]   Pursuant to INDIANA CODE § 31-40-2-1(a), a juvenile court “may” order a
    delinquent child or the child’s parent, guardian, or custodian to pay probation
    fees and an administrative fee; however, such fees are subject to INDIANA CODE
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-JV-2135 | April 8, 2020   Page 9 of 12
    § 31-40-1-3.3 Our Court recently addressed INDIANA CODE § 31-40-1-3,
    sometimes referred to as the reimbursement statute, as follows:
    The reimbursement statute provides that the juvenile court
    “shall” order parents to pay for or reimburse the costs of services
    provided to the delinquent child “unless” the court finds that
    parents are unable to pay or that justice would not be served.
    I.C. § 31-40-1-3(c). Thus, implicit in an order for parents to
    reimburse costs is that parents are able to pay and that such is in
    the interest of justice. Hence, this court has held that the
    reimbursement statute requires the juvenile court to inquire into
    parents’ ability to pay and what justice requires for any given set
    of circumstances before it can order parents to pay or reimburse
    costs.
    3
    INDIANA CODE § 31-40-1-3 provides, in relevant part:
    (a) A parent or guardian of the estate of:
    (1) a child adjudicated a delinquent child . . .
    is financially responsible . . . for any services provided by or through the department.
    (b) Each person described in subsection (a) shall, before a hearing under subsection (c)
    concerning payment or reimbursement of costs, furnish the court and the department with an
    accurately completed and current child support obligation worksheet on the same form that is
    prescribed by the Indiana supreme court for child support orders.
    (c) At:
    (1) a detention hearing;
    (2) a hearing that is held after the payment of costs by the department under section 2 of this
    chapter (or IC 31-6-4-18(b) before its repeal);
    (3) the dispositional hearing; or
    (4) any other hearing to consider modification of a dispositional decree;
    the juvenile court shall order the child’s parents or the guardian of the child’s estate to pay for,
    or reimburse the department for the cost of services provided to the child or the parent or
    guardian unless the court makes a specific finding that the parent or guardian is unable to pay or
    that justice would not be served by ordering payment from the parent or guardian.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-JV-2135 | April 8, 2020                        Page 10 of 12
    E.M. v. State, 
    128 N.E.3d 1
    , 7 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019) (citing of Matter of C.K., 
    695 N.E.2d 601
    , 605 (Ind. Ct. App. 1998), trans. denied; In re M.L.K., 
    751 N.E.2d 293
    , 298-99 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001)).
    [17]   Here, the juvenile court imposed costs and fees at the initial disposition hearing
    when K.B.’s parents or guardian were not present. K.B.’s stepmother was at
    that hearing, but the record before us does not reveal that the juvenile court
    made any inquiry to K.B. or Stepmother regarding an ability to pay.
    Additionally, at the disposition modification hearing, K.B.’s mother was
    present, but the juvenile court made no inquiry into her ability to pay.
    [18]   The State acknowledges that the juvenile court improperly ordered K.B. to pay
    costs and fees without inquiring as to his or his parents’ ability to pay and that
    “the appropriate remedy would be to remand to the juvenile court to conduct
    an indigency hearing.” (State’s Br. 13).4 Accordingly, we remand this case to
    the juvenile court to conduct an indigency hearing. See, e.g., 
    E.M., 128 N.E.3d at 2
    (reversing the imposition of costs and remanding for a hearing to consider
    statutory factors, including the parents’ ability to pay and whether
    reimbursement served the interest of justice); M.Q.M. v. State, 
    840 N.E.2d 441
    ,
    449 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006) (remanding the case for the juvenile court to conduct
    4
    We reject the State’s initial argument that K.B. forfeited his right to appeal the imposition of fees and costs
    because he did not file a notice of appeal when the juvenile court entered its initial disposition order and
    because there are no extraordinary compelling reasons to allow him to raise the issue.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-JV-2135 | April 8, 2020                       Page 11 of 12
    an indigency hearing); A.E.B. v. State, 
    756 N.E.2d 536
    , 544 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001)
    (remanding for indigency hearing to determine juvenile’s ability to pay
    probation and public defender fees).
    [19]   Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.
    Bradford, C.J., and Baker, J., concur.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-JV-2135 | April 8, 2020   Page 12 of 12