Tara Louise Crump v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.) ( 2020 )

MEMORANDUM DECISION
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D),
this Memorandum Decision shall not be FILED
regarded as precedent or cited before any Jun 26 2020, 12:08 pm
court except for the purpose of establishing
CLERK
the defense of res judicata, collateral Indiana Supreme Court
Court of Appeals
estoppel, or the law of the case. and Tax Court
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Elizabeth A. Flynn Curtis T. Hill, Jr.
Braje Nelson & Janes, LLP Attorney General of Indiana
Michigan City, Indiana Caroline G. Templeton
Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
Tara Louise Crump, June 26, 2020
Appellant-Defendant, Court of Appeals Case No.
20A-CR-91
v. Appeal from the LaPorte Superior
Court
State of Indiana, The Honorable Michael S.
Appellee-Plaintiff. Bergerson, Judge
Trial Court Cause No.
46D01-1905-F4-561 & 46D01-
1802-F4-143
Riley, Judge.
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
[1] Appellant-Defendant, Tina Crump (Crump), appeals following her conviction
for possession of methamphetamine, a Level 4 felony, Ind. Code § 35-48-4-
6.1(a), (c)(1).
[2] We affirm.
ISSUES
[3] Crump presents the court with two issues, which we restate as:
(1) Whether the trial court abused its discretion in denying
Crump’s counsel’s motion for a competency evaluation; and
(2) Whether the State proved beyond a reasonable doubt that she
possessed methamphetamine.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
[4] In the early spring of 2019, Crump was introduced to Larry Jackson (Jackson)
by her friend Ashley Eddie (Eddie). Eddie had been dealing drugs in La Porte
County and had been dating Jackson. Jackson assisted Eddie in dealing drugs
and met her supplier in South Bend, who was known as Trip. When Eddie’s
home was raided in March of 2019 and she was arrested, Jackson took over
Eddie’s drug dealing contacts. Jackson also took over the care of Eddie’s eight-
year-old son. Crump provided babysitting services for Jackson, and, in April of
2019, Jackson moved into Crump’s home in La Porte.
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[5] On May 3, 2019, Crump indicated to Jackson that she wanted him to procure
some methamphetamine for her. The $200 purchase money was to comprise
$100 that Jackson owed Crump for babysitting and another $100 supplied by a
friend of Crump’s. Later that day, Jackson drove Crump in his pickup truck to
a Dollar Store parking lot in South Bend where he purchased 14.05 grams of
methamphetamine from Trip. On the return trip to La Porte County, Deputy
Jonathan Samuelson (Deputy Samuelson) of the La Porte County Sheriff’s
Office observed Jackson commit a traffic violation on Highway 20. Deputy
Samuelson initiated a traffic stop and had his canine partner perform an open-
air sniff of the truck. The canine officer alerted at the driver’s-side door.
Deputy Samuelson removed Jackson and Crump from the truck, and during the
subsequent search, a baggie of methamphetamine was found in plain view in
the center of the driver’s-side floorboard. A backpack containing unused
baggies and a drug ledger was found behind the driver’s side seat, a digital scale
was found on the passenger seat next to Crump’s purse, and three cell phones
were found in Crump’s purse. After receiving her Miranda advisements, Crump
gave a statement to investigators in which she denied having traveled to South
Bend that day.
[6] On May 6, 2019, the State filed separate Informations, charging Crump and
Jackson with Level 4 felony possession of methamphetamine. In his initial
statement to law enforcement after his arrest, Jackson denied any involvement
with the May 3, 2019, drug transaction. In a later statement to law
enforcement, Jackson admitted that he was also involved in the transaction.
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Jackson subsequently pleaded guilty to the Level 4 felony charge as part of an
agreement with the State that he would receive a three-year sentence that would
not be served in prison and he would testify truthfully at Crump’s trial.
Approximately one week before Crump’s trial in a meeting with the prosecutor,
Jackson attempted to change details of his proposed testimony because he was
scared that he would face retaliation from Eddie and Crump.
[7] On October 28, 2019, Crump’s counsel filed a verified motion seeking a
competency evaluation for Crump in which he averred that Crump was
“manic, irate, and irrational” when he attempted to confer with him, which he
attributed to Crump not having had the benefit of psychotropic medications.
(Appellant’s App. Vol. II, p. 111). Crump’s counsel also averred that Crump
was unable “to rationally reconstruct the chronology of events leading to her
arrest[.]” (Appellant’s App. Vol. II, p. 111). On October 31, 2019, the trial
court held a final pre-trial conference in which it addressed the competency
evaluation motion. The trial court judge was familiar with Crump’s mental
health history because he had presided over several emergency commitment
proceedings for her in the past. Crump’s counsel reiterated the substance of his
written motion and commented that, although he thought that Crump was
capable of understanding the proceedings, her mental state affected her ability
to talk to him about the proceedings effectively. Crump, who was present in
court, acknowledged that she had experienced mental health issues in the past,
denied that she was manic at present, and stated that “I’m definitely I’m more
mentally stable now than I have ever been.” (Transcript Vol. II, p. 4). Crump
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was upset about her situation because she maintained that she was innocent.
Regarding her trial counsel, Crump related that
[w]hen he comes, he doesn’t even um, he’ll – he’s only came and
visited me like twice and he comes with a plea, and I get upset
and – ‘cause I told ‘em I -- there’s no discussing this, I don’t – I
want to go to trial.
(Tr. Vol. II, p. 4). Crump had asked her counsel to depose Jackson, to perform
DNA testing, and to provide her with copies of her phone records but had not
received a response from him. Crump stated that “I gave him a list of
everything I needed for the trial” and “I’ve been doing everything I needed for
the trial. I’ve, I’ve been doing everything on my part, but I’m getting no
response from him.” (Tr. Vol. II, p. 5). In response to the trial court’s question
if she knew why she was in court that day, Crump explained that it was a final
pre-trial conference before her trial scheduled on November 13, 2019, for her
charge of Level 4 felony drug possession. Crump confirmed to the trial court
that, despite her counsel’s request to have her competency evaluated, she
wished to proceed to trial. The trial court denied the competency evaluation
motion, observing that “based on my familiarity with [Crump], this is as, as
clear as I believe she’s ever been.” (Tr. Vol. II, p. 7). The trial court explained
to Crump that after the conclusion of the hearing, she would only be allowed to
plead as charged in the Information. Crump assured the trial court that she
understood but that she would prefer to stand trial in light of her innocence.
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[8] On November 12, 2019, the trial court convened Crump’s two-day jury trial.
Jackson testified that on May 3, 2019, he returned to his truck after purchasing
the methamphetamine from Trip and placed the baggie containing the
methamphetamine in the truck’s cupholder. Crump then picked up the baggie
from the cupholder and placed it in her purse. According to Jackson, when
Deputy Samuelson initiated the traffic stop, Crump panicked, retrieved the
baggie from her purse, and threw it in Jackson’s direction. The baggie had
landed on the driver’s side floorboard where it was later found during the
search. Jackson testified on direct and cross-examination that he had lied to
law enforcement and the prosecutor at various times during the case. Jackson
also admitted that he had not yet been sentenced in his own case. Crump’s
statement in which she denied having travelled to South Bend on May 3, 2019,
and copies of Crump’s cell phone location records indicating that she had
travelled to South Bend that day were admitted into evidence. The jury found
Crump guilty as charged.
[9] On December 12, 2019, the trial court held Crump’s sentencing hearing. The
trial court sentenced Crump to six years to be executed with the Department of
Correction. The trial court’s sentencing order provided that Crump could
petition for a modification of her sentence upon completion of substance abuse
treatment.
[10] Crump now appeals. Additional facts will be provided as necessary.
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DISCUSSION AND DECISION
I. Competency Evaluation
[11] Crump argues that the trial court abused its discretion when it denied her
counsel’s motion for a competency evaluation. A trial court judge has an
opportunity to observe a defendant’s demeanor first-hand to determine if she is
competent to stand trial. Timmons v. State, 500 N.E.2d 1212, 1217 (Ind. 1986).
As such, it is within the trial court’s sound discretion to determine if a
competency evaluation should be performed, and we will review the trial
court’s determination only for an abuse of that discretion. Cotton v. State, 753
N.E.2d 589, 591 (Ind. 2001).
[12] A defendant has a due process right not to be tried on a criminal charge while
she is incompetent. Wallace v. State, 486 N.E.2d 445, 453 (Ind. 1985). A
defendant may not stand trial if she lacks the present ability to consult with her
counsel with a reasonable degree of rational understanding or lacks a rational
and factual understanding of the proceedings. Gross v. State, 41 N.E.3d 1043,
1047 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015). This due process right is effectuated by Indiana
Code section 35-36-3-1(a), which provides that a trial court shall have a
defendant evaluated and hold a competency hearing if the court “has
reasonable grounds for believing that the defendant lacks the ability to
understand the proceedings and assist in the preparation of a defense[.]” A
review of a defendant’s competency is only required when the trial court is
confronted with evidence creating a bona fide doubt regarding the defendant’s
competency. Barber v. State, 141 N.E.3d 35, 44 (Ind. Ct. App. 2020), trans.
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denied. The trial court judge’s observations of a defendant in court can serve as
an adequate basis for finding that a competency hearing is not necessary.
Cotton, 753 N.E.2d at 591.
[13] Crump does not contend that she was incapable of understanding the
proceedings. Rather, she argues that the trial court’s knowledge of her previous
mental health issues, her statements at the hearing that she was unmedicated,
the concerns expressed by her attorney, and her demonstrated inability to “stay
on track” when questioned by the trial court showed that she was unable to
assist in the preparation of her defense. (Appellant’s Br. p. 17). In addressing
Crump’s arguments, we find Beesley v. State, 533 N.E.2d 112 (Ind. 1989) to be
instructive. In that case, our supreme court found no abuse of the trial court’s
discretion in denying a request for a competency evaluation where Beesley had
been before the trial court on multiple previous occasions and had done legal
research in preparation for trial, including speaking to witnesses. Id. at 113.
The court also noted that, at the hearing on the request for evaluation, Beesley
told the trial court that he thought he was competent and could assist in the
preparation of his case; he was coherent, answered questions posed to him, and
understood the charges; and he “had communicated with his attorney.” Id.
[14] Here, as in Beesley, the trial court judge had a history of contacts with Crump
which served as a frame of reference for his determination that an evaluation
was not necessary. Indeed, we agree with the State that the judge’s experience
presiding over previous emergency commitments for Crump gave him
particularized insight to support his finding that she was “as clear as I believe
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she’s ever been.” (Tr. Vol. II, p. 7). The need for a competency evaluation is
assessed as of the time of trial. Edwards v. State, 902 N.E.2d 821, 827 (Ind.
2009). Therefore, it would have been an abuse of the trial court’s discretion to
rely on the fact that Crump had previously been committed to establish her
fitness at the time of trial. Additionally, like Beesley, Crump had worked on
her own case and had actively participated in the preparation of her defense by
preparing a list of things she wanted done and sharing it with her counsel. At
the hearing on the competency evaluation motion, Crump indicated that she
understood the proceedings, answered the trial court’s questions appropriately,
denied that she was presently experiencing mental health issues, and urged the
trial court that she wished to proceed to trial. Following Beesley, we cannot say
that the trial court abused its discretion when it denied the competency
evaluation motion. Beesley, 533 N.E.2d at 113.
[15] We also reject Crump’s argument that her lack of medication merited a
competency evaluation. Although she may have been medicated in the past,
there was no evidence before the trial court that she was presently prescribed
medication that she was not taking. Neither did her counsel’s concerns, as
expressed in his motion and at the hearing, mandate that the trial court grant
the competency evaluation motion. The evidence before the trial court was that
Crump maintained her factual innocence and was adamant about going to trial.
As she explained at the hearing, Crump was upset when her counsel
approached her with a plea agreement, and she was dissatisfied with the fact
that her counsel had not prepared her defense as she wished. It was within the
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trial court’s discretion to determine that Crump was at most unwilling to
communicate with her counsel fully at times but not that she was incapable
mentally of doing so. Regarding what she contends was her inability to stay
focused sufficiently to assist in her defense, the trial court questioned Crump at
the hearing and was in the best position to observe Crump’s demeanor to
determine if she was capable of staying on task for purposes of assisting in her
defense. Given the deference that we accord the trial court’s observations of a
defendant’s demeanor in court, we will not second-guess the trial court’s
determination. See Cotton, 753 N.E.2d at 591; Timmons, 500 N.E.2d at 1217.
II. Sufficiency of the Evidence
[16] Crump also challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting her
conviction. It is well-established that when we review the sufficiency of the
evidence to support a conviction, we consider only the probative evidence and
reasonable inferences supporting the verdict. Drane v. State, 867 N.E.2d 144,
146 (Ind. 2007). It is not our role as an appellate court to assess witness
credibility or to weigh the evidence. Id. We will affirm the conviction unless
no reasonable fact-finder could find the elements of the crime proven beyond a
reasonable doubt. Id.
[17] In order to prove the offense, the State was required to show that Crump
knowingly or intentionally possessed between ten and twenty-eight grams of
pure or adulterated methamphetamine without a valid prescription. See I.C. §
35-48-4-6.1(a), (c)(1). Crump argues that the State did not prove that she
possessed the methamphetamine found in the truck. Possession of contraband
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can be actual or constructive. Houston v. State, 997 N.E.2d 407, 409-10 (Ind. Ct.
App. 2013). Actual possession occurs when a defendant exerts direct physical
control over the contraband. Sargent v. State, 27 N.E.3d 729, 733 (Ind. 2015).
[18] Here, Jackson testified that on May 3, 2019, after he purchased the
methamphetamine from Trip, he placed it in the cupholder of the truck and that
Crump picked it up and put the baggie of methamphetamine in her purse. This
evidence established that Crump actually possessed the methamphetamine.
The fact that she subsequently divested herself of possession of the
methamphetamine does not render the evidence of her actual possession
insufficient. See, e.g., Womack v. State, 738 N.E.2d 320, 324 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000)
(finding sufficient evidence of marijuana possession where, during a pursuit on
foot, an officer observed Womack reach into his pocket and toss what was later
determined to be a packet of marijuana), trans. denied.
[19] Crump does not address the substance of Jackson’s testimony showing her
actual possession of the methamphetamine, and she contends that this is a
constructive possession case. She argues that “Jackson repeatedly lied about
the circumstances and always exaggerated Crump’s involvement in the
transaction” and that, therefore, Jackson was not a reliable witness.
(Appellant’s Br. p. 23). However, the jury was made aware of Jackson’s
changing statements and his plea agreement. The jury also heard Crump’s
obviously-false statement to law enforcement that she had not travelled to
South Bend on the day in question. The jury evaluated this evidence and
decided that Jackson was more credible. Crump now essentially requests that
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we ignore the evidence that supports the jury’s verdict and reweigh the
credibility of the witnesses in this case. This is an unavailing argument, as it is
contrary to our standard of review. See Drane, 867 N.E.2d at 146.
CONCLUSION
[20] Based on the foregoing, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its
discretion when it denied Crump’s counsel’s motion for a competency
evaluation. We also conclude that the State proved beyond a reasonable doubt
that Crump possessed methamphetamine.
[21] Affirmed.
Mathias, J. and Tavitas, J. concur
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