Quentin E. Stewart v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.) ( 2020 )

MEMORANDUM DECISION
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D),
this Memorandum Decision shall not be FILED
regarded as precedent or cited before any Aug 18 2020, 8:59 am
court except for the purpose of establishing
CLERK
the defense of res judicata, collateral Indiana Supreme Court
Court of Appeals
estoppel, or the law of the case. and Tax Court
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Thomas C. Allen Curtis T. Hill, Jr.
Fort Wayne, Indiana Attorney General of Indiana
Tina L. Mann
Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
Quentin E. Stewart, August 18, 2020
Appellant-Defendant, Court of Appeals Case No.
20A-CR-230
v. Appeal from the
Allen Superior Court
State of Indiana, The Honorable
Appellee-Plaintiff. Frances C. Gull, Judge
Trial Court Cause No.
02D05-1809-MR-17
Kirsch, Judge.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 20A-CR-230 | August 18, 2020 Page 1 of 12
[1] Following a jury trial, Quentin E. Stewart (“Stewart”) was convicted of
murder1, a felony. Stewart appeals his murder conviction and raises one issue,
which we restate as whether the State presented sufficient evidence to rebut his
claim of self-defense.
[2] We affirm.
Facts and Procedural History
[3] Zachary Bailey (“Bailey”) and Codi McCann (“McCann”) had known each
other since childhood and were best friends. Tr. Vol. 3 at 21. If Bailey was
going through a hard time he would often live with McCann and considered
McCann to be like a brother. Id. at 22. On December 6, 2016, Dorrion
Jefferson (“Jefferson”), who was also known as City or City Boy, contacted
Bailey to purchase a pound of marijuana. Id. at 23-24. Bailey and Jefferson
communicated primarily through Snapchat and text messaging regarding the
marijuana purchase. Id. at 23. Bailey knew Jefferson primarily as City Boy and
had met with him on two previous occasions. Id. Jefferson told Bailey to meet
him at the State Bar and Grill that night, and Bailey thought Jefferson was
acting “pushy, he was real pushy” because Jefferson “was really trying to
initiate [the marijuana purchase] more than me and it was kind of a red -- I
should have known better, it was kind of a red flag.” Id. at 25. Bailey asked
McCann to come with him to meet Jefferson because of his concerns. Id.
1
See Ind. Code § 35-42-1-1.
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McCann went with Bailey and brought along a gun. Id. at 51-52. Before they
met, Jefferson asked Bailey what kind of car Bailey drove and told Bailey where
he should park the car, that Bailey should come into the bar as soon as he
arrived, and to leave McCann and the pound of marijuana in the car. Id. at 25-
26. Bailey thought the situation was “completely rehearsed” and that Jefferson
was “dictating” the terms but proceeded to meet with Jefferson according to
Jefferson’s instructions. Id. Bailey, who had been driving, left McCann in the
passenger seat and went into the bar to meet Jefferson. Id. at 26-27, 36; State’s
Ex. 9 at 21:47:42.
[4] While Bailey and Jefferson were in the bar talking, Adam Reinders
(“Reinders”) was in the outside smoking patio area of the bar talking to a friend
when he noticed a Jeep Cherokee slowly circling the parking lot. Tr. Vol. 3 at
10-11; State’s Exs. 2, 9. Reinders observed the Jeep Cherokee circling the
parking lot at least three times, which he thought was strange, and he then
heard what he thought were fireworks but were later determined to be gun shots
that seemed to be coming from down a nearby alley. Tr. Vol. 3 at 9-10, 15;
State’s Ex. 9 at 21:48:46. Reinders went back into the bar after he heard the
noises. Tr. Vol. 3 at 12.
[5] Bailey and Jefferson then left the bar together after three to four minutes and
walked to Bailey’s car. Tr. Vol. 3 at 28; State’s Ex. 9 at 21:50:36. When Bailey
entered the driver’s side of the car, he noticed shards of glass in the vehicle and
saw that McCann was unconscious and slumped over in the passenger seat, so
Bailey shook McCann while calling his name. Tr. Vol. 3 at 30. Jefferson did
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not get into Bailey’s car but looked through the shattered passenger side
window and said “[w]hat the fuck, bro?” Id. at 31. Jefferson then left in a black
Jeep Cherokee that he had borrowed from his girlfriend, telling Bailey “[d]on’t
say my fucking name.” Id. at 29-30, 87, 89. Bailey noticed that the bag
containing the pound of marijuana was gone from the car. Id. at 29. McCann’s
.40 caliber Smith & Wesson handgun was lying in his lap. Id. at 66.
[6] A call to 911 was made, and when the medics arrived, McCann was
pronounced dead. Tr. Vol. 2 at 211-12, 249-50; Tr. Vol. 3 at 56. He died of a
gunshot wound to his chest. Tr. Vol. 2 at 224, 228. The type of chest wound
McCann suffered would cause a person to lose consciousness within one to two
minutes, and death likely would have occurred within five minutes after being
shot. Id. at 230. McCann also had a second, non-fatal gunshot wound to the
thigh. Id. at 224.
[7] Jefferson arrived home at some time between eleven and midnight. Tr. Vol. 3 at
89-90. He came “through the door kind of frantically,” stating that “[t]hings
went bad, my friend got shot.” Id. at 90. He told his girlfriend that he had hurt
his ankle and told her to drive him to the hospital. Id. at 90-92. On their arrival
at the hospital, police seized the black Jeep Cherokee. Id. at 92-93.
[8] On that same night, Stewart had his then-girlfriend, Haley McPherson
(“McPherson”), drop him off near the bar. Id. at 77; Def’s. Ex. D. McPherson
heard gunshots about two minutes after she dropped Stewart off, and Stewart
called her saying that he had been shot. Id. at 79-83. McPherson drove Stewart
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to the hospital and did not notice whether Stewart had a gun on him. Id. at 81.
Police arrived at the hospital, impounded McPherson’s car, and found a .45
caliber Hi-Point semi-automatic weapon under the passenger seat. Id. at 95-97,
119. Stewart later told police during questioning that he had gone to the bar to
meet a girl; he denied knowing a person named City, having a gun with him
that evening, and that he had called McPherson to tell her he had been shot.
State’s Ex. 54 at 10:30:56; 10:34:04; 10:37:12; 10:39:15.
[9] DNA swab testing on the .45 caliber Hi-Point was conducted at the Indiana
State Police Laboratory. The test showed that the DNA of Jefferson,
McPherson, and Stewart were found on the weapon. Tr. Vol. 3 at 145-47. The
DNA testing showed that “the DNA profile, the evidence itself, is at least one
trillion times more likely if it originated from Quentin Stewart and two
unknown individuals than if it originated from three unknown individuals[,]”
which “provides strong support for the proposition that Quentin Stewart is a
contributor to the DNA profile” found on the weapon. Id. at 147. Ballistics
testing at the Indiana State Police Laboratory was also performed on the two
recovered firearms and the five casings and one bullet recovered at the scene.
Tr. Vol. 3 at 155. Of the five casings found at the scene, three were fired from
the .40 caliber handgun, and two were fired by the .45 caliber Hi-Point. Id. at
156. The bullet was excluded from having been shot by the .40 caliber gun, but
it could not be identified or excluded from being shot from the .45 caliber Hi-
Point. Id. at 156-57. The SIM card in Stewart’s phone contained a contact
named “City” with a phone number that matched Jefferson’s. Id. at 191.
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However, police were unable to extract additional information from Stewart’s
phone because Stewart had set the phone to reset if someone else tried to turn it
on. Id. at 176-77, 228.
[10] On September 17, 2018, Stewart was charged with murder and an enhancement
for use of a firearm. Appellant’s App. Vol. 2 at 23-25. On September 12, 2019,
Steward notified the State that he would be claiming the affirmative defense of
justifiable force. Id. at 68. A jury trial was set for September 24, 2019, which
was declared a mistrial as a result of a hung jury. Id. at 11-12.
[11] The trial court set another trial date for December 3, 2019. Id. at 14. At the
second trial, Stewart’s testimony from his prior trial, which was redacted in
parts, was read into evidence. Tr. Vol. 3 at 203-30; Defendant’s Ex. D at 61-95.
In that testimony, Stewart stated McPherson took him to the bar that night to
sell heroin to Jefferson. Tr. Vol. 3 at 204-05. His testimony was that he met
Jefferson in the bar’s parking lot, that both Bailey and McCann were also there,
and that he did not know either Bailey or McCann. Id. at 206-09. He added
that he did not have any drugs on him and that no drug transaction between
him and Jefferson occurred. Id. at 210-11. His testimony was that Bailey asked
him for heroin and cocaine and that McCann, who was in the car, “upped a
gun” on him. Id. at 212. At that point, he stated that he attempted to block
McCann’s gun by hitting it on the barrel, that McCann fired a shot at him
through the car’s halfway up window, and that the shot hit him in the chest. Id.
at 213. He stated that McCann shot him again in his lower stomach, and that
after having been shot twice, he shot back. Id. at 214. Stewart said he went to
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McPherson’s car and told her he had been shot and that she took him to the
hospital. Id. at 215. He also explained that he lied in his earlier statements to
the police because he was angry, stating that he was upset with Detective Scott
Tegtmeyer, McCann’s mother, and news reports about the case. Id. at 216. He
acknowledged that he knew and communicated with Jefferson, that he had a
loaded gun with him that evening, and that he fired the shot that killed
McCann. Id. at 219, 222, 228.
[12] On December 5, 2019, the jury returned a verdict of guilty to murder and also
returned a verdict of guilty as charged to the firearm enhancement. Id. at 175.
On January 3, 2020, the trial court sentenced Stewart to sixty years executed for
murder with an enhancement of an additional ten years for the use of a firearm,
for a total aggregate sentence of seventy years executed in the Indiana
Department of Correction. Id. at 177-78. Stewart now appeals.
Discussion and Decision
[13] Stewart contends that the State presented insufficient evidence to rebut his
claim that he was acting in self-defense. The standard for reviewing a challenge
to the sufficiency of evidence to rebut a self-defense claim is the same standard
for a claim of insufficient evidence. Ervin v. State, 114 N.E.3d 888, 895 (Ind. Ct.
App. 2018), trans. denied. We neither reweigh the evidence nor judge the
credibility of the witnesses. Id. We consider only the probative evidence and
reasonable inferences supporting the trial court’s decision. Id. We will affirm a
conviction if there is substantial evidence of probative value such that a
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reasonable trier of fact could have concluded the defendant was guilty beyond a
reasonable doubt. Id. It is not necessary that evidence overcome every
reasonable hypothesis of innocence. Sallee v. State, 51 N.E.3d 130, 133 (Ind.
2016). A conviction may be based upon circumstantial evidence alone. Id. at
134.
[14] Indiana’s self-defense statute provides:
A person: (1) is justified in using reasonable force, including
deadly force, against any other person; and (2) does not have a
duty to retreat; if the person reasonably believes that the force is
necessary to prevent serious bodily injury to the person or a third
person on the commission of a forcible felony. No person in this
state shall be placed in legal jeopardy of any kind whatsoever for
protecting the person or a third person by reasonable means
necessary.
Ind. Code § 35-41-3-2(c). The statute also provides that “a person is not
justified in using force if . . . the person is committing or is escaping after the
commission of a crime[.]” Ind. Code § 35-41-3-2(g)(1). With respect to the
limitation on the use self-defense set forth in Indiana Code section 35-41-3-
2(g)(1), the Indiana Supreme Court has recently stated that:
Although the self-defense statute instructs that a person cannot
use force defending himself if he, among other things, “is
committing . . . a crime,” Ind. Code § 35-41-3-2, we do not
strictly apply that statute because “[t]he legislature is presumed to
have intended the language used in the statute to be applied
logically and not to bring about an unjust or absurd result,”
Mayes v. State, 744 N.E.2d 390, 393 (Ind. 2001). Instead, we have
held that “there must be an immediate causal connection
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between the crime and the confrontation.” Id. at 394 (emphasis
added).
Gammons v. State, 148 N.E.3d 301, 304 (Ind. 2020).2
[15] To prevail on his self-defense claim, Stewart was required to show that he: (1)
was in a place where he had a right to be; (2) did not provoke, instigate, or
participate willingly in the violence; and (3) had a reasonable fear of death or
great bodily harm. Quinn v. State, 126 N.E.3d 924, 927 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019).
The State may meet its burden by rebutting the defense directly, by
affirmatively showing the defendant did not act in self-defense, or by relying on
the sufficiency of the case-in chief. Id.
[16] Relying primarily on his testimony that was read into evidence at trial, Stewart
contends that McCann shot first and that he shot back in self-defense to support
his argument that the State failed to rebut his self-defense claim. He maintains
that his testimony, coupled with the medical examiner’s testimony that
McCann would not have been able to return fire after having been shot in the
chest, supports his position that he was acting in self-defense. The State
2
Gammons involved a challenge to a trial court’s jury instruction on self-defense “instructing that the crime
and confrontation must merely be ‘directly and immediately related,’” which “weakened the causal
connection required to preclude a claim of self-defense.” 148 N.E.3d at 304. The Court “reiterate[d] that
self-defense is barred only when there is “an immediate causal connection between the crime and the
confrontation.” Id. at 305.
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maintains that it sufficiently rebutted Stewart’s claim of self-defense in its case-
in-chief.
[17] Stewart’s argument that the State failed to meet its burden is unavailing because
it asks us to reweigh the evidence, which we cannot do. See Ervin, 114 N.E.3d
at 895. The jury heard Stewart’s recounting of the events that night that was
read into evidence at trial and made the determination that it was not credible
and did not assign it significant weight. It was able to weigh Stewart’s
testimony with the other evidence that was presented during the trial, including
the testimony of the medical examiner. See Drane v. State, 867 N.E.2d 144, 146
(Ind. 2007) (“It is the fact-finder’s role, not that of appellate courts, to assess
witness credibility and weigh the evidence to determine whether it is sufficient
to support a conviction.”).
[18] Viewing the evidence most favorably to the conviction shows that Stewart
worked with Jefferson to commit a robbery. Bailey thought Jefferson was
acting “pushy, he was real pushy” because Jefferson “was really trying to
initiate [the marijuana purchase] more than me and it was kind of a red -- I
should have known better, it was kind of a red flag.” Tr. Vol. 3 at 25. He
described Jefferson’s actions as “completely rehearsed” and that Jefferson was
“dictating” the terms of the transaction. Id. McCann came with Bailey because
of Bailey’s concerns, and McCann brought his gun. Id. at 25-26, 51-52. Bailey
followed Jefferson’s instructions, including the where to park his car, to come
into the bar as soon as he arrived, and to leave McCann and the pound of
marijuana in the car. Id. at 25-26. Bailey left McCann in the passenger seat,
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exited the vehicle, entered the bar, and discussed the marijuana purchase for
about three or four minutes with Jefferson -- all according to Jefferson’s
instructions. Id. at 25-27, 36; State’s Ex. 9 at 21:47:42, 21:50:36. In the
meantime, McCann stayed in the car and Reinders, who was in the bar’s
outdoor patio area, reported hearing what were gunshots while Jefferson and
Bailey were still inside the bar. Tr. Vol. 3. at 9-15, 26-27; State’s Ex. 9 at
21:48:46. Approximately two minutes after McPherson dropped Stewart off
near the bar, she heard gunshots, and Stewart called her saying that he had been
shot. Tr. Vol. 3 at 77-83. Stewart admitted that on that evening he brought a
loaded gun with him to the bar and that he knew Jefferson and had
communicated with him. Id. at 219, 222, 228. Although police were unable to
extract additional information from Stewart’s phone because he had set the
phone to reset if someone else tried to turn it on, the SIM card in his phone also
listed “City”, which was Jefferson’s nickname, as a contact. Id. at 176-77, 191,
228. Stewart responded affirmatively, when asked whether he fired the shots
that killed McCann, stating “[y]es, sir.” Id. at 228. The same gun used in the
shooting of McCann was later found under the passenger seat of McPherson’s
car, precisely where Stewart had been sitting, and contained his DNA. Id. at
119, 148-51. While police did not recover any drugs during the search of the
three vehicles, the bag containing the marijuana was not in the car when Bailey
returned to the car. Id. at 29, 123, 197-98. Stewart also initially lied to police,
stating he went to the bar to meet a girl, denied knowing Jefferson, denied
having a gun with him that evening, and denied calling McPherson saying that
he had been shot. State’s Ex. 54 at 10:30:56; 10:34:04; 10:37:12; 10:39:15. See
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Hughes v. State, 546 N.E.2d 1203, 1208 (Ind.1989) (observing that testimony
tending to show a defendant’s attempt to conceal incriminating evidence or
to manufacture exculpatory evidence may be considered by the jury as evidence
of consciousness of guilt.). A reasonable jury could determine that the State’s
evidence showed that Stewart’s actions in concert with Jefferson resulted in an
“immediate causal connection” between the robbery and the eventual
confrontation, which removes the justification for Stewart’s use of force. See
Gammons, 148 N.E.3d at 304; Mayes, 744 N.E.2d at 394. Therefore, the
evidence was sufficient for a reasonable jury to determine that the State rebutted
Stewart’s self-defense claim.
[19] Affirmed.
Pyle, J., and Tavitas, J., concur.
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