Ralpheal Deleon Chambliss v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.) ( 2020 )

MEMORANDUM DECISION
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D),
this Memorandum Decision shall not be FILED
regarded as precedent or cited before any Jun 24 2020, 7:53 am
court except for the purpose of establishing
CLERK
the defense of res judicata, collateral Indiana Supreme Court
Court of Appeals
estoppel, or the law of the case. and Tax Court
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
R. Brian Woodward Curtis T. Hill, Jr.
Appellate Public Defender Attorney General of Indiana
Crown Point, Indiana
Tina L. Mann
Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
Ralpheal Deleon Chambliss, June 24, 2020
Appellant-Defendant, Court of Appeals Case No.
19A-CR-2878
v. Appeal from the Lake Superior
Court
State of Indiana, The Honorable Diane Ross Boswell,
Appellee-Plaintiff. Judge
Trial Court Cause No.
45G03-1705-F5-43
Bailey, Judge.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-CR-2878 | June 24, 2020 Page 1 of 10
Case Summary
[1] Ralpheal Deleon Chambliss (“Chambliss”) appeals his sentence, following a
plea agreement, for making a false statement on a criminal information form, a
Level 6 felony.1 We affirm.
Issues
[2] Chambliss raises two issues on appeal which we restate as:
I. Whether the trial court abused its sentencing discretion in
its finding of aggravating factors.
II. Whether Chambliss’s sentence is inappropriate in light of
the nature of the offense and Chambliss’s character.
Facts and Procedural History
[3] In March of 2017, Chambliss went into Westforth Sporting Goods in Gary,
Indiana, with his nephew, Damon Hill, and the two shopped for guns. Hill
chose three guns, and Chambliss and Hill left the store without purchasing
anything. Later, Hill gave Chambliss money which Chambliss used in March
of 2017 to purchase a J.A. T-380 Jimenez Arms handgun—one of the three
guns Hill had chosen previously—at Westforth Sporting Goods. To purchase
the gun, Chambliss was required to, and did, fill out and sign ATF Form 4473.
1
Ind. Code § 35-47-2.5-12.
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Chambliss indicated on the form that he was purchasing the gun for himself
when, in fact, he was not.2 On March 21, 2017, Hill used the gun purchased by
Chambliss to shoot and kill C. B., one of Chambliss’s other nephews.
[4] On March 30, 2017, Chambliss reported to the Merrillville Police Department
that his handgun had been stolen. On April 6, 2017, the police asked
Chambliss to give them a statement about his allegedly stolen gun. Chambliss
agreed and first told the police that he had purchased the gun because he was a
security guard and needed it for his employment. Chambliss then admitted that
he had bought the gun for Hill.
[5] On May 2, 2017, the State charged Chambliss with use of false information to
obtain a handgun, a Level 5 felony,3 and false informing, a Class B
misdemeanor.4 On August 30, 2019, the charging information was amended to
include a charge of making a false statement on a criminal history information
form, a Level 6 felony. Chambliss subsequently entered into a written plea
agreement with the State, under which he agreed to plead guilty to making a
false statement on a criminal history information form, a Level 6 felony, in
exchange for the State dismissing the other two counts against him. The plea
agreement allowed for argument of the parties and capped the aggregate
2
The form Chambliss signed is not in the record. However, Chambliss admits on appeal that he completed
the form and indicated on it that “he was the intended recipient of the gun when in fact he was not.”
Appellant’s Br. at 6.
3
I.C. § 35-47-2-17.
4
I.C. § 35-44.1-2-3(d)(1).
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sentence that could be imposed by the trial court at a maximum of eighteen
months. At the August 30, 2019, guilty plea hearing, Chambliss admitted to a
factual basis for the Level 6 felony.
[6] At Chambliss’s November 8, 2019, sentencing hearing, the trial court accepted
Chambliss’s guilty plea to the Level 6 felony false statement on a criminal
history information form, and the State dismissed the other two counts. The
trial court sentenced Chambliss to eighteen months in the Department of
Correction, to be served in Lake County Community Corrections with initial
placement in the Kimbrough Work Release Program. The trial court
recognized the defendant’s lack of criminal history to be a mitigating factor and
“the nature and circumstances of the crime” to be an aggravating factor.
Chambliss now appeals his sentence.
Discussion and Decision
Abuse of Discretion in Sentencing
[7] Chambliss maintains that the trial court erred in sentencing him.5 Sentencing
decisions lie within the sound discretion of the trial court. Cardwell v. State, 895
N.E.2d 1219, 1222 (Ind. 2008). An abuse of discretion occurs if the decision is
5
The State asserts that Chambliss has waived his sentencing challenge because he did not provide us with a
record adequate to fully review the issues; specifically, it notes Chambliss did not file the transcript from the
suppression hearing regarding police notes from an interview with Chambliss. However, Chambliss
subsequently did provide that transcript, which did not contain information necessary to our review. We find
no waiver here.
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“clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances before the
court, or the reasonable, probable, and actual deductions to be drawn
therefrom.” Gross v. State, 22 N.E.3d 863, 869 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014) (citation
omitted), trans. denied. A trial court abuses its discretion in sentencing if it does
any of the following:
(1) fails “to enter a sentencing statement at all;” (2) enters “a
sentencing statement that explains reasons for imposing a
sentence—including a finding of aggravating and mitigating
factors if any[ ]—but the record does not support the reasons;”
(3) enters a sentencing statement that “omits reasons that are
clearly supported by the record and advanced for consideration;”
or (4) considers reasons that “are improper as a matter of law.”
Id. (quoting Anglemyer v. State, 868 N.E.2d 482, 490-491 (Ind. 2007), clarified on
reh’g, 875 N.E.2d 218 (Ind. 2007)). So long as a sentence is within the statutory
range, the trial court may impose it without regard to the existence of
aggravating or mitigating factors. Anglemyer, 868 N.E.2d at 489. However, if
the trial court does find the existence of aggravating or mitigating factors, it
must give a statement of its reasons for selecting the sentence it imposes. Id. at
490. But the relative weight or value assignable to reasons properly found, or
those which should have been found, is not subject to review for abuse of
discretion, Gross, 22 N.E.3d at 869, and a trial court is under no obligation to
explain why a proposed mitigator does not exist or why the court found it to be
insignificant, Sandleben v. State, 22 N.E.3d 782, 796 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014), trans.
denied.
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[8] The sentencing range for a Level 6 felony is from six months to two-and-a-half
years, with an advisory sentence of one year. I.C. § 35-50-2-7(b). The trial
court imposed an eighteen-month sentence on Chambliss and, in its sentencing
statement, found his lack of criminal history to be a mitigating factor and the
nature and circumstances of his crime to be an aggravator. Specifically, as to
the latter, the trial court stated it was an aggravating factor that Chambliss “was
fully aware of his intentions to purchase a gun for someone who had a criminal
history.” Appealed Order at 1. Chambliss first contends that the court was not
permitted to consider that aggravator as it was a “material element of the
offense.” Appellant’s Br. at 9. However, the offense to which Chambliss pled
guilty and for which he was convicted is only that he knowingly made a
“materially false statement” on the form used to purchase a firearm. I.C. § 35-
47-2.5-12. That offense does not specify what the false information must be.
Therefore, the type of false statement made—i.e., that the gun was bought for
the purchaser when in fact it was knowingly bought for someone else with a
known criminal history—is not a material element of the crime of which he was
convicted.
[9] Chambliss next contends that there was no factual basis in the record to support
the aggravator upon which the trial court relied; i.e., that he was aware he was
purchasing a gun for someone who had a criminal history. However, the
record shows that Hill gave Chambliss money to purchase a gun for Hill and
Chambliss did so. From those facts the trial court could reasonably infer that
Chambliss knew there was some reason why Hill legally could not purchase the
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gun himself. The fact that Chambliss chose to purchase the gun for Hill despite
that knowledge is a permissible aggravating factor supported by the record.6
See, e.g., Caraway v. State, 959 N.E.2d 847, (Ind. Ct. App. 2011) (holding that,
although a trial court may not use a material element of the offense as an
aggravating circumstance, it may find the nature and circumstances of the
offense to be an aggravating circumstance), trans. denied. And we will not weigh
the relative weight or value the court decided to attribute to that permissible
aggravating factor. Gross, 22 N.E.3d at 869. The trial court did not abuse its
discretion in imposing the eighteen-month sentence that was within the
statutory range for the crime committed.
Appellate Rule 7(B)
[10] Chambliss contends that his sentence is inappropriate in light of the nature of
the offense and his character. Article 7, Sections 4 and 6 of the Indiana
Constitution “authorize[] independent appellate review and revision of a
sentence imposed by the trial court.” Roush v. State, 875 N.E.2d 801, 812 (Ind.
Ct. App. 2007) (alteration in original). This appellate authority is implemented
through Indiana Appellate Rule 7(B). Id. Revision of a sentence under Rule
7(B) requires the appellant to demonstrate that his sentence is “inappropriate in
6
To the extent that aggravating circumstance was a material element of one of the dismissed charges against
Chambliss, it is nevertheless permissible for the trial court to consider it. See, e.g., Bethea v. State, 983 N.E.2d
1134, 1145 (Ind. 2013) (holding that, if a plea bargain lacks language limiting the facts a trial court can
consider, it is not necessary for a trial court to “turn a blind eye to the facts of the incident that brought the
defendant before them”).
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light of the nature of his offenses and his character.”7 Ind. Appellate Rule 7(B);
see also Rutherford v. State, 866 N.E.2d 867, 873 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007). We assess
the trial court’s recognition or non-recognition of aggravators and mitigators as
an initial guide to determining whether the sentence imposed was
inappropriate. Gibson v. State, 856 N.E.2d 142, 147 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006).
However, “a defendant must persuade the appellate court that his or her
sentence has met th[e] inappropriateness standard of review.” Roush, 875
N.E.2d at 812 (alteration original).
[11] Indiana’s flexible sentencing scheme allows trial courts to tailor an appropriate
sentence to the circumstances presented, and the trial court’s judgment “should
receive considerable deference.” Cardwell, 895 N.E.2d at 1224. The principal
role of appellate review is to attempt to “leaven the outliers.” Id. at 1225.
Whether we regard a sentence as inappropriate at the end of the day turns on
“our sense of the culpability of the defendant, the severity of the crime, the
damage done to others, and myriad other facts that come to light in a given
case.” Id. at 1224. The question is not whether another sentence is more
appropriate, but rather whether the sentence imposed is inappropriate. King v.
7
The parties disagree about whether this Court has interpreted Rule 7(B) as requiring a defendant to
establish inappropriateness in light of both the nature of the offense and the character of the offender or only
one of those two prongs. Different panels of this Court have reached different conclusions on that issue.
Compare, e.g., Landske v. State, 19A-CR-2528, 2020 WL 2479704, at *4 (Ind. Ct. App. May 14, 2020)
(defendant must establish entitlement to relief under both prongs), with, e.g., Denham v. State, 142 N.E.3d 514,
517 (Ind. Ct. App. 2020) (defendant need only establish entitlement to relief under one prong). However, we
do not address that conflict as Chambliss has failed to establish that he is entitled to relief under either prong
of Rule 7(B).
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State, 894 N.E.2d 265, 268 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008). Deference to the trial court
“prevail[s] unless overcome by compelling evidence portraying in a positive
light the nature of the offense (such as accompanied by restraint, regard, and
lack of brutality) and the defendant’s character (such as substantial virtuous
traits or persistent examples of good character).” Stephenson v. State, 29 N.E.3d
111, 122 (Ind. 2015).
[12] Chambliss contends that the nature of his offense does not support his one-and-
a-half-year sentence. We disagree. When considering the nature of the offense,
we look at the defendant’s actions in comparison to the elements of the offense.
Cannon v. State, 99 N.E.3d 274, 280 (Ind. Ct. App. 2018). Not only was
Chambliss’s underlying offense a crime of dishonesty, but he continued to lie
after the fact by reporting the gun as stolen from him and telling the police he
had bought the gun for himself for his work. And there is no compelling
evidence showing any particular restraint in the commission of Chambliss’s
crime or otherwise casting the offense in a better light. Rather, Chambliss lied
on a required firearm form and knowingly helped a person who could not
otherwise legally obtain a weapon obtain a gun. Furthermore, the “damage
done to others” as an ultimate consequence of Chambliss’s crime was death.
Cardwell, 895 N.E.2d at 1224. That is, Hill used the gun Chambliss bought him
to kill a person. We see nothing in the nature of this offense that suggests the
sentence—which is within the statutory boundaries and is a year less than the
maximum sentence allowed—is too harsh for the crime committed.
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[13] Chambliss also maintains that the sentence is inappropriate in light of his
character. However, Chambliss has shown himself to be a dishonest person,
both in the offense for which he was convicted and in his later actions
attempting to cover up his crime. Moreover, Chambliss was given the
opportunity for pre-trial work release rather than incarceration, but that
placement was revoked for his failure to abide by the work release program
rules on three separate occasions within a thirty-day period of time.
Chambliss’s dishonesty and repeated failure to follow rules of the work release
program reflect poorly on his character.
[14] Although Chambliss points out that he is married, a father, and employed, he
has not pointed to evidence compelling enough to overcome the deference we
owe to the trial court regarding its sentence. Stephenson, 29 N.E.3d at 122.
Conclusion
[15] The trial court did not abuse its discretion when it sentenced Chambliss to an
eighteen-month sentence that was within the statutory range for the crime he
committed. And his sentence is not inappropriate given the nature of his
offense and his character.
[16] Affirmed.
Crone, J., and Altice, J., concur.
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