In re the Termination of the Parent-Child Relationship of: W.H. (Minor Child) and G.H. (Mother) & D.H. (Father) v. The Indiana Department of Child Services (mem. dec.) ( 2017 )


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  • MEMORANDUM DECISION
    Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D),
    this Memorandum Decision shall not be
    FILED
    regarded as precedent or cited before any                           Feb 28 2017, 9:14 am
    court except for the purpose of establishing                            CLERK
    Indiana Supreme Court
    the defense of res judicata, collateral                                Court of Appeals
    and Tax Court
    estoppel, or the law of the case.
    ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT                                    ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
    Andrew W. Foster                                          Curtis T. Hill, Jr.
    Wagoner, Ayer, Hargis & Rudisill, LLC                     Attorney General of Indiana
    Rockport, Indiana
    Robert J. Henke
    James D. Boyer
    Deputy Attorneys General
    Indianapolis, Indiana
    IN THE
    COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
    In re the Termination of the                              February 28, 2017
    Parent-Child Relationship of:                             Court of Appeals Case No.
    74A01-1606-JT-1553
    W.H. (Minor Child)
    Appeal from the Spencer Circuit
    and                                                       Court
    G.H. (Mother) & D.H. (Father),                            The Honorable Jonathan A. Dartt,
    Appellants-Respondents,                                   Judge
    Trial Court Cause No.
    v.                                                        74C01-1509-JT-255
    The Indiana Department of Child
    Services,
    Appellee-Petitioner.
    Robb, Judge.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 74A01-1606-JT-1553 | February 28, 2017    Page 1 of 8
    Case Summary and Issue
    [1]   G.H. (“Mother”) and D.H. (“Father”) appeal the involuntary termination of
    their parental rights to their two-year-old daughter, W.H., raising a sole issue
    for our review: whether the juvenile court’s finding that the Indiana
    Department of Child Services (“DCS”) presented a satisfactory plan for the care
    and treatment of W.H. is clearly erroneous. Concluding the juvenile court’s
    finding is not clearly erroneous, we affirm its order terminating Mother’s and
    Father’s parental rights.
    Facts and Procedural History
    [2]   W.H. was born on August 18, 2014, and shortly thereafter, DCS received a
    report W.H. tested positive for methamphetamine. At that time, Mother and
    Father had also tested positive for, and confirmed using, methamphetamine
    before W.H. was born. On August 27, 2014, the DCS filed a petition alleging
    W.H. to be a child in need of services (“CHINS”). Mother and Father
    submitted to another drug screen, which again came back positive for
    methamphetamine. The next day, Mother and Father admitted to the
    allegations in the CHINS petition and the juvenile court adjudicated W.H. a
    CHINS. W.H. was removed from Mother and Father’s home, and has lived
    with her foster parents ever since.
    [3]   Since W.H.’s removal from their care in 2014, Mother and Father have
    exercised about five visitations with W.H., although they were permitted to
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 74A01-1606-JT-1553 | February 28, 2017   Page 2 of 8
    visit with W.H. three or four times per week and lived within a five-minute
    walk from the DCS office. Mother and Father did not follow any
    recommendations from their family case manager and did not participate in or
    complete any counseling or substance abuse programs offered by the DCS.
    [4]   On September 17, 2015, the DCS filed a verified petition seeking the
    involuntary termination of Mother’s and Father’s parental rights to W.H. In
    March of 2016, S.S. and R.S., W.H.’s paternal grandmother and paternal step-
    grandfather, filed a petition for guardianship and a motion to intervene. It
    appears their motion and petition were denied; however, they were permitted to
    appear as witnesses for Mother and Father.
    [5]   The juvenile court held an evidentiary hearing on April 5, 2016, at which
    Mother and Father failed to appear. At the evidentiary hearing, S.S. testified
    she spoke with Jessica Richardson, the Director of the Spencer County DCS, in
    late 2014 about relative placement for W.H. Richardson then explained to S.S.
    what actions she should take to become active in the case, including receiving
    permission from Mother and Father, filling out paperwork, and obtaining a
    home check. S.S. took no action until October of 2015 when she requested the
    relevant paperwork from the DCS. The DCS obliged and sent S.S. the
    paperwork. S.S. claims she returned the paperwork to the DCS, but the DCS
    has no record of receiving it. Richardson stated the current plan for W.H. is
    adoption.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 74A01-1606-JT-1553 | February 28, 2017   Page 3 of 8
    [6]   On May 31, 2016, the juvenile court issued its order terminating Mother’s and
    Father’s parental rights to W.H. Mother and Father now appeal.
    Discussion and Decision
    [7]   “[T]he involuntary termination of parental rights is an extreme measure that is
    designed to be used as a last resort when all other reasonable efforts have failed
    . . . .” In re K.W., 
    12 N.E.3d 241
    , 249 (Ind. 2014) (alteration in original)
    (citation omitted). Indiana Code section 31-35-2-4(b)(2) sets forth what must be
    proven in order to terminate parental rights, which we quote in relevant part:
    (B) that one (1) of the following is true:
    (i) There is a reasonable probability that the conditions
    that resulted in the child’s removal or the reasons for
    placement outside the home of the parents will not be
    remedied.
    (ii) There is a reasonable probability that the continuation
    of the parent-child relationship poses a threat to the well-
    being of the child.
    (iii) The child has, on two (2) separate occasions, been
    adjudicated a child in need of services;
    (C) that termination is in the best interests of the child; and
    (D) that there is a satisfactory plan for the care and treatment of
    the child.
    The State must prove each element by clear and convincing evidence. Ind.
    Code § 31-34-12-2; In re G.Y., 
    904 N.E.2d 1257
    , 1261 (Ind. 2009). If a juvenile
    court determines the allegations of the petition are true, then the court shall
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 74A01-1606-JT-1553 | February 28, 2017   Page 4 of 8
    terminate the parent-child relationship. Ind. Code § 31-35-2-8(a). A
    satisfactory plan “need not be detailed, so long as it offers a general sense of the
    direction in which the child will be going after the parent-child relationship is
    terminated.” In re D.D, 
    804 N.E.2d 258
    , 268 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004), trans. denied.
    [8]    When reviewing the termination of parental rights, we will not reweigh the
    evidence or judge the credibility of the witnesses. K.T.K. v. Ind. Dep’t of Child
    Servs., 
    989 N.E.2d 1225
    , 1229 (Ind. 2013). Rather, we consider only the
    evidence and reasonable inferences that support the judgment. 
    Id. Where, as
    here, a juvenile court has entered findings of fact and conclusions thereon, we
    will not set aside the juvenile court’s findings or judgment unless clearly
    erroneous. 
    Id. In determining
    whether the court’s decision to terminate the
    parent-child relationship is clearly erroneous, we review the juvenile court’s
    judgment to determine whether the evidence clearly and convincingly supports
    the findings and the findings clearly and convincingly support the judgment. 
    Id. at 1229-30.
    [9]    Mother and Father’s sole argument is the juvenile court’s finding that there is a
    satisfactory plan for the care and treatment of W.H. is clearly erroneous
    because the DCS did not consider relative placement. Their argument fails for
    two reasons.
    [10]   First, the record is clear the DCS did, in fact, consider relative placement. At
    the evidentiary hearing, Richardson testified,
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 74A01-1606-JT-1553 | February 28, 2017   Page 5 of 8
    We start from the very beginning asking the parents about
    relatives. . . . [Father] and [Mother] made it very clear that they
    moved down here to get away from up north from those family
    members, that those were the family members that they ended up
    homeless with. They made it very clear that those were the
    family members that they were using the drugs with. . . . We
    then did inquire with [paternal step-grandmother] and [paternal
    grandfather] here locally. As far as placement options, he has
    some criminal history that kept him from being [a] placement.
    And [paternal step-grandmother], who has tried to stay involved,
    has lots of medical issues and lots of other things that kept her
    from being a possibility.
    Transcript at 78-79. Further, Richardson made clear that when S.S. contacted
    her, she explained to S.S. the actions she needed to take if she desired to have
    relative placement of W.H. S.S. then took no action for a year until the DCS
    filed its petition seeking involuntary termination of parental rights.
    [11]   Second, the DCS is not statutorily required to consider relative placement
    before terminating parental rights. A similar argument was made in In re B.M.,
    
    913 N.E.2d 1283
    , 1287 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009).1 There, the father was facing a
    prison sentence of twenty years to life, and the DCS filed a petition to terminate
    his parental rights. The father stated his sister would be willing to care for the
    child, but the sister was never contacted about the suggested arrangement nor
    did she appear in court on the matter. Further, the father argued Indiana Code
    1
    Mother and Father also argue our decision in In re B.M. should be reconsidered because the CHINS statute
    is “intimately linked to possible termination proceedings.” Appellants’ Brief at 8. The decision Mother and
    Father seek is one for the General Assembly to make, and we decline their invitation to reconsider In re B.M.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 74A01-1606-JT-1553 | February 28, 2017           Page 6 of 8
    section 31-34-6-2 (CHINS statute)2 required the DCS to first consider relative
    placement. This court held the termination of parental rights was appropriate
    despite the fact that the father’s proposed alternative living arrangement was not
    considered because the termination statute does not require the DCS to
    consider relative placement. 
    Id. at 1286-87.
    [12]   We conclude the juvenile court’s finding that the DCS presented a satisfactory
    plan for the care and treatment of W.H. is not clearly erroneous. Contrary to
    Mother and Father’s argument, the DCS did consider relative placement, even
    though it was not statutorily required to do so. Further, this court on numerous
    occasions has held that adoption is a satisfactory plan. 
    Id. at 1287.
    Conclusion
    [13]   The juvenile court’s finding regarding a satisfactory plan for W.H.’s future care
    and treatment was not clearly erroneous. Therefore, we affirm its order
    terminating Mother’s and Father’s parental rights.
    2
    Indiana Code section 31-34-6-2 states:
    (a) A juvenile court or the department shall consider placing a child alleged to be a child
    in need of services with a suitable and willing relative or de facto custodian of the child
    before considering any other placement for the child.
    (b) A juvenile court or the department shall consider placing a child described in
    subsection (a) with a relative related by blood, marriage, or adoption before considering
    any other placement of the child.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 74A01-1606-JT-1553 | February 28, 2017                 Page 7 of 8
    [14]   Affirmed.
    Kirsch, J., and Barnes, J., concur.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 74A01-1606-JT-1553 | February 28, 2017   Page 8 of 8
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 74A01-1606-JT-1553

Filed Date: 2/28/2017

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 4/17/2021