Charles B. Eldredge v. Susan M. Ruch ( 2020 )

FILED
Jun 04 2020, 10:02 am
CLERK
Indiana Supreme Court
Court of Appeals
and Tax Court
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE
Brian A. Karle Phillip M. Triplett
Ball Eggleston, P.C. Ryan, Moore, Cook, Triplett &
Lafayette, Indiana Albertson, LLP
Frankfort, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
Charles B. Eldredge, June 4, 2020
Appellant-Respondent, Court of Appeals Case No.
19A-DR-2937
v. Appeal from the Clinton Circuit
Court
Susan M. Ruch, The Honorable Bradley K. Mohler,
Appellee-Petitioner. Judge
Trial Court Cause No.
12C01-0906-DR-312
Mathias, Judge.
[1] Charles B. Eldredge (“Father”) appeals the order of the Clinton Circuit Court
granting a motion filed by Susan M. Ruch (“Mother”) requesting an income
withholding order to enforce the court’s earlier order requiring Father to pay a
portion of his daughter’s post-secondary educational expenses. On appeal,
Father presents two issues, which we restate as: (1) whether the trial court had
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statutory authority to issue an income withholding order for the payment of
college expenses; and (2) whether the amount of income withheld by the order
exceeds the maximum withholding permissible by federal statute.
[2] We affirm.
Facts and Procedural History
[3] Mother and Father were married in May 1994 and had one child, M.E.
(“Daughter”), who was born in December 1997. The marriage between the
parties was subsequently dissolved in North Carolina. During the North
Carolina dissolution proceedings, Mother and Father entered into a settlement
agreement that was accepted and incorporated into the North Carolina trial
court’s dissolution decree and child support order on July 10, 2000. Pursuant to
the support order, Father paid Mother $650 per month in child support.
[4] On November 9, 2009,1 the parties filed an agreement to modify child support
in Clinton Circuit Court, which the trial court granted. On June 1, 2012, Father
filed a petition to modify child support again. The parties reached another
agreement on this issue, which the trial court accepted on September 17, 2012.
[5] In the spring of 2016, Daughter graduated from high school in Indiana and was
admitted to both Purdue University and the University of Findlay in Ohio. In
1
At some point prior to this date, Mother moved to Indiana, and jurisdiction over the child support case was
transferred to the Clinton Circuit Court pursuant to the Uniform Interstate Family Support Act (“UIFSA”),
Indiana Code Article 31-18.5.
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the fall of 2016, Daughter began to attend the University of Findlay. Mother,
on December 14, 2016, filed a petition for college expenses in Clinton Circuit
Court.
[6] On April 4, 2017, Father filed a motion to dismiss Mother’s petition for college
expenses, arguing: (1) that the trial court was without authority to issue a new
order for post-secondary educational expenses that was unrelated to the existing
child-support order, and (2) that an order for post-secondary educational
expenses was impermissible under North Carolina law absent an agreement of
the parties2 and was therefore impermissible in the present case.
[7] Following a hearing on Father’s motion to dismiss, the trial court denied the
motion and entered an order requiring Mother, Father, and Daughter to
contribute toward Daughter’s college expenses. The trial court’s order permitted
Daughter to satisfy her obligation by way of scholarships she had received, with
Mother and Father contributing the remaining 46% and 54% respectively. The
court also ordered that the parents’ obligations be limited to the cost of a public,
in-state university, or approximately $23,000 annually.3 The trial court declined
to count $1,024 in monthly VA payments Daughter received as a result of
Father’s military service against the portion of the expenses for which she was
2
See, e.g., Bridges v. Bridges, 355 S.E.2d 230, 232 (N.C. Ct. App. 1987) (“[I]n the absence of an enforceable
contract otherwise obligating a parent, North Carolina courts have no authority to order child support for
children who have attained the age of majority unless the child has not completed secondary schooling[.]”)
(quoted in Brinkley v. Brinkley, 522 S.E.2d 90, 94 (N.C. Ct. App. 1999)).
3
The court also found that Daughter’s desire to attend a smaller school was insufficient to justify the
additional expenses associated with a private school such as Findlay.
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responsible. The trial court further declined to require Daughter to maintain
full-time status as a condition of the parents’ obligations.
[8] Father appealed this order, arguing that the trial court erred in ordering him to
be responsible for a portion of Daughter’s college expenses when there was no
such obligation in the original child-support order and where the parties did not
agree to provide for such expenses. He also argued that the trial court erred by
failing to count Daughter’s VA benefits or require her to maintain full-time
status. A panel of this court held that Indiana law, not North Carolina law,
applied and that, under Indiana law, an award of post-secondary educational
expenses was permissible. See Edlredge v. Ruch, 12A02-1710-DR-2352, 2018 WL
2092931 at *6 (Ind. Ct. App. May 1, 2018) (citing Batterman v. Bender, 809
N.E.2d 410, 413 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004)), trans. denied. We further concluded that
the trial court did not abuse its discretion by declining to require Daughter to
maintain full-time status or by declining to count her VA benefits toward her
obligation to contribute to her educational expenses. Id. at 8-10. Our supreme
court subsequently denied Father’s petition to transfer.4
[9] On July 2, 2019, Mother filed a motion requesting an income withholding
order. The trial court granted the motion the following day. Father filed a
motion to set aside the income withholding order on August 1, 2019, and later
4
We note with some concern that Father’s brief does not cite or otherwise mention his first appeal in this
case. Even if Father’s counsel truly believed that the first appeal was irrelevant to this case, a full recitation of
the procedural history of this case should have included the first appeal and our decision therein.
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filed an amended motion and a request to stay the withholding order. The trial
court held a hearing on these motions on November 15, 2019, and issued an
order denying Father’s motions that same day. On December 16, 2019, Father
filed a notice of appeal.5
I. Statutory Authority to Enter an Income Withholding Order
[10] Father first claims that the trial court lacked statutory authority to enter an
income withholding order for post-secondary educational expenses.6 Income
withholding orders for child support are governed by Indiana Code chapter 31-
16-15, the first section of which provides, “This chapter applies to child support
ordered in any proceeding, including a dissolution of marriage and a paternity
5
Also on December 16, Father filed a motion for relief from judgment, which the trial court denied the
following day.
6
Mother contends that Father’s arguments are precluded by the law-of-the-case doctrine. We summarized
the law-of-the-case doctrine in Rapkin Group., Inc. v. Cardinal Ventures, Inc., as follows:
Generally speaking, the law-of-the-case doctrine provides that an appellate court’s
determination of a legal issue binds both the trial court and the appellate court in any
subsequent appeal involving the same case and substantially the same facts. The law-of-
the-case doctrine is based upon the sound policy that once an issue is litigated and
decided, that should be the end of the matter. However, unlike the doctrine of res
judicata, the law-of-the-case doctrine is a discretionary tool. Moreover, [w]hen additional
information distinguishes the case factually from the case decided in the first appeal, the
law of the case doctrine does not apply.
29 N.E.3d 752, 758 n.6 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted), trans. denied.
In his reply brief, Father argues that the law-of-the-case doctrine is inapplicable because the issue presented
and decided in the first appeal was distinct from the issue presented in the present case. That is, he claims
that the issue in the first case was whether the trial court had the authority to issue the educational support
order, whereas the question in the present case is whether the trial court had the statutory authority to enforce
the educational support order via an income withholding order. Under these facts and circumstances, we
decline to apply the law-of-the-case doctrine and address Father’s claims on the merits, as is our preference.
See In re D.H., 119 N.E.3d 578, 586 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019) (noting our preference to resolve cases on the
merits), adhered to on reh’g, 122 N.E.3d 832, trans. denied.
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action.” Ind. Code § 31-16-15-0.3. Father argues that an order for post-
secondary educational expenses is not “child support” and that an income
withholding order is therefore not authorized.
[11] Father also notes that Indiana Code section 31-16-15-2.6 provides that “[a]n
income withholding order issued under this chapter remains in effect until a
child support obligation, including current child support, child support
arrearage, medical support, interest, and fees, is paid in full.” Because this
section does not explicitly include post-secondary educational expenses, Father
contends that an income-withholding order for such expenses is impermissible.
[12] Father is correct that Indiana law generally makes a distinction between a
“child support order” and an “educational support order.” See Sutton v. Sutton,
773 N.E.2d 289, 294 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002) (noting that education expenses are
addressed separately from child support) (citing Ind. Code § 31-16-6-2
(authorizing educational support orders)). But this does not mean that an
educational support order is unrelated to a child support order. Indeed, Indiana
Code section 31-16-6-2(a)(1), provides that a “child support order or an educational
support order may also include, where appropriate . . . amounts for the child’s
education in elementary and secondary schools and at postsecondary educational
institutions.” (emphases added). Thus, either a child support order or an
educational support order may include amounts for educational expenses,
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including post-secondary educational expenses.7 In other words, child support
orders and educational support orders are not only closely related, they overlap
in that they can both include awards for educational expenses.
[13] More importantly, Indiana Code section 31-9-2-58(a) provides:
(a) ‘Income withholding order,’ for purposes of IC 31-16-15 and
IC 31-16-16, means an order or other legal process directed to an
obligor’s income payor to withhold:
(1) support; and
(2) support fees and maintenance fees as described in IC 33-
37-5-6;[8]
from the income of the obligor.
(emphasis added). Accordingly, an “income withholding order” is by definition
not limited to “child support” but more generally to “support,” which includes
an order for educational support.
[14] Father also claims that post-secondary educational expenses cannot be
considered “child support” because there is no common-law duty to provide a
child with a college education. See Neal v. Austin, 20 N.E.3d 573, 577 (Ind. Ct.
App. 2014). He therefore claims that the statute authorizing a trial court to
7
This would apparently apply to those who begin their post-secondary education prior to reaching the age of
majority.
8
This section “applies to an action in which a final court order requires a person to pay support or
maintenance payments through the clerk or the state central collection unit.” Ind. Code § 33-37-5-6.
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require parents to contribute to a child’s post-secondary educational expenses,
Indiana Code section 31-16-6-2, must be strictly construed as being in
derogation of the common law. See Campbell v. Eary, 132 N.E.3d 413, 415 (Ind.
Ct. App. 2019) (noting that a statute in derogation of common law must be
strictly construed). Accordingly, Father claims that the trial court’s order
requiring him to contribute to Daughter’s post-secondary educational expenses
cannot be subject to an income withholding order. We disagree.
[15] Even if we strictly construe the relevant statutes, Father’s argument fails.
Indiana Code section 31-16-6-2(a) provides explicit statutory authority for the
entry of educational support orders for post-secondary education. And the
statutory definition of an income withholding order does not limit such
withholding orders strictly to child support, but to “support” generally. I.C. §
31-9-2-58(a).
[16] Because the statute defining the term “income withholding order” does not
limit such orders strictly to child support, we disagree with Father’s argument
that strictly construing the relevant statutes supports his position. In short, we
reject Father’s argument that the trial court had no authority to enforce its
educational support order by issuing an income withholding order.
II. 15 U.S.C. § 1673
[17] The trial court’s income withholding order provided that the amount to be
withheld from Father’s pay be the lesser of: (1) the amount by which Father’s
weekly disposable earnings exceed thirty times the current minimum wage, or
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(2) fifty percent of his disposable earnings. Appellant’s App. pp. 46–47. Father
argues that this income withholding order is contrary to the controlling
provisions of 15 U.S.C. § 1673, which sets certain limits on garnishments and
income withholdings.
[18] Father correctly notes that 15 U.S.C. § 1673(a) generally provides that “the
maximum part of the aggregate disposable earnings of an individual for any
workweek which is subjected to garnishment may not exceed . . . (1) 25 per
centum of his disposable earnings for that week” or “(2) the amount by which
his disposable earnings for that week exceed thirty times the Federal minimum
hourly wage,” whichever is less.
[19] Subsection (b) of this statute, however, provides an exception to the general
rule, stating that “[t]he restrictions of subsection (a) do not apply in the case of .
. . (A) any order for the support of any person issued by a court of competent
jurisdiction[.]” Id. § 1673(b)(1)(A). In such cases, “[t]he maximum part of the
aggregate disposable earnings of an individual for any workweek which is
subject to garnishment to enforce any order for the support of any person shall not
exceed—
(A) where such individual is supporting his spouse or dependent
child (other than a spouse or child with respect to whose support
such order is used), 50 per centum of such individual’s disposable
earnings for that week; and
(B) where such individual is not supporting such a spouse or
dependent child described in clause (A), 60 per centum of such
individual’s disposable earnings for that week[.]
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15 U.S.C. § 1673(b)(2) (emphasis added).
[20] Here, the trial court determined that the exception contained in subsection
1673(b)(1)(A) was applicable and that the withholding from Father’s pay was
limited by subsection 1673(b)(2)(A) to a maximum of fifty percent. Father
claims that this was improper and that the withholding order should be limited
to twenty-five percent of his weekly disposable income under subsection
1673(a).
[21] Specifically, Father contends that the term “support of any person” used in
subsection 1673(b)(1)(A) means support for a “spouse or dependent child,” and
he claims that Daughter, who is now over the age of eighteen, is no longer a
“dependent child.” In support of this argument, Father refers to the language in
subsection 1673(b)(2)(A), which sets forth the maximum allowable withholding
depending upon whether the individual is currently supporting a “spouse or
dependent child (other than a spouse or child with respect to whose support such
order is used).” (emphasis added). Thus, Father argues that the “support of any
person” mentioned in subsection 1673(b)(1)(A) must mean the support of a
“spouse or dependent child” as used in subsection 1673(b)(2)(A). We disagree.
[22] First, the plain language of subsection 1673(b)(1)(A) simply refers to “the
support of any person.” (emphasis added). An order requiring Father to
contribute to the post-secondary educational expenses of Daughter is clearly an
order for the support of any person.
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[23] Moreover, Father’s reliance on the term “spouse or dependent child” as used in
subsection 1673(b)(2) is misplaced. That subsection is concerned with whether
the individual subject to the withholding order is currently supporting a spouse
or dependent child other than a spouse or child who is the beneficiary of the
current withholding order. It does not modify the term “any person” as used in
subsection 1673(b)(1)(A). In fact, subsection 1673(b)(2) refers to the “spouse or
child” who is the beneficiary of the current withholding order and does not
limit the applicability of that subsection to a spouse or dependent child. In other
words, the general rule set forth in subsection 1673(a) is inapplicable in cases
involving an order for the support of “any person,” which includes a child,
whether a dependent child or not.
[24] In summary, the income withholding order is for the support of “any person,”
i.e., Daughter. Accordingly, the withholding order is not subject to the
limitations found in the general rule contained in subsection 1673(a), but to the
exceptions to this general rule contained in subsection 1673(b). And the trial
court’s income withholding order complies with the limitations of the latter
subsection. In other words, the trial court’s income withholding order is not
contrary to the provisions of 15 U.S.C. § 1673.
Conclusion
[25] The trial court did not lack statutory authority to enter an income withholding
order to enforce its earlier order requiring Father to contribute to Daughter’s
post-secondary educational expenses. Nor does the trial court’s withholding
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order run afoul of 15 U.S.C. § 1673. We therefore affirm the judgment of the
trial court.
[26] Affirmed.
Riley, J., and Tavitas, J., concur.
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