Judy Reece v. Tyson Fresh Meats, Inc. ( 2020 )

FILED
Aug 20 2020, 10:06 am
CLERK
Indiana Supreme Court
Court of Appeals
and Tax Court
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEES
Michael W. Phelps TYSON FRESH MEATS, INC. &
Stewart Phelps Wood TYSON FOODS, INC.
Indianapolis, Indiana Bruce D. Jones
Keith A. Gaston
Rachel O. Webster
Bradley M. Owen
Cruser, Mitchell, Novitz, Sanchez,
Gaston & Zimet, LLP
Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
Judy Reece, August 20, 2020
Appellant-Plaintiff, Court of Appeals Case No.
20A-CT-214
v. Appeal from the Wayne Superior
Court
Tyson Fresh Meats, Inc., et al., The Honorable Jay L. Toney,
Appellees-Defendants. Special Judge
Trial Court Cause No.
89D01-1508-CT-38
Bailey, Judge.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 20A-CT-214 | August 20, 2020 Page 1 of 21
Case Summary
[1] Judy Reece, individually and as the Guardian of Walter Reece (“Walter”),
(collectively, “Reece”) appeals a grant of summary judgment in favor of Tyson
Fresh Meats, Inc. and Tyson Foods, Inc. (collectively, “Tyson”). We affirm.
Issues
[2] Reece presents two consolidated and restated issues for review:
I. Whether the trial court abused its discretion in excluding
from the summary judgment record interrogatory
responses and a portion of the opinion of an accident
reconstructionist; and
II. Whether the trial court erred in granting summary
judgment to Tyson upon Reece’s negligence claim.
Facts and Procedural History
[3] On August 10, 2014, at approximately 7:30 p.m., ninety-two-year-old motorist
Harold Moistner (“Moistner”) was traveling southbound on Boyd Road in
Wayne County. As his vehicle approached the intersection of Boyd Road and
Hunnicut Road, Connie Sherwood (“Sherwood”) was driving her vehicle
eastbound on Hunnicut Road. Sherwood saw Moistner, who was driving very
slowly, motion to her to enter the intersection. Sherwood then turned south
onto Boyd Road.
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[4] After turning, Sherwood looked in her rearview mirror. She observed Moistner
execute a U-turn at Hunnicut Road west of Boyd Road, approach the
intersection, hesitate briefly, and pull out. Moistner’s vehicle collided with a
motorcycle operated by Walter. Walter suffered catastrophic brain injuries.
[5] Moistner left the scene of the accident but he was located and interviewed by
Wayne County Sheriff’s Deputy Tyler Dougherty (“Deputy Dougherty”).
Moistner appeared to be unable to recount the accident details but he conveyed
his perception that the motorcycle had pulled out in front of him. Deputy
Dougherty compiled a report in which he included the following observation:
Grass on the northwest corner of Hunnicut Road and Boyd Road
was tall. This grass would have limited or prohibited the view of
Driver 1 to see Vehicle 2 traveling southbound.
(App. Vol. II, pg. 86.) Tyson’s plant was located on the northwest side of this
intersection. A drainage ditch ran parallel to southbound Boyd Road.
[6] On August 24, 2015, Reece filed a complaint for damages against Moistner.
During discovery, Reece served Moistner with Interrogatories and scheduled
his deposition for January 27, 2016. In addition to any assistance that may
have been provided by his attorney, Moistner was assisted by his daughter,
Nola Geise (“Geise”). Geise wrote down Moistner’s verbal responses but did
not recall writing down a response to Interrogatory 21, which sought
information as to any claimed affirmative defenses. Moistner received and
signed a printed copy of his Responses to Interrogatories, which, as to
Interrogatory 21, stated in part that Moistner’s view at the intersection had been
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blocked by tall grass.1 Geise brought Moistner to the scheduled deposition but
Moistner questioned “what accident” and was not sworn in to provide
testimony. (Id. at Vol. III, pg. 50.)
[7] On March 29, 2016, Reece filed an Amended Complaint, adding as defendants
the State of Indiana, Wayne County, and Tyson. Regarding Tyson, Reece
alleged:
That on or about August 10, 2014, the defendant, Tyson Fresh
Meats, Inc., negligently allowed grass to grow so high on their
property that it blocked the view of the roadway where Hunnicut
Road and Boyd Road intersect, and therefore is at fault for the
collision described in paragraph 2 above.
(App. Vol. II, pg. 54.)
[8] Tyson answered the complaint on June 14, 2016. On June 19, 2016, Moistner
died. Eventually, Reece settled her claims with Moistner’s estate and Wayne
County. The State of Indiana was dismissed as a party.
[9] On December 5, 2017, Tyson filed a motion for summary judgment and its
designation of evidence. Although Tyson had initially denied ownership of the
drainage ditch at the intersection of Boyd Road and Hunnicut Road, Tyson
1
Interrogatory 21 provides: “Specify in detail the facts which establish each Affirmative Defense that you
assert in this case, giving names and addresses of all witnesses and describing all documents upon which you
rely to support such claim.” (App. Vol. II, pg. 96.)
The Answer included an objection, legal authority, and information as to collateral source payments. It also
included the language: “Defendant states that when he came to a stop at the intersection, his view was
blocked by tall grass and prevented him from fully seeing the Plaintiff’s vehicle.” (Id.)
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admitted ownership for purposes of summary judgment. Reece filed a response
in opposition to summary judgment together with a designation of evidence.
Included within Reece’s designations were Moistner’s responses to
interrogatories and an affidavit of Shawn Gyorke (“Gyorke”), a certified
accident reconstructionist. In part, Gyorke’s affidavit stated:
On May 16, 2017, I performed a site investigation at the
intersection of Boyd Road and Hunnicut Road in Wayne
County, Indiana, as well as examining sightlines across the
property of Tyson’s property located at the intersection of Boyd
and Hunnicut.
Based upon my investigation it is my professional opinion that
the placement of Tyson’s sign in conjunction with uncontrolled
foliage growth on Tyson’s property and within the draining ditch
along the west side of Boyd Road inhibited Harold Moistner’s
view and line of sight as he made a U-turn on Hunnicut Road
and approached Boyd Road heading eastbound on Hunnicut
Road.
(Id. at pg. 121.)
[10] On May 3, 2018, Tyson filed a motion to strike Moistner’s responses. On
February 19, 2019, Tyson filed a motion to exclude Gyorke’s opinion affidavit
testimony.
[11] The trial court conducted a hearing on the pending motions. On December 30,
2019, the trial court granted summary judgment to Tyson, concluding that
landowner Tyson had no duty to Reece, as a member of the traveling public.
The trial court also entered two orders, one excluding Moistner’s interrogatory
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responses and the second excluding Gyorke’s opinion with respect to Tyson’s
sign. Reece now appeals.
Discussion and Decision
Standard of Review
[12] We review summary judgment de novo, applying the same standard as the trial
court. Hughley v. State, 15 N.E.3d 1000, 1003 (Ind. 2014). Summary judgment
is appropriate “if the designated evidentiary matter shows that there is no
genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a
judgment as a matter of law.” Ind. Trial Rule 56(C). We construe the evidence
in favor of the nonmovant and resolve all doubts against the moving party.
Pfenning v. Lineman, 947 N.E.2d 392, 397 (Ind. 2011) (quotation omitted). The
party moving for summary judgment bears the initial burden to establish its
entitlement to summary judgment. Id. at 396–97. Only then does the burden
fall upon the nonmoving party to set forth specific facts demonstrating a
genuine issue for trial. Id. at 397 (quotation omitted).
[13] A genuine issue of material fact exists where facts concerning an issue that
would dispose of the litigation are in dispute or where the undisputed material
facts are capable of supporting conflicting inferences on such an issue.
Huntington v. Riggs, 862 N.E.2d 1263, 1266 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007), trans. denied.
[14] The summary judgment process is not a summary trial. Hughley, 15 N.E.3d at
1003–04. Indiana consciously errs on the side of letting marginal cases proceed
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to trial on the merits, rather than risk short-circuiting meritorious claims. Id. at
1004. Nevertheless, a grant of summary judgment is clothed with a
presumption of validity, and the appellant bears the burden of demonstrating
that the trial court erred. Kramer v. Catholic Charities of Diocese of Fort Wayne-
South Bend, Inc., 32 N.E.3d 227, 231 (Ind. 2015).
[15] Reece’s claim against Tyson is one of negligence. To recover on a negligence
claim, a plaintiff must establish: (1) a duty owed by the defendant to the
plaintiff; (2) a breach of that duty; and (3) injury to the plaintiff resulting from
the defendant’s breach. Miller v. Rosehill Hotels, LLC, 45 N.E.3d 15, 19 (Ind. Ct.
App. 2015). Summary judgment is rarely appropriate in negligence cases
because such cases are particularly fact-sensitive and are governed by a standard
of the objective reasonable person, which is best applied by a jury after hearing
all the evidence. Kramer, 32 N.E.3d at 231. However, summary judgment for a
defendant is appropriate if the moving party negates at least one element of the
negligence claim. American Legion Pioneer Post No. 340 v. Christon, 712 N.E.2d
532 (Ind. Ct. App. 1999).
Evidentiary Rulings
[16] A review of summary judgment is dependent upon what evidence the parties
designated for review. Beal v. Blinn, 9 N.E.3d 694, 698 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014). A
trial court has broad discretion in making evidentiary rulings and we will
reverse its decision to admit or exclude evidence only if that decision is clearly
against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances before the court. Id.
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Further, the trial court’s decision will not be reversed unless prejudicial error is
clearly shown. Id. at 698-99.
[17] Indiana Trial Rule 56(C) provides: “At the time of filing the motion or
response, a party shall designate to the court all parts of pleadings, depositions,
answers to interrogatories, admissions, matters of judicial notice, and any other
matters on which it relies for purposes of the motion.” Relevant to our
discussion here, Reece designated the portion of Moistner’s response to
Interrogatory 21 stating that his view at the intersection was blocked by tall
grass.
[18] Tyson moved to strike Moistner’s interrogatory responses as inadmissible
hearsay because Moistner allegedly had exhibited signs of incompetency and
cross-examination was impossible due to his death. As to Interrogatory 21 in
particular, Tyson took the position that Moistner’s attorney likely drafted the
response and he lacked personal knowledge of the circumstances of the
collision. The trial court struck the responses as hearsay. We need not reach
the issue of whether this was an abuse of discretion, because there was other
evidence in the designated record cumulative of the challenged portion of
Interrogatory 21.
[19] Reece alleged in her complaint that the grass at the intersection was tall enough
to block a motorist’s view. In addition to the response to Interrogatory 21, she
designated the report of the responding officer. Deputy Dougherty’s
contemporaneous review of the accident site resulted in his opinion that “this
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grass would have limited or prohibited the view of Driver 1 to see Vehicle 2
traveling southbound.” (App. Vol. II, pg. 86.) Tyson did not designate any
evidence to the contrary. Under Indiana’s summary judgment standard, the
trial court had to consider the grass to be tall enough to block the view. Reece
did not suffer prejudice from the exclusion of interrogatory responses.
[20] Reece also challenges the trial court’s exclusion, in part, of Gyorke’s affidavit.
Pursuant to Ind. Evidence Rule 702(a), expert testimony must convey
knowledge that “will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to
determine a fact in issue.” Evidence Rule 702(a) assigns to the trial court a
gatekeeping function of ensuring that an expert witness’s testimony both rests
on a reliable foundation and is relevant to the task at hand. Howerton v. Red
Ribbon, Inc., 715 N.E.2d 963, 966 (Ind. Ct. App. 1999). Knowledge admissible
under the Rule must connote more than subjective belief or unsupported
speculation. Id. Expert testimony must be supported by appropriate validation
or good grounds based on what is known, establishing a standard of evidentiary
reliability. Lytle v. Ford Motor Co., 696 N.E.2d 465, 472 (Ind. Ct. App. 1998).
[21] Gyorke opined that the placement of Tyson’s sign in conjunction with the
growth of Tyson’s foliage had inhibited Moistner’s view at the intersection. At
Tyson’s behest, the trial court struck the reference to the sign placement as
speculative. Sherwood, the sole eyewitness, placed Moistner’s vehicle past the
Tyson sign when he turned his vehicle and proceeded into the roadway.
Gyorke explained in his deposition that the sign placement was irrelevant
unless Sherwood’s account was inaccurate. As such, Gyorke’s opinion as to
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the sign placement was merely speculative, and the trial court did not abuse its
discretion by excluding it.
Grant of Summary Judgment
[22] Reece’s complaint alleged that Tyson was negligent because it had allowed
grass to grow so high on its property that the grass blocked the view at the
intersection of Boyd and Hunnicut Roads. For summary judgment purposes,
Tyson admitted ownership of the ditch at the northwest corner of the
intersection. As the nonmovant obliged to show prima facie the absence of a
genuine issue of material fact, T.R. 56, Tyson did not designate evidence to
contradict Reece’s allegation that grass was sufficiently tall to block the view at
the intersection.
[23] But Tyson argued that, under the common law, where a natural condition is
wholly contained within a parcel of property, the owner or occupier owes no
duty to a traveler using an adjacent public thoroughfare. Absent a duty, there
can be no breach and, therefore, no recovery in negligence. Stephenson v.
Ledbetter, 596 N.E.2d 1369, 1371 (Ind. 1992). Whether there is a legal duty
owed by one party to another in a negligence action is generally a question of
law for the court to decide. Chandradat v. State, Ind. Dep’t of Transp., 830 N.E.2d
904, 908 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005), trans. denied.
[24] It is well established under Indiana common law that a landowner owes a duty
to the traveling public to exercise reasonable care in the use of his property so as
not to interfere with safe travel on public roadways. Pitcairn v. Whiteside, 109
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Ind. App. 693, 34 N.E.2d 943 (1941). The facts of Pitcairn were that railroad
employees started a fire on the railroad’s right of way and smoke from the fire
blew over a nearby road, obscuring visibility of motorists who were involved in
an accident. The Pitcairn Court concluded that the railroad owed a duty to
Whiteside, a member of the traveling public, explaining:
The occupier of land abutting on or adjacent to, or in close
proximity of, a public highway, owes a duty to the traveling
public to exercise reasonable care to prevent injury to travelers
upon the highway from any unreasonable risks, created by such
occupier, which he had suffered to continue after he knew, or
should have known, of their existence, in cases where such
occupier could have taken reasonable precautions to avoid harm
to such travelers. The traveling public is entitled to make free use
of highways and streets, and an occupier of land, which is
adjacent to or in close proximity of such highway or street, has
no right to so use the property occupied by him as to interrupt or
interfere with the exercise of such right by creating or
maintaining a condition that is unnecessarily dangerous. …
The law requires that every one in the use and enjoyment of his
property shall have regard for the rights of others, and will not
allow him to set up or prosecute a business on his own land in a
way that is calculated to, or in fact does, materially or injuriously
affect the rights of adjoining owners, or that substantially or
harmfully interferes with or injures those rightfully traveling on
an adjoining highway.
Id. at 946.
[25] Subsequently, in Holiday Rambler Corp. v. Gessinger, 541 N.E.2d 559 (Ind. Ct.
App. 1989), a manufacturing plant was operated on the defendant’s property,
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which was located adjacent to a state highway. At 3:00 p.m., as the plant’s shift
ended, 750 people were released onto the highway from four plant exits, all
located within 800 feet of each other. See id. at 562. During one congested
exodus of vehicles, a motorcyclist was struck and injured. A panel of this Court
agreed with the motorcyclist that the plant owners owed a duty to travelers on
the adjacent highway and had created a dangerous condition on their land
which adversely affected the neighboring highway. As such, a landowner
whose plant emits smoke that drifts over the highway, or one who creates a
traffic jam on the highway during plant shift changes, may be liable to a
traveler.
[26] Smoke and a traffic jam are artificially created conditions arising from the use
of land. By contrast, a natural condition is “land that was not changed by any
acts of humans” and includes “the natural growth of vegetation, such as weeds,
on land that is not artificially made receptive to them.” Spears v. Blackwell, 666
N.E.2d 974, 977 (Ind. Ct. App. 1996) (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF TORTS § 363 cmt. b (1965)). Vegetation planted by humans is not a
natural condition. Id.
[27] In Valinet v. Eskew, 574 N.E.2d 283 (Ind. 1991), our Indiana Supreme Court
considered whether a landowner should be liable to a passing motorist who was
injured when a tree located on the landowner’s property fell into the roadway.
In analyzing the landowner’s duty, our Indiana Supreme Court adopted the
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 363, titled “Natural Conditions.” That section
provides:
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(1) Except as stated in Subsection (2), neither a possessor of land,
nor a vendor, lessor, or other transferor, is liable for physical
harm caused to others outside of the land by a natural condition
of the land.
(2) A possessor of land in an urban area is subject to liability to
persons using a public highway for physical harm resulting from
his failure to exercise reasonable care to prevent an unreasonable
risk of harm arising from the condition of trees on the land near
the highway.
[28] The Court acknowledged the general rule of non-liability for harm caused
outside land by a natural condition thereon but also recognized that courts had
imposed liability when landowners had actual knowledge of a dangerous
natural condition:
The general rule of nonliability for natural conditions on land
arose at a time when land was largely unsettled and the burden
imposed on a landowner to inspect it for safety was held to
exceed the societal benefit of preventing possible harm to
passersby. Courts have imposed liability, however, when
landowners had actual knowledge of a dangerous natural
condition, regardless of location. Furthermore, a line of cases
developed in which courts imposed a duty on landowners in
more heavily populated areas to inspect their trees to try to
prevent their posing an unreasonable risk of harm to passing
motorists. The rationale for imposing such a duty on urban
landowners is that the risk of harm to highway users is greater
and the burden of inspection on landowners is lighter in such
populated areas.
We agree that the differing duties placed on owners of land with
respect to differing demographics is correct. We, therefore, adopt
§ 363 of the RESTATEMENT. Whether the land is in an area of
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sufficient population density to invoke the rule requires a factual
consideration of such factors as land use and traffic patterns.
Also, whether the landowner exercised the requisite reasonable
care will require the fact finder to weigh the seriousness of the
danger against the case with which it may be prevented. As this
Court has previously held, a landowner need not continually
inspect his property for natural dangers. However, under some
circumstances, fulfilling a landowner’s duty to passing motorists
might reasonably require periodic inspections to be sure that the
premises do not endanger those lawfully on the highway.
Valinet, 574 N.E.2d at 285–86 (citations omitted).
[29] After our Indiana Supreme Court’s adoption of § 363, a panel of this Court had
occasion to consider, in the context of planted vegetation, “whether the scope
of the [landowner] duty extends to refraining from creating conditions wholly
on a landowner’s property which may impair a traveler’s vision of oncoming
traffic at an intersection.” Sheley v. Cross, 680 N.E.2d 10, 12 (Ind. Ct. App.
1997), trans. denied. Margaret Sheley was killed when her vehicle collided with
a vehicle driven by Kimberly Cross at an intersection. In addition to suing the
county and other driver, the Estate of Margaret Sheley sued Buryle and Hazel
Grossman, who owned land adjacent to the intersection. Allegedly, the
Grossmans had negligently planted crops on their land such that a motorist’s
view of oncoming traffic was impaired. See id. at 11.
[30] The Sheley Court reviewed the Pitcairn and Holiday Rambler cases, observing
that, in each case, the landowner’s “conduct caused a hazard to visit itself upon
the roadway.” Id. at 13. The Court then considered Blake v. Dunn Farms, Inc.,
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274 Ind. 560, 561, 413 N.E.2d 560 (1980), wherein the Indiana Supreme Court
had addressed the duty of a landowner to persons on an adjacent public road
“particularly as that duty applies to the ownership and keeping of domestic
animals.” Robert Blake was a passenger in an automobile which struck a horse
on a portion of the state highway running through the land of Dunn Farms, Inc.
Blake alleged negligence on the part of the owner and the occupier of the land
in permitting fences to fall into disrepair such that the horse could escape. Id. at
563. The Blake Court briefly discussed Pitcairn, explicitly agreeing with the
decision but finding the facts and circumstances of Blake unlike those in Pitcairn.
In distinguishing Pitcairn, the Court explained:
The facts in this case do not bring it within the rule set out in
Pitcairn v. Whiteside, (1941) 109 Ind. App. 693, 34 N.E.2d 943,
where it was held to be the duty of a property owner adjacent to a
highway to exercise reasonable care to prevent injury caused by
the property’s defective or dangerous condition. The defective or
dangerous condition in Pitcairn was heavy smoke going across
the traveled portion of the highway, caused by a railroad,
through its employees, in burning off the right-of-way. We
emphasize that in that case, the railroad itself was causing the dangerous
condition that visited itself upon the traveled portion of the highway.
413 N.E.2d at 566 (emphasis added.)
[31] Having reviewed Pitcairn, Holiday Rambler, and Blake, the Sheley Court found the
Indiana Supreme Court’s focus upon the railroad’s affirmative conduct to be
particularly instructive. The Sheley Court concluded: “to the extent a
landowner owes a duty to travelers on an adjacent roadway, that duty is limited
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to refraining from creating hazardous conditions that visit themselves upon the
roadway. Where an activity is wholly contained on a landowner’s property,
there is no duty to the traveling public.” 680 N.E.2d at 13.
[32] Here, the alleged dangerous condition was confined to the Tyson property. In
her amended complaint, Reece alleged that Tyson allowed high grass growth
“on their property.” (App. Vol. II, pg. 54.) Reece made no allegation of
encroachment upon the roadway. Thus, consistent with Sheley, the grass
growth did not give rise to a duty to the traveling public.
[33] As an alternative to common law duty, Reece argued that Tyson had
voluntarily assumed a duty when its employee mowed the drainage ditch.
Reece deposed John Lewellen (“Lewellen”), a Tyson retiree, and learned that
he had mowed the drainage ditch during his employment with Heinhold Hog
Market from 1975 to 1995 and his employment with Tyson from 1995 to 2012.
According to Lewellen, he did so without explicit instruction from his
employer, but he was paid for his time, and he intended to make the area
“presentable to the public.” (Id. at 105). Lewellen had last mowed the ditch in
2012, the year of his retirement.
[34] A duty of care may arise where a party gratuitously or voluntarily assumes such
a duty. Plan-Tec, Inc. v. Wiggins, 443 N.E.2d 1212, 1219 (Ind. Ct. App. 1983).
“The assumption of such a duty creates a special relationship between the
parties and a corresponding duty to act in the manner of a reasonably prudent
person.” Id. The existence and extent of such a duty are ordinarily questions
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for the trier of fact. Marks v. NIPSCO, 954 N.E.2d 948, 956 (Ind. Ct. App.
2011). However, the court will decide the issue as a matter of law where there
is no genuine issue of material fact. Id.
[35] The assumption of such a duty requires affirmative and deliberate conduct such
that it is “apparent that the actor ... specifically [undertook] to perform the task
that he is charged with having performed negligently.” Yost v. Wabash College, 3
N.E.3d 509, 517 (Ind. 2014) (internal citation omitted). Liability for the breach
of an assumed duty is expressed in the Restatement (Third) of Torts: Physical
and Emotional Harm § 42 (2012), which states:
An actor who undertakes to render services to another and who
knows or should know that the services will reduce the risk of
physical harm to the other has a duty of reasonable care to the
other in conducting the undertaking if:
(a) The failure to exercise such care increases the risk of harm
beyond that which existed without the undertaking, or
(b) The person to whom the services are rendered or another
relies on the actor’s exercising reasonable care in the
undertaking.
“Thus, to impose liability resulting from breach of assumed duty, it is essential
to identify and focus on the specific services undertaken. Liability attaches only
for the failure to exercise reasonable care in conducting the ‘undertaking.’”
Yost, 3 N.E.3d at 517.
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[36] Tyson did not dispute Lewellen’s deposition testimony that he was paid by
Tyson for his time spent mowing the drainage ditch twice monthly for several
years, albeit without specific instruction to do so. Tyson highlights Lewellen’s
testimony that he mowed solely for aesthetic reasons. Thus, according to
Tyson, Lewellen never intended to render a service to the motorists at the
public intersection. But regardless of Lewellen’s motivation or Tyson’s
acquiescence, Lewellen ceased mowing upon his retirement in 2012.2 Reece
has suggested that an assumed duty cannot be abandoned, but she provides no
authority for this proposition, and we are aware of none.
[37] Even were we to assume that Lewellen’s conduct at one time gave rise to a
“special relationship between the parties,” Plan-Tek, 443 N.E.2d at 1219,
Lewellen ceased to participate in the relationship upon his retirement. For
approximately two years preceding the collision, Lewellen was not performing
his “undertaking,” Yost, 3 N.E.3d at 517, negligently or otherwise. There is no
act providing a basis for liability under § 42 of the Restatement. Reece may not
obtain a reversal of the grant of summary judgment on grounds of the
assumption of duty.
2
According to Tyson, Wayne County employees mowed the ditch after 2012.
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Conclusion
[38] Tyson negated the element of duty in Reece’s negligence claim. Reece did not
satisfy the burden of persuading this Court that summary judgment was
erroneously granted. Nor has Reece shown reversible error in the trial court’s
evidentiary rulings.
[39] Affirmed.
Vaidik, J., concurs.
Baker, Sr. J., dissents in part with opinion.
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IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
Judy Reece, Court of Appeals Case No.
20A-CT-214
Appellant-Plaintiff,
v.
Tyson Fresh Meats, Inc., et al.,
Appellees-Defendants.
Baker, Senior Judge, dissenting in part.
[40] I fully concur with respect to the resolution of the evidentiary issue, but I
respectfully dissent from the majority’s decision to affirm the trial court’s order
granting summary judgment in favor of Tyson.
[41] The evidence is undisputed that the grass on Tyson’s property was sufficiently
tall to block the view at the intersection in question. Our appellate courts have
held that private property owners bear a duty of reasonable care in the use of
their property in a way that does not interfere with safe travel on public
roadways. Pitcairn, 34 N.E.2d at 946; see also Valinet, 574 N.E.2d at 285
(holding that “[w]hether the land is in an area of sufficient population density to
invoke the rule” is a question of fact, as is the question of “whether the
landowner exercised the requisite reasonable care”).
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[42] In this case, I believe that there are multiple issues of fact rendering summary
judgment inappropriate. Specifically, I believe that a factfinder needs to resolve
the questions of the population density of the area at the intersection as well as
whether Tyson exercised the requisite reasonable care in maintaining the
vegetation on its property. Consequently, I would reverse the trial court’s order
on summary judgment and remand for further proceedings.
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