Judy Vigus, as Administratrix of the Estate of Ruth C. Vigus and the Estate of Eugene Vigus v. Dinner Theater of Indiana, L.P. ( 2020 )

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Karl L. Mulvaney Edward F. Harney, Jr.
Nana Quay Smith Erin M. Radefeld
Dentons Bingham Greenebaum LLP Hume Smith Geddes Green &
Indianapolis, Indiana Simmons, LLP
Indianapolis, Indiana
FILED
James Ludlow Aug 17 2020, 10:46 am
James F. Ludlow, Attorney at Law P.C. CLERK
Indiana Supreme Court
Indianapolis, Indiana Court of Appeals
and Tax Court
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
Judy Vigus, as the August 17, 2020
Administratrix of the Estate of Court of Appeals Case No.
Ruth C. Vigus and of the Estate 19A-CT-1365
of Eugene Vigus, Appeal from the Marion Superior
Appellant-Plaintiff, Court
The Honorable Michael D. Keele,
v. Special Judge
Trial Court Cause No.
Dinner Theater of Indiana, L.P., 49D07-1302-CT-6951
Appellee-Defendant.
Najam, Judge.
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Statement of the Case
[1] Judy Vigus, as administratrix of the Estates of Ruth C. Vigus and Eugene Vigus
(“Vigus”), appeals the trial court’s judgment for Dinner Theater of Indiana,
L.P. (“the Theater”) following a jury trial on Vigus’s complaint alleging
negligence. Vigus raises two issues on appeal, which we restate as follows:
1. Whether the trial court erred when it revoked a pretrial
order and did not instruct the jury that the Theater had
made a judicial admission of a building code violation.
2. Whether the trial court abused its discretion when it
denied Vigus’s attempt to admit into evidence statements
the Theater’s owners had made after Ruth’s fall to seek a
variance for the step’s height rather than reduce that
height.
[2] We affirm.
Facts and Procedural History
[3] On August 30, 2012, Ruth and Eugene Vigus went to the Derby Dinner
Playhouse in Clarksville. The Derby Dinner Playhouse offers customers a
buffet dinner along with a live show. The Theater is the corporate owner of the
Derby Dinner Playhouse, and the Theater is owned and operated by Rebecca
Jo Saunders and Cynthia Knopp.
[4] That evening, Ruth and Eugene were seated at a table on a riser. The step up
to, or down from, the table was approximately ten inches. Ruth and Eugene
successfully went up the step to initially sit at the table, and Ruth successfully
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got down from and back up the step in the course of visiting the buffet for
herself and for Eugene. However, when they attempted to leave at the end of
the show, Ruth fell off the step and broke her hip.
[5] Thereafter, Ruth sued the Theater for negligence, and Eugene sued for loss of
consortium. During the course of the proceedings, both Ruth and Eugene died,
and Vigus took over the suit as administratrix of their estates. Meanwhile, the
Theater moved for a preliminary determination as a matter of law that a
building code violation in the height of the step was not negligence per se.
Specifically, the Theater sought a motion in limine “[p]recluding a negligence
per se jury instruction for any potential Building Code . . . violation.”
Appellant’s App. Vol. 2 at 124. Noting that Vigus had “no objection,” the
court granted the Theater’s request. Id.
[6] In September of 2017, the trial court held a hearing on other pending motions
(“2017 hearing”). At that hearing, counsel for the Theater engaged the court in
the following colloquy:
[Counsel for the Theater]: Our experts do not say that the step . . . as
built, complies with any code . . . .
As designed, it did. It was designed for nine inches. It was built.
It’s about nine and three-quarters or ten inches . . . . So we’re not
even in a situation where we’re saying it complies with the
Building Code . . . .
So we’re on the same page as to the existence of the Building Code
violation as built and we agree on that, none of this other
stuff . . . is relevant.
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THE COURT: Because the Building Code is . . . seven and-a-
half[,] is that right?
[Counsel for the Theater]: Well, . . . [t]heir expert will say seven
and-a-half for a step.
THE COURT: Okay.
[Counsel for the Theater]: Our expert says nine inches for a riser.
THE COURT: Riser.
[Counsel for the Theater]: Which is why step and riser [are]
different. . . .
***
. . . So . . . in any event, . . . it’s too tall as built. . . .
***
And on this violation issue and the Building Code violation, we
don’t disagree that, as built, it[’s] evidence of negligence. . . .
***
I feel like I’m in the Twilight Zone with some of these things . . . .
[Plaintiff’s counsel and I are] not communicating very well. I
think I heard [plaintiff’s counsel] say that [the Theater says the
ten-inch step] complies with the [local] Building Code, and I
think I just said that that’s not the case. Our expert doesn’t say
that because we can’t . . . . [The step] is ten inches. Evidence of
negligence, certainly. We know that, but not [a] Building Code
violation.
***
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Plaintiff[s] say in their response, This evidence is fair to show the
existence of [a] Building Code violation. Again, we don’t deny
there’s a Building Code violation.
Tr. Vol. 2 at 149-51, 157-58 (emphases added).
[7] About one and one-half years later, on the day before the jury trial was to begin,
Vigus moved to have the statements made by the Theater’s counsel at the 2017
hearing declared to be a judicial admission that the step at issue was in violation
of relevant building codes. In that motion, Vigus asked
that the Court issue an Order that conclusively finds that the step
which allegedly caused Plaintiff’s injury was 10” in height, that
this step was in violation of Indiana Building Code, that this
evidence is conclusive, that Defendant cannot contradict these
facts at any point throughout the trial, and for all further relief
which is just and proper.
Appellant’s App. Vol. 9 at 61. In her motion, Vigus did not request a jury
instruction on this issue. Within hours, the Theater filed a motion to strike
denying that counsel for the Theater had “made such an admission under
applicable Indiana law.” Appellant’s App. Vol. 9 at 108. On the same day, the
trial court denied the Theater’s motion to strike and granted Vigus’s motion in
part. The court found that “the step . . . was a violation of [the] applicable
Indiana Building Code,” and it prohibited the Theater “from attempting to
submit argument or evidence to contradict these conclusive facts.” Id. at 118.
But in its order, the trial court struck the finding proposed by Vigus that the step
“has been conclusively established as being 10” in height.” Id.
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[8] The next day, during voir dire, a prospective juror asked the Theater’s counsel,
“Did you say . . . [the code] was indeed broken?” Tr. Vol. 3 at 104. The
Theater’s counsel replied, “The code was broken. There will be evidence of a
building code violation.” Id. (emphasis added). Then, immediately following voir
dire, the court asked counsel for both sides how to proceed with the
“stipulation” or the Theater’s “admission” on the building code violation. Id.
at 132. The following discussion ensued:
[Counsel for the Theater]: The admission . . . we will admit that
there is a Building Code violation as to the step, as built, being
higher than nine inches.
***
THE COURT: . . . Thank you. And that’s a stipulation?
[Counsel for the Theater]: Correct.
THE COURT: Thank you.
[Counsel for the Theater]: Well, it’s a ruling on your part.
THE COURT: I guess it is. That’s true. But I’m just, I guess,
frankly surprised that it wasn’t by stipulation of the parties.
[Counsel for the Theater]: I think it’s just because there’s—it’s a
bit semantic in terms of an expert would come in and say, you
know, [“]Most of you would not get cited for that type of
infraction,[”] but I can’t say it’s lower than nine inches as built.
THE COURT: Right. And that’s why I didn’t include—there
was a proposed order saying about the height.
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[Counsel for the Theater]: Right.
THE COURT: We don’t…
[Counsel for the Theater]: That part we don’t dispute.
THE COURT: We don’t. Okay.
[Counsel for Vigus]: So the jury will be informed that this is a
Building Code violation, that the step is . . .
THE COURT: Right.
[Counsel for Vigus]: The step in question is a Building Code
violation?
THE COURT: That the step, as built…
[Counsel for the Theater]: Is higher than nine inches which is
violative of the code.
THE COURT: Which is violative of the Building Code.
Correct. And I just presumed—forgive me for presuming this—
that the parties, again, if not agreeing, then [Vigus] would mention,
explain that.
[Counsel for the Theater]: Absolutely.
THE COURT: Right.
[Counsel for the Theater]: And we will explain nine inches and
how it’s as built.
THE COURT: Absolutely.
[Counsel for the Theater]: Being violative. But the question
though then becomes provided—because I—the way I read the
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order was I can’t argue it’s not basically. So as long as I don’t say,
[“]We didn’t violate [the] Building Code[”] . . .
THE COURT: Right.
***
[Counsel for Vigus]: Your Honor, I wanted to make clear that
we’re not stipulating that the step should have been nine inches.
[Counsel for the Theater]: No. . . . Their expert is saying it’s
seven and-a-half inches.
THE COURT: Right. We’re going to hear from experts with
respect to that issue. . . .
Id. at 132-34 (emphases added).
[9] Vigus’s counsel then proceeded with his opening argument and informed the
jury that
there is no dispute there is a building code violation with this
particular step, that is[,] the judge will instruct you that that is taken
as a given. That is something that—we don’t need to prove it.
It’s—you’ll be instructed that there is a building code violation.
Id. at 137 (emphases added). Thereafter, counsel for the Theater informed the
jury in his opening argument that
[y]ou will hear evidence that [the step] was constructed according
to plans in 1974. . . .
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I will challenge Plaintiff’s expert, . . . who will come in and say
that it’s seven inches[, t]hat’s what’s required. A step is required
to be seven inches. Our expert will say differently. . . .
What you will hear from our expert from that perspective is that
there was some plywood put on top, the carpeting put on top,
and that gave it the nominal distance past the nine inches.
What you will not hear . . . is this idea that the judge is going to tell you
that there was a building code violation. It’s not going to happen. It’s
not going to be one of the instructions.
Id. at 156-57 (emphasis added).
[10] Vigus did not object to the Theater’s opening statement as inconsistent with the
court’s pretrial order. Later, during her case-in-chief, Vigus’s expert, Lee
Martin, testified that relevant building codes required the step to be seven and
one-half inches, that the step at issue exceeded that, that that difference was
contrary to the safety purposes underlying the code’s standard, and that the
height of this step was the single most significant cause in Ruth’s fall. And
Martin explicitly testified that “this is a Building Code violation” and added that it
was also “a Fire Code violation.” Id. at 192 (emphasis added).
[11] During its ensuing case-in-chief, the Theater called its own expert witness, Greg
Wisniewski. He testified that the building’s construction plan called for a nine-
inch riser, which was correct under the relevant code at that time, and that the
building received a certificate of occupancy following its construction, which
was evidence that the structure as built was “reasonably compliant
with . . . what the code requires.” Tr. Vol. 6 at 3. He also testified that a nine-
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inch riser “complies with the current code,” which was likely “more stringent”
than the code at the time of construction. Id. at 7-8. Regarding the riser from
which Ruth fell, Wisniewski testified that it was in excess of nine inches by
“some fraction,” i.e., seven-eighths of an inch, but it was not quite “ten inches”
in height. Id. at 18. But he expressly acknowledged that the riser “exceeds the
nine inches” that was called for in the construction plan. Id. According to
Wisniewski, that difference was likely attributable to adding about one-half inch
of plywood on top of the concrete and then adding about one-quarter-inch thick
carpet to the plywood. Vigus did not object to Wisniewski’s testimony and,
specifically, she did not object that any part of his testimony contradicted the
trial court’s pretrial order on the Theater’s judicial admission.
[12] After Wisniewski’s testimony, the Theater asked the court to reconsider its
pretrial order granting Vigus’s motion for the judicial admission and to deny the
Theater’s motion to strike. The court responded as follows:
. . . After what I’ve heard from the experts, I don’t know if there’s
a Building Code violation . . . and I won’t include an instruction that
as built it’s a Building Code violation because I don’t know that.
***
. . . I think there’s a discrepancy. . . . I think you can argue
respectively based on what your experts have testified to, about
their research and their findings . . . .
The only reason I entered [that pretrial order] was because . . .
[counsel for the Theater] did, in fact, indicate that he believed
there was a Building Code violation.
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But, again, based on what I’ve heard from these experts, I don’t
have a clue. I know what we do know and what the jury should
understand is that these plans, as built, prepared by architects
charged with that knowledge and responsibility and then getting
the building authorities to review and approve, I mean, it was
stamped, sealed[,] and then built . . . .
. . . I’m not comfortable with a judicial admission that there was a
Building Code violation because I’ve not heard that.
Id. at 77-78 (emphases added). Vigus then stated that, “once that admission is
made . . . , then that fact is taken as conclusively established . . . [e]ven if it’s
wrong” and “contradictory evidence thereafter will not be considered . . . .” Id.
at 79.
[13] The court took the matter under advisement and, the next day, before it
instructed the jury, returned to the topic of the Theater’s admission. The parties
then engaged with the court as follows:
[Counsel for the Theater]: . . . [T]here w[ere] no repercussions as
we were always contending the height was . . . it was undisputed
what it was. We all knew it was nine and three-quarters.
THE COURT: Right.
[Counsel for the Theater]: We contended nine. They contended
seven. That was disputed.
THE COURT: Right. . . . But let me ask this. What wasn’t
disputed is that the nine and three-quarters . . . close to ten is not
in compliance with the approved plans submitted?
[Counsel for the Theater]: True. That’s true as built.
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THE COURT: Exactly. . . . As built. Because the plans
. . . called for nine inches?
[Counsel for the Theater]: Right.
THE COURT: So as constructed, not in compliance with
approved building . . . plans.
[Counsel for the Theater]: Agreed. . . . [A]nd then Mr.
Wisniewski explained why that would be the case . . . .
THE COURT: Well, right. We heard conflicting testimony
from the experts. Yes[, g]entlemen?
[Counsel for Vigus]: Your Honor . . . the issue is that once a
judicial admission is made, can it be taken back? There is . . . no
dispute . . . that the step, as built, was not compliant with the plans.
THE COURT: Right. Everybody agrees with that. I agree with
that. I can judicially admit that. I think the jury will understand
that. They should understand that. As built . . . it doesn’t
comply with the plans which called for nine inches.
[Counsel for Vigus]: Now, the question is . . . that [counsel for
the Theater], in that [September 2017] hearing, did say . . . “We
do not dispute that there’s a Building Code violation.” I believe
that was the quoted language. . . . So there is a judicial
admission. . . . [Case law] says that once that judicial admission
is made, then evidence to contradict that cannot be considered or
admitted. I think the Defense has . . . tried to submit evidence
that basically says, Well, you know, okay. So it is an inch. . . .
[B]ut that doesn’t take away the fact . . . that[ it is] still not built
in accordance with the plans. So it is a Building Code violation
because it’s not built according to the plans.
***
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THE COURT: . . . [A] judicial admission is . . . a substitute for
evidence at trial. We heard evidence and conflicting evidence
from two experts with respect to that issue. I can’t find that it’s a
Building Code violation. I can’t do that. So the motion to strike or
vacate the order that was entered [the day before trial began] is granted.
But, again, that doesn’t mean that there isn’t an
admission . . . that, as built, . . . [the step] was not built in
compliance with approved building plans . . . . And argue that
and point that out because that’s, in fact, the case.
***
[Counsel for Vigus]: . . . [B]oth parties have told the jury—
[counsel for the Theater] said that—words to the effect . . . that
there is a building code violation in his opening statement or Voir
Dire. I said the same thing, . . . that[ t]he Court is going to tell
you that there’s a building code violation based upon your
current order . . . . So I’m trying to figure out . . . what’s the best
way to not come across as a liar to the jury on that topic.
***
[Counsel for the Theater]: . . . [H]e did say, The judge is going to
instruct you. I think that was a misinterpretation of . . . how you were
going to handle the actual situation.
***
THE COURT: . . . I think the best way . . . is simply at this
point emphasizing that . . . the structure, as built, does not
comply with plans approved by all appropriate government
entities at the time because that’s not in dispute . . . .
[Counsel for Vigus]: Okay.
THE COURT: And I do see that in the revised proposed
finals—thank you. I didn’t see one but perhaps that was
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anticipating how I might rule on the motion. But I see that you
didn’t include an instruction as it relates to the judicial admission of a
building code violation but instead have included some other language
that I do think based on the evidence that we’ve heard is appropriate.
Tr. Vol. 7 at 33-41 (emphases added).
[14] The court then adopted Vigus’s Proposed Final Instruction Number 11 and
instructed the jury in relevant part as follows:
At the time of Ruth Vigus’[s] injury, there were certain Indiana
Building Codes . . . and industry practices that [the Theater] was
subject to . . . relat[ing] to the safe construction and maintenance
of the building. You are to consider the violation of any Indiana
Building Code . . . or industry practice as evidence of
negligence . . . .
Id. at 108; see Appellant’s App. Vol. 9 at 159. Vigus proposed no other
instructions with respect to the Theater’s alleged judicial admission. And Vigus
did not move the court for leave to recall any witnesses or otherwise submit
additional evidence relevant to the building code violation. The jury returned a
verdict for the Theater, and the court entered judgment for the Theater
accordingly. This appeal ensued.
Discussion and Decision
Issue One: Judicial Admission
[15] Vigus first contends that the trial court erred when it revoked its pretrial order
finding that the Theater had made a judicial admission on the question of a
building code violation. It is well settled that a trial court may reconsider an
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order or ruling if the action remains in fieri, or pending resolution. Lewis v.
Toliver (In re Estate of Lewis), 123 N.E.3d 670, 673 (Ind. 2019). We review such
reconsiderations for an abuse of discretion. Id. An abuse of discretion occurs
when the court’s decision either clearly contravenes the logic and effect of the
facts and circumstances or misinterprets the law. River Ridge Dev. Auth. v.
Outfront Media, LLC, 146 N.E.3d 906, 912 (Ind. 2020).
[16] As this Court has explained,
[a] judicial admission “is an admission in a current pleading or
made during the course of trial; it is conclusive upon the party
making it and relieves the opposing party of the duty to present
evidence on that issue.” Weinberger v. Boyer, 956 N.E.2d 1095,
1105 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011), trans. denied. “Statements contained
in a party’s pleadings may be taken as true as against the party
without further controversy or proof.” Lutz v. Erie Ins. Exch., 848
N.E.2d 675, 678 (Ind. 2006). “Opposing parties prepare their
case on the assumption that facts admitted by other parties
require no proof. For this scheme to work properly, parties must
be entitled to rely on trial courts to treat admissions in pleadings
as binding on the party making the admission.” Id.
Brazier v. Maple Lane Apts. I, LLC, 45 N.E.3d 442 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015), trans.
denied. However, “[a] party must testify clearly and unequivocally to a fact
peculiarly within his knowledge in order for it to be considered a judicial
admission.” Stewart v. Alunday, 53 N.E.3d 562, 568 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016). And
this Court has held that where “‘there is ambiguity or doubt in a statement’”
made by a party’s attorney, “‘it is presumed that the attorney did not intend to
make an admission.’” Sans v. Monticello Ins. Co., 718 N.E.2d 814, 816 n.3 (Ind.
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Ct. App. 1999) (quoting Lystarczyk v. Smits, 435 N.E.2d 1011, 1014 (Ind. Ct.
App. 1982)), trans. denied.
[17] In her brief on appeal, Vigus maintains that the Theater’s counsel’s statements
during the 2017 hearing and during and immediately following voir dire,
“individually and collectively, constituted a judicial admission that the step in
question did not comply with the applicable building code.” 1 Appellant’s Br. at
46. Whether a party’s statement constitutes a judicial admission is a question of
law, which we review de novo. See Stewart, 53 N.E.3d at 570. We decline to
cherry pick a particular statement by counsel to the exclusion of other
statements. When we consider, as we must, both the content and context of the
statements by counsel, as a whole, we conclude that counsel’s statements did
not amount to a clear and unequivocal statement of fact. See id. at 570. Thus,
we cannot agree with Vigus’s assertion, made during her opening argument at
trial, that “there is no dispute there is a building code violation.” Tr. Vol. 3 at
137.
1
We note that the parties dispute whether a judicial admission can occur “at any point in a judicial
proceeding” or may only occur in a pleading or during the course of a trial. We need not resolve that issue,
but we observe that the statement in Stewart that a judicial admission can occur “at any point in a judicial
proceeding” is mere dicta and unsupported by prior Indiana case law. 53 N.E.3d at 568. This statement was
part of a general discussion clarifying case law, the essential distinction between judicial and evidentiary
admissions, and the conclusive legal effect of judicial admissions. The statement had no bearing on and was
irrelevant to the holding in Stewart. Further, we note that Vigus’s reliance on Stewart is misplaced because we
held that the witness testimony at issue was not a judicial admission and that, “when determining whether a
party has made a judicial admission, the party’s testimony must be considered as a whole and be clear and
unequivocal.” Id. at 570.
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[18] The transcripts of the 2017 hearing, subsequent conferences, and the trial show
that the parties engaged in back-and-forth discussions with the trial court
regarding the issue of a building code violation that were confusing, ambiguous,
and inconclusive. As the Theater’s counsel put it during the 2017 hearing,
I feel like I’m in the Twilight Zone with some of these things . . . .
[Plaintiff’s counsel and I are] not communicating very well. I
think I heard [plaintiff’s counsel] say that [the Theater says the
ten-inch step] complies with the [local] Building Code, and I
think I just said that that’s not the case. Our expert doesn’t say
that because we can’t . . . . [The step] is ten inches. Evidence of
negligence, certainly. We know that, but not [a] Building Code
violation.
Tr. Vol. 3 at 157 (emphases added). Then, just a few moments later, the
Theater’s counsel said, “Again, we don’t deny there’s a building code violation.” Id.
at 158 (emphasis added). In sum, at the 2017 hearing, the Theater conceded
that the height of the riser was evidence of negligence but equivocated on the
question of whether or not the riser was a building code violation.
[19] Some twenty months later, during voir dire, the Theater’s counsel responded to
a question from a prospective juror and said, “The code was broken. There will
be evidence of a building code violation.” Id. at 104 (emphasis added). After voir
dire, during a colloquy with the court, the parties attempted to get clarification
on the judicial admission as follows:
[Counsel for Vigus]: So the jury will be informed that this is a
Building Code violation, that the step is . . .
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THE COURT: Right.
[Counsel for Vigus]: The step in question is a Building Code
violation?
THE COURT: That the step, as built…
[Counsel for the Theater]: Is higher than nine inches which is
violative of the code.
Id. at 133 (emphases added). And in her opening argument, Vigus declared,
“there is no dispute there is a building code violation,” an assertion that the
Theater immediately disputed in its opening argument, without an objection
from Vigus. Tr. Vol. 3 at 137.
[20] The transcript reveals that the parties frequently talked past each other, and
there was no clarity on the parameters of the judicial admission under
discussion. The parties disagreed whether the Viguses’ table was located on a
“step” or a “riser,” a fact material to the building code violation issue. And
Theater’s counsel equivocated, saying that the height of the riser was only
evidence of a building code violation, was a building code violation, and was not a
building code violation. Given these and other ambiguities, we cannot say as a
matter of law that the Theater’s counsel made a definitive, unequivocal judicial
admission of a building code violation. See, e.g., Harr v. Hayes, 106 N.E.3d 515,
527 (Ind. Ct. App. 2018) (holding party had not made binding judicial
admission where statement, taken in context, contained an ambiguity).
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[21] The trial court concluded that it was not “comfortable saying there’s a building
code violation.” Tr. Vol. 6 at 78. Indeed, considering the Theater’s counsel’s
statements “as a whole,” they were neither “clear” nor “unequivocal.” Stewart,
53 N.E.3d at 570. Thus, we cannot say that the trial court erred, and we hold
that the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it revoked its pretrial order
finding that the Theater had made a judicial admission on the building code
violation.
[22] In any event, even if we were to assume that the Theater made a judicial
admission, it did not affect the manner in which the case was tried or the
question the parties asked the jury to decide. Both parties conducted the trial as
though the jury would be instructed on the judicial admission, and it was not
until the instruction conference that the court actually revoked its order. Thus,
the prejudice, if any, would not have occurred until the instruction Vigus
wanted was not given.
[23] In other words, the ultimate question was whether the court would give a final
instruction on the Theater’s admission that the riser was in violation of the
building code. After both parties had rested, during the instruction conference,
the court granted the Theater’s motion to reconsider its pretrial order finding a
judicial admission and revoked the order that had been entered the day before
the trial began. The court stated that “the best way” to address the building
code issue would be to emphasize that “the structure, as built, does not comply
with plans approved by all appropriate government entities at the time because
that is not in dispute.” Tr. Vol. 7 at 40. Counsel for Vigus replied, “Okay.” Id.
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The court then noted that, “perhaps [in] anticipating” how the court would rule
on the Theater’s motion to reconsider the judicial admission order, Vigus had
tendered the following instruction:
At the time of Ruth Vigus’[s] injury, there were certain Indiana
Building Codes . . . and industry practices that [the Theater] was
subject to . . . relat[ing] to the safe construction and maintenance
of the building. You are to consider the violation of any Indiana
Building Code . . . or industry practice as evidence of
negligence[.]
Id. at 40-41; Appellant’s App. Vol. 9 at 159. The court expressly observed at the
instruction conference that Vigus did not request or tender a final jury
instruction on the Theater’s judicial admission. The court all but invited Vigus
to tender such an instruction. She did not.
[24] For the first time on appeal, Vigus contends that the trial court should have
instructed the jury that the Theater had admitted that the step violated the
applicable building code. Indiana Trial Rule 51(C) provides that, at the close of
the evidence, each party may file written requests that the court instruct the jury
on the law as set forth in the requests. And, as our Supreme Court has made
clear, when, as here, the claimed error is the failure to give an instruction, as
distinguished from the giving of an erroneous one, a tendered instruction is
necessary to preserve error because, without the substance of an instruction
upon which to rule, the trial court has not been given a reasonable opportunity
to consider and implement the request. Scisney v. State, 701 N.E.2d 847, 848 n.3
(Ind. 1998). In this procedural posture, a party’s “failure to . . . tender a
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relevant jury instruction” results in waiver. Bowman v. State, 51 N.E.3d 1174,
1178-79 (Ind. 2016).
[25] Here, again, the court and the parties discussed the judicial admission issue
before the trial, during the trial, and during the instruction conference. As we
have noted, the transcript shows that those discussions between the court and
counsel, which occurred outside the presence of the jury, were confusing and
equivocal. And, again, at no time did Vigus request a jury instruction on the
Theater’s admission of a building code violation. As Scisney directs, Vigus was
required to tender an instruction in order to give the trial court an opportunity
during the trial to deny or implement the request and for Vigus to preserve the
issue for appeal. 701 N.E.2d at 848 n.3. This was necessary even though Vigus
may well have believed and anticipated that the court would refuse to give the
instruction. 2 Instead, Vigus acquiesced and tendered a different instruction,
which the trial court gave. Thus, we cannot consider whether the trial court
erred when it did not instruct the jury on the Theater’s alleged judicial
admission.
[26] In sum, we hold that the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it revoked
its pretrial order finding that the Theater had made a judicial admission on the
building code violation. Even if the Theater had made a judicial admission, it
2
The day before the instruction conference, during the parties’ colloquy with the court regarding the
Theater’s motion to reconsider the judicial admission order, the court stated, “I won’t include an instruction
that as built [the step was] a Building Code violation because [I] don’t know that.” Tr. Vol. 6 at 77.
Regardless, Vigus was required to tender the desired instruction in order to preserve the issue for our review.
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was incumbent on Vigus to tender a jury instruction on the judicial admission.
Vigus did not tender that instruction, and she has not preserved that issue for
our review.
Issue Two: Post-Fall Evidence that the Theater
Sought a Variance Instead of Reducing the Riser’s Height
[27] Vigus also asserts on appeal that the trial court abused its discretion when it did
not admit into evidence communications between the Theater’s owners, after
Ruth’s fall, that they would seek a variance in the riser’s height rather than
reduce that height. We review the trial court’s decision to admit or not admit
evidence for an abuse of the court’s discretion. Snow v. State, 77 N.E.3d 173,
177 (Ind. 2017). “This discretion means that, in many cases, trial judges have
options. They can admit or exclude evidence, and we won’t meddle with that
decision on appeal.” Id.
[28] Vigus’s argument on this issue is that the Theater’s owners “lied under oath”
because, during trial, they testified that they would have taken remedial actions
if they had known the riser’s height posed a danger, yet, following Ruth’s fall,
they applied for a building variance rather than reduce the riser’s height.
Appellant’s Br. at 51. Vigus asserts that that evidence was relevant
impeachment evidence and, as such, the court erred when it denied the
admission of that evidence.
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[29] In a pretrial order, 3 the trial court prohibited the admission of those
communications, stating that they did not reveal that the owners “knew the
condition of the platform as-built did not comply with potentially applicable
building codes” and thus were “not relevant.” Appellant’s App. Vol. 4 at 98.
The court further stated that, under Indiana Evidence Rule 403, even if those
communications had “some limited relevance . . . , the probative value of the
evidence is substantially outweighed by the danger of confusing the issues at
trial as well as misleading the jury” by asking the jury to focus on what was
known by the owners “after the fall . . . when the relevant inquiry is what [they]
knew at the time of [Ruth’s] fall.” Id.
[30] The trial court did not abuse its discretion. The purported relevance of those
communications aside, Indiana Evidence Rule 403 permits the trial court to
exclude “relevant evidence if its probative value is substantially outweighed by
a danger of one or more of the following: . . . confusing the issues[ or]
misleading the jury . . . .” “[T]his balancing is committed to the trial court’s
discretion.” Snow, 77 N.E.3d at 179.
[31] The trial court here concluded that the relevance, if any, of the owners’
communications to seek a variance after Ruth’s fall would be substantially
outweighed by the danger of suggesting to the jury that the owners knew at the
time of Ruth’s fall of the alleged danger posed by the riser. The court’s
3
Vigus sought to admit the evidence at trial, and the court denied the request for the same reasons as in the
pretrial order. Vigus objected, and the court permitted her to make an offer of proof.
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balancing of those concerns was not error as a matter of law, and we will not
usurp the trial court’s role of balancing those factors. See id. Accordingly,
Vigus has not met her burden to show error on this issue.
Conclusion
[32] We hold that the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it revoked its
pretrial order on the judicial admission. Even assuming that the Theater had
made a judicial admission that the riser was a building code violation, Vigus
has not shown reversible error. In particular, prior to trial, the court asked
Vigus to “explain” the building code violation to the jury. Tr. Vol. 3 at 133.
Vigus obliged and, in her opening argument, told the jury that, “you’ll be
instructed that there is a building code violation.” Id. at 137. But Vigus made
no objection when the Theater told the jury in its opening argument that the
court would not instruct the jury on the violation. Neither did Vigus object to
any of the Theater’s evidence on the basis that it violated the court’s judicial
admission order. In the end, the dispute on the judicial admission became “an
instructional issue.” See Bowman, 51 N.E.3d at 1178. But at the instruction
conference, Vigus did not argue she was entitled to such an instruction, and she
did not tender an instruction on the judicial admission. See Scisney, 701 N.E.2d
at 848. Thus, Vigus has not preserved for our review her contention on appeal
that the trial court erred when it did not instruct the jury that the Theater had
made a judicial admission of a building code violation.
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[33] We also hold that the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it excluded
evidence of communications between the Theater’s owners, after Ruth’s fall,
that they would seek a variance in the riser’s height rather than reduce that
height. And we affirm the judgment for the Theater.
[34] Affirmed.
Kirsch, J., and Brown, J., concur.
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