Jesus Pedraza, Jr. v. State of Indiana ( 2020 )

FILED
Jun 05 2020, 10:16 am
OPINION ON REHEARING
CLERK
Indiana Supreme Court
Court of Appeals
and Tax Court
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Scott H. Duerring George P. Sherman
South Bend, Indiana Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
Jesus Pedraza, Jr., June 5, 2020
Appellant-Defendant, Court of Appeals Case No.
19A-CR-850
v. Appeal from the St. Joseph
Superior Court
State of Indiana, The Honorable Elizabeth C.
Appellee-Plaintiff. Hurley, Judge
Trial Court Cause No.
71D08-1709-MR-12
Tavitas, Judge.
OPINION ON REHEARING
[1] Pedraza petitions for rehearing and challenges “material factual misstatements
regarding Pedraza’s involvement in the drug deal/robbery” and “material
misstatements regarding the admissibility of Pedraza’s statement.” Pedraza’s
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion on Rehearing 19A-CR-850 | June 5, 2020 Page 1 of 4
Petition for Rehearing at pp. 4, 7. We grant Pedraza’s petition for rehearing for
the limited purpose of making a point of clarification. In all other respects,
Pedraza’s petition for rehearing is denied.
[2] Pedraza first argues that our opinion contains factual misstatements. Our
review of the record does not support Pedraza’s argument. There is evidence in
the record to support the factual statements at issue, and Pedraza’s argument is
merely a request to reweigh the evidence, which we cannot do. Beasley v. State,
46 N.E.3d 1232, 1235 (Ind. 2016).
[3] Next, we write briefly to clarify our factual recitation regarding the
circumstances of Pedraza’s Miranda waiver. Although Pedraza’s challenge to
our factual recitation is not dispositive, 1 clarification is necessary with respect to
our statement in paragraph 29 as follows:
1
Pedraza maintains that his Miranda waiver was neither knowing nor voluntary because, despite Pedraza’s
multiple requests, Investigator Mullins did not tell Pedraza what charges were pending against him at the
time of the custodial interrogation. We did not find, and Pedraza did not cite, any compelling support for his
argument that Investigator Mullins was required to recite the specific charges against him. Nor did we find
support for Pedraza’s contention that Investigator Mullins’ failure to recite the specific charges rendered
Pedraza’s Miranda waiver not knowing or involuntary.
In Burgans v. State, 500 N.E.2d 183, 185 (Ind. 1986), Burgans argued that his waiver and confession were not
voluntarily and intelligently made because the police did not advise, before commencing custodial
interrogation, that Burgans could face the death penalty. In finding a valid Miranda waiver, our Supreme
Court reasoned:
The legal standard to be applied to determine whether an accused has voluntarily waived his
rights is whether, looking at all the circumstances, the confession was free and voluntary, and
not induced by any violence, threats, promises or other improper influences.
The record is devoid of any suggestion that police resorted to physical or psychological pressure
to elicit the confession. Nor is there any question about appellant’s comprehension of the full
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The record reveals that, before Pedraza waived his Miranda
rights, he asked why he was being interviewed, and Investigator
Mullins replied: “It’s got everything to do with Frederickson
[Street]”; and “[w]e’ve got information that you were out there
that night . . . .” See Tr. Exhibits Vol. p. 177, State’s Ex. 129.
Pedraza v. State, No. 19A-CR-850, slip. op. at 13 (Ind. Ct. App. Mar. 30, 2020).
[4] Pedraza’s time-stamped video statement proceeded as follows:
1:25 2-1:51 Investigator Mullins recites the Miranda advisement.
1:52 Pedraza indicates that he understands.
2:05-2:19 Investigator Mullins reads from the written Miranda
waiver form.
2:21 Pedraza indicates that the recitals that Investigator
Mullins read to Pedraza are true.
panoply of rights set out in the Miranda warnings and of the potential consequences of a
decision to relinquish them.
Appellant’s decision not to rely on his rights was uncoerced, he at all times knew he could stand
mute and request a lawyer. He was aware of the State’s intention to use his statements to secure
a conviction. We therefore find the waiver is valid as a matter of law. The trial court did not err
by admitting appellant’s confession.
Burgans, 500 N.E.2d at 185; see Armour v. State, 479 N.E.2d 1294 (Ind. 1985) (“Miranda does not require an
accused be informed of the penal consequences or the specificity of charges.”); see also Douglas v. State, 481
N.E.2d 107, 112 (Ind. 1985) (“. . . [A]ny alleged deficiencies regarding this type of discrete information does
not render a confession involuntary.”).
2
For reference, we denote, for each event, the corresponding minute and second mark in the eleven minute
and forty-six seconds-long video interview. For instance, “1:25” refers to the “1 minute, 25 second” mark in
the video interview.
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2:41 Investigator Mullins gives Pedraza the written
Miranda waiver form to sign.
2:43 Pedraza signs the Miranda waiver.
2:53 Investigator Mullins asks Pedraza why Pedraza
believes he is in custody.
3:05 Investigator Mullins replies that the interrogation
pertains to the Frederickson Street incident.
(Mullins reiterates the same at 3:45).
3:53 Pedraza replies that his childhood friend, Bethel,
died in the Frederickson Street incident.
[5] Accordingly, we write to clarify that Investigator Mullins referred to
Frederickson Street approximately twenty seconds after Pedraza signed the
Miranda waiver. 3 In all other respects, our memorandum decision is affirmed.
Najam, J. and Vaidik, J., concur.
3
Paragraph 18 of our memorandum decision correctly recounts the sequence of events as they occurred
during Pedraza’s custodial interrogation.
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