Stephen H. Hoop, II v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.) ( 2020 )

MEMORANDUM DECISION
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D),
this Memorandum Decision shall not be FILED
regarded as precedent or cited before any Sep 01 2020, 7:56 am
court except for the purpose of establishing CLERK
the defense of res judicata, collateral Indiana Supreme Court
Court of Appeals
estoppel, or the law of the case. and Tax Court
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Alexander W. Robbins Curtis T. Hill, Jr.
The Law Office of Alex Robbins Attorney General of Indiana
Bedford, Indiana
Sierra A. Murray
Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
Stephen H. Hoop, II, September 1, 2020
Appellant-Defendant, Court of Appeals Case No.
20A-CR-665
v. Appeal from the Hendricks Circuit
Court
State of Indiana, The Honorable Daniel F. Zielinski,
Appellee-Plaintiff Judge
Trial Court Cause No.
32C01-1808-F2-17
Baker, Senior Judge.
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[1] Stephen Hoop II appeals his convictions for Level 2 Felony Dealing in
Methamphetamine1 and Level 5 Felony Dealing in Marijuana.2 Hoop argues
that he did not consent to a search of his hotel room by law enforcement
officers, nor did he have authority to consent, and that the evidence collected
from this search was improperly admitted. Finding no error, we affirm.
Facts
[2] On August 28, 2018, Plainfield Police Officer Robert Pritchard, a canine
handler, conducted a criminal patrol of the Budget Inn. While looking up
license plate numbers of the cars in the hotel’s parking lot, he discovered that
the driver of a pickup truck, Hoop, had recently been arrested. The hotel
manager told Officer Pritchard that Hoop was staying in Room 206.
[3] Officer Pritchard then deployed his canine companion, Jocko, who is trained to
detect crack, cocaine, marijuana, methamphetamine, and heroin. Jocko alerted
around Hoop’s truck and outside Room 206. Officer Pritchard called for
backup, and multiple officers responded.
[4] After the additional officers arrived, Hoop left Room 206. The officers
approached Hoop. Hoop consented to the officers’ search of his vehicle. The
officers did not find any illegal substances in Hoop’s truck.
1
Ind. Code § 35-48-4-1.1(a)(2).
2
Ind. Code § 35-48-4-10 (a)(2).
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[5] Following the search of his truck, Hoop asked if he was free to leave. The
officers said that he was, but that they would like to search Room 206 as well.
Hoop responded, “yeah that’s fine, it’s not just my room.” Tr. Vol. II p. 82.
He then got into his truck and drove away. Officers used a master key to gain
access to the room. There, they found drug paraphernalia, firearms, several
pounds of methamphetamine, several pounds of marijuana, and scales, along
with Hoop’s belongings.
[6] Hoop was taken to the police station, where he confessed to trafficking in drugs.
Police also discovered incriminating text messages on his cell phone. Hoop was
arrested. On August 29, 2018, he was charged with Level 2 felony dealing in
methamphetamine, Level 3 felony possession of methamphetamine, Level 5
felony dealing in marijuana, and Level 5 felony possession of a narcotic drug.
On February 5, 2019, the state moved to add an habitual offender enhancement
to the charges.
[7] Hoop’s counsel moved to suppress the evidence found in Room 206, Hoop’s
incriminating statements, and the incriminating text messages on the basis that
the officers did not have consent to search the room. The trial court held a
suppression hearing on August 29, 2019. At the hearing, Hoop testified that he
told the officers that it was not his room, he did not possess a key, and that he
could not consent to its search. Id. at 125-26. Officer Pritchard testified that
Hoop said, “that’s fine, it’s not just my room” when asked if police could
search Room 206. Id. at 82. Another officer testified that Hoop said, “as long
as I can leave . . . do whatever.” Id. at 104. A third officer testified that Hoop
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consented to the search as long as he could leave. Id. at 117. He also testified
that he did not remember Hoop ever saying the room was not his. Id. at 123
[8] The trial court denied Hoop’s motion on October 17, 2019. The court found
that “[a]ll three Officers that testified were credible. Their testimony was
consistent.” Appellant’s App. Vol. II p. 52. In contrast, the trial court found
that Hoop “was not credible” and that the search was “consensual.” Id.
[9] Hoop waived his right to a jury trial, and his bench trial took place on
December 10, 2019. The day of trial, Hoop admitted that he is an habitual
offender. Id. at 70. At the trial, the evidence stemming from the search of
Room 206 was admitted over Hoop’s objection. At the close of the trial, the
trial court found Hoop guilty of dealing in methamphetamine and dealing in
marijuana. The State dismissed the possession of marijuana charge and the
trial court vacated the possession of methamphetamine charge due to double
jeopardy concerns. Tr. Vol. II p. 191. The trial court sentenced him to a
twenty-year term, which was enhanced by ten years based on the habitual
offender finding, for an aggregate term of thirty years imprisonment. Hoop
now appeals.
Discussion and Decision
[10] Hoop argues that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress
evidence stemming from the search of Room 206. Because Hoop appeals after
a completed trial, the issue is best characterized as a request to review the
admission of the evidence at trial. E.g., Guilmette v. State, 14 N.E.3d 38, 40 (Ind.
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2014). In reviewing a trial court’s ruling on the admissibility of evidence, we
“reverse only when admission is clearly against the logic and effect of the facts
and circumstances and the error affects a party’s substantial rights.” Id. In
conducting our review, we consider conflicting evidence in the light most
favorable to the trial court’s ruling, and do not reweigh evidence or re-evaluate
witness credibility. Johnson v. State, 992 N.E.2d 955, 957 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013).
Questions of law, like the constitutionality of a search and seizure, are subject
to de novo review. Guilmette, 14 N.E.3d at 40.
[11] Hoop argues that because he did not consent to the search of Room 206, nor
did he have authority to consent, the search violated both the Fourth
Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I, Section 11 of the
Indiana Constitution. The Fourth Amendment generally prohibits warrantless
searches, subject to specific exceptions. Krise v. State, 746 N.E.2d 957, 961 (Ind.
2001). Consent to search is one such exception. Id. Similarly, Article I,
Section 11 forbids unreasonable searches, generally requires warrants, and
allows valid consent as an exception to the warrant requirement. Joyner v. State,
736 N.E.2d 232, 242 (Ind. 2000). Under both provisions, the consenting party
must have authority to consent. Krise, 746 N.E.2d at 964.
[12] Hoop argues that he did not consent to the search, but the record belies his
argument. For example, Officer Pritchard testified that Hoop said, “that’s not
just my room.” Tr. Vol. II p. 83. Another officer testified that Hoop said, “as
long as I can leave . . . do whatever.” Id. at 104. A third officer testified that
Hoop consented to the search as long as he could leave. Id. at 117. Hoop
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directs our attention to other evidence in the record, including his own assertion
that he did not consent, but this amounts to a request that we reweigh the
evidence and second-guess the trial court’s conclusion that the officers were
credible but Hoop was not. We decline the request. Given this record, the trial
court did not err by finding that Hoop consented to the search, rendering it
reasonable under both the Fourth Amendment and Article 1, Section 11.
[13] Hoop next argues that even if he did consent, he did not have the requisite
actual or apparent authority to consent. Actual authority rests on showing a
“mutual use of property” and “joint access and control for most purposes.”
Krise, 746 N.E.2d at 967 (citing U.S. v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164 (1974)). Apparent
authority exists if the information available to police at the time would
“warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief that the consenting party had
authority over the premises.” Id. (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21-22
(1968)). If either exists, consent to search is valid. Id.
[14] Again, this constitutional question rests on questions of fact for which we give
great deference to the trial court. The hotel manager told Officer Pritchard that
Hoop was staying in Room 206. Tr. Vol. II p. 50-51. Officer Pritchard testified
that he saw Hoop leaving Room 206. Id. at 58-59. A second officer did not
recall Hoop ever saying the room was not his, and Officer Pritchard testified
that Hoop said the room was not just his. Id. at 123, 83. Though they used a
master key to access Room 206, rather than one provided by Hoop, Officer
Pritchard testified that this is common procedure for hotel searches. Id. at 66-
67, 88. The trial court found the officers’ testimony more credible than Hoop’s.
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Appellant’s App. Vol. II p. 52. The trial court had sufficient facts to conclude
that Hoop at the very least had apparent authority to consent, rendering the
search lawful. Therefore, it was well within the trial court’s discretion to admit
the evidence discovered pursuant to a lawful search.3
[15] The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
Bailey, J., and Vaidik, J., concur.
3
As we resolve this case under the consent issue, we need not and will not address Hoop’s remaining
arguments.
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