C.D. v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.) ( 2020 )

MEMORANDUM DECISION
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D),
this Memorandum Decision shall not be FILED
regarded as precedent or cited before any Oct 26 2020, 10:50 am
court except for the purpose of establishing
CLERK
the defense of res judicata, collateral Indiana Supreme Court
Court of Appeals
estoppel, or the law of the case. and Tax Court
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Kelly Starling Curtis T. Hill, Jr.
Marion County Public Defender Agency Attorney General of Indiana
Indianapolis, Indiana
Courtney Staton
Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
C.D., October 26, 2020
Appellant-Defendant, Court of Appeals Case No.
20A-JV-434
v. Appeal from the Marion Superior
Court
State of Indiana, The Honorable Marilyn A.
Appellee-Plaintiff, Moores, Judge
The Honorable Geoffrey A.
Gaither, Magistrate
Trial Court Cause No.
49D09-1911-JD-1388
Robb, Judge.
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Case Summary and Issue
[1] C.D., a minor, appeals his adjudication as a juvenile delinquent based on the
juvenile court’s finding that he committed various acts that would be crimes if
committed by an adult, including criminal recklessness, carrying a handgun
without a license, dangerous possession of a firearm, and intimidation. On
appeal, C.D. raises a single issue, which we restate as whether the evidence is
sufficient to support the juvenile court’s finding that C.D. committed
intimidation. Concluding the evidence is sufficient, we affirm.
Facts and Procedural History
[2] On October 21, 2019, T.E. was at her mother Shaquita Emery’s home when
C.D. knocked on her door. T.E. testified “[C.D.] was like is [P]ap here and we
was like no-we was like [P]ap not here can you please leave and that is when
[C.D.] was like alright and we will be back to shoot this up, shoot this mother
up.” Transcript of Evidence, Volume II at 8. Pap is T.E.’s sister’s boyfriend,
and T.E. knew where he was but did not want to tell C.D. T.E. saw a purple
and black gun on C.D.’s hip “in his pants” but “showing” during this
encounter. Id. at 9. After the brief conversation with C.D., T.E. had her father
pick her up and take her to his home because although she did not believe C.D.
was “for real[, she] was just scared a little bit” that he might come back and
shoot up the house. Id. at 10.
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[3] Later that night around 8:00 pm, Shaquita was home alone sitting upstairs in
her bedroom and looking out the window “already on the look-out[,]” id. at 16,
when she observed C.D. walk from across the street into her yard and “instantly
start[] shooting” at her house, id. at 18. C.D. fired “at least seven” times. Id. at
19. Shaquita ran out of the house, called the police, and did not return until the
detectives arrived.
[4] Detective Ivan Ivanov of the Indianapolis Metropolitan Police Department was
on duty the night of the shooting and interviewed both Shaquita and T.E. after
the incident. Shaquita and T.E. both told Detective Ivanov that C.D. was
involved in the incident. Detective Ivanov subsequently obtained a search
warrant for C.D.’s home which he served on November 6, finding, among other
things, a purple and black nine-millimeter handgun and ammunition. C.D. was
arrested.
[5] The State filed a juvenile delinquency petition alleging that C.D. had
committed criminal recklessness, carrying a handgun without a license,
dangerous possession of a firearm, and intimidation if committed by an adult.
On December 10, a denial hearing was conducted where the juvenile court,
having heard the evidence, entered a true finding on all counts.1 At the
dispositional hearing, C.D. was placed on probation with a suspended
1
The carrying a handgun without a license count and the dangerous possession of a firearm count were
merged for purpose of disposition. Tr., Vol. II at 76.
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commitment to the Indiana Department of Correction and placed in a
residential program at Campagna Academy. C.D. now appeals.
Discussion and Decision
I. Standard of Review
[6] When reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence supporting
a juvenile’s adjudication as a delinquent, we neither reweigh the evidence nor
judge witnesses’ credibility. C.D.H. v. State, 860 N.E.2d 608, 610 (Ind. Ct. App.
2007), trans. denied. Rather, we consider only the probative evidence and
reasonable inferences supporting the juvenile court’s judgement. M.S. v.
State, 889 N.E.2d 900, 901 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008), trans. denied. We will affirm the
adjudication of delinquency if probative evidence exists such that a reasonable
factfinder could find the elements of the underlying offense proven beyond a
reasonable doubt. Id.
II. Sufficiency of Evidence
[7] C.D. contends the evidence presented by the State is insufficient to sustain the
true finding that he committed intimidation. To support a finding that C.D.
committed intimidation as charged, the State was required to prove that (1)
C.D. communicated a threat (2) with the intent that another person engage in
conduct against the other person’s will. See Ind. Code § 35-45-2-1(a)(1).
[8] When the State seeks to have a juvenile adjudicated a delinquent for an act that
would be a crime if committed by an adult, the State must prove every element
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of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. C.D.H., 860 N.E.2d at 610. A
defendant’s intent may be proven by circumstantial evidence alone, and
knowledge and intent may be inferred from the facts and circumstances of each
case. E.B. v. State, 89 N.E.3d 1087, 1091 (Ind. Ct. App. 2017). “We will not
reverse a conviction that rests in whole or in part on circumstantial evidence
unless we can state as a matter of law that reasonable persons could not form
inferences with regard to each material element of the offense so as to ascertain
a defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.” McCaskill v. State, 3 N.E.3d
1047, 1050 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014).
[9] In relevant part, Indiana Code section 35-45-2-1(d) defines a threat as an
“expression, by words or action, of an intention to: (1) unlawfully injure the
person threatened or another person, or damage property; (2) unlawfully subject
a person to physical confinement or restraint; [or] (3) commit a crime[.]”
Whether a statement is a threat is an objective question for the fact
finder. Newell v. State, 7 N.E.3d 367, 369 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014), trans. denied. It is
undisputed that when C.D. told T.E. that he would “shoot this mother up,” he
was communicating a threat pursuant to Indiana Code section 35-45-2-1(d).
[10] C.D. argues that the State failed to show that he acted with the intent that T.E.
engage in conduct against her will. C.D. contends there is no evidence that
“C.D. threatened to shoot at the Emery’s [sic] home to force [T.E.] to give him
specific information about Pap’s whereabouts.” Brief of Appellant at 7.
However, “[i]ntent is a mental function; and so, absent an admission, it can be
inferred from a defendant’s conduct and the natural and usual sequence to
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which such conduct logically and reasonably points.” Heuring v. State, 140
N.E.3d 270, 275 (Ind. 2020) (quotation omitted). And “intent may be proven by
circumstantial evidence.” McCaskill, 3 N.E.3d at 1050.
[11] In McCaskill, the defendant was in a romantic relationship with a married man.
The defendant made several threats to the husband’s wife including threatening
physical violence. The defendant was charged with intimidation for making a
threat with the intent to make the wife leave the husband. This court held that
“because the events leading up to the threats are not a part of the record
and McCaskill never clarified her reasons for the threats, that conclusion is pure
speculation.” Id. at 1050. We further stated that “we are not persuaded that it is
the logical inference stemming from the evidence in the record.” Id.
[12] Here, C.D. asked T.E. where Pap was and when C.D. was told Pap was not at
the residence and asked to leave, he responded with “alright and we will be
back to shoot this up, shoot this mother up.” Tr., Vol. II at 8. Unlike McCaskill,
the evidence here includes a description of the events occurring just prior to the
threat; specifically, the brief interaction between C.D. and T.E. when C.D.
asked where Pap was. And although C.D. did not state his reasons for the
threat, a reasonable person could determine from the evidence that C.D.’s
threat was made with the intent of inducing T.E. to disclose Pap’s location. See
McCaskill, 3 N.E.3d at 1050.
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Conclusion
[13] Sufficient evidence supports the juvenile court’s finding that C.D. committed
acts that would constitute intimidation, a Class A misdemeanor, if committed
by an adult. C.D.’s delinquency adjudication is therefore affirmed.
[14] Affirmed.
Crone, J., and Brown, J., concur.
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