Jason Brimner and Kelli Brimner v. Bradley Binz and Laurie Binz ( 2020 )

FILED
Jun 05 2020, 10:10 am
CLERK
Indiana Supreme Court
Court of Appeals
and Tax Court
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANTS ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEES
John D. Waller Andrew S. Williams
James A. Carter Eric M. Wilkins
David W. Patton Hunt Suedhoff Kalamaros, LLP
Wooden McLaughlin LLP Fort Wayne, Indiana
Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
Jason Brimner and Kelli June 5, 2020
Brimner, Court of Appeals Case No.
Appellants/Defendants/Counterclaim 19A-PL-3021
Plaintiffs, Appeal from the Allen Superior
Court
v. The Hon. Nancy Eshcoff Boyer,
Judge
Bradley Binz and Laurie Binz, Trial Court Cause No.
Appellees/Plaintiffs/Counterclaim 02D01-1804-PL-116
Defendants.
Bradford, Chief Judge.
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Case Summary
[1] In 2014, Neil and Grace Schroeder sold two tracts of land in Allen County, one
to Bradley and Laurie Binz (“Tract A”) and one to Jason and Kelli Brimner
(“Tract B”). The sales of the contiguous plots left Tract B landlocked, and the
Binzes have never contested that the Brimners would be entitled to an ingress-
egress easement of necessity from Tract B to a public roadway through Tract A.
Prior to the sales, the Schroeders and Brimners executed a roadway easement
instrument (“the Easement Instrument”) that gave the Brimners the right to
extensively landscape their ingress-egress easement. As it happened, the
Easement Instrument was not recorded prior to the sales of Tract A and Tract
B.
[2] Over time, the Brimners landscaped and made other improvements to the
easement, and the Binzes eventually filed suit, contending, inter alia, that the
Easement Instrument, with its landscaping rights, was unenforceable because
the Binzes had not been put on notice of it prior to purchasing Tract A. The
Binzes later amended their complaint to add their title insurer and the closing
agent. The Brimners countersued, alleging that the Binzes had intentionally or
negligently damaged the improvements the Brimners had made to the
easement, improvements that the Brimners argued they were entitled to make
pursuant to the Easement Instrument. In June of 2019, all parties settled and
stipulated to the dismissal of the Binzes’ amended complaint with prejudice.
The Brimners’ counterclaim, however, was specifically excluded from the
stipulation of dismissal.
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[3] Meanwhile, in May of 2019, the Binzes had moved for summary judgment on
the Brimners’ counterclaim, alleging that they could not be liable for damage to
improvements to the easement because the Easement Instrument was
unenforceable. Despite the Brimners’ argument that the settlement of the
Binzes’ amended complaint foreclosed further litigation of the enforceability of
the Easement Instrument, the trial court entered summary judgment in favor of
the Binzes on the basis that it was not enforceable. The Brimners contend that
the trial court erred in failing to conclude that the stipulated dismissal of the
Binzes’ amended complaint was res judicata as to the Brimners’ counterclaim.
Because we disagree, we affirm.
Facts and Procedural History
[4] On June 8, 2014, the Binzes and Schroeders executed a purchase agreement
and seller-disclosure form for Tract A, the latter of which indicated that “there
will be an easement granted prior to closing for access to [Tract B].”
Appellant’s App. Vol. II p. 21. On July 14, 2014, the Schroeders and Brimners
executed the Easement Instrument, which granted the Brimners an ingress-
egress easement from Tract B to a public roadway1 and provided that the
Brimners “shall be responsible for maintaining the easement as well as have the
rights to plant and maintain trees, shrubs, plants and/or other vegetation as
1
This provision is arguably superfluous, as it is not disputed that the Brimners are entitled to an easement of
necessity in any event.
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well as construct and maintain an entrance gate, sign, or other structure.”
Appellant’s App. Vol. II p. 58.
[5] On July 28, 2014, a title commitment was issued for Tract A, which stated that
it was subject to “legal right-of-way to Hathaway Road, and subject to all
easements of record.” Appellant’s App. Vol. II pp. 22–23. On August 6, 2014,
the Schroeders executed a warranty deed for Tract A to Bradley Binz, which
stated that Tract A was “subject to all easements, covenants, conditions, and
restrictions of record[.]” Appellant’s App. Vol. II p. 23. On August 8, 2014,
the Easement Instrument and the warranty deed for Tract A were recorded.
Appellant’s App. Vol. II p. 23.
[6] Over the next few years, the Brimners landscaped and made other
improvements to the easement. On April 4, 2018, the Binzes filed their
complaint for damages and declaratory judgment against the Brimners and
Schroeders. While the Binzes have always acknowledged that the Brimners are
entitled to an easement of necessity over their property, they took issue with the
landscaping rights granted to the Brimners in the Easement Instrument. The
Binzes alleged that the Schroeders had breached the purchase agreement and
committed fraud by failing to disclose the Easement Instrument before selling
them Tract A. (Appellant’s App. Vol. II p. 38–41). The complaint also sought
a declaratory judgment against the Brimners that the Easement Instrument was
unenforceable because it had not been timely recorded. (Appellant’s App. Vol.
II p. 41–45). On July 30, 2018, the Binzes and Schroeders settled and filed a
joint stipulation to dismiss the Schroeders. (Appellant’s App. Vol. II p. 68–70).
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[7] On September 6, 2018, the Brimners counter-sued the Binzes for alleged
intentional or negligent removal of shrubs from and damage to drainage tile
within the easement. (Appellant’s App. Vol. II p. 71). On September 26, 2018,
the Binzes amended their complaint to add First American Title Insurance
Company (their title insurer) and Metropolitan Title of Indiana, LLC (the
closing agent), as defendants. (Appellant’s App. Vol. II p. 119–66). On May
17, 2019, a notice filed by Metropolitan Title indicated that the parties had
settled the Binzes’ amended complaint but that “[t]his Notice of Settlement
does not reflect an agreement to settle the Counterclaim dispute filed by [the
Brimners] against [the Binzes].” Appellant’s App. Vol. II p. 236. Also on May
17, 2019, the Binzes moved for summary judgment on the Brimners’
counterclaim, arguing that they could not be liable for damage to improvements
in the easement because Brimners had failed to establish that the Easement
Instrument was enforceable. (Appellant’s App. Vol. II p. 185–234).
[8] On June 13, 2019, all parties to the Binzes’ amended complaint entered a joint
stipulation that provided, in full, that “[t]he parties, by counsel, hereby stipulate
that the Amended Complaint filed by [the Binzes] is dismissed with prejudice.”
Appellant’s App. Vol. II p. 238. The parties did not stipulate to any facts
related to either the amended complaint or the counterclaim. On July 15, 2019,
the Brimners responded to the Binzes’ summary-judgment motion, asserting,
inter alia, that the dismissal of the amended complaint with prejudice was res
judicata as to their counterclaim and, therefore, barred relitigation of the
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enforceability of the Easement Instrument, leaving only the question of
damages to their improvements.
[9] On September 12, 2019, the trial court entered summary judgment in favor of
the Binzes on the basis that the Easement Instrument was unenforceable. The
trial court also ruled that (1) the Binzes were entitled to do whatever they
wished with any trees, shrubs, signage, or vegetation in the easement and (2)
the Brimners’ rights were limited to a common-law easement of necessity for
ingress and egress. On October 15, 2019, the Brimners moved to correct error,
which motion the trial court denied in part and granted in part, clarifying only
the location of the easement and that the Brimners did have the right to
maintain a paved driveway and run utilities in the easement. (Appellant’s App.
Vol. II p. 31–33).
Discussion and Decision
Standard of Review
[10] The Brimners appeal from the partial denial of their motion to correct error.
“The standard of appellate review of trial court rulings on motions to correct
error is abuse of discretion.” Paragon Family Rest. v. Bartolini, 799 N.E.2d 1048,
1055 (Ind. 2003). A trial court has abused its discretion when its decision is
against the logic and effect of the circumstances. Mitchell v. Stevenson, 677
N.E.2d 551, 558–59 (Ind. Ct. App. 1997), trans. denied. The basis of the
Brimners’ argument is their contention that the trial court erred in granting
summary judgment in favor of the Binzes on the Brimners’ counterclaim.
“When reviewing the grant of summary judgment, our standard of review is the
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same as that of the trial court.” Poiry v. City of New Haven, 113 N.E.3d 1236,
1239 (Ind. Ct. App. 2018). Summary judgment is precluded by any genuine
issue of material fact, and “a fact is material if its resolution would affect the
outcome of the case, and an issue is genuine if a trier of fact is required to
resolve the parties’ differing accounts of the truth, or if the undisputed material
facts support conflicting reasonable inferences.” Hughley v. State, 15 N.E.3d
1000, 1003 (Ind. 2014) (citation and quotation marks omitted). The moving
party has the burden of making a prima facie showing from the designated
evidentiary matter that there are no genuine issues of material fact and that it is
entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Smith v. Delta Tau Delta, Inc., 9 N.E.3d
154, 160 (Ind. 2014). If the moving party satisfies this burden, then the non-
moving party must show from the designated evidentiary matter the existence
of a genuine issue of fact precluding summary judgment. Id. The court
considers only the designated evidentiary matters, and all evidence and
inferences are reviewed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party.
Id.; Ind. Trial Rule 56(C).
Res Judicata
[11] The Brimners argue that the trial court erred in failing to conclude that the
dismissal of the Binzes’ amended complaint was res judicata as to the question of
enforceability of the Easement Instrument. The Brimners’ damages
counterclaim, of course, depends on the Easement Instrument being
enforceable. The Binzes argue that the trial court correctly concluded that res
judicata does not apply, allowing further litigation of the Easement Instrument’s
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enforceability. The doctrine of res judicata serves to prevent repetitious litigation
of disputes that are essentially the same. Hilliard v. Jacobs, 957 N.E.2d 1043,
1046 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011), trans. denied. The doctrine consists of the two
components of claim preclusion and issue preclusion, id., and the Brimners
contend that both apply in this case.
A. Claim Preclusion
[12] Claim preclusion applies when a final judgment on the merits has been
rendered in an action, and it acts to bar a subsequent action on the same claim
between the same parties. Evergreen Shipping Agency Corp. v. Djuric Trucking, Inc.,
996 N.E.2d 337, 340 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013). The Binzes argue, however, that
there was no final judgment on the merits because only the amended complaint
was dismissed, leaving the Brimners’ counterclaim for future determination.
We agree with the Binzes.
[13] Trial Rule 54(B) provides, in part, that
A judgment as to one or more but fewer than all of the claims or
parties is final when the court in writing expressly determines
that there is no just reason for delay, and in writing expressly
directs entry of judgment, and an appeal may be taken upon this
or other issues resolved by the judgment; but in other cases a
judgment, decision or order as to less than all the claims and parties is
not final.
(Emphasis added); see also Ind. App. Rule 2(H)(1) (“A judgment is a final
judgment if […] it disposes of all claims as to all parties[.]”). As mentioned,
while the Binzes’ amended complaint was dismissed by stipulation, the
Brimners’ counterclaim was explicitly excluded from that stipulation, leaving to
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be resolved the claim that the Binzes had unlawfully damaged the
improvements the Brimners made to the easement. Moreover, the trial court
did not expressly make, in writing, an entry of judgment or determine that there
was no just reason for delay. Consequently, there was no final judgment on the
merits, a foundational requirement of claim preclusion. See, e.g., Reising v.
Guardianship of Reising, 852 N.E.2d 644, 649 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006) (“Neither
order conclusively settled the entire guardianship issue permanently. Thus, the
orders were not final judgments on the merits that adjudicated all the claims in
this action and cannot be given preclusive effect.”); Exide Corp. v. Millwright
Riggers, Inc., 727 N.E.2d 473, 478 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000) (“Because the circuit
court’s decision in Millwright’s case was not final and was subject to change,
the superior court correctly declined to grant preclusive effect to the circuit
court’s grant of summary judgment.”), trans. denied.
B. Issue Preclusion
[14] The Brimners also argue that the second branch of res judicata, issue preclusion,
prevents entry of summary judgment in favor of the Binzes.
The second branch of the principle of res judicata is issue
preclusion, also known as collateral estoppel. Issue preclusion
bars the subsequent litigation of a fact or issue that was
necessarily adjudicated in a former lawsuit if the same fact or
issue is presented in the subsequent lawsuit. If issue preclusion
applies, the former adjudication is conclusive in the subsequent
action, even if the actions are based on different claims.
Angelopoulos v. Angelopoulos, 2 N.E.3d 688, 696 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013) (citations
omitted), trans. denied. Issue preclusion, however, only “applies only to matters
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actually litigated and decided, not all matters that could have been decided.”
Miller Brewing Co. v. Ind. Dep’t of State Rev., 903 N.E.2d 64, 68 (Ind. 2009)
(emphasis added). Because the Binzes’ amended complaint was dismissed by
stipulation, the issue of the enforceability of the Easement Instrument was not
actually litigated and decided. Consequently, issue preclusion does not apply to
bar its consideration as raised in the Brimners’ counterclaim. See Restatement
(Second) of Judgments § 27 cmt. e (1982) (“An issue is not actually litigated if […]
it is the subject of a stipulation between the parties[.]”). The Brimners have
failed to establish that either branch of the doctrine of res judicata helps them in
this case.
[15] We affirm the judgment of the trial court.
Baker, J., and Pyle, J., concur.
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