In the Matter of K.H., A Child Alleged to be in Need of Services, C.M. (Mother) and P.H. (Father) v. Indiana Department of Child Services (mem. dec.) ( 2020 )


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  • MEMORANDUM DECISION
    Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D),
    this Memorandum Decision shall not be                                                   FILED
    regarded as precedent or cited before any                                           Nov 20 2020, 8:26 am
    court except for the purpose of establishing                                            CLERK
    Indiana Supreme Court
    the defense of res judicata, collateral                                                Court of Appeals
    and Tax Court
    estoppel, or the law of the case.
    ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT                                   ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
    Dorothy Ferguson                                         Curtis T. Hill, Jr.
    Anderson, Indiana                                        Attorney General
    Monika Prekopa Talbot
    Deputy Attorney General
    Indianapolis, Indiana
    IN THE
    COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
    In the Matter of K.H., a Child                           November 20, 2020
    Alleged to be in Need of                                 Court of Appeals Case No.
    Services,                                                20A-JC-1137
    C.M. (Mother) and                                        Appeal from the
    P.H. (Father),                                           Madison Circuit Court
    The Honorable
    Appellants-Respondents,
    G. George Pancol, Judge
    v.                                               Trial Court Cause No.
    48C02-2003-JC-93
    Indiana Department of Child
    Services,
    Appellee-Petitioner
    Vaidik, Judge.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 20A-JC-1137 | November 20, 2020         Page 1 of 10
    Case Summary
    [1]   C.M. (“Mother”) and P.H. (“Father”) (collectively “Parents”) appeal the trial
    court’s determination that their daughter, K.H. (“Child”), is a Child in Need of
    Services (CHINS). We affirm.
    Facts and Procedural History
    [2]   Mother and Father are the biological parents of Child, born in November 2014.
    In 2016, the Department of Child Services (DCS) assessed Parents for drug use.
    Another assessment, also for drug use, was conducted in 2019. In March of this
    year, DCS again assessed Parents after receiving a report that Parents were
    “using substances” and “allowing [Child’s] grandmother to watch her while
    using substances.” Tr. p. 30. On March 10, Family Case Manager (FCM)
    Caycia Ransbottom went to Parents’ home to make the assessment. Mother,
    Child’s maternal grandmother, and Child were present at the home. The home
    “smelled like marijuana,” and Mother was “very manic,” “yelling,” “pacing,”
    and “slurring her words.”
    Id. at 33, 41.
    Mother and the grandmother admitted
    they were “using [marijuana] that day,” but both refused to take a drug test.
    Id. at 41.
    FCM Ransbottom left and returned later that day with law enforcement.
    This time, Mother took a drug test and “admitted that there would be cocaine
    on her drug screen” and that Father would test positive for marijuana and
    cocaine.
    Id. at 33.
    Mother’s test was positive for cocaine and marijuana. Child’s
    maternal grandmother also took a drug test, which was positive for marijuana.
    When Father arrived home later during the assessment, he was not drug tested.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 20A-JC-1137 | November 20, 2020   Page 2 of 10
    Finding the report “substantiated against [Mother] and grandmother,” DCS
    removed Child from the home and placed her with her paternal grandmother.
    Id. at 31.
    The following day, DCS filed a petition alleging Child was a CHINS
    because there was “no sober adult care giver present in [Child’s] home.”
    Appellant’s App. Vol. II p. 45.
    [3]   In May, the trial court conducted the fact-finding hearing. The court admitted
    two exhibits—which Parents stipulated to—showing Mother had two positive
    drug screens. The first drug screen was taken at the assessment on March 10.
    The second was taken on March 19 and was positive for “low level[s]” of THC.
    Tr. p. 49. All other drug tests for Mother were negative.
    [4]   FCM Ransbottom then testified about the events leading to Child’s removal,
    specifically that Child was removed “because she did not have a sober
    caregiver” and was at “high risk” of “future abuse or neglect” because DCS had
    previously been involved with the family due to Parents’ drug use.
    Id. at 35, 36.
    FCM Timothy Johnson, who took over for FCM Ransbottom after Child’s
    removal, testified he recommended Parents undergo a “substance use
    assessment” and counseling and that he did not “believe that [Parents] would
    do so on their own[.]”
    Id. at 45, 49. [5]
      After DCS presented its case, Parents moved to dismiss the case. The following
    exchange occurred:
    [Parents’ Attorney]: . . . I would, at this time, move to dismiss. I
    don’t feel that the department has met their burden of proof at
    this time to allege that the child is a child in need of services. The
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 20A-JC-1137 | November 20, 2020   Page 3 of 10
    only thing that they proved is that my clients failed one (1) drug
    screen and [] all the other testimony presented here today is that
    the child has been provided for and safe [in] my clients[’] care.
    The Court: Let me just tell you where I am right now without
    precluding you because I haven’t heard your side of the case yet,
    but we have parents that have stipulated to a drug screen and
    sounds like admitted and that’s the first step and unfortunately
    mom didn’t even get to have her child sleep with her on mother’s
    day so my position at this point is, that I’m willing to return this
    child based on drug screens to the mother and father but I am
    going to make at this point a finding that they would benefit from
    the services and I would also make a statement on the record that
    they do a substance abuse evaluation, follow the
    recommendations and show me continued clean drug screens
    and completion of that treatment then I will make a commitment
    that at that point I would feel that they’re ready and I will dismiss
    the case. So if you want to present evidence that’s where I am at
    this point.
    Id. at 52-53.
    Later, before Parents presented their evidence, the trial court stated,
    “I do need to warn you that I am gonna consider this evidence as well as the
    evidence I already heard for placement.”
    Id. at 55.
    [6] 
      After Parents presented their case, the court stated, “I didn’t find any reason to
    change my position either way, so I’m gonna make a finding that this child is in
    need of services . . . .”
    Id. at 64.
    A dispositional hearing was held immediately
    thereafter, and the court ordered Child returned to Parents but required them to
    submit to random drug tests and complete a substance-abuse evaluation.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 20A-JC-1137 | November 20, 2020   Page 4 of 10
    [7]   Parents now appeal.1
    Discussion and Decision
    I. Due Process
    [8]   Parents contend the trial court violated their due-process rights. Due-process
    protections are vital at all stages of CHINS proceedings because “[e]very
    CHINS proceeding has the potential to interfere with the rights of parents in the
    upbringing of their children.” In re K.D., 
    962 N.E.2d 1249
    , 1258 (Ind. 2012)
    (citation omitted). Due process requires the opportunity to be heard at a
    meaningful time and in a meaningful manner. Thompson v. Clark Cnty. Div. of
    Family & Children, 
    791 N.E.2d 792
    , 795 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003), trans. denied.
    Parents did not raise a due-process claim before the trial court, and thus we may
    consider it waived. See Hite v. Vanderburgh Cnty. Office of Family & Children, 
    845 N.E.2d 175
    , 180 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006). But we prefer to resolve due-process
    claims on the merits.
    [9]   Parents argue their due-process rights were violated because the trial court “had
    made a determination as to the evidence prior to [Parents] presenting their case
    in chief” and then attempted “to deter them from presenting their case[.]”
    Appellant’s Br. p. 14. To support this assertion, Parents point to the trial court’s
    1
    In September, while this appeal was pending, Parents filed a motion to dismiss in the trial court. As of the
    date of this opinion, it has not been ruled on.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 20A-JC-1137 | November 20, 2020                  Page 5 of 10
    comments before their case-in-chief. However, Parents take these comments out
    of context and mischaracterize the record.
    [10]   The trial court’s comments were in response to Parents moving to dismiss the
    case. This prompted the court to reply: “Let me just tell you where I am right
    now without precluding you because I haven’t heard your side of the case yet.”
    Tr. p. 53. The court then discussed DCS’s evidence and what the court’s
    findings would be on that evidence alone. The court concluded by saying, “So if
    you want to present evidence, that’s where I am at this point.”
    Id. The court’s comments
    were simply an explanation of its reasoning regarding the motion to
    dismiss and how the case could proceed. Parents were then allowed to present
    their case.
    [11]   Furthermore, the trial court did not “deter” Parents from presenting their case
    by saying, “I am gonna consider this evidence as well as the evidence I already
    heard for placement.”
    Id. at 55.
    A review of the entire record reveals that the
    trial court had previously suggested—based on the DCS’s evidence—that it was
    inclined to return Child to Parents. The court then made sure Parents
    understood that if they presented their case, it would consider any new
    evidence, which could alter its decision. This far from denied Parents a
    meaningful opportunity to be heard. On the contrary, it was an effort to make
    sure Parents knew what their options were going forward.
    [12]   For these reasons, the trial court did not deny Parents their due-process right to
    be heard.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 20A-JC-1137 | November 20, 2020   Page 6 of 10
    II. Sufficiency
    [13]   Parents also argue the evidence presented at the fact-finding hearing was
    insufficient to support the CHINS finding. When determining whether there is
    sufficient evidence to support a CHINS determination, we neither reweigh the
    evidence nor judge the credibility of the witnesses. In re D.F., 
    83 N.E.3d 789
    ,
    796 (Ind. Ct. App. 2017). Rather, we consider only the evidence that supports
    the trial court’s determination and reasonable inferences drawn therefrom.
    Id. [14]
      The trial court found Child to be a CHINS under Indiana Code section 31-34-1-
    1, which provides a child is a CHINS if that child is under eighteen and:
    (1) the child’s physical or mental condition is seriously impaired
    or seriously endangered as a result of the inability, refusal, or
    neglect of the child’s parent, guardian, or custodian to supply
    the child with necessary food, clothing, shelter, medical care,
    education, or supervision; and
    (A) when the parent, guardian, or custodian is financially
    able to do so; or
    (B) due to the failure, refusal, or inability of the parent,
    guardian, or custodian to seek financial or other
    reasonable means to do so; and
    (2) the child needs care, treatment or rehabilitation that the child:
    (A) is not receiving; and
    (B) is unlikely to be provided or accepted without the
    coercive intervention of the court.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 20A-JC-1137 | November 20, 2020   Page 7 of 10
    Ind. Code § 31-34-1-1. DCS has the burden of proving by a preponderance of
    the evidence that the child is a CHINS. Ind. Code § 31-34-12-3. In sum, a
    CHINS adjudication “requires three basic elements: that the parent’s actions or
    inactions have seriously endangered the child, that the child’s needs are unmet,
    and (perhaps most critically) that those needs are unlikely to be met without
    State coercion.” In re S.D., 
    2 N.E.3d 1283
    , 1287 (Ind. 2014), reh’g denied.
    Parents assert DCS failed to show all three elements. We disagree.
    [15]   For the first element, the record sufficiently shows Parents’ actions seriously
    endangered Child. Parents argue their case is analogous to Perrine v. Marion
    County Office of Child Services, where this Court held a single use of
    methamphetamine outside the presence of child, without more, was insufficient
    to support a CHINS determination. 
    866 N.E.2d 269
    , 277 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007).
    The facts here differ, as Parents’ drug use was neither limited to a single
    instance nor done outside the presence of Child. Mother admitted to FCM
    Ransbottom she and Child’s grandmother—the only two adults in the home
    with five-year-old Child—had smoked marijuana that day. The home also
    smelled of marijuana, and Mother appeared under the influence, acting manic,
    yelling, pacing, and slurring her words. Mother’s drug screen revealed she was
    positive for cocaine and marijuana. This is sufficient to prove Mother was
    caring for Child while under the influence of illegal substances. Failing to
    provide such a young child with a sober caregiver endangers them. See In re J.L.,
    
    919 N.E.2d 561
    , 564 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009) (finding the “endangered” element
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 20A-JC-1137 | November 20, 2020   Page 8 of 10
    met where the mother used illegal substances while her child slept, leaving the
    child “without any responsible adult care and supervision”).
    [16]   Regarding the second element, Parents argue Child “does not have any unmet
    needs.” Appellant’s Br. p. 6. But, as stated above, the record clearly shows
    Child lacked sober supervision, an undoubtedly important need for a five-year-
    old. As to the third element, there is sufficient evidence this unmet need will not
    be met without the coercive intervention of the State. DCS contends coercive
    intervention is necessary to meet Child’s need as “it remains to be seen whether
    Parents’ sobriety continues without the coercive intervention of the court.”
    Appellee’s Br. p. 16. We agree. Concerns about continued drug use are well
    founded, as this is Parents’ third involvement with DCS for substance-abuse
    issues since Child was born in 2014. Despite this past involvement, both
    Parents continued to abuse drugs and leave Child with no sober caregiver. And
    even after testing positive for cocaine and marijuana and having Child removed
    from the home, Mother failed a subsequent drug screen. FCM Johnson also
    testified that, after working with Parents for two months, he did not believe they
    would seek out a substance-abuse evaluation or other services on their own.
    This is sufficient to show Child’s need for sober supervision will not be met
    without coercive intervention.
    [17]   We conclude the trial court properly found Child to be a CHINS.
    [18]   Affirmed.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 20A-JC-1137 | November 20, 2020   Page 9 of 10
    Bailey, J., and Weissmann, J., concur.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 20A-JC-1137 | November 20, 2020   Page 10 of 10