In the Termination of the Parent-Child Relationship of K.J v. (Minor Child), and Z.T. (Mother) v. Indiana Department of Child Services (mem. dec.) ( 2020 )

MEMORANDUM DECISION
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D),
this Memorandum Decision shall not be FILED
regarded as precedent or cited before any Aug 18 2020, 9:29 am
court except for the purpose of establishing CLERK
Indiana Supreme Court
the defense of res judicata, collateral Court of Appeals
and Tax Court
estoppel, or the law of the case.
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Mark F. James Curtis T. Hill, Jr.
Anderson, Agostino & Keller P.C. Attorney General of Indiana
South Bend, Indiana Katherine A. Cornelius
Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
In the Termination of the Parent- August 18, 2020
Child Relationship of K.J.V. Court of Appeals Case No.
(Minor Child), and 20A-JT-366
Z.T. (Mother), Appeal from the St. Joseph Probate
Court
Appellant-Respondent,
The Honorable Jason A.
v. Cichowicz, Judge
The Honorable Ashley Mills
Indiana Department of Child Colburn, Magistrate
Services, Trial Court Cause No.
71J01-1909-JT-121
Appellee-Petitioner.
Brown, Judge.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 20A-JT-366 | August 18, 2020 Page 1 of 18
[1] Z.T. (“Mother”) appeals the involuntary termination of her parental rights to
her child, K.J.V. We affirm.
Facts and Procedural History
[2] On October 16, 2009, K.J.V. was born to Mother and J.P.V. (“Father”). 1 In
2010, a guardianship was filed in which Mother’s sister was given guardianship
of K.J.V. for a few months, and K.J.V. was ultimately returned to Mother.
[3] In 2011, the Department of Child Services (“DCS”) filed a petition under cause
number 71J01-1105-JC-124 alleging K.J.V. was a child in need of services
(“CHINS”), K.J.V. was failing to thrive, Mother had admitted to dosing the
child with Benadryl in her baby bottle on a regular basis, Mother appeared to
hospital staff to be under the influence of drugs or alcohol, and hospital staff
believed she could not care for the child. On February 1, 2012, K.J.V. was
adjudicated to be a CHINS. K.J.V. was returned home on March 21, 2012.
On September 10, 2012, the trial court entered an Order Terminating
Jurisdiction.
[4] On April 4, 2014, Mother’s sister, E.B., was appointed as guardian under cause
number 71J01-1308-GU-151 (“Cause No. 151”). 2 On December 27, 2017, DCS
filed a petition alleging K.J.V. was a CHINS. Specifically, it alleged that E.B.
1
Father signed and executed a Consent to Adoption relating to K.J.V.
2
At the hearing, Mother’s counsel asked: “And then there was the guardianship case, which lasted for many
years; is that correct?” Transcript Volume II at 189. Mother answered: “Yes. Which never would have
happened if I had never done what I was duped into doing.” Id.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 20A-JT-366 | August 18, 2020 Page 2 of 18
was appointed as K.J.V.’s guardian under Cause No. 151, E.B. relocated to
California with K.J.V., and DCS received a report in August 2017 alleging
concerns regarding E.B.’s mental health. DCS alleged that K.J.V. disclosed on
September 1, 2017, to California CPS that E.B. had a “disease that makes [her]
freak out,” E.B. attempted to spray Lysol on her, and she had not been fed.
Exhibits Volume I at 190. DCS asserted that California CPS detained K.J.V.
and placed her in foster care, DCS spoke with E.B. by phone on December 18,
2017, and she claimed to be in Wisconsin and said she takes mood stabilizers
but was not on her medication and had been diagnosed with “something
schizophrenic disorder.” Id. DCS also alleged that California CPS flew K.J.V.
back to St. Joseph County on December 21, 2017, Mother and Father’s
supervised visits with K.J.V. had been suspended in the guardianship case since
August 2015, and she lacked an appropriate caregiver.
[5] In February 2018, K.J.V. was adjudicated to be a CHINS. On March 14, 2018,
the court entered a dispositional order. On July 9, 2019, the court entered an
Order on Modification of Dispositional Decree ordering Mother to write a
letter to K.J.V. with the assistance of her therapist and engage in two
therapeutically supervised telephone visitations with K.J.V.
[6] On September 5, 2019, DCS filed a petition to terminate Mother’s parental
rights. During hearings held in November and December 2019, DCS presented
the testimony of Family Case Manager Rachel Cohen (“FCM Cohen”); Dr.
Anthony Berardi, a clinical and forensic psychologist; Kyra Clark, a case
manager employed by Dockside Services; Stacy Hellinga, a therapist; G.C.,
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 20A-JT-366 | August 18, 2020 Page 3 of 18
who had K.J.V. in her care for almost two years; Janel Quillin, a licensed
clinical social worker and registered play therapy supervisor; and Guardian ad
Litem Marielena Duerring (“GAL Duerring”). Mother’s counsel presented the
testimony of Mother, Mother’s husband, and D.D., Mother’s son.
[7] On January 24, 2020, the court entered an order terminating Mother’s parental
rights. The court found:
7. [K.J.V.] is currently the subject of an open guardianship under
[Cause No. 151]. [E.B.] (hereinafter “Guardian”) was appointed
[K.J.V.’s] guardian on April 4, 2014.
8. In August of 2017, Guardian and [K.J.V.] relocated to
California. [K.J.V.’s] Guardian Ad Litem, Marielena Duerring,
credibly testified at great lengths about the circumstances under
the guardianship matter that led to the relocation. As credibly
outlined by Ms. Duerring, Guardian filed a Petition to Relocate[]
to California, which initially Ms. Duerring objected to.
9. Mother was exercising visitation with [K.J.V.] under the
guardianship matter. Unfortunately, Mother’s visitation was
terminated from two (2) separate visitation facilities due to
Mother’s inappropriate behavior as credibly testified to by Ms.
Duerring. Ms. Duerring credibly testified that she recommend[s]
that Mother’s visitation with [K.J.V.] be suspended, which was
granted by the guardianship Court.
10. After Mother’s visitation was suspended with [K.J.V.],
Guardian once again filed another request to relocate to
California. Ms. Duerring credibly testified that she agreed to the
request at that time, since Mother’s visitation was suspended,
and [K.J.V.] and Guardian relocated to California.
11. While in California, the California Child Protective Services
became involved due to the Guardian’s mental health and
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 20A-JT-366 | August 18, 2020 Page 4 of 18
stability. At that time, the California Court involved with the
family allowed the Mother to exercise visitation with [K.J.V.],
contrary to the Order issued in Indiana. Mother testified that
while [K.J.V.] was in custody of the California Child Protective
Services, she exercised weekly visitation with [K.J.V.].
12. In November of 2017, a communication occurred between
the California court who had custody of [K.J.V.] and Judge
James Fox from the St. Joseph Probate Court as authorized
under Indiana Code § 31-21-4-1. Ms. Duerring testified credibly
that after that UCCJA proceeding the case returned to Indiana
for further proceedings.
13. The DCS filed a Petition alleging that [K.J.V.] was a Child
in Need of Services (hereinafter “CHINS”) on December 22,
2017 under Cause Number 71J01-1712-JC-0000994. . . .
14. [K.J.V.] was previously adjudicated a CHINS under Cause
Number 71J01-1105-JC-000124 due to being diagnosed as failure
to thrive and concerns with Mother dosing the child with allergy
medication in her bottle. See State’s Exhibit B.
15. On December 27, 2017, a Detention Hearing was held. This
Court authorized [K.J.V.’s] continued detention and continued
the suspension of visitation for Mother and Father.
16. [K.J.V.] has never returned to the care of Mother, Father, or
Guardian since December 27, 2017. [K.J.V.] has not resided in
Mother’s care since the guardianship was granted in 2014.
17. On February 7, 2018, Mother entered an admission to the
CHINS Petition. Father failed to appear after appropriate notice
that day, and the Court adjudicated [K.J.V.] a CHINS.
18. A Dispositional Order was entered by this Court for [K.J.V.]
on March 14, 2018.
19. . . . The Court also declined to order visitation for Mother
until visitation was therapeutically recommended.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 20A-JT-366 | August 18, 2020 Page 5 of 18
20. FCM Cohen testified credibly that Mother completed all of
her services.
21. Based on Mother’s progression in services, FCM Cohen
credibly testified that Mother began therapeutic visitation during
the summer of 2018. [K.J.V.’s] therapist, Janel Quillin,
supervised that visitation between Mother and [K.J.V.]. Ms.
Quillin credibly testified that she met with Mother on May 3,
2018. Ms. Quillin testified credibly that the session went “okay.”
She further credibly testified that Mother had difficulty not
talking about the Guardian, and that Mother was “tearful and
angry.” Ms. Quillin further credibly testified that Mother
believed people were alienating [K.J.V.] from Mother.
22. Mother testified that her visitation with [K.J.V.] in California
went well and that [K.J.V.] was “very affectionate” with Mother
during those visits. Ms. Quillin, [K.J.V.’s] therapist from
January 2018 till March 2019, agreed that the California visits
appeared to go well from the reports she reviewed.
23. On June 14, 2018, Mother had her first therapeutic visitation
with [K.J.V.]. Ms. Quillin credibly testified that [K.J.V.] was
very fearful of having the visit. Ms. Quillin credibly testified that
she talked about the rules of the visit with Mother, which
included no recording, letting [K.J.V.] lead the visit, and advising
Mother that [K.J.V.] was scared of Mother yelling at her again.
Ms. Quillin credibly testified that [K.J.V.] was very tearful when
the visit began, and then suddenly, [K.J.V.] just stopped crying.
Ms. Quillin testified credibly that she thought [K.J.V.’s] behavior
was unusual because there was no transition from the crying to
stopping, and there was a belief [K.J.V.] disassociated during the
visitation. During the visitation, Mother asked [K.J.V.] for hugs
and kisses, all of which [K.J.V.] continued to resist, until the end
of the visitation, when [K.J.V.] did hug Mother.
24. On July 12, 2018, Ms. Quillin met with [K.J.V.] to work on
what rules [K.J.V.] wanted for her next therapeutic visit with
Mother. Ms. Quillin testified that [K.J.V.] wanted no hugs, no
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 20A-JT-366 | August 18, 2020 Page 6 of 18
kisses, for Mother to not request [K.J.V.] call her mom, no
pressures for affection, for Mother to stay three (3) feet away
from her at all times, and for Mother not to force [K.J.V.] to
come in.
25. Prior to the next therapeutic visitation, Ms. Quillin credibly
testified that Mother sent her a text message stating that [G.C.],
the foster mother, should not be present at the drop-off for visits.
Before the visit, Ms. Quillin credibly testified that Mother told
her that Mother believed [G.C.] was causing parental alienation
of her and [K.J.V.].
26. On July 17, 2018, Mother had her second supervised visit
with [K.J.V.]. According to the credible testimony of Ms.
Quill[i]n, the visit went very poorly. [K.J.V.] had made a list of
thoughts she wanted to share with Mother, including telling
Mother that she did not want to live with her, according to the
credible testimony of Ms. Quill[i]n. Mother began yelling at
[K.J.V.], which was a fear of [K.J.V.’s] that she had previously
shared with Ms. Quill[i]n. Ms. Quill[i]n credibly testified that
[K.J.V.] left the visit and was very upset.
27. After the July 17, 2018 [visit], Ms. Quillin credibly testified
that she could no longer recommend any ongoing visitation
because she believed any further visits would be “emotionally
detrimental” to [K.J.V.].
28. The events of July 17, 2018 were not the first time that
Mother’s behavior led to her visitation be[ing] terminated in a
supervised visitation agency. Kyra Clark, a case manager for
Dockside, credibly testified that in 2015, she supervised visitation
between Mother and [K.J.V.]. Ms. Clark credibly testified that
on November 3, 2015, Mother was visiting with [K.J.V.] and
Mother was redirected regarding her questioning of [K.J.V.].
Ms. Clark credibly testified that Mother became agitated and
[K.J.V.] was removed from the visit. Ms. Clark credibly testified
that Mother was using foul language and aggressive mannerisms
that necessitated the need for the police to be called. After that
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 20A-JT-366 | August 18, 2020 Page 7 of 18
visit, Ms. Clark testified credibly that Dockside terminated the
supervised visitation due to Mother’s behavior.
29. Mother’s inability to control herself and appropriately
manage her behavior was unfortunately a common topic in
testimony. FCM Rachel Cohen credibly testified that at times
Mother was “rude and nasty.” Ms. Duerring, the Guardian Ad
Litem, credibly testified that Mother was very angry with her
when Ms. Duerring pushed Mother to accept some responsibility
for Mother’s role in the case, and that Ms. Duerring found
Mother’s and Mother’s husband’s[] behavior threatening.
30. Dr. Anthony Berardi, a clinical and forensic psychologist,
also found concerns with Mother’s behavior. On March 20,
2019, Dr. Berardi conducted a psychological examination of
[K.J.V.] to determine if [K.J.V.] was a victim of parental
alienation by the foster parents . . . as Mother had continuously
alleged to be true. See State’s Exhibit E. As part of that
evaluation, Dr. Berardi credibly testified that he conducted an
interview with Mother. Dr. Berardi credibly described Mother as
“emotionally reactive.” Dr. Berardi credibly testified that during
the interview Mother was “very difficult to contain” and accused
Ms. Duerring of interfering with her parent-child relationship.
31. Dr. Berardi testified credibly that Mother had many
psychological and mental health concerns. He credibly testified
that Mother was taking large doses of benzodiazepines and
Suboxune [sic] for pain management. He further credibly opined
that he was concerned with Mother’s chronic major depressive
episodes. Dr. Berardi credibly testified that he found grandiosity
in Mother’s thinking, and that Mother demonstrated personality
disorder traits, including histrionic, impulsivity, and a paranoid
thought process.
32. Dr. Berardi also made diagnoses for [K.J.V.] as well. He
credibly testified that [K.J.V.] suffered from persistent depressive
disorder, anxiety, and feelings of low self-worth.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 20A-JT-366 | August 18, 2020 Page 8 of 18
33. Dr. Berardi credibly testified that for [K.J.V.’s] psychological
safety and future welfare, the [foster family] should adopt her.
He further credibly found and opined that [K.J.V.] was not the
victim of parental alienation, and rather, it was “a handy defense
used by [Mother] to portray herself as a victim when [K.J.V.] is
really the victim.” Dr. Berardi credibly testified that any
relationship with Mother would be a threat to [K.J.V.’s] well-
being, and that it would be in [K.J.V.’s] best interest to
recommend the Court terminate parental rights. Dr. Berardi
further credibly testified that removing [K.J.V.] from the [foster
family] would not only cause [K.J.V.] anxiety, but a “pretty
substantial breakdown.”
34. Even with that report, the Department continued to attempt
to repair Mother’s relationship with [K.J.V.]. On July 9, 2019,
after an extremely contested hearing, this Court approved a
modification to allow Mother to begin working toward building a
relationship with [K.J.V.]. The Order on Modification of
Dispositional Decree allowed the Mother to write a letter to
[K.J.V.] with the assistance of her therapist. After [K.J.V.] was
able to process the letter in therapy, Mother was authorized to
have up to (2) telephonic visits with [K.J.V.].
35. The first, and only, telephone visit lasted approximately ten
(10) minutes per the credible testimony of FCM Cohen. FCM
Cohen testified that [K.J.V.] was extremely anxious and very
nervous about the phone call and required the use of a weighted
blanket during the course of the visit. While Mother was
appropriate during the phone call, [K.J.V.] was very vocal in
talking about how she was uncomfortable and “her desire to live
with her current family.” See Respondent’s Exhibit 1.
36. Dr. Brad Mazick supervised the phone visit between Mother
and [K.J.V.]. Dr. Mazick summarized the visit and his
recommendations in an email to the DCS. See Respondent’s
Exhibit 1. Dr. Mazick wrote, when discussing the telephone call,
“However, I am fairly certain this did not change anything for
[K.J.V.]. While not awful and inappropriate, it likely wasn’t
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 20A-JT-366 | August 18, 2020 Page 9 of 18
productive to [K.J.V.] and holds little to no meaning.” Dr.
Mazick further continued that while Mother handled the
telephone call pretty well, Mother’s desires in regarding to
[K.J.V.] have not changed. He wrote, “While I think [Mother] is
a bit more realistic and open to suggestions to the process –
[Mother’s] end goal remains the same – having [K.J.V.] back
(fully) in her life – which is something that [K.J.V.] is totally
against.”
37. To say that [K.J.V.] is totally against reunification would be
minimizing how strongly [K.J.V.] has expressed her feelings
against living with Mother. Prior to the telephone visit with
Mother, Stacy Hellinga, [K.J.V.’s] current therapist, credibly
testified that [K.J.V.] questioned whether if she hurt herself
would she be required to have the telephone conversation with
Mother. Ms. Hellinga credibly testified that she would not
recommend any further visitation between Mother and [K.J.V.]
because continuing visitation would cause [K.J.V.] extreme harm
and regressions.
38. [K.J.V.] is currently in kinship placement with the [foster
family]. [G.C.] credibly testified that when [K.J.V.] was placed
in their home, she was incredibly argumentative, lacked
appropriate boundaries, physically attacked her school peers, and
overall lacked self-control. [G.C.] credibly testified that [K.J.V.]
is a different child now and is not so reclusive any more.
39. The plan of care for [K.J.V.] is adoption with a concurrent
plan of reunification as approved by this Court on July 9, 2019.
[G.C.] credibly testified her family would be willing to adopt
[K.J.V.]. Dr. Berardi credibly testified that it is in [K.J.V.’s] best
interest for Mother’s parental rights to be terminated and for the
[foster family] to adopt [K.J.V.]. He further credibly opined that
removing [K.J.V.] from the [foster family] would lead to a pretty
substantial breakdown for [K.J.V.].
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 20A-JT-366 | August 18, 2020 Page 10 of 18
Appellant’s Appendix Volume II at 35-38. The court concluded there was a
reasonable probability that continuation of the parent-child relationship posed a
threat to the well-being of the child, termination of the parent-child relationship
was in the child’s best interests, and there was a satisfactory plan for care and
treatment of the child.
Discussion
[8] Mother argues that no evidence was presented that she posed a physical threat
to K.J.V., she completed all services, there was no finding her home was
inappropriate, and the reasons stated by the trial court for termination were not
the same reasons K.J.V. was removed from the home. DCS argues that
termination was necessary to preserve K.J.V.’s emotional development and
mental health and that the court did not err in concluding it was reasonably
probable continuing the parent-child relationship posed a threat to K.J.V.’s
well-being.
[9] In order to terminate a parent-child relationship, DCS is required to allege and
prove, among other things:
(B) that one (1) of the following is true:
(i) There is a reasonable probability that the conditions that
resulted in the child’s removal or the reasons for placement outside
the home of the parents will not be remedied.
(ii) There is a reasonable probability that the continuation of the
parent-child relationship poses a threat to the well-being of the
child.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 20A-JT-366 | August 18, 2020 Page 11 of 18
(iii) The child has, on two (2) separate occasions, been adjudicated
a child in need of services;
(C) that termination is in the best interests of the child; and
(D) that there is a satisfactory plan for the care and treatment of the
child.
Ind. Code § 31-35-2-4(b)(2). If the court finds that the allegations in a petition
described in Ind. Code § 31-35-2-4 are true, the court shall terminate the parent-
child relationship. Ind. Code § 31-35-2-8(a).
[10] A finding in a proceeding to terminate parental rights must be based upon clear
and convincing evidence. Ind. Code § 31-37-14-2. We do not reweigh the
evidence or determine the credibility of witnesses but consider only the
evidence that supports the judgment and the reasonable inferences to be drawn
from the evidence. In re E.M., 4 N.E.3d 636, 642 (Ind. 2014). We confine our
review to two steps: whether the evidence clearly and convincingly supports the
findings, and then whether the findings clearly and convincingly support the
judgment. Id. We give due regard to the trial court’s opportunity to judge the
credibility of the witnesses firsthand. Id. “Because a case that seems close on a
‘dry record’ may have been much more clear-cut in person, we must be careful
not to substitute our judgment for the trial court when reviewing the sufficiency
of the evidence.” Id. at 640.
[11] The involuntary termination statute is written in the disjunctive and requires
proof of only one of the circumstances listed in Ind. Code § 31-35-2-4(b)(2)(B).
Mother concedes that K.J.V. has been adjudicated a child in need of services on
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 20A-JT-366 | August 18, 2020 Page 12 of 18
two separate occasions. Further, we observe that the trial court also found that
there was a reasonable probability that the continuation of the parent-child
relationship posed a threat to the well-being of K.J.V. “Clear and convincing
evidence need not reveal that ‘the continued custody of the parents is wholly
inadequate for the child’s very survival.’” In re G.Y., 904 N.E.2d 1257, 1261
(Ind. 2009) (quoting Bester v. Lake Cty. Office of Family & Children, 839 N.E.2d
143, 148 (Ind. 2005) (quoting Egly v. Blackford Cty. Dep’t of Pub. Welfare, 592
N.E.2d 1232, 1233 (Ind. 1992))), reh’g denied. “Rather, it is sufficient to show
by clear and convincing evidence that ‘the child’s emotional and physical
development are threatened’ by the respondent parent’s custody.” Id. (quoting
Bester, 839 N.E.2d at 148 (quoting Egly, 592 N.E.2d at 1234)).
[12] To the extent Mother does not challenge the court’s findings of fact, the
unchallenged facts stand as proven. See In re B.R., 875 N.E.2d 369, 373 (Ind.
Ct. App. 2007) (failure to challenge findings by the trial court resulted in waiver
of the argument that the findings were clearly erroneous), trans. denied.
[13] The trial court’s order concludes:
3. There is a reasonable probability that the continuation of the
parent-child relationship poses a threat to the well-being of
[K.J.V.].
*****
b. Continuing the parent-child relationship would not only be a
threat to [K.J.V.’s] mental and emotional well-being, but would
instead destroy [K.J.V.’s] mental and emotional well-being. Dr.
Berardi credibly testified that any continued relationship between
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 20A-JT-366 | August 18, 2020 Page 13 of 18
[K.J.V.] and Mother would be a threat to [K.J.V.’s] well-being.
Dr. Berardi further credibly opined that for [K.J.V.’s]
“psychological safety and future welfare,” she needed to be
adopted by the [foster family]. Dr. Berardi, in the psychological
evaluation he completed on [K.J.V.], credibly concluded that
“future contact between [K.J.V.] and [Mother] is not
recommended and would like[ly] contribute to more disruption
and regression in [K.J.V.’s] functioning.” This Court could not
agree more.
c. While it is not contested that Mother completed the services
Ordered by this Court, the damage that has been inflicted on
[K.J.V.] and her relationship with Mother is much too severe.
[K.J.V.] had not lived with her Mother since 2014 when she was
placed with Guardian. Ms. Clark credibly testified that Mother’s
visitation with [K.J.V.] was terminated from Dockside due to
Mother’s behavior. Ms. Duerring credibly testified that she
recommended, as [K.J.V.’s] Guardian Ad Litem in the
guardianship matter, that Mother’s visitation be suspended with
[K.J.V.]. Ms. Duerring credibly testified that Mother’s behavior
was inappropriate and that Mother was never able to take
responsibility for her actions. Ms. Duerring testified that Mother
consistently blamed others for her broken relationship with
[K.J.V.].
d. Mother’s own testimony, while difficult to follow and
incredible, did corroborate Mother’s inability to accept any
responsibility for her actions. When questioned by DCS about if
Mother had ever made any mistakes in regards to this case,
Mother’s answers were focused on Guardian’s involvement in
the case and trusting certain people.
e. This is the pattern of Mother’s thinking and what makes
Mother’s continued relationship with Mother a threat to
[K.J.V.’s] well-being. When Mother was given an opportunity to
visit with [K.J.V.] over the summer of 2018, Mother did the exact
thing that frightened [K.J.V.] – yelling at her. [K.J.V.’s] reaction
to Mother’s yelling was so severe that visitation was once again
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 20A-JT-366 | August 18, 2020 Page 14 of 18
suspended. Mother testified that without being prepared to hear
the things [K.J.V.] told her at that visit, there was “nothing she
could have done differently.”
f. Dr. Berardi also credibly testified that Mother is convinced
that DCS, [G.C.], Ms. Duerring, and the child’s therapist were
all involved in a plan to alienate [K.J.V.] from Mother. Dr.
Berardi ruled out parental alienation of [K.J.V.], and instead
credibly testified that parental alienation was a “handy defense”
used by Mother in order to portray herself as the victim.
g. [K.J.V.] is terrified of her Mother. Ms. Hellinga, [K.J.V.’s]
therapist, testified that once Mother was allowed to have a
telephone communication with [K.J.V.], [K.J.V.] disclosed
feeling of self-harm in order to avoid future telephone calls with
Mother. She further credibly testified that she could not
recommend any additional communication between Mother and
[K.J.V.] because it would cause extreme harm and regression to
[K.J.V.]. This opinion was credibly testified to by [K.J.V.’s]
previous therapist, Janel Quillin, as well. Ms. Quillin credibly
testified that, when she stopped seeing [K.J.V.] in March of 2019,
any additional visitation between [K.J.V.] and Mother would be
emotionally detrimental to [K.J.V.].
h. Mother argued that there were other ways to work toward
reunification, namely as outlined by Dr. Mazick. See Respondent’s
Exhibit 1. Dr. Mazick writes, “I further wonder that if [K.J.V.]
had some sense of security with her family whom she feels safe
with (possibly for the first time in her life then having some
potential of [Mother] in her life would not be so threatening.”
The Court finds this statement highly compelling. Dr. Mazick
acknowledges how threatened [K.J.V.] is by her relationship with
Mother. The only way to provide the security he mentions is
through termination of Mother’s parental rights.
[i]. In addition, Dr. Mazick’s observations and interactions with
[K.J.V.] were very limited. Per Mother’s own admission, Dr.
Mazick only met with [K.J.V.] twice during the course of the
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 20A-JT-366 | August 18, 2020 Page 15 of 18
case and was provided evidence from Mother. This Court finds
the testimony of Ms. Quillin and Ms. Hell[i]nga, [K.J.V.’s]
therapists, and Dr. Berardi substantially more credible in regards
to [K.J.V.’s] mental health needs.
j. “Termination of the parent-child relationship is proper where
the child’s emotional and physical development is threatened.”
In re S.K. at 1234. The Court finds that the evidence presented by
the DCS supports by clear and convincing evidence that the
continuation of Mother’s parent-child relationship with [K.J.V.]
does not only threaten her emotional development, it seriously
endangers it.
k. Mother’s inability to accept any responsibility in the
breakdown of her relationship with [K.J.V.], Mother’s pattern of
inappropriate behavior with almost every person involved in
[K.J.V.’s] care, as well as the deep mental and emotional issues
any attempt to work toward even visits between Mother and
[K.J.V.] would cause [K.J.V.] demonstrates by clear and
convincing evidence that the continuation of the parent-child
relationship poses a threat to the well-being of [K.J.V.].
Appellant’s Appendix Volume II at 38-39.
[14] When asked if she believed that continuing the parent-child relationship posed a
threat to K.J.V.’s well-being, FCM Cohen answered: “Yes. Maybe not her
physical well-being, but definitely her emotional and psychological well-being.”
Transcript Volume II at 29. Dr. Berardi testified that “they carried off a couple
of visits which ended rather disastrously with [Mother] yelling at her daughter,
scaring her to the extent that she ran out of the office, and that pretty much
ended the visits.” Id. at 51. He also testified that K.J.V. is “really riddled with
a lot of anxiety,” “suffers with persistent depressive disorder,” and “[t]his is
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 20A-JT-366 | August 18, 2020 Page 16 of 18
what they acquire and they acquire it usually in homes where they’ve been
neglected, invalidated, abused, and not provided the nurturing and positive
supports that they need, and this is the way she presents.” Id. at 54. Quillin,
the licensed clinical social worker and registered play therapy supervisor,
testified that she recommended no further visits between K.J.V. and Mother
and “felt that they would be emotionally detrimental for [K.J.V.] and
traumatic.” Id. at 117. When asked if she believed that continuing the parent-
child relationship between [K.V] and K.J.V. was a threat to K.J.V.’s well-being,
GAL Duerring answered affirmatively. We conclude that clear and convincing
evidence supports the trial court’s determination that the continuation of the
parent-child relationship poses a threat to K.J.V.’s well-being.
[15] To the extent Mother challenges the trial court’s finding that termination of the
parent-child relationship is in the best interest of K.J.V., we note that in
determining the best interests of a child, the trial court is required to look
beyond the factors identified by DCS and to the totality of the evidence.
McBride v. Monroe Cty. Office of Family & Children, 798 N.E.2d 185, 203 (Ind. Ct.
App. 2003). The court must subordinate the interests of the parent to those of
the child. Id. The court need not wait until a child is irreversibly harmed before
terminating the parent-child relationship. Id.[16] When asked if she believed that termination of Mother’s parental rights was in
K.J.V.’s best interests, FCM Cohen answered: “Unfortunately, this is the worst
question I have as a worker, I hate answering this question, but yes. It is
definitely in [K.J.V.’s] best interest to have her relationship between mother and
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 20A-JT-366 | August 18, 2020 Page 17 of 18
her terminated.” Transcript Volume II at 31. Dr. Berardi testified: “I feel very
confident that for this child’s best interest, in fact, for her psychological safety
and future welfare, that she should be adopted by the [foster family].” Id. at 54.
When asked what course of action he thought was in K.J.V.’s best interest, he
answered: “Well, I would recommend that the Court consider terminating
parental rights in this case and having this child have permanency in what she
looks at as her forever family . . . .” Id. at 55. GAL Duerring testified that
Mother’s parental rights “need to be terminated.” Id. at 142. When asked if
she believed it was in K.J.V.’s best interest for Mother’s parental rights to be
terminated, GAL Duerring answered affirmatively. Based on the totality of the
evidence, we conclude the trial court’s determination that termination is in the
children’s best interests is supported by clear and convincing evidence.
[17] For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the trial court.
[18] Affirmed.
Robb, J., and Crone, J., concur.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 20A-JT-366 | August 18, 2020 Page 18 of 18