Annette Spicer v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.) ( 2020 )

MEMORANDUM DECISION
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), FILED
this Memorandum Decision shall not be
regarded as precedent or cited before any Apr 30 2020, 8:25 am
court except for the purpose of establishing CLERK
Indiana Supreme Court
the defense of res judicata, collateral Court of Appeals
and Tax Court
estoppel, or the law of the case.
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Edmond W. Foley Curtis T. Hill, Jr.
Douglas D. Small Attorney General of Indiana
Foley & Small
Abigail R. Recker
South Bend, Indiana Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
Annette Spicer, April 30, 2020
Appellant-Plaintiff, Court of Appeals Case No.
19A-CT-2948
v. Appeal from the LaPorte Superior
Court
State of Indiana, The Honorable Jeffrey L. Thorne,
Appellee-Defendant Judge
Trial Court Cause No.
46D03-1802-CT-279
Baker, Judge.
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[1] Annette Spicer filed a negligence claim against the State after she was injured
following a slip and fall in the parking lot of her place of employment, Westville
Correctional Facility (Westville). The trial court entered summary judgment in
favor of the State, finding as a matter of law that it was entitled to immunity
under the Indiana Tort Claims Act (ITCA).1 The State argues that even if the
trial court erred by finding that it was entitled to immunity as a matter of law,
summary judgment in its favor is still appropriate because Spicer was
contributorily negligent. Finding that there are genuine issues of material fact
rendering summary judgment inappropriate, we reverse and remand for further
proceedings.
Facts
[2] At the time of Spicer’s fall, she was employed as a kitchen supervisor at
Westville. On March 15, 2017, it snowed approximately two inches in the area.
There may have been some rain or other precipitation during the next couple of
days. On March 17, 2017, Spicer was scheduled to start work at 4:00 a.m.
Normally, it took her approximately fifteen minutes to drive from home to
work, but that day, she gave herself extra time because it was slippery outside.
When she left home, there was no snow on her car, and she did not have any
difficulty getting into her car because she had salted her property. Spicer left
1
Ind. Code ch. 34-13-3.
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home around 2:30 a.m. and arrived at work around 3:20 a.m.; it was very cold
outside and the roads were icy in some places.
[3] The Westville parking lot is dark and dimly lit. During the winter months, the
parking lot is frequently slippery. It is unclear whether the parking lot had been
salted in the hours leading up to Spicer’s accident, but there is evidence in the
record that the parking lot was slippery and icy in spots. Westville employees
were aware that there were areas in the parking lot where water tends to pool.
[4] After Spicer pulled into the parking lot, she exited her vehicle with only her
keys in her hand. She slipped on a patch of black ice behind her vehicle and
fell, injuring herself; she heard a crack when she fell. She screamed and the
people who responded found her on the ground, in pain. Westville staff helped
Spicer into a wheelchair and transported her into the facility. A nurse called an
ambulance and Spicer was transported to the hospital, to be treated for her
injuries.
[5] On February 27, 2018, Spicer filed a complaint against the State, alleging that
she had sustained injuries and damages that were proximately caused by the
negligence of the agents and employees of Westville. On January 29, 2019, the
State moved for summary judgment, arguing that it is immune under the ITCA
and that Spicer was contributorily negligent and, therefore, barred from
recovery as a matter of law.
[6] Following briefing and a hearing, the trial court granted the State’s summary
judgment motion on December 6, 2019. In pertinent part, it concluded that
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Spicer’s “alleged injuries are directly related to a temporary condition caused by
the weather and that the time and circumstances under which Spicer sustained
her alleged injuries either preceded or occurred very early within the period of
reasonable response by the [State].” Appealed Order p. 3 (emphasis in original
omitted). The trial court did not rule on the State’s argument regarding
contributory negligence. Spicer now appeals.
Discussion and Decision
[7] Spicer argues that the trial court erred by granting summary judgment in favor
of the State because there are issues of fact that must be evaluated by a
factfinder. Our standard of review on summary judgment is well settled:
The party moving for summary judgment has the burden of
making a prima facie showing that there is no genuine issue of
material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as
a matter of law. Reed v. Reid, 980 N.E.2d 277, 285 (Ind. 2012).
Once these two requirements are met by the moving party, the
burden then shifts to the non-moving party to show the existence
of a genuine issue by setting forth specifically designated
facts. Id. Any doubt as to any facts or inferences to be drawn
therefrom must be resolved in favor of the non-moving
party. Id. Summary judgment should be granted only if the
evidence sanctioned by Indiana Trial Rule 56(C) shows there is
no genuine issue of material fact and that the moving party
deserves judgment as a matter of law. Freidline v. Shelby Ins.
Co., 774 N.E.2d 37, 39 (Ind. 2002).
Goodwin v. Yeakle’s Sports Bar & Grill, Inc., 62 N.E.3d 384, 386 (Ind. 2016). Our
Supreme Court has cautioned that “[a]s long as competent evidence has been
designated in response to a summary judgment motion, . . . ‘weighing [the
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evidence]—no matter how decisively the scales may seem to tip—[is] a matter
for trial, not summary judgment.’” Stafford v. Szymanowski, 31 N.E.3d 959, 963
(Ind. 2015) (quoting Hughley v. State, 15 N.E.3d 1000, 1005-06 (Ind. 2014)).
I. ITCA
[8] Indiana Code section 34-13-3-3(3) provides that “[a] governmental entity or an
employee acting within the scope of the employee’s employment is not liable if
a loss results from . . . [t]he temporary condition of a public thoroughfare . . .
that results from weather.” (Emphasis added.) This provision, like all
provisions in the ITCA, is in derogation of the common law and is strictly
construed against the grant of immunity. Mullin v. Mun. City of South Bend, 639
N.E.2d 278, 281 (Ind. 1994). The party seeking immunity has the burden of
establishing that its conduct falls within the provisions of the Act. Id.
“Whether a particular governmental act is immune is a question of law for the
court to decide, although the question may require extensive factual
development.” Barns v. Antich, 700 N.E.2d 262, 265 (Ind. Ct. App. 1998); see
also Gary Cmty. Sch. Corp. v. Roach-Walker, 917 N.E.2d 1224, 1228 (Ind. 2009)
(holding that the trial court properly refused a governmental entity’s proposed
jury instruction on immunity under the ITCA “[b]ecause immunity is a matter
of law for the court to decide”).
[9] It is undisputed that Westville is a governmental entity and that the Westville
parking lot is a public thoroughfare. It is likewise undisputed that Spicer’s
accident was at least partially related to the weather. What must be
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determined, for summary judgment purposes, is whether it can be concluded as
a matter of law that the weather-related condition was “temporary,” or, instead,
was a condition that Westville had had the time and opportunity to ameliorate.
[10] We find Roach-Walker instructive. In that case, the plaintiff took her children to
a middle school to attend enrichment classes. The record as to weather
conditions was inconclusive, with no evidence establishing when the most
recent rain, snow, or sleet had occurred. As the plaintiff approached the
entrance to the school, she slipped and fell. A witness later described the area
where the plaintiff had slipped as “slick” and “wet looking” after the fall. Id. at
1225. A jury ultimately found in favor of the plaintiff, and the school
corporation appealed. Our Supreme Court noted that “whether a condition
was ‘temporary’ ultimately hinge[s] on whether the governmental entity had a
reasonable opportunity to remedy conditions initially caused by weather.” Id.
at 1228. In other words,
the government may be liable for negligence in maintaining
roads, but when the government is in the process of responding
to a weather condition, as a matter of law the immunity
conferred in subsection (3) for ‘temporary conditions caused by
weather’ extends to all claims caused by that condition during the
period of reasonable response, whether the alleged injury
occurred early or late in that period.
Id. Our Supreme Court found that “[t]he record reasonably support[ed] both
[the school’s] and [the plaintiff’s] explanation of the facts.” Id. As such, the
school corporation failed to carry its burden. See also Bules v. Marshall Cty., 920
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N.E.2d 247, 250 (Ind. 2010) (holding that “[i]f the evidence permits conflicting
reasonable inferences as to material facts, the government unit has failed to
establish its immunity”). Therefore, in Roach-Walker, “[e]ven if attributable to
weather, because [the school] has not established that it had no opportunity to
cure the condition, [the school] has not established that the condition was
‘temporary.’ Accordingly, [the school] failed to establish immunity under the
ITCA.” Id. at 1229.
[11] Under Roach-Walker, two things are clear. First, the ITCA is strictly construed
against the governmental entity, which bears the heavy burden of establishing
its entitlement to immunity. Second, concomitantly, a record that reasonably
supports both the governmental entity’s and the plaintiff’s version of the facts
must be resolved in favor of the plaintiff and against immunity.
[12] Here, the record contains the following evidence regarding the weather in the
days leading up to Spicer’s accident:
• It snowed approximately two inches in the area on March 15, 2017.
• It did not snow the night before the accident. It may have rained the
night before the accident.2
• Spicer gave herself extra time to drive to Westville on March 17 because
she was aware it was slippery outside. Her drive to work, which
2
Spicer designated as evidence meteorological reports from the Porter County Regional Airport. The State
argues that this evidence does not conclusively establish what conditions were like at Westville, which is
approximately ten miles from the airport. As the movant and the party seeking immunity, it was the State
that bore the burden of designating other, more specific meteorological evidence regarding conditions at
Westville. Because the State did not do so, the only official evidence in the record regarding meteorological
conditions (aside from the lay testimony of Westville employees regarding their recollection of the weather at
the time) is that designated by Spicer.
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normally takes fifteen minutes, took nearly an hour because of road
conditions.
• Spicer had no problems getting into her vehicle at home because she had
salted her property well.
• When Spicer got into her vehicle at home, it did not have any snow on it.
• There was still snow in the Westville parking lot when Spicer pulled in;
therefore, she proceeded carefully.
• At the time of Spicer’s accident, it was neither raining nor snowing.
• Westville employees did not know whether the parking lot had been
salted in the hours leading up to the accident. They salted the parking lot
after the accident, however.
• Westville employees did not know whether anyone at the facility inspects
the parking lot to make sure that snow and ice haven’t built up or
whether surfaces are salted at regular intervals. More than one employee
indicated that they were aware that the lot was poorly lit and that there
were areas in the lot where water, ice, and snow frequently accumulated.
• When the parking lot is salted, it is not salted in between parked vehicles.
[13] We must determine whether the evidence conclusively establishes that
Westville was “in the process of responding to a weather condition” when
Spicer’s accident occurred. Roach-Walker, 917 N.E.2d at 1228. We find that
the evidence does not reach that threshold. It is undisputed that two days had
passed since the last major snow event. And even if we were to assume that
there had been some precipitation overnight (which is not without dispute in
the record), causing freezing on the roadways, Westville offered no evidence
that it had not had a reasonable opportunity to ameliorate the conditions in its
parking lot. Indeed, there is no evidence in the record that any Westville
employees had salted, or attempted to salt, the parking lot in the hours leading
up to Spicer’s accident, even though employees were aware that the lot was
poorly lit and vulnerable to accumulating precipitation. Likewise, there is no
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evidence that any effort to salt would have been pointless or unreasonable.
Therefore, we can only find that Westville has not met its burden on summary
judgment to show that it is entitled to immunity.
[14] We acknowledge the caselaw cited above, specifically Roach-Walker, which says
that immunity is a determination that must be made as a matter of law. And
the Roach-Walker Court held that if the evidence can support either party’s
position, then the government has failed and is not entitled to immunity. But
Roach-Walker was decided following a jury trial. Here, in contrast, the case is
only at the summary judgment stage. Because there are questions of fact
regarding weather conditions leading up to the time of Spicer’s accident (as well
as possible other causes, including poor lighting and pavement conditions), the
State has not met its burden as a summary judgment movant. It will have
another opportunity to make its case, however, as part of a trial with a fully
developed factual record. The trial court may, yet again, be called upon to
determine whether the State is immune under the ITCA, but that will have to
occur following a full presentation of evidence at trial. Therefore, we reverse
the trial court’s grant of summary judgment on the basis of immunity and
remand for further proceedings.
II. Contributory Negligence
[15] The State also argues that summary judgment should be entered in its favor
because of Spicer’s alleged contributory negligence. Tort claims filed against
governmental entities are governed by Indiana’s common law contributory
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negligence doctrine, meaning that “a plaintiff is barred from recovery when he
or she is negligent and this negligence is even slightly the cause of the alleged
damages.” Murray v. Indianapolis Pub. Schs., 128 N.E.3d 450, 452-53 (Ind.
2019).
[16] Contributory negligence results when a person fails to exercise “that degree of
care and caution which an ordinary, reasonable, and prudent person in a
similar situation would exercise.” Id. at 453 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Contributory negligence is generally a question of fact to be answered by a jury,
but it may be appropriately decided on summary judgment if the facts are
undisputed and only a single inference may be drawn therefrom. Id.
[17] The State argues that Spicer knew that it was icy outside when she was on her
way into work. Indeed, she gave herself extra time to get to work because of
the poor road conditions. According to the State, “[a] reasonable person would
have been aware that because of the icy road conditions, the parking lot would
have also been slippery and taken extra precautions to ensure that they were
able to get into the facility without injury.” Appellee’s Br. p. 20.
[18] Spicer attested that when she exited her vehicle, she was being very cautious.
There is no evidence that she was heavily laden with items—instead, she only
had her keys in her hands—nor is there evidence that she was moving quickly
or recklessly or that she was distracted. Instead, Spicer attested that as she
moved around the back end of her vehicle, she slipped on a patch of black ice
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that she could not see because of the poor lighting conditions in that area of the
parking lot. Spicer did not believe that she contributed to the fall.
[19] Spicer’s testimony is sufficient to create an issue of fact as to whether she acted
with reasonable care when she exited her vehicle and walked around it. In
other words, based on this record, we cannot resolve the issue of contributory
negligence as a matter of law and the State is not entitled to summary judgment
on this basis.
[20] The judgment of the trial court is reversed and remanded for further
proceedings.
Bradford, C.J., and Pyle, J., concur.
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