James Dean Childers v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.) ( 2020 )

MEMORANDUM DECISION
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), FILED
this Memorandum Decision shall not be Sep 15 2020, 7:54 am
regarded as precedent or cited before any CLERK
Indiana Supreme Court
court except for the purpose of establishing Court of Appeals
and Tax Court
the defense of res judicata, collateral
estoppel, or the law of the case.
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Jessica L. Richert Curtis T. Hill, Jr.
Richmond, Indiana Attorney General of Indiana
Sierra A. Murray
Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
James Dean Childers, September 15, 2020
Appellant-Defendant, Court of Appeals Case No.
20A-CR-58
v. Appeal from the Wayne Circuit
Court
State of Indiana, The Honorable David A. Kolger,
Appellee-Plaintiff. Judge
Trial Court Cause No.
89C01-1701-MR-1
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 20A-CR-58 | September 15, 2020 Page 1 of 13
Tavitas, Judge.
Case Summary
[1] James Dean Childers appeals his conviction for murder. We affirm.
Issues
[2] Childers raises two issues, which we restate as:
I. Whether the trial court properly admitted a
statement made by Childers.
II. Whether Childers’ due process rights were
violated.
Facts
[3] On the evening of January 14, 2017, Childers went to the Tally Ho bar in
Richmond, and he was seen wearing a silver cross necklace. At some point,
Childers left the Tally Ho bar and went to Mack’s Bar in Richmond. Austin
Sparks and his father, Michael Sparks, also went to Mack’s Bar that evening.
At some point, Tara Parsley and her friend, Taylor Strunk, also arrived at
Mack’s Bar.
[4] Strunk and Austin began talking about Strunk’s ex-boyfriend, Trey, and
Austin’s estranged wife; Austin became very upset. When Parsley and Strunk
were ready to leave at approximately 1:30 a.m. on January 15, 2017, Austin
wanted to go with the women and “hang out,” but Parsley and Strunk refused
Austin’s request. Tr. Vol. III p. 12. The two women waited until Austin was
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 20A-CR-58 | September 15, 2020 Page 2 of 13
distracted while talking to someone else, and the pair left the bar. The women
walked out the back door of the bar because the front door was broken. When
they walked outside, Strunk saw Childers, whom she knew. As the women
were running toward their vehicle, they noticed that Austin was following
them. Childers also followed the women to their vehicle.
[5] As the women were trying to leave, Austin and Childers both tried to talk to
Strunk. Austin pulled out a knife, waved it in the air, told Strunk “tell Trey that
[Austin] had something for him,” and then put the knife away. Id. at 15, 45.
Childers said, “you never stabbed somebody in your life,” and Austin
responded, “do you know me, I don’t know you, do you have a problem with
me.” Id. at 45. Childers was “kind of ignoring it” and trying to talk to Strunk
and Parsley. Id. Strunk said that she needed to leave and that Childers and
Austin needed to go back inside. Strunk then closed her door, and the women
drove away.
[6] According to Parsley, “it looked like [Austin and Childers] were having a
discussion . . . as [the women] were pulling off and it didn’t look like a friendly
conversation.” Id. at 15-16. According to Strunk, it appeared that Childers was
“talking sh**.” Id. As the women left, Parsley called Henry Farris in the bar
“to tell Austin’s dad that he might want to come and get Austin because there
might be an argument or confrontation . . . .” Id. at 16.
[7] Near the same time, Morton Maish and his girlfriend, Chelsea Reynolds,
arrived in the area, parked their vehicle, and walked in the alley toward the bar.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 20A-CR-58 | September 15, 2020 Page 3 of 13
Maish and Reynolds heard two angry voices in the alley. Maish could only see
Austin; because it was dark, Maish could not see the person standing behind
Austin. Reynolds, however, testified that she saw both Austin and Childers.
Austin said to Maish, “who does this guy think he is uh, talking shit to me . . .
.” Id. at 62. Maish and Reynolds continued toward the bar and saw several
people, including Austin’s father, Michael, run out of the bar toward Austin’s
location.
[8] When Michael and the others arrived outside, Childers “was standing up on
[Austin], right in front of him, and right against him.” Id. at 109. Michael
“thr[e]w [Childers] away from [Austin].” Id. Michael saw that “Austin was
standing there, his eyes [were] all bugged out . . . . He’s standing there his eyes
are just froze. He couldn’t say a word. [Michael] kept tapping him on his jaw,
Austin, Austin, Austin. There was no response. He never spoke a word.” Id.
at 110. Austin fell to the ground, and Michael discovered that Austin’s jacket
was covered in blood. Childers got into his vehicle and left.
[9] Austin sustained two stab wounds to his chest, one of which damaged his heart,
resulting in his death. The events leading up to and following the stabbing were
recorded on the bar’s security cameras; the actual altercation and stabbing,
however, were outside the view of the cameras.
[10] William Mills (“William”) is Childers’ stepfather and brother to James Mills
(“Mills”). On January 15, 2017, William called Mills and said that Childers
was “in trouble” and “needed a place to stay.” Tr. Vol. III p. 244. Mills drove
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 20A-CR-58 | September 15, 2020 Page 4 of 13
to Richmond from Cincinnati, Ohio, to pick up Childers. Childers stayed with
Mills for five to seven days in Ohio. While Childers stayed with Mills, Childers
admitted to Mills that he stabbed Austin. Mills also saw that Childers had a
handgun and a couple boxes of ammunition. Childers told Mills that he “was
not going back to Indiana” and that he would “hold court in the street,” which
Mills testified meant “if the cops come to wherever he’s at he’s going to shoot it
out.” Id. at 250. Mills was on probation or parole at the time and did not want
a gun in his house. Mills advised Childers that he “had to leave” and that he
was taking Childers to a relative’s house in Richmond. Tr. Vol. IV p. 2. Mills
told Childers to put his gun in the backseat of Mills’ vehicle, which Childers
did. Mills contacted the Richmond Police Department to report that he was
bringing Childers back to Richmond, and officers stopped Mills’ vehicle and
arrested Childers.
[11] A silver cross necklace was located at the crime scene outside Mack’s Bar on
the ground near the location Austin fell. DNA testing of a sample found on the
cross demonstrated that it was “at least one trillion times more likely if it
originated from Austin Sparks, James Childers and two unknown individuals
than if it originated from four unknown, unrelated, non-tested individuals.” Tr.
Vol. II p. 228. The analysis provided “strong support for the proposition that
Austin Sparks and James Childers [were] contributors to the DNA profile.” Id.
DNA testing of a swab from the chain of the necklace demonstrated that it was
“at least one trillion times more likely if it originated from Austin Sparks, James
Childers and another individual than if it originated from three unknown,
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 20A-CR-58 | September 15, 2020 Page 5 of 13
unrelated, untested individuals.” Id. The analysis provided “strong support for
the proposition that James Childers and Austin Sparks [were] contributors to
the DNA profile.” Id.
[12] In January 2017, the State charged Childers with murder. A September 2018
trial, however, ended with a hung jury and a mistrial. At that trial, Mills
testified that Childers did not admit to stabbing Austin.
[13] Childers was retried in November 2019. During the jury trial, the trial court
held a preliminary hearing outside the presence of the jury to review several
aspects of Mills’ probable testimony, including Childers’ statement about
holding court in the street. Tr. Vol. III p. 220. The trial court ruled that
Childers’ statement was admissible as evidence of flight.
[14] On cross-examination, Mills testified that he decided approximately one month
before the second trial that he planned to change his testimony and he reported
this to the deputy prosecutor at that time. After Mills’ testimony was
completed, Childers argued to the trial court that his due process rights were
violated by the State knowingly using false testimony to obtain a conviction.
The deputy prosecutor informed the trial court that, contrary to Mills’
testimony: (1) Mills informed the deputy prosecutor about his changed
testimony on the Friday before the trial began; and (2) the deputy prosecutor
informed Childers’ counsel of the changed testimony on Sunday before the trial
began. The trial court took the issue under advisement. The parties then
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 20A-CR-58 | September 15, 2020 Page 6 of 13
reached an agreement, and the next morning, a stipulation was read to the jury
as follows:
The parties stipulate the witness James Mills informed the State
of Indiana that he decided to change his testimony on Friday,
November 15th not three weeks ago as he testified. The parties
further stipulate that this communication was initiated by the
State of Indiana and not the witness himself.
Tr. Vol. IV p. 107.
[15] The jury found Childers guilty of murder. The trial court sentenced Childers to
sixty-two years in the Department of Correction. Childers now appeals.
Analysis
I. Admissibility of Evidence
[16] Childers first challenges the trial court’s admission of Childers’ statement
regarding holding court in the street. “The general admission of evidence at
trial is a matter we leave to the discretion of the trial court.” Clark v. State, 994
N.E.2d 252, 259-60 (Ind. 2013). “We review these determinations for abuse of
that discretion and reverse only when admission is clearly against the logic and
effect of the facts and circumstances and the error affects a party’s substantial
rights.” Id. at 260.
[17] Although the holding court in the street statement was addressed by the parties
during a preliminary hearing immediately before Mills’ testimony, Childers did
not object to the statement during Mills’ testimony. By failing to make a
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 20A-CR-58 | September 15, 2020 Page 7 of 13
contemporaneous objection, Childers failed to preserve his challenge to the
admissibility of the evidence. See Brown v. State, 929 N.E.2d 204, 206-07 (Ind.
2010) (“A contemporaneous objection at the time the evidence is introduced at
trial is required to preserve the issue for appeal, whether or not the appellant has
filed a pretrial motion to suppress.”). According, this issue is waived.
[18] Waiver notwithstanding, Childers argues that his statement was inadmissible
under Indiana Evidence Rule 403, which provides: “The court may exclude
relevant evidence if its probative value is substantially outweighed by a danger
of one or more of the following: unfair prejudice, confusing the issues,
misleading the jury, undue delay, or needlessly presenting cumulative
evidence.” According to Childers, the statement was unfairly prejudicial,
confused the issues, and misled the jury.
[19] Mills testified that Childers said he “was not going back to Indiana” and that he
would “hold court in the street,” which Mills interpreted as meaning, “if the
cops come to wherever he’s at he’s going to shoot it out.” Tr. Vol. III at 250.
When Childers was arrested, he was in possession of a gun and more than one
hundred bullets. At a preliminary hearing, the trial court found that Childers’
statement was admissible because it was similar to evidence of flight. 1
1
The State argues that the trial court did not clearly rule on the admissibility of this statement. During the
403 hearing, the trial court, however, stated: “I think I’m going to let his statements about holding (inaudible)
in the street come in and like because again, I think that’s the same that’s a Lee v. State issue I think. But you
both could argue whatever you feel uh, is appropriate there but . . . .” Tr. Vol. III p. 239. The trial court
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 20A-CR-58 | September 15, 2020 Page 8 of 13
[20] Our Supreme Court has held that “‘[e]vidence of flight may be considered as
circumstantial evidence of consciousness of guilt.’” Myers v. State, 27 N.E.3d
1069, 1077 (Ind. 2015) (quoting Brown v. State, 563 N.E.2d 103, 107 (Ind.
1990)). Additionally, “‘[e]vidence of an attempt to avoid arrest [also] tends to
show guilt.’” Id. (quoting Wilson v. State, 455 N.E.2d 1120, 1123 (Ind. 1983)).
[21] Childers argues that the prospect of a law enforcement-related shooting is
“almost certain to evoke strong emotions.” Appellant’s Br. p. 12. The State
argues that, “[t]hough the statement at issue speaks to flight and Childers’
desire to avoid arrest, it is unlikely the jury overvalued the statement when
viewed within the context of the other damaging evidence presented.”
Appellee’s Br. pp. 16-17. We agree with the State. The jury was already aware
of substantial evidence that Childers fought with Austin immediately before
Austin died and that Childers fled Indiana soon thereafter. The statement at
issue was relevant evidence of flight and further efforts to evade arrest, and we
find no indication that the statement unduly prejudiced Childers or would have
confused or misled the jury. The trial court properly admitted the statement.
II. Due Process
[22] Childers next argues that his due process rights were violated because the State
presented false evidence. According to Childers, Mills falsely testified on cross-
earlier cited Lee v. State, 439 N.E.2d 603, 604 (Ind. 1982), for the proposition that “evidence of an attempted
escape is relevant to show consciousness of guilt.”
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 20A-CR-58 | September 15, 2020 Page 9 of 13
examination regarding the date he informed the State of his change in
testimony and the State did not correct the testimony on redirect examination.
[23] “It is well established that ‘a conviction obtained through use of false evidence,
known to be such by representatives of the State, must fall under the Fourteenth
Amendment. The same result obtains when the State, although not soliciting
false evidence, allows it to go uncorrected when it appears.’” Smith v. State, 34
N.E.3d 1211, 1219 (Ind. 2015) (quoting Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264, 269, 79
S. Ct. 1173, 1177 (1959)). “[A] defendant’s Fourteenth Amendment due
process rights are violated when the prosecution knowingly uses false testimony
without disclosing its falsity or attempting to correct it.” Id. In such a case,
“the proper question is: did the State impermissibly use false testimony to
obtain a conviction in violation of a defendant’s due process rights?” Id. at
1220. We focus on “whether the jury’s ability to assess all of the facts and the
credibility of the witnesses supplying those facts has been impeded to the unfair
disadvantage of the defendant.” Id. “Active or passive behavior by the State
that hinders the jury’s ability to effectively act as the fact-finder is impermissible
and may violate a defendant’s due process rights.” Id.
[24] Our Supreme Court addressed alleged false testimony in Smith v. State, 34
N.E.3d 1211 (Ind. 2015). There, two people burglarized a Dollar General
store. Nicole Greenlee, the store manager, was charged and pleaded guilty. At
her guilty plea hearing, Greenlee testified that she entered the store using the
security codes and took the money. Later, at Smith’s trial, Greenlee testified
that Smith entered the store and that Greenlee acted as the lookout. Greenlee
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 20A-CR-58 | September 15, 2020 Page 10 of 13
admitted that she told the police multiple stories regarding the burglary and that
she gave a different story at her guilty plea. Smith moved for a mistrial, which
the trial court denied.
[25] On appeal, Smith argued Greenlee’s trial testimony “cannot be viewed as
simply inconsistent with her previously sworn testimony at the plea hearing.”
Id. at 1219. According to Smith: “One must be false if the other is to be true. . .
. The State should not be able to ‘cherry pick’ which statement under oath is
the truth and which is the perjury.” Id. The State argued that “Greenlee gave
inconsistent statements, which were fully presented to the jury . . . . [thus] [t]he
State did not knowingly use false testimony; instead, a jury performed its duty
in making a credibility determination.” Id.
[26] Our Supreme Court held that “the State did not impair the defendant’s due
process rights by any misuse of Greenlee’s testimony.” Id. at 1220.
To the contrary, the State notified opposing counsel and the trial
court of Greenlee’s conflicting testimony and proactively drew
attention to the discrepancies in Greenlee’s testimony multiple
times throughout the trial, thus permitting the jury to fully
function as an informed fact finder. And the defense was enabled
to, and did, actively emphasize such inconsistencies to the
defendant’s advantage. We find no violation of the defendant’s
due process rights from the State’s use of Greenlee’s testimony in
this case.
Id. at 1220-21.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 20A-CR-58 | September 15, 2020 Page 11 of 13
[27] Here, Mills testified on cross-examination that he informed the State
approximately a month before the second trial that he was changing his
testimony. On redirect examination, the State did not attempt to clarify or
correct Mills’ testimony regarding when the State was notified of the change.
After Mills’ testimony, Childers brought the matter to the trial court’s attention,
and the parties later entered into a stipulation. The following morning, this
stipulation was read to the jury:
The parties stipulate the witness James Mills informed the State
of Indiana that he decided to change his testimony on Friday,
November 15th not three weeks ago as he testified. The parties
further stipulate that this communication was initiated by the
State of Indiana and not the witness himself.
Tr. Vol. IV p. 107.
[28] As in Smith, we find no violation of Childers’ due process rights here. After
Childers brought the timing discrepancy to the trial court’s attention, the parties
entered into a stipulation that was read to the jury and corrected Mills’
testimony regarding when Mills notified the State that he planned to change his
prior testimony. Mills’ false testimony regarding the timing of his changed
testimony was not allowed to go uncorrected. Rather, Childers actively
participated in correcting Mills’ testimony and expressly agreed to the
stipulation read to the jury. Moreover, during closing arguments, Childers
emphasized all of the discrepancies in Mills’ testimony to Childers’ advantage.
Under these circumstances, we cannot say that the “jury’s ability to assess all of
the facts and the credibility of the witnesses supplying those facts” was
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 20A-CR-58 | September 15, 2020 Page 12 of 13
“impeded to the unfair disadvantage” of Childers. See Smith, 34 N.E.3d at
1220. Childers’ argument fails.
Conclusion
[29] The trial court did not abuse its discretion by admitting Childers’ statement
regarding holding court in the street, and Childers’ due process rights were not
violated by Mills’ testimony. We affirm.
[30] Affirmed.
Kirsch, J., and Pyle, J., concur.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 20A-CR-58 | September 15, 2020 Page 13 of 13