Carl Murray v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.) ( 2020 )

MEMORANDUM DECISION
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D),
this Memorandum Decision shall not be FILED
regarded as precedent or cited before any Sep 14 2020, 8:35 am
court except for the purpose of establishing CLERK
the defense of res judicata, collateral Indiana Supreme Court
Court of Appeals
estoppel, or the law of the case. and Tax Court
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Daniel I. Hageman Curtis T. Hill, Jr.
Marion County Public Defender Agency Attorney General of Indiana
Indianapolis, Indiana Courtney L. Staton
Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
Carl Murray, September 14, 2020
Appellant-Defendant, Court of Appeals Case No.
20A-CR-428
v. Appeal from the Marion Superior
Court
State of Indiana, The Honorable Grant W. Hawkins,
Appellee-Plaintiff. Judge
Trial Court Cause No.
49G05-1908-F3-32467
Bailey, Judge.
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Case Summary
[1] Carl Murray (“Murray”) appeals his convictions for two counts of Attempted
Murder, Level 1 felonies,1 and one count of Domestic Battery, as a Class A
misdemeanor.2 We affirm.
Issues
[2] Murray presents two issues for review:
I. Whether there is sufficient evidence to support his
conviction for the attempted murder of Y.H.; and
II. Whether instructing the jury on transferred intent was
fundamental error because it conflicted with an instruction
on the State’s burden of proof.
Facts and Procedural History
[3] During the summer of 2019, Murray presented his wife, Y.H., with dissolution
documents. Y.H. did not sign the documents but the couple separated. Their
estrangement was partially due to Murray’s accusations that Y.H. was sexually
involved with their neighbor and friend, J.J. After the separation, Murray
1
Ind. Code §§ 35-42-1-1, 35-41-5-1.
2
I.C. § 35-42-2-1.3(a)(1).
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would sometimes return to Y.H.’s Indianapolis residence to socialize with
friends on the porch or to visit his stepchildren.
[4] On the day of August 10, 2019, Murray was in and out of the residence. He
transported his stepdaughter to her friend’s house. Atypically, he asked his
stepson if he would like to go to his biological father’s house, and then drove
him there. Around 11:00 p.m., Y.H. and J.J. left to buy cigarettes. When they
returned, Y.H. backed her vehicle into her driveway. The pair sat in Y.H.’s
vehicle for about twenty-five minutes, drinking and listening to music. Y.H.
saw Murray drive his vehicle through an alley and park behind her vehicle.
[5] Murray approached the driver’s side of Y.H.’s vehicle, holding a rifle. He
opened the door and said, “you mother******* thought this was a game.” (Tr.
Vol. II, pg. 221.) Y.H. saw that the rifle was pointed toward J.J.’s head and she
grabbed the barrel. Murray shot through Y.H.’s right hand pinky finger and
Y.H. yelled “mother****** you just shot my finger off.” (Id. at 222.) Murray
continued shooting, until Y.H. was hit with three bullets and J.J. was hit with
six bullets.
[6] Inside the residence, Y.H.’s friend Steven Seals (“Seals”) had been watching
television when he heard Y.H. cry out “no Carl don’t” followed by gunshots.
(Id. at 138.) Seals looked in vain for a weapon, then went outside to confront
Murray. Murray approached Seals, rifle in hand, but Seals tackled Murray and
flipped him over a porch railing. Seals got Murray into a headlock and used his
fists and a brick to strike blows to Murray’s head. Seals was able to get control
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of Murray’s rifle at some point but when Seals tried to fire it, he discovered that
it was either empty or jammed. During the struggle, Murray protested that he
loved Y.H. and was sorry. When Seals was injured by a brick and lost his grip,
Murray escaped the headlock, ran to his truck, and drove off.
[7] Police and emergency medical personnel arrived to find Y.H. and J.J. each in a
critical condition. One bullet had struck an artery in Y.H.’s leg. She underwent
surgery and was given 5.5 liters of blood, essentially a replacement of her full
blood supply. Y.H. was hospitalized for five days. J.J. was placed in a
medically induced coma, having suffered injuries to his colon, spleen,
diaphragm, spine, and kidney. J.J. endured multiple surgeries, received five
liters of blood, and was hospitalized for nineteen days.
[8] On January 6, 2020, Murray was brought to trial before a jury on two counts of
Aggravated Battery, Level 3 felonies,3 two counts of Attempted Murder, Level
1 felonies, and one count of Domestic Battery, as a Level 5 felony. The jury
found Murray guilty as charged but, due to double jeopardy concerns, the trial
court declined to enter judgments of conviction upon the Aggravated Battery
counts and reduced the Domestic Battery conviction to a misdemeanor.
Murray received consecutive sentences of thirty years and twenty-five years for
the attempted murders of J.J. and Y.H., respectively. He was given a
concurrent one-year sentence for Domestic Battery. Murray now appeals.
3
I.C. § 35-42-2-1.5.
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Discussion and Decision
Sufficiency of the Evidence
[9] Murray does not contest the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his
conviction for the attempted murder of J.J. However, he contends that the
State presented insufficient evidence of his intent to kill Y.H. He points to a
lack of testimony that he deliberately aimed the rifle at Y.H. or verbally
threatened Y.H. in particular.
[10] In order to convict Murray of the attempted murder of Y.H., the State was
required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Murray, acting with the
specific intent to commit murder, engaged in an overt act that constituted a
substantial step toward the commission of the crime. Davis v. State, 558 N.E.2d
811, 812 (Ind. 1990).
[11] When reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence to support a conviction, we will
consider only the probative evidence and reasonable inferences supporting the
verdict. Drane v. State, 867 N.E.2d 144, 146 (Ind. 2007). We will affirm the
conviction unless no reasonable factfinder could find the elements of the crime
proven beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. The requisite intent to commit murder
may be inferred from the intentional use of a deadly weapon in a manner likely
to cause death. Davis v. State, 558 N.E.2d 811, 812 (Ind. 1990). Discharging a
weapon in the direction of a victim is substantial evidence from which a jury
can infer intent to kill. Leon v. State, 525 N.E.2d 331, 332 (Ind. 1988).
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[12] Y.H. testified that Murray, armed with a rifle, approached her vehicle, opened
the door, and stated “you mother******* thought this was a game.” (Tr. Vol.
II, pg. 221.) After Murray fired the first shot, which severed Y.H.’s pinky, and
Y.H. cursed at him, Murray did not desist. Rather, he continued firing his
weapon into the vehicle until it was either empty or jammed. Y.H. was
ultimately struck by three bullets. From this evidence, the jury could
reasonably conclude that Murray intended to kill Y.H.
Instruction on Transferred Intent
[13] “The purpose of a jury instruction is to inform the jury of the law applicable to
the facts without misleading the jury and to enable it to comprehend the case
clearly and arrive at a just, fair, and correct verdict.” Dill v. State, 741 N.E.2d
1230, 1232 (Ind. 2001). Jury instruction is a matter assigned to trial court
discretion, and an abuse of that discretion occurs when instructions, taken as a
whole, mislead the jury as to the applicable law. Ham v. State, 826 N.E.2d 640,
641 (Ind. 2005).
[14] Here, the jury was instructed, in accordance with Spradlin v. State, 569 N.E.2d
948, 950 (Ind. 1991), that the jury could convict Murray of Attempted Murder
only if it found that he had specific intent to kill. The jury also received an
instruction on transferred intent:
Under the doctrine of Transferred Intent, the intent to harm one
person may be treated as the intent to harm a different person
when, through mistake or inadvertence, violence directed toward
one person results in injury to a different person.
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In a situation where there is an intent to kill one person, but a
different person suffers the injury and dies, the intent to kill the
first person may serve as proof of the intent to kill the actual
victim.
Murray lodged a vague objection: “I have a problem with it because if there’s
an accident then where’s the transferred intent? … For the record, I’m objecting
to it.” (Tr. Vol. III, pg. 71.) On appeal, he relies upon grounds not asserted at
trial, that is, he argues that the transferred intent instruction conflicts with the
instruction on specific intent to kill and the State could have secured a
conviction upon a lessened burden of proof.
[15] It is well-settled that a defendant may not object to an instruction upon one
ground at trial and present a different ground upon appeal. See Morgan v. State,
755 N.E.2d 1070, 1077 (Ind. 2001). Murray has therefore waived any such
error and may prevail only upon showing fundamental error. Fundamental
error is an extremely narrow exception to the waiver rule where the defendant
faces the heavy burden of showing that the alleged errors are so prejudicial to
the defendant’s rights as to “make a fair trial impossible.” Benson v. State, 762
N.E.2d 748, 756 (Ind. 2002).
[16] Under the doctrine of transferred intent, a defendant’s intent to kill one person
is transferred when, by mistake or inadvertence, the defendant kills a third
person; thus, the defendant may be found guilty of the murder of the person
who was killed, even though the defendant intended to kill another. Blanche v.
State, 690 N.E.2d 709, 712 (Ind. 1998). “This doctrine also applies to the intent
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necessary for attempted murder.” Id. Murray has shown no conflict or error in
the instructions given to the jury, much less fundamental error.
Conclusion
[17] Sufficient evidence supports Murray’s conviction for the attempted murder of
Y.H. He has not established fundamental error in the instruction to the jury.
[18] Affirmed.
Vaidik, J., and Baker, Sr. J., concur.
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