Anthony J. Demarco v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.) ( 2020 )


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  • MEMORANDUM DECISION
    Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D),
    this Memorandum Decision shall not be                                                FILED
    regarded as precedent or cited before any                                        Oct 30 2020, 8:38 am
    court except for the purpose of establishing
    the defense of res judicata, collateral                                              CLERK
    Indiana Supreme Court
    Court of Appeals
    estoppel, or the law of the case.                                                     and Tax Court
    APPELLANT PRO SE                                         ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
    Anthony J. DeMarco                                       Curtis T. Hill, Jr.
    Indiana State Prison                                     Attorney General of Indiana
    Michigan City, Indiana
    Steven J. Hosler
    Deputy Attorney General
    Indianapolis, Indiana
    IN THE
    COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
    Anthony J. DeMarco,                                      October 30, 2020
    Appellant-Defendant,                                     Court of Appeals Case No.
    20A-CR-627
    v.                                               Appeal from the Kosciusko
    Superior Court
    State of Indiana,                                        The Honorable David C. Cates,
    Appellee-Plaintiff                                       Judge
    Trial Court Cause No.
    43D01-0503-FA-35
    Crone, Judge.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 20A-CR-627| October 30, 2020               Page 1 of 5
    Case Summary
    [1]   Anthony J. DeMarco, pro se, appeals the trial court’s denial of his petition for
    permission to file a belated notice of appeal. We affirm.
    Facts and Procedural History
    [2]   In 2006, a jury found DeMarco guilty of four counts of class A felony child
    molesting. The trial court sentenced him to an aggregate term of 120 years.
    DeMarco appealed his sentence, arguing that the aggravating circumstances
    found by the trial court did not justify four consecutive thirty-year sentences.
    Another panel of this Court determined that DeMarco’s claim was precluded
    by recent statutory amendments and instead reviewed the appropriateness of his
    sentence under Indiana Appellate Rule 7(B); the panel held that an aggregate
    term of sixty years was appropriate and remanded with instructions to issue an
    amended sentencing order. DeMarco v. State, No. 43A03-0603-CR-128, 
    2006 WL 3759216
    (Ind. Ct. App. Dec. 22, 2006), trans. denied (2007). The trial court
    issued that order in March 2007.
    [3]   In January 2020, DeMarco, pro se, filed a petition for permission to file a
    belated notice of appeal of his amended sentence, in which he alleged that the
    failure to file a timely notice of appeal was not his fault because he “was not
    present when the trial court re-sentenced [him] to sixty years, nor was [he]
    made aware that he was entitled to be present, or entitled to counsel, or advised
    that he had a right to appeal the newly imposed 60-year sentence.” Appellant’s
    App. Vol. 2 at 46. The trial court denied the petition without a hearing, finding
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 20A-CR-627| October 30, 2020   Page 2 of 5
    that the record “is clear” that DeMarco appeared in person and by counsel for
    entry of the amended sentencing order and “[t]hat there are no grounds for
    permitting filing of a belated notice of appeal.”
    Id. at 53.
    DeMarco then filed a
    motion to reconsider and a motion to correct error, both of which were denied.
    This appeal ensued.
    Discussion and Decision
    [4]   Where, as here, “the trial court does not conduct a hearing on a petition for
    permission to file a belated notice of appeal, we review a trial court’s decision
    regarding the petition de novo.” Bosley v. State, 
    871 N.E.2d 999
    , 1002 (Ind. Ct.
    App. 2007). Such petitions are governed by Indiana Post-Conviction Rule 2(1),
    which provides,
    An eligible defendant convicted after a trial or plea of guilty may
    petition the trial court for permission to file a belated notice of
    appeal of the conviction or sentence if;
    (1) the defendant failed to file a timely notice of appeal;
    (2) the failure to file a timely notice of appeal was not due to the
    fault of the defendant; and
    (3) the defendant has been diligent in requesting permission to
    file a belated notice of appeal under this rule.
    A petitioner has the burden of proving the foregoing by a preponderance of the
    evidence. Townsend v. State, 
    843 N.E.2d 972
    , 974 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006), trans.
    denied. As a pro se litigant, DeMarco is held to the same standard as trained
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 20A-CR-627| October 30, 2020   Page 3 of 5
    counsel and is required to follow procedural rules. Hollen v. State, 
    994 N.E.2d 1166
    , 1168 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013).
    [5]   It is undisputed that DeMarco failed to file a timely notice of appeal. He claims
    that this failure was not his fault because he “was not made aware that he had a
    statutory right to be present when the judge resentenced [him] to 60 years.”
    Appellant’s Br. at 6. 1 DeMarco asserts that this right derives from Indiana
    Code Section 35-38-1-4(a), which provides that “[t]he defendant must be
    personally present at the time sentence is pronounced.” But DeMarco cites no
    authority for the proposition that Indiana Code Section 35-38-1-4(a) applies in
    situations like this, where a trial court resentences a defendant pursuant to
    instructions from this Court that leave no discretion as to the sentence
    imposed. 2 Failure to cite authority for an argument waives the issue for our
    review. Whitfield v. State, 
    127 N.E.3d 1260
    , 1268 n.5 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019), trans.
    denied. And, as the State points out, DeMarco has failed to identify “how he
    pursued his belated appeal with diligence.” Appellee’s Br. at 9. Therefore, we
    affirm the trial court.
    1
    The record leaves some doubt regarding whether DeMarco was in fact present when the trial court issued
    the amended sentencing order. Although that order (which is nearly identical to the original sentencing
    order) states that DeMarco was present with counsel for resentencing, the chronological case summary does
    not indicate that a hearing was held or that an order was issued to transport him to a hearing. The judge who
    issued both sentencing orders is not the judge who ruled on the instant petition.
    2
    DeMarco mistakenly suggests that he could relitigate the appropriateness of his amended sentence, which
    this Court has already found to be appropriate.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 20A-CR-627| October 30, 2020                    Page 4 of 5
    [6]   Affirmed.
    Robb, J., and Brown, J., concur.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 20A-CR-627| October 30, 2020   Page 5 of 5
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 20A-CR-627

Filed Date: 10/30/2020

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 10/30/2020