Timothy Marcus Mayberry v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.) ( 2020 )


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  • MEMORANDUM DECISION
    Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D),                                                 FILED
    this Memorandum Decision shall not be                                              Nov 24 2020, 7:43 am
    regarded as precedent or cited before any
    CLERK
    court except for the purpose of establishing                                       Indiana Supreme Court
    Court of Appeals
    the defense of res judicata, collateral                                                 and Tax Court
    estoppel, or the law of the case.
    ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT                                  ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
    Thomas P. Keller                                        Curtis T. Hill, Jr.
    South Bend, Indiana                                     Attorney General of Indiana
    Ian McLean
    Supervising Deputy Attorney
    General
    Indianapolis, Indiana
    IN THE
    COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
    Timothy Marcus Mayberry,                                November 24, 2020
    Appellant-Defendant,                                    Court of Appeals Case No.
    20A-CR-158
    v.                                              Appeal from the St. Joseph
    Superior Court
    State of Indiana,                                       The Honorable Jeffrey L. Sanford,
    Appellee-Plaintiff.                                     Judge
    Trial Court Cause No.
    71D03-1810-MR-6
    Pyle, Judge.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 20A-CR-158 | November 24, 2020          Page 1 of 11
    Statement of the Case
    [1]   Timothy Marcus Mayberry (“Mayberry”) appeals, following a jury trial, his
    conviction of murder1 and an enhancement for the use of a firearm in the
    commission of a felony.2 Mayberry argues that the trial court abused its
    discretion in admitting evidence. Concluding that the trial court did not abuse
    its discretion, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.
    [2]   We affirm.
    Issue
    Whether the trial court abused its discretion in admitting evidence.
    Facts
    [3]   The facts most favorable to the verdict reveal that on September 20, 2018,
    Avery Brown (“Brown”) and several friends were at the Bleachers Bar in
    Mishawaka celebrating a birthday. Mayberry and a friend were also at the bar
    socializing, eating, and playing pool.
    [4]   Shortly after midnight, Brown entered the men’s bathroom, which was a small
    one-toilet, one-sink bathroom. Soon thereafter, Mayberry entered the
    1
    IND. CODE § 35-42-1-1.
    2
    I.C. § 35-50-2-11.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 20A-CR-158 | November 24, 2020   Page 2 of 11
    bathroom. Brown and Mayberry had never met and had not interacted with
    each other until this point. After several seconds, customers at the bar heard
    three gunshots. The bathroom door opened, and Mayberry exited and moved
    quickly towards the bar’s exit. Brown, who was crawling on the bathroom
    floor, collapsed and said, “[h]e shot me. Help me. He shot me.” (Tr. Vol. 2 at
    113). As Mayberry attempted to leave the bar, he was tackled by other bar
    customers. However, Mayberry broke free and left the bar.
    [5]   Several customers rushed to assist Brown, including an off-duty paramedic who
    observed three gunshot wounds. The off-duty paramedic also observed that
    Brown had money “halfway out of his pocket.” (Tr. Vol. 2 at 145). Several of
    those who assisted Brown later testified at trial that Brown did not have a
    weapon of any kind and that no one had removed anything from the scene.
    Brown later died from his gunshot wounds.
    [6]   The South Bend Police Department’s Crime Lab responded to the bar and
    found several items of physical evidence, including Mayberry’s sandal, two
    cartridge casings, and one bullet projectile. Law enforcement also observed
    bullet damage on the tile on the bathroom floor. The firearm involved in the
    shooting was never recovered.
    [7]   Forensic pathologist Dr. Darin Wolfe (“Dr. Wolfe”) performed Brown’s
    autopsy on September 22, 2018. Dr. Wolfe found that Brown had been shot
    three times. Specifically, one bullet entered the front of Brown’s chest,
    perforated his right lung, and stopped before exiting his back. A second bullet
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 20A-CR-158 | November 24, 2020   Page 3 of 11
    entered the right side of Brown’s lower abdomen, passed through the small
    intestine, and stopped in his pelvis. A third bullet entered Brown’s back,
    penetrated his right lung, and exited the right side of his chest. Dr. Wolfe
    concluded that the cause of Brown’s death was multiple gunshot wounds.
    [8]    On October 3, 2018, the State charged Mayberry with murder and an
    enhancement for the use of a firearm in the commission of a felony. A warrant
    was issued for Mayberry’s arrest, but he was not taken into custody until
    January 2019, when he was arrested by U.S. Marshals in South Carolina.
    [9]    At Brown’s final pre-trial hearing in November 2019, his jury trial was
    confirmed for December 9, 2019, and the parties were ordered to submit
    proposed voir dire questions to the trial court one week before the trial date.
    After reviewing Mayberry’s questions, the State believed that Mayberry was
    going to pursue a claim of self-defense.
    [10]   Mayberry’s four-day jury trial began on December 9, 2019. The State presented
    the evidence set forth above through the testimony of two Bleachers Bar
    employees, nine of the bar’s customers, several law enforcement officers and
    homicide investigators, Dr. Wolfe, and South Bend Police officer and firearm
    and toolmark examiner Ray Wolfenbarger (“Officer Wolfenbarger”).
    [11]   On the second day of trial, the State filed a supplemental notice of discovery,
    and the trial continued with testimony from Dr. Wolfe about his observations
    of Brown’s wounds during the autopsy. Dr. Wolfe testified that he did not
    observe any “soot or stippling” around any of Brown’s wounds. (Tr. Vol. 3 at
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 20A-CR-158 | November 24, 2020   Page 4 of 11
    79). He explained that this was significant because if there had been soot, then
    that would mean that the gun was “quite close.” (Tr. Vol. 3 at 80). Dr. Wolfe
    further explained that if there had been stippling, then that would mean that the
    gun was “reasonably close.” (Tr. Vol. 3 at 80). Because “there [was] no soot
    and there [was] no stippling,” he could not determine how far the bullets had
    traveled. (Tr. Vol. 3 at 80). According to Dr. Wolfe, one explanation for the
    lack of soot and stippling was because the bullets had passed through thick
    clothing that had acted like a filter.
    [12]   Later that day, the State presented testimony from Officer Wolfenbarger, who
    testified that he had examined the fired casings and bullets recovered from the
    investigation and autopsy. Officer Wolfenbarger first explained that he believed
    that the bullets had been fired from the same handgun and that the model used
    was a semiautomatic Springfield XD .45 caliber handgun. The State then asked
    Officer Wolfenbarger if he had examined the jacket that Brown had been
    wearing when he was shot for gunshot residue, and Officer Wolfenbarger stated
    that he had. Mayberry’s counsel objected and argued that there was a lack of
    foundation. He further explained that he had just learned of Officer
    Wolfenbarger’s testimony the previous night. The trial court agreed that the
    State had failed to lay an adequate foundation and sustained the objection.
    [13]   The State then asked Officer Wolfenbarger about his gunshot residue and
    proximity examination training and testing methods, which included one test
    for the presence of nitrates and another for lead residue. Officer Wolfenbarger
    stated that he had observed three holes in Brown’s jacket: an entrance puncture
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 20A-CR-158 | November 24, 2020   Page 5 of 11
    on the back; an entrance puncture near the lower right jacket pocket; and an
    exit puncture on the right side above the pocket. Officer Wolfenbarger further
    testified that the test results had revealed lead residue patterns but had not
    revealed nitrates residue patterns. Officer Wolfenbarger explained that he had
    then used a Springfield XD .45 handgun and ammunition consistent with the
    evidence he had previously examined and had performed tests on cotton twill
    by “placing the muzzle from contact all the way back to 36 to 38 inches to
    determine the same pattern as what [was] on” Brown’s jacket. (Tr. Vol. 3 at
    117).
    [14]   Before Officer Wolfenbarger could testify about the results of his residue and
    proximity tests, Mayberry’s counsel objected and explained that the request for
    testing had been submitted by the State on December 6, three days before the
    start of trial. He further explained that the results had not been provided to him
    until that morning, December 10. The trial court then asked defense counsel
    how Officer Wolfenbarger’s testimony prejudiced his defense, which it
    understood to be self-defense. Mayberry’s counsel explained that, given the
    timing of when he had received the officer’s test results, he would not be able to
    meaningfully cross-examine Officer Wolfenbarger. The trial court again asked
    how the officer’s testimony prejudiced his defense and asked if he would like to
    postpone cross-examination until the following day. Mayberry’s counsel
    refused, arguing that “he should have [had] an opportunity to have this in
    advance of trial, not be sprung on me in the middle of the trial in terms of
    fairness.” (Tr. Vol. 3 at 119). The State interjected and stated that the testing
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 20A-CR-158 | November 24, 2020   Page 6 of 11
    had been performed in response to Mayberry’s voir dire questions that had
    indicated that he was going to pursue a claim of self-defense. The State
    explained that it had asked Officer Wolfenbarger to re-examine Brown’s jacket
    in an effort to “see if it would help support, contradict any of that kind of
    information with regard to the self-defense issue.” (Tr. Vol. 3 at 119).
    Thereafter, the trial court again offered Mayberry’s counsel the opportunity to
    prepare overnight and then cross-examine Officer Wolfenbarger the following
    day. In the alternative, the trial court stated that if defense counsel did not want
    to pursue that opportunity, then he could cross-examine the officer after the
    State had finished its direct examination. Mayberry’s counsel chose the latter
    option, and the trial court overruled his objection.
    [15]   Officer Wolfenbarger testified that although the cotton twill was not the same
    fabric as Brown’s jacket, his test and the results were not affected. Officer
    Wolfenbarger then testified that he had fired the Springfield handgun into the
    cotton twill and examined the cloth for “vaporous lead and lead particulates.”
    (Tr. Vol. 3 at 122). Officer Wolfenbarger then compared his results with
    Brown’s jacket and found that the hole in the back of jacket had “very
    minimal” lead or lead particulates. (Tr. Vol. 3 at 122). As a result, Officer
    Wolfenbarger concluded that the bullet that had created the hole in the back of
    Brown’s jacket had been fired by a gun from a distance “further than 36
    inches.” (Tr. Vol. 3 at 123). Because the other two holes tested yielded
    “vaporous lead and also particulates throughout[,]” Officer Wolfenbarger
    concluded that the bullets had been fired by a gun from within twelve inches.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 20A-CR-158 | November 24, 2020   Page 7 of 11
    (Tr. Vol. 3 at 123). On cross-examination, Officer Wolfenbarger testified that
    his results were not inconsistent with a handgun being discharged in a small
    space and that the results did not disclose who had discharged the gun.
    [16]   Following the State’s presentation of evidence, the defense presented testimony
    from a Mishawaka police officer and Mayberry. Mayberry testified that after he
    entered the bathroom, he had been verbally and physically accosted by Brown,
    who was washing his hands. Mayberry stated that Brown had pulled a gun on
    him, and to defend himself, he had begun to wrestle with Brown. Mayberry
    explained that he had grabbed Brown’s wrists and had struggled to disarm
    Brown. Mayberry then stated that during this struggle, the gun had discharged
    and had struck Brown several times. On cross-examination, Mayberry
    explained that he “didn’t possess [a gun] nor did [he] aim it.” (Tr. Vol. 4 at
    130). He further explained that he did not pull the trigger and that the gun was
    in Brown’s hand for all three shots.
    [17]   The jury convicted Mayberry of murder and the firearm enhancement.
    Thereafter, the trial court sentenced Mayberry to sixty-five (65) years for
    murder. The trial court then enhanced Mayberry’s sixty-five (65) year sentence
    by ten (10) years for the firearm enhancement. Mayberry now appeals.
    Decision
    [18]   Mayberry argues that the trial court abused its discretion when it admitted into
    evidence testimony about test results which had been performed shortly before
    trial. As a preliminary matter, Mayberry has waived appellate review of his
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 20A-CR-158 | November 24, 2020   Page 8 of 11
    argument because he makes no cogent argument and provides no caselaw to
    support his argument regarding the admission of evidence. See State v.
    Holtsclaw, 
    977 N.E.2d 348
    , 350 (Ind. 2012) (holding that the defendant had
    waived his argument by failing to appropriately develop or support it); Smith v.
    State, 
    822 N.E.2d 193
    , 202-03 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005) (“Generally, a party waives
    any issue raised on appeal where the party fails to develop a cogent argument or
    provide adequate citation to authority and portions of the record.”), trans.
    denied. See also Ind. Appellate Rule 46(A)(8)(a) (requiring appellate arguments
    to be supported by cogent reasoning and citation to the authorities).
    [19]   Waiver notwithstanding, Mayberry has not met his burden of showing that the
    trial court abused its discretion. “‘A trial court has broad discretion in ruling on
    the admissibility of evidence and we will disturb the court’s rulings only where
    the petitioner has shown an abuse of that discretion.’” Bowman v. State, 
    51 N.E.3d 1174
    , 1180 (Ind. 2016) (quoting Isom v. State, 
    31 N.E.3d 469
    , 482 (Ind.
    2015)). An abuse of discretion occurs only “‘if a ruling is clearly against the
    logic and effect of the facts and circumstances and the error affects a party’s
    substantial rights.’” Bowman, 51 N.E.3d at 1180 (quoting Carpenter v. State, 
    18 N.E.3d 998
    , 1001 (Ind. 2014)).
    [20]   Further, “[w]here the [S]tate seeks to introduce discoverable evidence at the
    time that that evidence is revealed to the defendant, defendant may seek either a
    continuance or exclusion of that evidence.” Cook v. State, 
    675 N.E.2d 687
    , 690
    (Ind. 1996). A continuance is usually the appropriate remedy. 
    Id.
     However,
    the exclusion of evidence is proper where the State engaged in deliberate
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 20A-CR-158 | November 24, 2020   Page 9 of 11
    conduct or bad faith or where introduction of the evidence would result in
    substantial prejudice to the defendant’s rights. 
    Id.
    [21]   Here, Mayberry has not established deliberate conduct or bad faith on the
    State’s part. There is no evidence in the record, nor does Mayberry argue, that
    the State deliberately or intentionally avoided telling Mayberry about Officer
    Wolfenbarger or his testimony. Indeed, Officer Wolfenbarger was listed on the
    State’s potential list of witnesses in October 2019 and again in December 2019.
    Furthermore, at trial, the State explained that it had requested that Officer
    Wolfenbarger perform the tests in response to Mayberry’s voir dire questions
    that indicated that Mayberry was going to pursue a claim of self-defense. Upon
    learning of the officer’s examination results, the State promptly provided the
    results to defense counsel by telephone and then provided the copies of the
    results the following morning. Under these circumstances, we conclude that
    Mayberry has failed to provide evidence of deliberate conduct or bad faith on
    the part of the State. See Cain v. State, 
    955 N.E.2d 714
    , 719 (Ind. 2011)
    (explaining that there is no error if the prosecuting attorney provides the defense
    with requested evidence as soon as the prosecuting attorney is in possession
    thereof).
    [22]   Mayberry has also not shown substantial prejudice to his rights. Here,
    Mayberry argues that the timing of receipt of the officer’s findings prevented
    him from “provid[ing] any scientific basis to contradict the . . . information
    regarding the distance of the gun in the middle of the trial.” (Mayberry’s Br.
    13). Although Mayberry objected to Officer Wolfenbarger’s testimony, he did
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 20A-CR-158 | November 24, 2020   Page 10 of 11
    not request a continuance, which is the appropriate remedy in such a situation.
    See Cook, 675 N.E.2d at 690; see also Warren v. State, 
    725 N.E.2d 828
    , 832 (Ind.
    2000) (explaining that as a general proposition, the proper remedy for a
    discovery violation is a continuance). In fact, the trial court effectively offered
    Mayberry this relief by proposing to delay Officer Wolfenbarger’s cross-
    examination until the following day. However, Mayberry’s counsel did not
    take advantage of this opportunity and chose to proceed with cross-examination
    following the State’s direct examination. Mayberry does not explain how his
    refusal to delay Officer Wolfenbarger’s cross-examination resulted in prejudice
    to his rights.
    [23]   Because Mayberry has not shown any deliberate conduct of bad faith by the
    State or substantial prejudice to his rights, his argument fails. Accordingly, the
    trial court was well within its discretion in allowing Officer Wolfenbarger’s
    testimony.
    [24]   Affirmed.
    Kirsch, J., and Tavitas, J., concur.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 20A-CR-158 | November 24, 2020   Page 11 of 11
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 20A-CR-158

Filed Date: 11/24/2020

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 11/24/2020