N.H. v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.) ( 2020 )

MEMORANDUM DECISION
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), FILED
this Memorandum Decision shall not be
regarded as precedent or cited before any May 22 2020, 10:23 am
court except for the purpose of establishing CLERK
Indiana Supreme Court
the defense of res judicata, collateral Court of Appeals
and Tax Court
estoppel, or the law of the case.
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Kelly M. Starling Angela N. Sanchez
Marion County Public Defender Agency Tina L. Mann
Appellate Division Deputy Attorneys General
Indianapolis, Indiana Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
N.H., May 22, 2020
Appellant-Respondent, Court of Appeals Case No.
19A-JV-2876
v. Appeal from the Marion Superior
Court
State of Indiana, The Honorable Danielle P. Gaughan,
Appellee-Petitioner. Judge Pro Tempore
The Honorable Geoffrey A. Gaither,
Magistrate
Trial Court Cause No.
49D09-1908-JD-977
Bailey, Judge.
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Case Summary
[1] N.H. appeals the juvenile court’s true finding that she committed the delinquent
act of escape, a Level 6 felony1 if committed by an adult. The only issue she
raises on appeal is whether the trial court abused its discretion when it admitted
State’s Exhibits 1 and 2 into the record, over her objections.
[2] We affirm.
Facts and Procedural History
[3] In early August of 2019, the State placed N.H. on electronic monitoring as a
pretrial condition in relation to another case. On August 13, the State filed a
delinquency petition in which it alleged that N.H. committed the delinquent act
of escape. The juvenile court conducted a fact finding hearing on September 27
at which Lidiana Adams (“Adams”), N.H.’s Marion County Juvenile
Probation Officer, testified that, on August 7, N.H. was released from detention
and, as a condition of her release, was placed on a GPS electronic monitoring
system in the form of a monitor on an ankle strap. Adams testified that ankle
monitors allow the community adjustment team (“CAT”) of the Marion
1
Ind. Code § 35-44.1-3-4(b) (“A person who knowingly or intentionally violates a home detention order or
intentionally removes an electronic monitoring device or GPS tracking device commits escape, a Level 6
felony.”).
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County Juvenile Probation Department to monitor a juvenile’s location at all
times.
[4] On August 12, CAT received an alert that N.H.’s ankle monitor was either
malfunctioning or had been tampered with. Because the probation department
was unable to contact N.H. otherwise, Adams and members of CAT went to
N.H.’s home. N.H. was not there, but Adams and the other probation officers
found an ankle monitor lying in the driveway of N.H.’s home with the strap cut
and a pair of scissors lying next to the ankle monitor. From the information
Adams had up to that point, she believed the discarded ankle monitor belonged
to N.H. The probation officers collected the ankle monitor and filed a notice of
probation violation.
[5] Dave Akers (“Akers”), the supervisor of Marion County CAT, also testified.
Through Akers, the State offered into evidence two exhibits. Akers testified
that he had printed out both exhibits from the computer system CAT uses to
monitor juveniles on community release. He stated that computer system is
“from” a company out of Colorado called Behavioral Interventions Total
Access, which services the monitoring equipment and provides CAT with alerts
when certain activities occur, such as tampering with ankle monitor straps. Tr.
at 15. Exhibit 1 was a printout of an activity summary indicating that a
“Tracker Strap Tamper” had occurred on August 12, 2019, for the ankle
monitor provided to N.H.. Ex. 1. N.H. objected to Exhibit 1 as “hearsay,” and
on the grounds that the State had only provided the document to N.H. right
before the hearing. Tr. at 16. The juvenile court asked Akers if there was any
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information in Exhibit 1 “that hasn’t been talked about today in court,” and
Akers replied in the negative. Id. at 19. The court overruled the objection and
Exhibit 1 was admitted.
[6] Akers also testified as to Exhibit 2, which was another document he had printed
out from the system owned by Behavioral Interventions. Exhibit 2 contained a
“history” of activity on N.H.’s ankle monitor from August 8 through September
24, 2019. Tr. at 22. Akers stated that the documents in both Exhibits 1 and 2
are documents CAT “keeps in its regular course of business.” Id. at 23. N.H.
objected to the admission of Exhibit 2 on the grounds that (1) it was provided to
her only right before the hearing and (2) it is hearsay. As to the latter, N.H.
noted the document in Exhibit 2 is from a computer system “from [Behavioral
Interventions] Total Access,” and Akers is “not the keeper of that system.” Id.
N.H. further stated: “We don’t have anybody here from Total Access to
authenticate that these [exhibits] are accurate or anything about the [computer]
system.” Id. The juvenile court overruled the objection and Exhibit 2 was
admitted into evidence.
[7] On November 8, 2019, the court issued its written order finding it true that
N.H. committed the delinquent act of escape, a Level 6 felony if committed by
an adult, and placing her on probation. This appeal ensued.
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Discussion and Decision
[8] N.H. appeals the juvenile court’s admission of State’s Exhibits 1 and 2 into
evidence. A trial court has broad discretion to rule on the admissibility of
evidence, and we review such rulings for an abuse of discretion. E.g., Cornell v.
State, 139 N.E.3d 1135, 1143 (Ind. Ct. App. 2020) (citing Nicholson v. State, 963
N.E.2d 1096, 1099 (Ind. 2012)). An abuse of discretion occurs when the trial
court’s decision is clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and
circumstances before it. Id.
[9] As an initial matter, the State asserts that N.H. has waived her appeal of the
admission of Exhibits 1 and 2 because her objections to those exhibits lacked
specificity. Indiana Rule of Evidence 103(a)(1) provides, in relevant part, that
an error is preserved for appeal only if a party makes a timely objection that
states a specific ground, “unless it was apparent from the context.” The State
contends that the hearsay objections to its exhibits were insufficient because
they did not reference Indiana Rule of Evidence 803(6), commonly referred to
as the “business records exception” to hearsay.
[10] However, N.H.’s hearsay objection to Exhibit 2 was specific enough as it
asserted a lack of authentication by the record keeper, which is a requirement of
the business records exception to the rule against hearsay. Ind. Evid. R.
803(6)(D). And N.H.’s general hearsay objection to Exhibit 1 was sufficient to
preserve the issue of its admissibility on appeal, as the ground for the objection
was apparent from the context. See Evid. R. 103(a)(1); Ward v. State, 50 N.E.3d
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752, 756 (Ind. 2016) (cautioning appellate courts not to unrealistically “insist on
detailed doctrinal arguments during the exigencies of trial,” and observing that
an objection need simply be sufficient “to let the trial judge make an informed
decision and prevent the objecting party from switching theories on appeal”);
K.T. v. Ind. Dep’t of Child Servs. (“In re O.G.”), 65 N.E.3d 1080, 1086-76 (Ind. Ct.
App. 2016) (finding a general hearsay objection sufficient to preserve the issue
of admissibility for appeal, even when the objection did not specifically identify
the business records exception to the hearsay rule), trans. denied. N.H. did not
waive appeal of the admissibility of State’s Exhibits 1 and 2.
[11] N.H. contends the trial court abused its discretion when it admitted State’s
Exhibits 1 and 2 into evidence. Specifically, she maintains that those
documents do not fall within the business records exception to the rule against
hearsay. See Evid. R. 803(6). However, even assuming—without deciding—
that the exhibits were inadmissible hearsay, their admission was harmless error.
“The fact that evidence was erroneously admitted does not
automatically require reversal, and we will reverse only if we
conclude the admission affected a party’s substantial rights.” [In
re A.J., 877 N.E.2d 805, 813 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007), trans. denied.]
“In general, the admission of evidence that is merely cumulative
of other evidence amounts to harmless error as such admission
does not affect a party’s substantial rights.” In re Paternity of
H.R.M., 864 N.E.2d 442, 450-51 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007).”
D.B.M. v. Ind. Dep’t of Child Servs., 20 N.E.3d 174, 179 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014),
trans. denied; see also Sibbing v. Cave, 922 N.E.2d 594, 598 (Ind. 2010)
(“[R]eversible error cannot be predicated upon the erroneous admission of
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evidence that is merely cumulative of other evidence that has already been
properly admitted.”(quotation and citation omitted)); E.B. v. Ind. Dep’t of Child
Servs. (“In re Des.B.”), 2 N.E.3d 828, 834 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014) (“To determine
whether the admission of evidence affected a party’s substantial rights, we
assess the probable impact of the evidence upon the finder of fact.”(citation
omitted)).
[12] Here, State’s Exhibits 1 and 2 were merely cumulative of the testimony
provided by Adams. She testified that: N.H. was on electronic monitoring; the
probation department received an alert on August 12, 2019, that N.H.’s
monitor was either malfunctioning or had been tampered with; Adams and
other probation officers went to N.H.’s house when they could not otherwise
get in touch with her; N.H. was not at home; Adams and other probation
officers found an ankle monitor lying in N.H.’s driveway with a cut strap; and
they also found a pair of scissors lying next to the monitor in the driveway.
From that evidence, the juvenile court could reasonably infer that N.H.
intentionally removed her electronic monitoring device, thus committing the
delinquent act of escape. I.C. § 35-44.1-3-4(b). The evidence in Exhibits 1 and
2 provided no additional information that was necessary to reach such a
reasonable inference. The only new information in the exhibits was the specific
number of N.H.’s ankle monitor, and that information was not necessary to
support the reasonable inference that the ankle monitor with the cut strap found
in N.H.’s driveway was N.H.’s monitor. Therefore, the only new information
in the challenged exhibits likely had no impact on the juvenile court’s decision.
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See In re Des.B., 2 N.E.3d at 834. Any error in the admission of State’s Exhibits
1 and 2 was harmless.
Conclusion
[13] N.H. preserved her appeal of the admission of the State’s exhibits into evidence
by timely objecting on hearsay grounds. However, assuming without deciding
that the admission of those exhibits was erroneous, the error was harmless as
the relevant information in the exhibits was cumulative.
[14] Affirmed.
Crone, J., and Altice, J., concur.
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