Robert J. White v. Estate of Robert L. White (mem. dec.) ( 2020 )

MEMORANDUM DECISION
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D),
this Memorandum Decision shall not be FILED
regarded as precedent or cited before any Jul 31 2020, 8:53 am
court except for the purpose of establishing CLERK
Indiana Supreme Court
the defense of res judicata, collateral Court of Appeals
and Tax Court
estoppel, or the law of the case.
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Thomas D. Seal Timothy K. Ryan
Law Office of Thomas D. Seal Steven T. Henke
Richmond, Indiana Hackman Hulett LLP
Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
Robert J. White, July 31, 2020
Appellant-Plaintiff, Court of Appeals Case No.
19A-CT-2764
v. Appeal from the Wayne Superior
Court
Estate of Robert L. White, The Honorable Charles K. Todd,
Appellee-Defendant. Jr., Judge
Trial Court Cause No.
89D01-1512-CT-59
Najam, Judge.
Statement of the Case
[1] Robert J. White appeals the trial court’s entry of summary judgment in favor of
the Estate of Robert L. White (“Estate”) on White’s second amended
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complaint, which alleged fraud and waste. 1 White raises three issues for our
review, which we consolidate and restate as whether the trial court erred when
it entered summary judgment in favor of the Estate.
[2] We affirm.
Facts and Procedural History
[3] David Showalter, Jr. had a longstanding oral agreement with White’s father.
Pursuant to that oral agreement, White’s father gave Showalter the right to
farm nearly 500 acres of farmland (“the Property”) in exchange for rent
payments in the amount of $150 per tillable acre. Following the death of
White’s father, the Estate continued this agreement with Showalter on an
annual basis. White was aware that his father rented out the farm property, and
he saw both Showalter’s father and Showalter farming tillable acreage on the
Property. However, White never asked Showalter about the terms of the lease.
[4] After his father died, White filed a will contest action that resulted in a
Mediated Settlement Agreement (“Agreement”). According to the Agreement,
the Estate agreed to sell the Property to White for $1,715,000. Also, White
agreed that his possession of the Property is “subject to the rights of crop
tenants to cultivate, tend and harvest growing crops for the 2015 crop year.”
Appellee’s App. Vol. 2 at 18 (emphasis removed). White was aware of that
1
White also filed a claim for trespass against David. However, the trial court dismissed that claim on
February 2, 2017.
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clause but did not know what the crop tenant’s rights were. However,
following a conversation with his attorney, White concluded that he would
have the right to unrestricted immediate possession of the entire Property.
[5] At the closing on September 30, 2015, the executors of the Estate executed an
Executors’ Deed and conveyed the Property to White subject to the same rights
of the crop tenants. Following the closing, Showalter continued to “permit[]
various pieces of equipment” to remain on the real estate. Id. at 31. Showalter
also “asserted” to White that he and not White had the “exclusive right” to
possession of all tillable acres pursuant to the oral agreement. Id. at 34.
[6] Thereafter, White filed a complaint against the Estate, which, as amended,
alleged that the Estate had committed fraud and waste. In particular, White
alleged that the Estate was aware that White did not know about the terms of
the oral lease and that, “in an effort to fraudulently induce” White into
purchasing the Property, the Estate “failed to disclose” to him that the tillable
acres were subject to the oral lease, which lease deprived him of the right to
immediate unrestricted access to the Property. Id. at 34. He also alleged that
the Estate had “damaged the [the Property] by recklessly removing items from
the land.” Id. at 36. Furthermore, White alleged that the Estate had
“abandoned numerous equipment [sic] . . . on the . . . Property,” which items
White had to remove. Id.
[7] In response, the Estate filed a motion for summary judgment. In that motion,
the Estate asserted that White’s claim for fraud sounded in “constructive fraud
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rather than actual fraud.” Id. at 9 (emphasis removed). Specifically, the Estate
alleged that White’s complaint failed to demonstrate that a duty existed
between him and the Estate; that, even if a duty existed, White’s complaint
failed to demonstrate a breach of that duty; and that White’s complaint
demonstrated that he did not rely on the Estate’s silence but, rather, that he
relied on the opinion of his attorney. As to White’s claim for waste, the Estate
asserted that that claim must fail because the undisputed evidence demonstrated
that no representative of the Estate entered the Property after the closing. In
support of its motion, the Estate designated as evidence the mediated settlement
agreement, the Executors’ Deed, and White’s deposition. White failed to
respond to the motion or otherwise file any responsive pleadings to the motion
for summary judgment. 2
[8] Following a hearing on the Estate’s motion, the trial court found:
Respectfully, the Court sees no need to go into significant detail
in this Order regarding the elements for fraud, constructive fraud,
or waste. . . . The Court finds that as a matter of law, and based
solely on the designated evidence properly before the Court, that
there is an absence of a genuine factual issue on at least one
element of [White’s] claimed causes of action, which then is fatal
to [White’s] claims. In summary, [the Estate] made a prima facie
showing that there are no genuine issues of material fact and that
[the Estate] is entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law
on the claims within [White’s] complaint and [White] has not
2
White filed a brief in opposition to the Estate’s motion for summary judgment on January 24, 2019, but, on
January 29, he filed a motion to withdraw the brief as untimely. The trial court granted White’s motion.
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designated specific facts in evidence pursuant to Trial Rule 56
demonstrating the existence of a genuine issue for trial.
Id. at 3-4 (footnote and citation omitted). Accordingly, the court entered
summary judgment in favor of the Estate. This appeal ensued.
Discussion and Decision
[9] White asserts that the trial court erred when it entered summary judgment in
favor of the Estate on his claims of fraud and waste. The trial court found, and
White concedes, that he failed to timely respond to the Estate’s motion, to
designate factual matters in dispute, or to designate any evidence in opposition
to the Estate’s motion under Trial Rule 56(C). Thus, the resolution of the
Estate’s motion depends entirely upon the Estate’s designated evidence
although, as the trial court correctly noted, the Estate must still meet its burden
to show that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that the Estate is
entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
[10] In addition, on appeal, White has failed to file an appendix or otherwise direct
us to portions of the record where we could find the relevant documents or the
facts that support his contentions. The Indiana Appellate Rules require
appellants to include in their brief an argument section that “contain[s] the
contentions of the appellant on the issues presented, supported by cogent
reasoning. Each contention must be support by citation to the authorities,
statutes, and the Appendix or parts of the Record on appeal relied on[.] Ind.
Appellate Rule 46(A)(8)(a). Here, White has failed to comply with the
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appellate rules and, as a result, has failed to meet his burden on appeal to
demonstrate that the trial court erred. Nevertheless, given that the Estate filed
an appendix that includes the documents relevant to White’s appeal, and our
preference for resolving issues on the merits, we will consider White’s
arguments.
Standard of Review
[11] Our Supreme Court recently stated that:
“When . . . review[ing] a grant or denial of a motion for
summary judgment, we “stand in the shoes of the trial court.”
We ask, “whether there is a genuine issue of material fact, and
whether the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of
law.” The party moving for summary judgment bears the burden
of making a prima facie showing that there is no issue of material
fact and that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. The
burden then shifts to the non-moving party to show the existence
of a genuine issue. On appellate review, we resolve “[a]ny doubt
as to any facts or inferences to be drawn therefrom . . . in favor of
the non-moving party.”
Burton v. Benner, 140 N.E.3d 848, 851 (Ind. 2020) (internal citation and
quotation omitted). “A defendant is entitled to judgment as matter of law when
undisputed material facts negate at least one element of [a] plaintiff’s claim.”
Colen v. Pride Vending Serv., 654 N.E.2d 1159, 1162 (Ind. Ct. App. 1995). The
absence of a genuine factual issue on even just one element of a cause of action
is fatal to that claim. Woods v. Qual-Craft Indus., Inc., 648 N.E.2d 1198, 1202
(Ind. Ct. App. 1995).
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[12] On appeal, White asserts that the trial court erred when it granted summary
judgment in favor of the Estate because it relied on the wrong standard of
review and because there are genuine issues of material fact as to White’s
claims for fraud and waste. 3 We address each argument in turn.
Trial Court’s Standard of Review
[13] White first asserts that the trial court misstated the holding in Woods and relied
on the wrong standard of review when it stated that the “absence of a genuine
factual issue on even just one element of a cause of action is fatal to that claim.”
Appellee’s App. Vol. 2 at 3. Specifically, White asserts that that statement by
the trial court “is not an accurate representation of the principle actually
enunciated in the Woods case.” Appellant’s Br. at 12. However, White has not
provided cogent argument to explain how the trial court misstated the holding
in Woods. On the contrary, White acknowledges that it “is undisputed that [he]
must prove all of the elements of its cause of action in order to recover.
Consequently, if [the Estate] can prove, with undisputed facts, that negate at
least one of the elements, [he] cannot prevail.” Id. at. 13. White has wholly
failed to show that the trial court either misstated or misapplied the holding in
Woods.
3
The trial court also found that no genuine issue of material fact existed on White's claim of constructive
fraud. However, White does not make any argument regarding constructive fraud on appeal.
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Fraud
[14] White next contends that the court erred when it entered summary judgment in
favor of the Estate because there are genuine issues of material fact as to
White’s claim for fraud. To prevail on a claim for fraud, White must show that
the Estate made a material misrepresentation of a past or existing fact which
was untrue, with knowledge of or in reckless ignorance of the
misrepresentation’s falsity and with the intent to deceive, that he rightfully
relied upon the misrepresentation, and that his reliance proximately caused the
injury or damage complained of. See Kesling v. Hubler Nissan, Inc., 997 N.E.2d
327, 335 (Ind. 2013). On appeal, White specifically asserts that the Estate had
informed him that he would have immediate unrestricted access to the Property
after the closing, which representation the Estate knew was false, and that he
relied on the Estate’s false representation to his detriment.
[15] Here, in support of its motion for summary judgment, the Estate designated as
evidence the Agreement, which demonstrated that White acquired the Property
“subject to the rights of crop tenants to cultivate, tend and harvest growing
crops for the 2015 crop year.” Appellee’s App. Vol. 2 at 18 (emphasis
removed). The Estate also designated the Executors’ Deed, which contained
the same provision. Further, the Estate designated as evidence White’s
deposition, which showed that no party to the Agreement represented to White
that he would have the right to immediate unrestricted possession of the
Property. See id. at 59-60. Rather, the designated evidence shows that it was
White’s attorney, not a representative of the Estate, who asserted to White that
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he had the right to immediate unrestricted possession of the Property. See id. at
57.
[16] In addition, White acknowledged during his deposition that he was aware that
Showalter rented and farmed tillable acres on the Property. See Appellant’s
App. Vol. II at 53, 54. That evidence demonstrated, that, at a minimum, White
was on inquiry notice concerning the crop tenancy agreement. The law has
always imputed to a purchaser of land all information which would have been
conveyed by an actual view of the premises, and when one purchases property
where a visible state of things exists which could not legally exist without the
property being subject to some burden, he is taken to have notice of the nature
and extent of the burden. Fenley Farms, Inc. v. Clark, 404 N.E.2d 1164, 1171-72
(Ind. Ct. App. 1980). When the property was conveyed to White, as a matter
of law, he was charged with knowledge of the crop tenancy agreement and with
notice of the nature and extent of the burden represented by that agreement.
See id at 1172. Accordingly, the Estate met its burden as the summary judgment
movant to demonstrate that the Estate did not make a material
misrepresentation to White which was untrue. As such, the Estate met its
burden to negate the first element of White’s claim for fraud.
[17] At that point, the burden shifted to White to designate evidence to demonstrate
that a genuine issue of material fact existed. But White did not designate any
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such evidence. 4 Accordingly, the trial court did not err when it granted
summary judgment in favor of the Estate on White’s fraud claim.
Waste
[18] Finally, White asserts that the court erred when it entered summary judgment
in favor of the Estate on his claim for waste. This Court has previously stated:
“At common law, the owner or a person with an interest in real property may
bring an action for waste for the destruction, misuse, alteration or neglect of the
premises by one lawfully in possession of the premises.” Wright Motors, Inc. v.
Marathon Oil Co., 631 N.E.2d 923, 927 n.3 (Ind. Ct. App. 1994). On appeal,
White specifically contends that, “notwithstanding [the Estate’s] representation
to the contrary, [White’s] testimony d[id] state that the Estate, or its agents,
[had] commit[ed] affirmative acts of destruction by ransacking the trucks,
throwing junk out, and making things worse.” Appellant’s Br. at 19.
[19] However, the Estate designated as evidence White’s deposition, which
demonstrated that the alleged waste happened after closing and that no
representative of the Estate entered the Property after that date. Appellee’s
App. Vol. 2 at 61, 74. That designated evidence negated one element of
4
White also appears to suggest that, because the trial court did not go into detail about every element of his
fraud claim, it failed to consider the claim. But White ignores the fact that the Estate was only required to
negate one element of White’s claim in order to be entitled to summary judgment. Accordingly, once the
trial court found that there is no genuine issue on one element, it did not have the obligation to address the
other elements.
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White’s waste claim, namely, that it was the Estate that had committed the
alleged waste. The burden then shifted to White to demonstrate that a genuine
issue of material fact existed. But, again, White did not designate any such
evidence. Therefore, the trial court did not err when it granted summary
judgment in favor of the Estate on White’s claim for waste.
[20] In sum, the trial court did not err when it entered summary judgment in favor
of the Estate. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court.
[21] Affirmed.
Bradford, C.J., and Mathias, J., concur.
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