In Re the Termination of the Parent-Child Relationship of K.H. and J.H. (Minor Children) T.B. (Mother) and J.H. (Father) v. The Indiana Department of Child Services (mem. dec.) ( 2018 )


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  • MEMORANDUM DECISION
    FILED
    Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D),
    Jul 31 2018, 7:41 am
    this Memorandum Decision shall not be
    regarded as precedent or cited before any                                  CLERK
    Indiana Supreme Court
    Court of Appeals
    court except for the purpose of establishing                                and Tax Court
    the defense of res judicata, collateral
    estoppel, or the law of the case.
    ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT                                    ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
    (FATHER)                                                  Curtis T. Hill, Jr.
    Jennifer A. Joas                                          Attorney General of Indiana
    Madison, Indiana                                          Abigail R. Recker
    ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT                                    Deputy Attorney General
    (MOTHER)                                                  Indianapolis, Indiana
    Leanna Weissmann
    Lawrenceburg, Indiana
    IN THE
    COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
    In Re the Termination of the                              July 31, 2018
    Parent-Child Relationship of                              Court of Appeals Case No.
    K.H. and J.H. (Minor Children);                           17A-JT-3047
    T.B. (Mother) and J.H. (Father),                          Appeal from the Ripley Circuit
    Court
    Appellants-Respondents,
    The Honorable Ryan J. King,
    v.                                                Judge
    Trial Court Cause No.
    The Indiana Department of                                 69C01-1706-JT-12
    69C01-1706-JT-13
    Child Services,
    Appellee-Plaintiff.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 17A-JT-3047 | July 31, 2018                  Page 1 of 14
    Pyle, Judge.
    Statement of the Case
    [1]   Appellants, T.B. (“Mother”) and K.H. (“Father”) (collectively, the “Parents”),
    appeal the termination of the parent-child relationships with their children,
    (“K.H.” and “J.H.”) (collectively, the “Children”). Both Parents claim that
    there is insufficient evidence to support the terminations. Specifically, Mother
    argues that the Indiana Department of Child Services (“DCS”) failed to prove
    by clear and convincing evidence that: (1) there is a reasonable probability that
    the conditions that resulted in the Children’s removal or the reasons for
    placement outside the home will not be remedied; (2) a continuation of the
    parent-child relationship poses a threat to the Children’s well-being; and (3)
    termination of the parent-child relationships is in the Children’s best interests.
    Father argues only that there is insufficient evidence that termination of his
    parental rights is in the Children’s best interests. Concluding that there is
    sufficient evidence to support the termination of the parent-child relationships,
    we affirm the trial court’s judgment.
    [2]   We affirm.
    Issue
    The sole issue for our review is whether there is sufficient evidence
    to support the termination of the parent-child relationships.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 17A-JT-3047 | July 31, 2018   Page 2 of 14
    Facts
    [3]   Parents have two children: K.H., born August 20, 2012, and J.H., born
    September 17, 2014. Prior to the trial court’s termination of the Parents’
    relationships with K.H. and J.H., Parents had a history of involvement with
    DCS, including two prior Child In Need of Services (“CHINS”) adjudications.
    [4]   The first CHINS proceeding, which involved then-one-year-old K.H., was filed
    on December 16, 2013. DCS alleged that Parents’ had drugs and drug
    paraphernalia in the home with K.H. present. On January 8, 2014, K.H. was
    adjudicated a CHINS. DCS subsequently provided Parents multiple services,
    including supervised visitation, random drug screens, and home-based case
    management. After Parents complied with the case plan, the court terminated
    its jurisdiction over the CHINS case on July 29, 2014.
    [5]   Less than three months later, on October 16, 2014, DCS filed another CHINS
    petition after J.H.’s meconium tested positive for amphetamine and
    methamphetamine at birth. Both K.H. and J.H. were adjudicated CHINS and
    placed with a foster mother (“Foster Mother”) upon their removal from
    Parents. During this second CHINS case, DCS again provided Parents with
    multiple services, including substance abuse counseling, random drug screens,
    and visitation. Parents participated in services, and on September 28, 2015, the
    court terminated its jurisdiction over the CHINS case, and the Children
    returned to the Parents.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 17A-JT-3047 | July 31, 2018   Page 3 of 14
    [6]   Shortly thereafter, on July 14, 2016, DCS received a report alleging drug use
    and domestic violence in Parents’ home. DCS Family Case Manager Tammy
    Clark (“FCM Clark”) visited Parents’ home multiple times to investigate, but
    she was unable to locate the family there. On July 18, 2016, FCM Clark was
    finally able to make contact with the family. DCS then located the Children in
    Ohio at the home of Mother’s aunt.
    [7]   FCM Clark testified at the termination hearing that when she discovered K.H.,
    he had an “oozing burn” that had not been medically treated. (Tr. at 7). FCM
    Clark sought medical treatment for K.H. at Indiana University Medical Center,
    where DCS Family Case Manager Michelle Huber (“FCM Huber”), after
    interviewing K.H. and assessing the injury, determined that the injury was the
    result of abuse or neglect. Father later admitted, first to his substance abuse
    counselor and again during his testimony at the termination hearing, that
    K.H.’s arm had been burned with Father’s methamphetamine pipe
    [8]   On July 18, 2016, Children were again placed with Foster Mother. On July 22,
    2016, Parents were arrested for maintaining a common nuisance, a Level 6
    felony. At the time of their arrests, both Parents tested positive for
    amphetamine and methamphetamine. Father also tested positive for THC.
    When FCM Clark visited Mother on July 23, 3016, she “was very clearly
    impaired,” rocking back and forth, picking at a sore on her lip, and unable to
    follow the conversation. (Tr. 9). On August 1, 2016, a probation violation was
    filed against Mother for her positive drug screens. Soon after, Parents both
    pleaded guilty to neglect of a dependent resulting in bodily injury, a Level 5
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 17A-JT-3047 | July 31, 2018   Page 4 of 14
    felony. A no-contact order was issued prohibiting Parents from having contact
    with K.H. until two years following their release from incarceration.
    [9]    On September 19, 2016, the court held a fact-finding hearing, during which
    both Parents admitted to drug use and domestic violence in the home. The
    court subsequently adjudicated the Children as CHINS, and the Children have
    remained with Foster Mother until present.
    [10]   On September 20, 2016, Mother pleaded guilty to maintaining a common
    nuisance, a Level 6 felony, and was sentenced to 450 days with 122 days
    executed. For violating her probation, Mother was also ordered to serve 730
    days of her previously suspended sentence. Father also pleaded guilty to
    maintaining a common nuisance, a Level 6 felony, and was sentenced to 420
    days in prison with 120 days executed and 300 days suspended. Father also
    received two additional sentences: (1) 420 days in prison for possession of
    methamphetamine, a Level 6 felony; and (2) 180 days in the Decatur County
    Jail for possession of marijuana, a Class B misdemeanor, both which were
    suspended and to be served on probation.
    [11]   Also in September 2016, Father pleaded guilty to dealing in marijuana, a Level
    6 felony, and was sentenced to 910 days, with 545 days suspended and 339 days
    served on Ripley County Jail Work Release.
    [12]   While incarcerated, Father participated in the Fatherhood Engagement
    Program, had supervised visits with the Children, and completed a substance
    abuse assessment with Extra Special Parents substance abuse counselor Monica
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 17A-JT-3047 | July 31, 2018   Page 5 of 14
    Berry (“Berry”). During the assessment, Father admitted a history of
    methamphetamine use and that K.H. was burned by Father’s
    methamphetamine pipe. Berry recommended Father complete an intensive
    outpatient program. On March 17, 2017, Father bonded out of jail, and six
    days later, on March 23, 2017, he tested positive for amphetamine,
    methamphetamine, and tramadol. As a result of this positive drug screen,
    Father’s bond was revoked, and he was reincarcerated at Ripley County Jail.
    [13]   Mother has remained incarcerated through the pendency of the CHINS case
    and termination of parental rights hearing. Her estimated earliest release date is
    August 26, 2019, after which she will be on probation for two years. During
    her incarceration, she completed a Mother’s Against Methamphetamine
    program and additional classes. She has had video and phone contact with the
    Children. Mother also completed a substance abuse assessment with Berry,
    during which Mother admitted to a history of alcohol and drug use, as well as
    domestic violence in the home when she and Father were under the influence of
    drugs. Mother also admitted to drug and alcohol use during her pregnancy
    with J.H. Berry recommended Mother complete an inpatient substance abuse
    treatment program and a mental health evaluation.
    [14]   On September 27, 2017, Mother pleaded guilty to a felony neglect of a
    dependent charge and was sentenced to five years in prison with two years
    suspended to probation. On October 2, 2017, Father also pleaded guilty to
    felony neglect of a dependent and was sentenced to five years in prison with
    three years actually served and two years suspended to probation. Parents were
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 17A-JT-3047 | July 31, 2018   Page 6 of 14
    both ordered to have no contact with K.H. until at least two years post-
    incarceration.
    [15]   On October 23, 2017, the trial court held a fact-finding hearing regarding
    termination of the Parents’ parental rights. The Court heard testimony from
    Parents, Foster Mother, multiple DCS employees, including FCM Clark and
    FCM Huber, as well as other service providers, including Berry and Court
    Appointed Special Advocate Becky Stein (“CASA Stein”). At the hearing,
    Huber and Stein both opined that termination of the Parents’ parental rights
    was in the Children’s best interests. Mother further testified that she wanted
    Children to be adopted by Foster Mother and believed that the adoption would
    be in the Children’s best interests. Father testified that he did not want his
    parental rights terminated, but he agreed that the Children “need some sort of
    permanency[.]”
    [16]   On November 3, 2017, the trial court issued its order for involuntary
    termination of the parent-child relationships between Parents and Children.
    Parents now appeal.
    Decision
    [17]   The traditional right of parents to establish a home and raise their children is
    protected by the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. In
    re J.W., Jr., 
    27 N.E.3d 1185
    , 1187-88 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015), trans denied.
    However, a trial court must subordinate the interests of the parents to those of
    the child when evaluating the circumstances surrounding a termination. 
    Id.
     at
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 17A-JT-3047 | July 31, 2018   Page 7 of 14
    1188. Termination of the parent-child relationship is proper where a child’s
    emotional and physical development is threatened. 
    Id.
     Although the right to
    raise one’s own child should not be terminated solely because there is a better
    home available for the child, parental rights may be terminated when a parent is
    unable or unwilling to meet his or her parental responsibilities. 
    Id.
    [18]   Before an involuntary termination of parental rights may occur, DCS is
    required to allege and prove, among other things:
    (B) that one (1) of the following is true:
    (i) There is a reasonable probability that the conditions that
    resulted in the child’s removal or the reasons for placement outside
    the home of the parents will not be remedied.
    (ii) There is a reasonable probability that the continuation of the
    parent-child relationship poses a threat to the well-being of the
    child.
    (iii) The child has, on two (2) separate occasions, been adjudicated
    a child in need of services;
    (C) that termination is in the best interests of the child; and
    (D) that there is a satisfactory plan for the care and treatment of the
    child.
    [19]   IND. CODE § 31-35-2-4(b)(2). DCS must prove the alleged circumstances by
    clear and convincing evidence. K.T.K. v. Ind. Dep’t. Servs., 
    989 N.E.2d 1225
    ,
    1230 (Ind. 2013).
    [20]   When reviewing the termination of parental rights, this Court will not reweigh
    the evidence or judge the credibility of the witnesses. In re R.S., 
    56 N.E.3d 625
    ,
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 17A-JT-3047 | July 31, 2018   Page 8 of 14
    628 (Ind. 2016). First, we determine whether the evidence supports the
    findings, and second, we determine whether the findings support the judgment.
    
    Id.
     We will set aside a trial court’s judgment terminating a parent-child
    relationship only if it is clearly erroneous. 
    Id.
     Findings are clearly erroneous
    when the record contains no facts or inferences to be drawn therefrom that
    support them. In re A.G., 
    6 N.E.3d 952
    , 957 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014). A judgment
    is clearly erroneous if the findings do not support the trial court’s conclusions or
    the conclusions do not support the judgment. 
    Id.
    [21]   Mother challenges the trial court’s finding that Parents’ “continued pattern of
    drug use is extremely unlikely to stop.” (Mother’s Br. 20). She also challenges
    the trial court’s conclusions that DCS met its burden of proof for both
    subsections (B) and (C) of INDIANA CODE § 31-35-2-4(b)(2). Father challenges
    only the trial court’s conclusion that DCS met its burden of proof for subsection
    (C). We will address each subsection in turn.
    A. Reasonable Probability Conditions Will Not Be Remedied
    [22]   First, Mother argues that DCS did not meet its burden under INDIANA CODE §
    31-35-2-4(b)(2)(B) because it failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence
    that: (1) there is a reasonable probability that the conditions that resulted in the
    Children’s removal or the reasons for placement outside the home will not be
    remedied; and (2) a continuation of the parent-child relationship poses a threat
    to the Children’s well-being. However, we note that subsection (B) is written in
    the disjunctive. Accordingly, DCS is required to establish by clear and
    convincing evidence only one of the three requirements of subsection (B). In re
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 17A-JT-3047 | July 31, 2018   Page 9 of 14
    A.K., 
    924 N.E.3d 212
    , 220 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010). We therefore discuss only
    whether there is a reasonable probability that the conditions that resulted in the
    children’s removal or the reasons for their placement outside the home will not
    be remedied.
    [23]   In determining whether the conditions that resulted in a child’s removal or
    placement outside the home will not be remedied, trial courts engage in a two-
    step analysis. In re E.M., 
    4 N.E.3d 636
    , 643 (Ind. 2014). The first step is to
    identify the conditions that led to removal or placement outside the home and
    then determine whether there is a reasonable probability that those conditions
    will not be remedied. 
    Id.
     The second step requires trial courts to judge a
    parent’s fitness at the time of the termination proceeding, taking into
    consideration evidence of changed conditions and balancing any recent
    improvements against habitual patterns of conduct to determine whether there
    is a substantial probability of future neglect or deprivation. 
    Id.
     Habitual
    conduct may include parents’ prior criminal history, drug and alcohol abuse,
    history of neglect, failure to provide support, and a lack of adequate housing
    and employment. A.D.S. v. Ind. Dep’t of Child Servs., 
    987 N.E.2d 1150
    , 1157
    (Ind. Ct. App. 2013), trans. denied. The trial court may also consider services
    offered to the parent by DCS and the parent’s response to those services as
    evidence of whether conditions will be remedied. 
    Id.
     Requiring trial courts to
    give due regard to changed conditions does not preclude them from finding that
    a parent’s past behavior is the best predictor of her future behavior. 
    Id.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 17A-JT-3047 | July 31, 2018   Page 10 of 14
    [24]   Here, our review of the evidence reveals that the Children were removed most
    recently from Mother and Father on July 18, 2016, due to suspected drug
    abuse, domestic violence, and child neglect. At that time, FCM Clark
    discovered K.H. with an untreated burn on his arm from Father’s pipe used for
    smoking methamphetamine. Parents subsequently pleaded guilty to neglect of
    a dependent resulting in bodily injury. In concluding that the conditions
    leading to Children’ removal—namely, Parents’ continued drug abuse and
    neglect of the Children—would probably not be remedied, the trial court
    considered Mother’s continuous pattern of substance abuse over several years.
    The trial court noted that Mother has had multiple criminal convictions,
    probation violations, and three CHINS cases. The court also noted that despite
    services offered to her by DCS, Mother was unable to remain sober longer than
    four weeks following DCS’s closing of the second CHINS proceeding, and she
    had a positive drug screen at the time of her arrest, indicating
    methamphetamine and amphetamine use.
    [25]   The trial court also considered evidence bearing on Mother’s present fitness,
    including her continuous and current incarceration until August 2019, her
    violation of the no-contact order currently in place between her and K.H. until
    August 2021, and that her most recent stretch of sobriety overlaps entirely with
    her incarceration. See In re T.K., 
    989 N.E.2d 1225
    , 1234 (Ind. 2013) (finding it
    within a trial court’s discretion to ascribe less predictive value to a mother’s
    sobriety while in prison “where she would not have had access to illegal
    substances”). Mother argues in her brief that the trial court relied too heavily
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 17A-JT-3047 | July 31, 2018   Page 11 of 14
    upon her pattern of drug addiction and neglect, rather than Mother’s recent
    sobriety while incarcerated. Specifically, she contends that “[by] opin[ing]
    Mother would continue the same pattern of drug addiction which first led to the
    children’s removal ... the court failed to consider evidence from the Record that
    Mother has changed.” (Mother’s Br. at 20). However, Mother’s argument
    simply invites this Court to reweigh the evidence, which it will not do. As
    discussed above, the record contains facts or inferences that support the trial
    court’s finding regarding Mother’s likelihood of continued drug use, and
    therefore Mother has not met her burden of showing that the court’s finding is
    clearly erroneous. The trial court’s finding is supported by the evidence, and in
    turn, that finding directly supports the trial court’s conclusion that there is a
    reasonable probability that the conditions leading to the Children’s removal will
    not be remedied. Accordingly, we find no error.
    B. Best Interests of the Children
    [26]   Finally, Mother and Father both argue that there is insufficient evidence that
    the termination was in Children’s best interests, as is required by INDIANA
    CODE § 31-35-2-4(b)(2)(C). In determining whether termination of parental
    rights is in the best interests of a child, the trial court is required to look at the
    totality of the evidence. In re D.D., 
    804 N.E.2d 258
    , 267 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004),
    trans. denied. In so doing, the court must subordinate the interests of the parents
    to those of the child involved. 
    Id.
     Termination of the parent-child relationship
    is proper where the child’s emotional and physical development is threatened.
    In re R.S., 
    774 N.E.2d 927
    , 930 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002), trans. denied. “‘A parent’s
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 17A-JT-3047 | July 31, 2018   Page 12 of 14
    historical inability to provide adequate housing, stability and supervision
    coupled with a current inability to provide the same will support a finding that
    continuation of the parent-child relationship is contrary to the child’s best
    interest.’” In re B.D.J., 
    728 N.E.2d 195
    , 203 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000) (quoting
    Matter of Adoption of D.V.H., 
    604 N.E.2d 634
    , 638 (Ind. Ct. App. 1992), trans.
    denied, superseded by rule on other grounds). Further, the testimony of the service
    providers may support a finding that termination is in the child’s best interests.
    McBride v. Monroe Cty. Office of Family and Children, 
    798 N.E.2d 185
    , 203 (Ind.
    Ct. App. 2003).
    [27]   Neither Mother nor Father challenges any of the trial courts’ findings pertaining
    to the best interests of the children. Rather, they both challenge whether the
    findings support the trial court’s conclusions that termination was in the
    Children’s best interests, arguing that guardianship should have been pursued
    instead. Here, our review of the trial court’s findings reveals that Parents both
    have a long history of criminal conduct and drug use, resulting in their current
    incarceration, that Parents have historically been unable to provide stability and
    supervision for the Children and were unable to provide the same at the time of
    the termination hearing, that Mother admitted at the termination hearing that
    adoption by Foster Mother would be in the Children’s best interests, and that
    Father agreed that the Children “need some sort of permanency[.]” (Tr. at
    110). In addition, CASA Stein and FCM Huber both opined in their hearing
    testimonies that DCS’s permanency plan, namely adoption by Foster Parents,
    was in the Children’s best interests. These testimonies, as well as the other
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 17A-JT-3047 | July 31, 2018   Page 13 of 14
    evidence previously discussed, all support the trial court’s conclusion that
    termination was in the Children’s best interests.
    [28]   We reverse a termination of parental rights “only upon a showing of ‘clear
    error’—that which leaves us with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake
    has been made.” Egly v. Blackford Cty. Dep’t of Pub. Welfare, 
    592 N.E.2d 1232
    ,
    1235 (Ind. 1992). We find no such error here and therefore affirm the trial
    court.
    [29]   Affirmed.
    Vaidik, C.J., and Barnes, Sr.J., concur.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 17A-JT-3047 | July 31, 2018   Page 14 of 14