B.P. v. Review Board of the Indiana Department of Workforce Development (mem. dec.) ( 2020 )

MEMORANDUM DECISION
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D),
this Memorandum Decision shall not be FILED
regarded as precedent or cited before any
court except for the purpose of establishing
Apr 15 2020, 8:52 am
the defense of res judicata, collateral CLERK
Indiana Supreme Court
estoppel, or the law of the case. Court of Appeals
and Tax Court
APPELLANT, PRO SE ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
B.P. Curtis T. Hill, Jr.
Fort Wayne, Indiana Attorney General of Indiana
Natalie F. Weiss
Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
B.P., April 15, 2020
Appellant-Petitioner, Court of Appeals Case No.
19A-EX-1862
v. Appeal from the Review Board of
the Department of Workforce
Review Board of the Indiana Development
Department of Workforce Steven F. Bier, Chairperson
Development, Larry A. Dailey, Member
Appellee-Respondent. Lower Court Cause No.
19-R-609
Pyle, Judge.
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Statement of the Case
[1] B.P. (“B.P.”), pro se, appeals the Review Board of the Indiana Department of
Workforce Development’s (“Review Board”) decision, which affirmed an
administrative law judge’s (ALJ) determination that B.P. was discharged from
his employment for just cause and was, therefore, ineligible for unemployment
benefits. Concluding that B.P. has waived appellate review of his case due to
his lack of cogent argument and failure to cite to relevant legal authority, we
dismiss this appeal and affirm the Review Board’s decision.
[2] We affirm.
Facts
[3] After B.P.’s employment with the Department of Child Services was terminated
in April 2019, he filed for unemployment benefits with the Indiana Department
of Workforce Development. In May 2019, a claims investigator determined
that B.P. was not entitled to benefits because he had been discharged for just
cause. B.P. appealed that determination. In June 2019, an ALJ held an in-
person hearing to determine whether B.P. had been discharged for just cause
pursuant to INDIANA CODE § 22-4-15-1(d). Thereafter, the ALJ issued a
decision, concluding, in relevant part, that B.P. had “knowingly violated
known, reasonable, and uniformly enforced rules of an employer” and had been
“discharged for just cause.” (Ex. Vol. at 68). B.P. appealed the ALJ’s decision
to the Review Board, and the Review Board affirmed the ALJ’s decision. B.P.
now appeals.
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Decision
[4] B.P. appeals the Review Board’s decision that he was ineligible for
unemployment benefits.
[5] The Indiana Unemployment Compensation Act provides that “[a]ny decision
of the review board shall be conclusive and binding as to all questions of fact.”
IND. CODE § 22-4-17-12(a). Our standard of review on appeal of a decision of
the Review Board is threefold: “(1) findings of basic fact are reviewed for
substantial evidence; (2) findings of mixed questions of law and fact—ultimate
facts—are reviewed for reasonableness; and (3) legal propositions are reviewed
for correctness.” Recker v. Review Bd. of Ind. Dep’t of Workforce Dev., 958 N.E.2d
1136, 1139 (Ind. 2011) (citing McClain v. Rev. Bd. of Ind. Dep’t of Workforce Dev.,
693 N.E.2d 1314, 1318 (Ind. 1998), reh’g denied). When conducting our review,
we will neither reweigh the evidence nor assess witness credibility. Chrysler
Group, LLC v. Rev. Bd. of Ind. Dep’t of Workforce Dev., 960 N.E.2d 118, 122 (Ind.
2012).
[6] Initially, we note that B.P. proceeds pro se in this appeal.
[O]ne who proceeds pro se is held to the same established rules of
procedure that a trained legal counsel is bound to follow and,
therefore, must be prepared to accept the consequences of his or
her action. While we prefer to decide cases on the merits, we will
deem alleged errors waived where an appellant’s noncompliance with the
rules of appellate procedure is so substantial it impedes our appellate
consideration of the errors. The purpose of our appellate rules, Ind.
Appellate Rule 46 in particular, is to aid and expedite review and
to relieve the appellate court of the burden of searching the
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record and briefing the case. We will not become an advocate for a
party, nor will we address arguments which are either inappropriate, too
poorly developed or improperly expressed to be understood.
Ramsey v. Review Bd. of Indiana Dept. of Workforce Dev., 789 N.E.2d 486, 487 (Ind.
Ct. App. 2003) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted) (emphasis
added). See also Basic v. Amouri, 58 N.E.3d 980, 983-84 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016),
reh’g denied.
[7] B.P.’s appellate brief is a glaring failure to comply with Appellate Rule 46. He
failed to include a Statement of Facts and an Argument section, and his brief is
rife with rambling assertions and derogatory comments about his former
employer, including accusations that his employer initiated false allegations
against him and lied to the Review Board. Most notably, however, is B.P.’s
failure to comply with Appellate Rule 46(A)(8). B.P.’s brief contains no cogent
argument, no standard of review, and no citation to caselaw or other relevant
authority. A party waives an issue where the party fails to develop a cogent
argument or provide adequate citation to authority and portions of the record.
See Ramsey, 789 N.E.2d at 490; see also Thacker v. Wentzel, 797 N.E.2d 342, 345
(Ind. Ct. App. 2003) (“It is well settled that we will not consider an appellant’s
assertion on appeal when he has not presented cogent argument supported by
authority and references to the record as required by the rules.”). B.P.’s lack of
cogent argument impedes our ability to provide meaningful appellate review.
As a result, we conclude that B.P. has waived appellate review of his case, and
we affirm the Review Board’s decision. See, e.g., Ramsey, 789 N.E.2d at 490
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(holding that the appellant’s substantial noncompliance with rules of appellate
procedure resulted in waiver of his appellate challenge to the Review Board’s
decision); Basic, 58 N.E.3d at 984 (explaining that the consequences of failing to
make a cogent argument on appeal is waiver of the appeal).1
[8] Affirmed.
Bradford, C.J., and Baker, J., concur.
1
Waiver notwithstanding, B.P.’s apparent argument is nothing more than a request to reweigh the evidence,
which we will not do. See Chrysler Group, 960 N.E.2d at 122. Additionally, we note that, at the end of his
brief, B.P. makes a passing reference to a “violati[on] of [the]14th amendment[.]” (B.P.’s Br. 16). Aside from
the lack of cogent argument, he also did not raise such an argument below. Accordingly, he has waived any
such argument. See Cunningham v. Review Bd. of Indiana Dep’t of Workforce Dev., 913 N.E.2d 203, 205 (Ind. Ct.
App. 2009) (holding that “a party who fails to raise an issue before an administrative body has waived the
issue on appeal”).
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