Culver Community Teachers Association v. Indiana Education Employment Relations Board ( 2020 )

FILED
Aug 12 2020, 9:12 am
CLERK
Indiana Supreme Court
Court of Appeals
and Tax Court
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE:
Eric M. Hylton INDIANA EDUCATION
Laura S. Reed EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS
Indianapolis, Indiana BOARD
Curtis T. Hill, Jr.
Attorney General of Indiana
Natalie F. Weiss
Aaron T. Craft
Deputy Attorneys General
Indianapolis, Indiana
WEST CLARK COMMUNITY
SCHOOLS
Jonathan L. Mayes
Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 19A-PL-2989 | August 12, 2020 Page 1 of 31
Culver Community Teachers August 12, 2020
Association, Decatur County Court of Appeals Case No.
Education Association, Smith 19A-PL-2989
Green Community Schools Appeal from the Marion Superior
Classroom Teachers Association, Court
and West Clark Teachers The Honorable Heather Welch,
Association, Judge
Appellant-Petitioners, Trial Court Cause No.
49D01-1810-PL-41794
v.
Indiana Education Employment
Relations Board,
Appellee-Respondent,
and
West Clark Community Schools,
Intervenor.
Tavitas, Judge.
Case Summary
[1] The Culver Community Teachers Association, Decatur County Education
Association, Smith-Green Community Schools Classroom Teachers
Association, and West Clark Teachers Association, (collectively “Teachers
Associations”), appeal from the trial court’s denial of their joint verified petition
for judicial review of the Indiana Education Employment Relations Board’s
(“IEERB”) final decisions regarding their respective collective bargaining
agreements (“CBAs”). We reverse and remand.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 19A-PL-2989 | August 12, 2020 Page 2 of 31
Issue
[2] The sole issue on appeal is whether the trial court properly denied judicial
review of the IEERB’s final decisions that the CBAs negotiated and ratified by
the Teachers Associations and their respective school employers each included
provisions that were contrary to law.
Facts
[3] For the 2017-2018 academic school year, the Teachers Associations’ respective
school corporations (the “School Employers”) and the exclusive
representatives 1 for the Teachers Associations negotiated and ratified CBAs.
Pursuant to Indiana Code Section 20-29-6-6.1, the CBAs were submitted for
review to an IEERB-appointed individual (“compliance officer”) to ensure
compliance with Indiana law.
[4] On May 30, 2018, the IEERB compliance officer issued compliance reports and
recommendations regarding the four CBAs and found that each CBA included
a provision that was non-compliant with Indiana Code Section 20-29-6-4,
which enumerates the mandatory subjects of collective bargaining for teachers.
See infra.
1
An “exclusive representative” is “the school employee organization which has been . . . recognized by a
school employer as the exclusive representative of the employees” for purposes of collective bargaining. Ind.
Code § 20-7.5-1-2(l).
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 19A-PL-2989 | August 12, 2020 Page 3 of 31
[5] The Teachers Associations appealed to the IEERB. On September 18, 2018,
the IEERB entered individual final reports as to the Teachers Associations’
respective CBAs. In each instance, as detailed below, the IEERB affirmed the
compliance officer’s finding of statutory non-compliance.
I. Culver CBA
[6] The IEERB compliance officer found the following provision from the Culver
CBA to be non-compliant:
Article III
Compensation
*****
J. Ancillary Duties. Ancillary Duties are defined as meetings,
professional development trainings, and other school activities
outside the contractual day or Contractual year. Ancillary
Duties do not include lesson planning and the grading of student
work. In a given school year teachers shall be required to
perform a maximum of ten (10) hours of Ancillary Duties at a
rate of $0 per hours [sic].
Teachers Associations’ App. Vol. II p. 207. In affirming the finding of statutory
noncompliance, the IEERB found that the provision above did not comport
with Indiana law because the “parties may not bargain a limitation on the
assignment of an ancillary duty.” Id. at 24. In its final report, the IEERB
adopted the following provision from the compliance officer’s report:
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 19A-PL-2989 | August 12, 2020 Page 4 of 31
Although the parties may bargain wages for an ancillary duty,
they may not bargain what constitutes an ancillary duty. The
parties have included a definition of “ancillary duties” specifying
what does and does not constitute an ancillary duty. What
constitutes an ancillary duty is not a bargainable subject pursuant
to Indiana Code § 20-29-6-4 and 20-29-6-4.5 and, therefore, is not
compliant.
Id. at 39-40.
II. Decatur CBA
[7] The IEERB compliance officer found the following provision from the Decatur
CBA to be non-compliant:
Article IV
Salary Regulations
Chapter 1. Salary Requirements
A. The Teacher’s Compensation Model for the 2017-18 school
year is set forth in Appendix ‘A’, which is attached hereto and
incorporated herein along with the salary schedules referred to
therein. The attached salary schedule reflects the salary increases
that were bargained for the 2017-2018 term as compared to the
2016 2017 schedule.
*****
L. A teacher supervising Friday Night Detention shall be paid a
flat rate of Seventy five Dollars ($75.00) for 12 students or less.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 19A-PL-2989 | August 12, 2020 Page 5 of 31
Teachers Associations’ App. Vol. III, p. 32 (quotation omitted). In affirming
the finding of statutory noncompliance, the IEERB stated: “[the] parties may
not bargain a limitation on the assignment of an ancillary duty.” Teachers
Associations’ App. Vol. II p. 24. In its final report, the IEERB adopted the
following provision from the compliance officer’s report:
Although the parties may bargain wages for an ancillary duty,
they may not bargain any parameters, restrictions, or limitations
on the school’s assignment of an ancillary duty. The parties have
bargained compensation for supervising Friday night detention
“for 12 students or less.” The conditions of the assignment, i.e.
for 12 students or less, is not a bargainable subject pursuant to
Indiana Code § 20-29-6-4 and 20-29-6-4.5 and, therefore, is not
compliant.
Id. at 34-35.
III. Smith-Green CBA
[8] The IEERB compliance officer found the following provision from the Smith-
Green CBA to be non-compliant:
Article III
Salary and Compensation
*****
9. Every effort shall be made by the corporation to provide a
substitute teacher when a teacher is absent. In the event a
substitute is not available for a period of time, upon mutual
agreement, a teacher may be requested to supervise a class’s
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 19A-PL-2989 | August 12, 2020 Page 6 of 31
instructional time during his/her preparation period. The
teacher shall be compensated with one additional leave day for:
• Each 6 periods in CJSHS
• Each 5 hours in CES
The teacher shall be compensated with one-half of an additional
leave day for:
• Each 3 periods in CJSHS
• Each 2.5 hours in CES
Teachers are responsible for notifying the attendance secretary in
CJSHS or the administrative assistant in CES for any instances of
preparation period supervision.
Teachers Associations’ App. Vol. III, p. 95. In affirming the finding of
statutory noncompliance, the IEERB found that the provision did not comport
with Indiana law because the “parties may not bargain a limitation on the
assignment of an ancillary duty.” Teachers Associations’ App. Vol. II p. 24. In
its final report, the IEERB adopted the following provision from the compliance
officer’s report:
The parties have impermissibly bargained restrictions on the
school’s assignment of a teacher to serve as a substitute for
another teacher. Although the parties may bargain wages for an
ancillary duty, they may not bargain any parameters, restrictions,
or limitations on the school’s assignment of the ancillary duty.
The parties have bargained that “mutual agreement” of the
teacher is required before the school can assign the teacher to
serve as a substitute for another teacher. This is not a
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 19A-PL-2989 | August 12, 2020 Page 7 of 31
bargainable subject pursuant to Indiana Code § 20-29-6-4 and 20-
29-6-4.5 and, therefore, is not compliant.
Id. at 24-25.
IV. West Clark CBA
[9] The IEERB compliance officer found the following provision from the West
Clark CBA to be non-compliant:
APPENDIX E
ANCILLARY DUTIES
*****
Lead Teacher — If a teacher is asked to, and accepts
responsibility for, writing lesson plans, grading assignments, and
entering grades for these assignments in the absence of a certified
teacher for a week or longer, the teacher will receive an
additional four hours of pay per week. Rate of pay for this duty
will be at row E, Career Level 1 or Career Level 2, depending on
the teacher’s current Career Level placement.
Teachers Associations’ App. Vol. III, p. 167. In affirming the compliance
officer’s finding of noncompliance, the IEERB found that the “parties may not
bargain a limitation on the assignment of an ancillary duty.” Teachers
Associations’ App. Vol. II p. 24. In its final report, the IEERB adopted the
following provision from the compliance officer’s report:
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Although the parties may bargain wages for an ancillary duty,
they may not bargain any parameters, restrictions, or limitations
on the school’s assignment of an ancillary duty. The parties have
bargained that as a condition of the Lead Teacher ancillary duty,
the teacher must agree to accept the duty (“if a teacher is asked
to, and accepts responsibility for . . .”). The condition of
accepting an assignment is not a bargainable subject pursuant to
Indiana Code § 20-29-6-4 and 20-29-6-4.5 and, therefore, is not
compliant.
The Compliance Officer notes that, if the conditioned acceptance
was not bargained, but is function [sic] of school policy, the
parties may avoid a future finding of noncompliance by including
a statement to that effect.
Id. at 29-30.
[10] On October 17, 2018, the Teachers Associations jointly filed a petition for
judicial review of the IEERB’s final decisions affirming the compliance officers’
findings of noncompliance. The IEERB filed its response on November 9,
2018. The Teachers Associations, IEERB, and intervenor West Clark
Community Schools tendered briefs to the trial court, which heard argument on
September 25, 2019. On November 25, 2019, the trial court entered its order,
containing findings of fact and conclusions thereon, providing in part as
follows:
FINDINGS OF FACT
*****
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2. In [ ] four [final] decisions, IEERB affirmed that a certain
provision in each of the [Teachers Associations’] collective
bargaining agreements (“CBA”) was non-compliant with Indiana
Code Section 20-29-6-4.
*****
7. Specifically, in each of these four final decisions, IEERB found
that the school and exclusive representative impermissibly
bargained for a definition of, or limitation on, what constitutes an
ancillary duty, in violation of Indiana Code section 20-29-6-4,
which permits bargaining only for salary, wages, and salary and
wage related fringe benefits.
*****
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
12. According to Indiana Code section 20-29-6-1, [s]chool
employers and school employees shall: (1) have the obligation
and the right to bargain collectively the items set forth in section
4 [IC 20-29-6-4]; (2) have the right and obligation to discuss any
item set forth in section 7 [IC 20-29-6-7]; an[d] (3) enter into a
contract embodying any of the matters listed in section 4 [IC 20-
29-6-4] of this chapter on which they have bargained collectively.
Ind. Code § 20-29-6-1.
*****
14. Pursuant to Indiana Code section 20-29-6-4, [a] school
employer shall bargain collectively with the exclusive
representative on the following: (1) salary, (2) wages, (3) salary
and wage related fringe benefits, including accident, sickness,
health, dental, vision, life, disability, retirement benefits, and
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 19A-PL-2989 | August 12, 2020 Page 10 of 31
paid time off as permitted to be bargained under IC 20-28-9-11.
Salary and wages include the amounts of pay increases available
to employees under the compensation plan adopted under IC 20-
28-9-1.5, but do not include the teacher evaluation procedures
and criteria, any components of the teacher evaluation plan,
rubric, or tool, or any performance stipend or addition to base
salary based on a stipend to an individual teacher under IC 20-
43-10-3.5. Ind. Code § 20-29-6-4.
15. Also, according to Indiana Code section 20-29-6-4.5, [f]or a
contract entered into after June 30, 2011, a school employer may
not bargain collectively with the exclusive representative on the
following: (1) the school calendar; (2) teacher dismissal
procedures and criteria; (3) restructuring options available to a
school employer under federal or state statutes, regulations, or
rules because of the failure of the school corporation or a school
to meet federal or state accountability standards; (4) the ability of
a school employer to: contract, partner, or operate jointly with an
educational entity that provides postsecondary credits to students
of the school employer or dual credits from the school employer
and the educational entity; or (5) any subject not expressly listed
in section 4 [IC 20-29-6-4]. Ind. Code § 20-29-6-4.5.
16. Furthermore, Indiana Code section 20-29-6-2 provides that,
[a]ny contract may not include provisions that conflict with . . .
section 4.5(a) [IC 20-29-6-4.5(a)]. Ind. Code § 20-29-6-2.
a. IEERB’s Interpretation of Ind. Code § 20-29-6-4
17. IEERB argues that its interpretation of Ind. Code § 20-29-6-4
was correct. IEERB specifically claims that parties to a CBA
may not bargain the definition of an ancillary duty or other
limitation because only schools have the authority to define or
limit an ancillary duty. IEERB also claims that once the school
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 19A-PL-2989 | August 12, 2020 Page 11 of 31
defines an ancillary duty, the parties may then bargain the wage
for that particular ancillary duty.
18. In support of its argument, IEERB cites to the Indiana Code
to say that, Indiana law provides that only school[ ] [employer]
have the authority to direct the work of teachers and maintain
efficient school operations, Ind. Code § 20-29-4-3(1), (5), and a
CBA may not contain any provision that interferes with the
school employer’s rights, Ind. Code § 20-29-6-2(a)(3).
19. IEERB contends that if the parties bargained the definition of
an ancillary duty, or some other limitation on an ancillary duty,
then they would be infringing on the school’s sole authority to
direct the work and operations of the school. IEERB argues that
the provisions challenged in these four cases show that the parties
bargained limitations on what work teachers may or may not
perform, which is, impermissible under Indiana law.
20. IEERB claims that Petitioners provide little to no explanation
as to how the language of this statute (Ind. Code § 20-29-6-4)
supports their claim that the school and the representative may
bargain for certain ancillary duties or limitations on ancillary
duties; and instead, Petitioners rely on dicta in two cases to argue that
this statute does not prohibit the parties from bargaining the definition of,
or limitation on, an ancillary duty.
21. The Court notes that the Petitioners rely heavily upon IEERB
v. Nettle Creek Classroom Teachers Ass’n, 26 N.E.3d 47 (Ind. Ct.
App. 2015) and Jay Classroom Teachers Ass’n v. Jay School Corp., 45
N.E.3d 1217 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015) to support their arguments and
interpretation of Ind. Code § 20-29-6-4.
i. Court Decisions on Bargaining Ancillary Duties
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 19A-PL-2989 | August 12, 2020 Page 12 of 31
*****
23. [In Nettle Creek, the] Indiana Court of Appeals held that
although teachers are not entitled to receive overtime
compensation for performing normal teaching duties, they may
negotiate for additional wages for responsibilities associated with
ancillary duties.
24. In Jay Classroom Teachers Ass’n, the Indiana Court of Appeals
held that “that compensable ‘ancillary duties’ can occur during
the normal teachers’ workday—where both parties agree to them
and where they are not otherwise impermissible.” The Indiana
Supreme Court affirmed the Court of Appeals on the above issue.
25. This Court finds that, while the Petitioners rely on these two
cases in support of their arguments, Nettle Creek Classroom Teachers
Ass’n addressed the question of whether teachers’ ancillary duties
entitle them to additional compensation rather than whether Ind.
Code § 20-29-6-4 provides teachers the ability to bargain with a
school corporation as to what constitutes an ancillary duty. In
Jay Classroom, the Court of Appeals held that the parties could
bargain for additional compensation for ancillary duties during
the normal teachers’ workday. This Court does not find that
Nettle[ ] Creek or Jay Classroom held that the School Corporation
and Teachers Association could bargain for what the ancillary
duty is because “Indiana law provides that only schools have the
authority to direct the work of teachers and maintain efficient
school operations, Ind. Code § 20-29-4-3(1), (5), and a CBA may
not contain any provision that interferes with the school
employer’s rights.” Ind. Code § 20-29-6-2(a)(3). Thus, this Court
finds that neither of these cases under Indiana law allows the
bargaining of what an ancillary duty is.
26. Based on this Court’s reading of the statute and supporting
Indiana law, the Court finds that IEERB’s interpretation of Ind.
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Code § 20-29-6-4 is reasonable, and thus this Court need not
move forward with any other proposed interpretation. The Court
holds that the IEERB’s four final decisions were not arbitrary
and capricious, and therefore the Petitioners’ Petition for Judicial
Review is DENIED.
Teachers Associations’ App. Vol. II pp. 10, 12-20 (citations and quotations
omitted) (emphasis added). The Teachers Associations now appeal.
Analysis
[11] The Teachers Associations challenge the trial court’s denial of their petition for
judicial review. Pursuant to the Indiana Administrative Order and Procedures
Act, we may only set aside an agency action if “(1) [it is] arbitrary, capricious,
an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law; (2) contrary to
constitutional right, power, privilege, or immunity; (3) in excess of statutory
jurisdiction, authority, or limitations, or short of statutory right; (4) without
observance of procedure required by law; or (5) unsupported by substantial
evidence.” Ind. Code § 4-21.5-5-14(d). The party that seeks judicial review
bears the burden to prove the agency action is invalid for one of the foregoing
reasons. I.C. § 4-21.5-5-14(a).
[12] When reviewing a challenge to an administrative agency’s decision, this Court
will not try the facts de novo nor substitute its own judgment for that of the
agency. Jay Classroom Teachers Ass’n v. Jay School Corp. (“Jay Classroom II”), 55
N.E.3d 813 (Ind. 2016) (citations and quotations omitted). “Rather, we defer to
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the agency’s findings if they are supported by substantial evidence.” Id. “On
the other hand, we review an agency’s conclusions of law de novo.” Id.
[13] Further, this Court “‘employs a deferential standard of review of the
interpretation of a statute by an administrative agency charged with its
enforcement in light of its expertise in the given area.’” Senter v. Foremost
Fabricators, 137 N.E.3d 1027, 1031-32 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019).
Although an agency’s interpretation of a statute presents a
question of law entitled to de novo review, the agency’s
interpretation is given “great weight.” In fact, “if the agency’s
interpretation is reasonable, we stop our analysis and need not
move forward with any other proposed interpretation.” This is
true even if another party presents “an equally reasonable
interpretation.”
Jay Classroom II, 55 N.E.3d at 816 (citations omitted). We will only reverse the
agency if it incorrectly interpreted the statute. Senter, 137 N.E.3d at 1032-33.
[14] The Teachers Associations argue that the IEERB’s final decisions, finding that
the parties to the respective CBAs impermissibly bargained what constitutes an
ancillary duty, are “contrary to Indiana law, arbitrary and capricious and
should be reversed.” Teachers Associations’ Br. p. 15. The Teachers
Associations maintain that, pursuant to Indiana caselaw, negotiations for
compensation for ancillary duties are encompassed within the mandatory
collective bargaining topics for teachers.
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[15] The IEERB counters that, although teachers associations may bargain wages for
ancillary duties, teachers associations may not bargain as to what constitutes an
ancillary duty. The IEERB argues that defining an ancillary duty is not among
the mandatory bargaining topics enumerated under Indiana law, but, rather, is
a matter to be left solely to the discretion of the school employer. See IEERB’s
final report, Teachers Associations’ App. Vol. II p. 73 (“Once the ancillary
duties [ ] are identified by the [School Employer], the parties are permitted to
bargain the wage for the duty or position. The [collective bargaining
agreement] would then reflect the [School Employer-]identified ancillary duty[ ]
and the wage for the specific duty or position . . . .”).
I. Collective Bargaining by Indiana Schools and School Employees
A. Statutes
[16] The citizens of Indiana have a fundamental interest in the
development of harmonious and cooperative relationships
between school corporations and their certified employees. Ind.
Code § 20-29-1-1(1). Recognition of the right of school
employees to organize and acceptance of the principle and
procedure of collective bargaining between school employers and
school employee organizations can alleviate various forms of
strife and unrest. I.C. § 20-29-1-1(2).
Jay Classroom Teachers Ass’n v. Jay School Ass’n (“Jay Classroom I”), 45 N.E.3d
1217, 1219-20 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015), aff’d in part, vacated in part, Jay Classroom II,
55 N.E.3d 813 (Ind. 2016).
[17] In 2011, the statutory scheme governing collective bargaining for
teachers was significantly amended to promote speed and
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finality. Although those amendments left intact the bargaining
rights and obligations of teachers and schools, I.C. §§ 20-29-4-1, -
6-1 (Supp. 2011), they reduced the number of bargaining subjects
....
Specifically, the 2011 amendments eliminated permissive
bargaining subjects altogether, while also limiting mandatory
bargaining subjects to just wages, salaries, and related fringe
benefits . . . .
Jay Classroom II, 55 N.E.3d 813, 817 (Ind. 2016) (citations omitted).
[18] Several Indiana statutes are pertinent to our review. Indiana Code Section 20-
29-6-1 provides:
(a) School employers and school employees shall:
(1) have the obligation and the right to bargain collectively
the items set forth in [Indiana Code Section 20-29-6-4];
(2) have the right and obligation to discuss any item set
forth in [Indiana Code Section 20-29-6-7] of this chapter;
and
(3) enter into a contract embodying any of the matters
listed in [Indiana Code Section 20-29-6-4] of this chapter
on which they have bargained collectively.
(b) Notwithstanding any other law, before a school employer and
school employees may privately negotiate the matters described
in subsection (a)(1) during the time period for formal collective
bargaining established in [Indiana Code Section 20-29-6-12] of
this chapter, the parties must hold at least one (1) public hearing
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and take public testimony to discuss the items described in
subsection (a).
[19] Indiana Code Section 20-29-6-4 delineates the mandatory bargaining subjects of
collective bargaining: (1) salary; (2) wages; and (3) “[s]alary and wage related
fringe benefits, including accident, sickness, health, dental, vision, life,
disability, retirement benefits, and paid time off as permitted to be bargained
under IC 20-28-9-11.”
[20] Indiana Code Section 20-29-6-4.5 provides:
(a) For a contract entered into after June 30, 2011, a school
employer may not bargain collectively with the exclusive
representative on the following:
(1) The school calendar.
(2) Teacher dismissal procedures and criteria.
(3) Restructuring options available to a school employer
under federal or state statutes, regulations, or rules because
of the failure of the school corporation or a school to meet
federal or state accountability standards.
(4) The ability of a school employer to contract, partner, or
operate jointly with an educational entity that provides
postsecondary credits to students of the school employer
or dual credits from the school employer and the
educational entity.
(5) Any subject not expressly listed in [Indiana Code
Section 20-29-6-4] of this chapter.
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(b) For a contract entered into after January 1, 2015, for a school
year beginning after June 30, 2015, a school employer may not
bargain collectively with the exclusive representative for the
following:
(1) A matter described in subsection (a).
(2) A matter that another statute specifies is not subject to
collective bargaining, including IC 20-28-9-1.5 and IC 20-
43-10-3.5.
(c) A subject set forth in subsection (a) or (b) that may not be
bargained collectively may not be included in an agreement
entered into under this article.
[21] Indiana Code Section 20-29-6-2 provides:
(a) Any contract may not include provisions that conflict with:
*****
(6) [Indiana Code Section 20-29-6-4.5(a)] of this chapter.
(b) A subject that is set forth in [Indiana Code Section 20-29-6-
4.5(a)] of this chapter may not be included in any contract after
June 30, 2011.
[22] Indiana Code Section 20-29-6-6 provides:
The obligation to bargain collectively does not include the final
approval of a contract concerning any items. Agreements
reached through collective bargaining are binding as a contract
only if ratified by the governing body of the school corporation
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and the exclusive representative. The obligation to bargain
collectively does not require the school employer or the exclusive
representative to agree to a proposal of the other or to make a
concession to the other.
[23] Indiana Code Section 20-29-6-6.1 provides:
(a) After ratification of a contract under [Indiana Code Section
20-29-6-6] of this chapter, a school employer shall submit the
[CBA], including the compensation model developed under IC
20-28-9-1.5, to the [IEERB].
(b) The [IEERB] shall appoint a staff member or an ad hoc panel
member to review each submitted [CBA] and to make a written
recommendation concerning the [CBA]’s compliance with this
chapter, including a penalty for any noncompliance. . . .
*****
(f) If, following the review of a [CBA], the [IEERB] finds the
[CBA] does not comply with this chapter, the [IEERB] shall issue
an order that may include one (1) or more of the following items:
(1) Ordering the parties to cease and desist from all
identified areas of noncompliance.
(2) Preventing the parties from ratifying any subsequent
[CBAs] until the parties receive written approval from the
[IEERB] or the [IEERB]’s agent.
(3) Requiring other action as deemed appropriate by the
[IEERB] as authorized by state law. . . .
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B. Caselaw
[24] In support of their argument that negotiations of ancillary duties are
encompassed within the mandatory collective bargaining topics for teachers,
the Teachers Associations rely upon Jay Classroom I and Nettle Creek, which we
discuss in turn below.
A. Nettle Creek
[25] In Nettle Creek, the Nettle Creek school employer and teachers association
reached a stalemate in their collective bargaining negotiations regarding the
teachers association’s request for additional compensation for ancillary duties
that the school employer required its teachers to perform outside the teachers’
normal teaching duties. After the parties were unsuccessful at mediation, the
parties, as required by statute, tendered their last best offers to the IEERB in
order for the IEERB to select one party’s last best offer to serve as the parties’
bargained contract for the academic year. The school employer’s last best offer
excluded the additional compensation provision from its last best offer, and the
teachers association included the provision in its last best offer.
[26] The IEERB recommended the adoption of the school employer’s last best offer,
which did not allow for the desired additional compensation for ancillary
duties. The teachers association filed a petition for judicial review, and the trial
court reversed the IEERB’s decision as arbitrary, capricious, and contrary to
law. The IEERB appealed, and a panel of this Court found that, although
“teachers are not entitled to receive overtime for performing their ‘normal’
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teaching duties, i.e., duties that are completed as part of one’s direct teaching
function[,] . . . . teachers may negotiate for additional wages for responsibility
associated with co-curricular duties that are voluntarily assumed by a teacher.”
Nettle Creek, 26 N.E.3d at 56. The panel remanded to the IEERB to “review the
parties’ proffered [last best offers] taking into consideration” that “[the] parties
may negotiate for additional wages for required ancillary duties . . . .” Id. at 57.
B. Jay Classroom I and Jay Classroom II
[27] In Jay Classroom I, the Jay teachers association and school employer reached an
impasse in their collective bargaining negotiations. After a failed mediation,
the parties tendered last best offers to an IEERB factfinder, who recommended
the adoption of the school employer’s last best offer as the parties’ master
contract. The teachers association appealed to the IEERB. After a hearing, the
IEERB affirmed the factfinder’s recommendation.
[28] Despite the affirmance, however, the IEERB ordered stricken from the adopted
contract a provision (“the additional compensation provision”) that appeared in
both parties’ last best offers. The additional compensation provision authorized
extra pay and established a pay scale for teachers who, voluntarily or by
assignment, covered other teachers’ classes. The IEERB reasoned that the
additional compensation provision was statutorily impermissible and “would
allow teachers to be double-paid for an assignment of duties.” Jay Classroom I,
45 N.E.3d at 1221. The teachers association filed a petition for judicial review,
which was denied by the trial court. The trial court found, in part, that the
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 19A-PL-2989 | August 12, 2020 Page 22 of 31
additional compensation provision allowed teachers to be doubly-paid for
performing their duties.
[29] The teachers association appealed to this Court, which found that the
additional compensation provision was not prohibited by statute or otherwise
impermissible and, thus, should not have been stricken. This Court reasoned:
. . . we find that the question of ancillary duties can be
determined at the local level. Particularly where, as here, both
the Association and the School included the very same
additional-compensation provision in their respective [last best
offers]. This shows a clear agreement and understanding
between the parties that covering another teacher’s class during
the normal workday does fall outside the scope of normal
teaching duties—at least within this school district—and thus
authorizing additional compensation for this duty does not
constitute “double payment.” * * * * * In sum, we find that the
provision was not prohibited by statute or otherwise
impermissible. See I.C. § 20-29-6-18(b) (providing that the
[IEERB]’s decision must be restricted to only those items
permitted to be bargained and included in the collective
bargaining agreement).
Id. at 1225.
[30] Although our Supreme Court granted transfer and reversed this Court’s Jay
Classroom I judgment on grounds relating to an unrelated provision, Jay
Classroom II “summarily affirm[ed]” this Court’s holding in Jay Classroom I that
the additional compensation provision was not prohibited by statute or
otherwise impermissible. Our Supreme Court reasoned as follows:
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On direct appeal, the [teachers association] also argued that the
IEERB improperly struck a contract provision in both parties’
[last best offers] that “provid[ed] additional wages to teachers
who volunteer or are assigned to cover a class.” Jay Classroom [I],
45 N.E.3d at 1223. The trial court had affirmed the IEERB’s
decision to strike the additional compensation provision,
concluding that “teachers cannot receive payment above their
salaries for teaching duties and that this provision allowed
teachers to be double paid for their assigned duties.” The Court
of Appeals disagreed and held that the additional compensation
provision was permissible. We agree and summarily affirm the
Court of Appeals on this issue.
Jay Classroom II, 55 N.E.3d at 816 n.1 (citations omitted).
II. Teachers Associations v. IEERB
[31] In applying the pertinent statutes and caselaw to the instant facts, we observe
that, when the General Assembly limited the mandatory bargaining topics to
salary, wages, and wage-related benefits, it evinced its intention that school
employers and teachers associations could rightfully negotiate as to wage and
wage-related fringe benefits. See I.C. § 20-29-6-4. Moreover, by designating
certain topics—including wages—for mandatory bargaining, while relegating
other topics to “discuss[ion]” only at the school employer’s discretion, the
General Assembly further evinced its intention to allow school employers to
direct the course of collective bargaining negotiations with teachers. See I.C. §
20-29-6-7. This is consistent with the following conclusions of law entered by
the trial court in its order denying the petition for judicial review:
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17. IEERB argues that its interpretation of Ind. Code § 20-29-6-4
was correct. IEERB specifically claims that parties to a CBA
may not bargain the definition of an ancillary duty or other
limitation because only schools have the authority to define or
limit an ancillary duty. IEERB also claims that once the school
defines an ancillary duty, the parties may then bargain the wage
for that particular ancillary duty.
18. In support of its argument, IEERB cites to the Indiana Code
to say that, Indiana law provides that only schools have the
authority to direct the work of teachers and maintain efficient
school operations, Ind. Code § 20-29-4-3(1), (5), and a CBA may
not contain any provision that interferes with the school
employer’s rights, Ind. Code § 20-29-6-2(a)(3).
Teachers Associations’ App. Vol. II pp. 17-18 (quotations omitted).
[32] As an initial matter, we note that, although the IEERB artfully frames the issue
as whether the Teachers Associations impermissibly negotiated what
constitutes an ancillary duty, the record reveals that the Teachers Associations
and their respective School Employers agreed as to what constituted an
ancillary duty and bargained regarding the compensation therefor, as is authorized by
the Jay Classroom I and Nettle Creek holdings. Identifying agreed-upon ancillary
duties is not the same as bargaining them. 2 A plain and ordinary reading of the
2
In reading the CBAs as a whole, and giving the provisions their plain and ordinary meaning, we observe the
challenged Culver, Decatur, and Smith Green provisions are appropriately catalogued within CBA articles
governing either salary or compensation; and the challenged provision in the West-Clark CBA is found in an
appendix labelled, “Ancillary Duties[.]” Teachers Associations’ App. Vol. III, p. 167.
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CBAs does not indicate that the parties bargained regarding which ancillary
duties teachers would be required to perform. Rather, the parties identified the
compensable ancillary duties and bargained the compensation accordingly.
[33] Notwithstanding the IEERB’s repeated acknowledgment of the School
Employers’ authority to direct the course of collective bargaining regarding
ancillary duties, the IEERB failed to honor the intent of the respective School
Employers. Just as the last best offers submitted separately by the school
employer and teachers association in Nettle Creek included the same “additional
compensation provision[,]” the ratified CBAs here—which reflected the
bargained agreement of the School Employers and Teachers Associations—
included the challenged provisions pertaining to ancillary duties. It is,
therefore, undisputed that the School Employers were aligned with the
Teachers Associations regarding these IEERB-challenged provisions.
[34] Although the trial court discounted Nettle Creek and Jay Classroom I as mere
dicta, the holdings of these cases are not dicta. These cases are directly on-point
and set forth legal holdings that directly relate to the issue at-bar. See Sw. Allen
Cty. Fire Prot. Dist. v. City of Fort Wayne, 142 N.E.3d 946, 956 (Ind. Ct. App.
2020) (“[S]tatements that are not necessary in the determination of the issues
presented are dicta, are not binding, and do not become the law of the case.”).
The trial court’s findings and conclusions thereon dismissing Nettle Creek and
Jay Classroom I as dicta are clearly erroneous.
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[35] Nettle Creek and Jay Classroom I presented more of a challenge than the instant
matter because, in those cases, the parties could not fully agree regarding the
ancillary duties sought to be bargained. Nonetheless, in Nettle Creek and Jay
Classroom I, this Court held that teachers may negotiate for additional wages for
responsibilities associated with ancillary duties. As the Nettle Creek panel
reasoned:
. . .[W]e interpret the law to provide that although the law does
not allow for the receipt of overtime compensation by teachers
related to their direct teaching functions, teachers are not
necessarily excluded from receiving additional wages for required
or agreed upon ancillary duties. Notably, counsel for the
[IEERB] conceded during oral argument that it is possible under
the relevant statutory authority for a teacher to earn wages in
addition to the teacher’s salary and that an agreed-upon salary
for direct teaching functions does not exclude wages for other
functions completed by the individual teacher. As such, we
conclude that teachers may negotiate with their employers for the
receipt of additional wages for these ancillary duties. In reaching
this conclusion, however, we do not mean to say that a school
corporation must compensate teachers for the ancillary duties,
but only that the law allows that teachers may negotiate with
their employers for additional compensation for said ancillary
duties.
Nettle Creek, 26 N.E.3d at 56; see Jay Classroom I, 45 N.E.3d 1219 (“We find that
under both statutory law and Nettle Creek[,] a teacher can receive additional
compensation for ancillary duties, and that covering another teacher’s class
during the normal workday can be a compensable ancillary duty outside the
scope of normal teaching duties—where both parties agreed to the same
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additional-compensation provision and included it in their respective [last best
offers].”).
[36] Given the willingness of the School Employers to bargain regarding the
ancillary duties at issue, we cannot agree with the IEERB’s conclusion that the
challenged provisions interfered with the School Employers’ collective
bargaining rights. To the contrary, by including the challenged provisions in
the final, negotiated, and ratified CBAs, the School Employers assented to and
permitted bargaining thereon, and the Teachers Associations did not
impermissibly dictate bargaining subjects for negotiation.
[37] The School Employers and Teachers Associations reached final agreements
after they followed the collective bargaining processes established by Indiana
Code Chapter 20-29-6. One of the stated aims of Indiana Code Chapter 20-29-6
is for school employers and school employee organizations to “develop[ ]
harmonious and cooperative relationships” by way of a statutory process meant
to “alleviate various forms of strife and unrest.” See Jay Classroom I, 45 N.E.3d
at 1219-20. The parties accomplished their bargaining purposes here without
strife and unrest; and we are perplexed by the IEERB’s stance in this case. The
reasoning of the Jay Classroom I panel is especially instructive here:
. . . the question of ancillary duties can be determined at the local
level. Particularly where, as here, both the Association and the School
included the very same additional-compensation provision in their
respective [last best offer]s. This shows a clear agreement and
understanding between the parties . . . . In sum, we find that the
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provision was not prohibited by statute or otherwise
impermissible. . . .
Jay Classroom I, 45 N.E.3d at 1225 (emphasis added).
[38] For the foregoing reasons, we find the IEERB’s interpretation of the applicable
statutes to be unreasonable and decline to afford great weight thereto. The
Teachers Associations have carried their burden to prove that the IEERB’s final
decisions regarding their respective CBAs are arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of
discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law. Accordingly, we find that
the trial court erred in denying the Teachers Associations’ joint petition for
judicial review. We reverse and remand to the IEERB with instructions to
adopt the ratified CBAs of the School Employers and the Teachers
Associations.
Conclusion
[39] The trial court erred in denying the Teachers Associations’ petition for judicial
review. We reverse and remand.
[40] Reversed and remanded.
Mathias, J., concurs.
Riley, J., dissents with opinion.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 19A-PL-2989 | August 12, 2020 Page 29 of 31
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
Culver Community Teachers Court of Appeals Case No.
Association, et al., 19A-PL-2989
Appellants-Petitioners,
v.
Indiana Education Employment
Relations Board,
Appellee-Respondent,
And
West Clark Community Schools,
Intervenor.
Riley, Judge dissenting
[41] I respectfully dissent from the majority’s conclusion that the IEERB’s final
decisions regarding the four CBAs at issue were arbitrary, capricious, an abuse
of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law, and, thus, that the trial
court erred in denying the Teachers Associations’ petition for review. Indiana
Code section 20-29-6-4 limits the mandatory subjects for collective bargaining
to salary, wages, and salary and wage-related benefits. Accordingly, pursuant
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 19A-PL-2989 | August 12, 2020 Page 30 of 31
to the plain terms of the statute, what constitutes an ancillary duty cannot be a
subject for collective bargaining. See also I.C. § 20-29-6-4.5 (“[A] school
employer may not bargain collectively with the exclusive representative on . . .
[a]ny subject not expressly listed in [I.C. § 20-29-6-4].”). In reaching a contrary
conclusion, the majority relies on dicta contained in our previous decisions in
Nettle Creek Classroom Teachers Ass’n and Jay Classroom I, neither of which
addressed the issue at hand, which is properly framed as whether Indiana Code
section 20-29-6-4 provides teachers the authority to bargain with a school
corporation as to what constitutes an ancillary duty.
[42] As the majority acknowledges, we accord deference to an administrative
agency’s interpretation of a statute it is charged with enforcing. Given the plain
terms of the statute and the lack of binding legal authority for the Teachers
Associations’ position, I cannot conclude that the trial court erred when it
denied the petition for judicial review. For these reasons, I respectfully dissent.
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