Jose Francisco Mancillas v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.) ( 2019 )

MEMORANDUM DECISION
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D),
this Memorandum Decision shall not be FILED
regarded as precedent or cited before any Jul 03 2019, 6:55 am
court except for the purpose of establishing CLERK
the defense of res judicata, collateral Indiana Supreme Court
Court of Appeals
and Tax Court
estoppel, or the law of the case.
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Susan D. Rayl Curtis T. Hill, Jr.
Horvath Smith & Rayl, LLC Attorney General of Indiana
Indianapolis, Indiana Chandra K. Hein
Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
Jose Francisco Mancillas, July 3, 2019
Appellant-Defendant, Court of Appeals Case No.
19A-CR-59
v. Appeal from the Marion Superior
Court
State of Indiana, The Honorable Angela D. Davis,
Appellee-Plaintiff. Judge
The Honorable Patrick Murphy,
Magistrate
Trial Court Cause No.
49G16-1809-F6-31841
Riley, Judge.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-CR-59 | July 3, 2019 Page 1 of 8
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
[1] Appellant-Defendant, Jose Francisco Mancillas (Mancillas), appeals his
conviction for invasion of privacy, a Level 6 felony, Ind. Code § 35-46-1-15.1.
[2] We affirm.
ISSUE
[3] Mancillas raises one issue on appeal, which we restate as: Whether the State
presented sufficient evidence beyond a reasonable doubt to support his
conviction for invasion of privacy.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
[4] Mancillas and Martha Contreras (Contreras), Mancillas’ wife of twenty-eight
years, separated in February 2017. The following month, the trial court issued
a no-contact order, which expired after one year. On January 26, 2018, the no-
contact order was renewed as a condition of Mancillas’ sentence in a different
cause. In February 2018, Contreras and her fifteen-year-old daughter moved in
with her oldest daughter, Myra Lacaro (Myra). Mancillas was granted
visitation with the youngest child on the condition that he would visit when
Contreras was not home or make arrangements to visit at a different location.
[5] On September 18, 2018, Contreras returned home from work. Myra informed
Contreras that Mancillas “was around,” and “that she had seen him.”
(Transcript p. 6). Contreras called 911. Meanwhile, Contreras saw that
Mancillas knocked on the door of the residence but did not enter. Myra made
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Mancillas a sandwich, which he ate outside. When an officer of the
Indianapolis Metropolitan Police Department arrived, the officer approached
Mancillas and asked for his name. Mancillas gave his name as ‘Jose Cruz
Herrera.’ After learning that a no-contact order was in place between Mancillas
and Contreras, the officer arrested Mancillas.
[6] On September 20, 2018, the State filed an Information, charging Mancillas with
invasion of privacy, a Level 6 felony. On December 12, 2018, a bench trial was
conducted. At the close of the evidence, the trial court found Mancillas guilty
of invasion of privacy as a Class A misdemeanor. After admitting that he has a
prior conviction for invasion of privacy, the trial court elevated his instant
conviction to a Level 6 felony. Mancillas was sentenced to 910 days in the
Marion County jail with 545 days suspended to probation.
[7] Mancillas now appeals. Additional facts will be provided if necessary.
DISCUSSION AND DECISION
[8] Although phrased as a Fourteenth Amendment issue, Mancillas’ argument is
more properly characterized as a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence.
Specifically, Mancillas contends that the State failed to present sufficient
evidence beyond a reasonable doubt to sustain his conviction for invasion of
privacy.
[9] When reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence to support a conviction, we
consider only the probative evidence and reasonable inferences supporting the
verdict. Jackson v. State, 50 N.E.3d 767, 770 (Ind. 2016). We neither assess
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-CR-59 | July 3, 2019 Page 3 of 8
witness credibility nor weigh the evidence, and we will affirm the conviction
unless no reasonable fact-finder could find the elements of the crime proved
beyond a reasonable doubt. Id.
[10] In order to convict Mancillas, the State was required to establish that Mancillas
knowingly or intentionally violated the no-contact order under I.C. § 35-38-1-
30, which required Mancillas to refrain from any direct or indirect contact with
Contreras. A person who knowingly or intentionally violates a no-contact
order issued as a condition of probation and who has a prior conviction for
invasion of privacy commits Level 6 felony invasion of privacy. I.C. § 35-46-1-
15.1. Knowing conduct occurs when a person “engages in the conduct, he is
aware of a high probability that he is doing so.” I.C. § 35-41-2-2.
[11] Mancillas’ main argument revolves around the State’s lack of introducing the
no-contact order into evidence, as it was “the State’s burden to show the terms
of the no-contact order[.]” (Appellant’s Br. p. 11). While our review of the
record reveals that the no-contact order is not included, we note that the
Chronological Case Summary of the underlying cause indicates that on January
26, 2018, as a condition of his sentence, Mancillas was issued a no-contact
order in open court. Pursuant to I.C. § 35-38-1-30, “[a] sentencing court may
require that, as a condition of a person’s executed sentence, the person shall
refrain from any direct or indirect contact with an individual.” As such, the
statutory provision explicitly defines the conduct Mancillas was prohibited to
engage in.
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[12] Here, Mancillas arrived at the residence where Contreras lived without an
invitation and without adhering to the parties’ visitation arrangements.
Contreras was at home and heard him knock on the door. See Eisert v. State, 102
N.E.3d 330, 334 (Ind. Ct. App. 2018) (Invasion of privacy is a crime “that can
be accomplished by telephone calls, emails, letters, or rung doorbells.”) When
law enforcement arrived, Mancillas tried to pass himself off as someone else.
Providing a false name to law enforcement is “evidence of consciousness of
guilt.” Bennett v. State, 883 N.E.2d 888, 892 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008), trans. denied.
Thus, it would be reasonable for the finder of fact to infer that Mancillas was
attempting to evade detection by the officer because he knew of the existence
and violation of the no-contact order.
[13] While Mancillas claims that the trial court violated his due process rights by
convicting him of violating the “spirit” of the no-contact order, he ignores the
entirety of the trial court’s order, stating
With the evidence and the [inferences] are its and it’s not
disputed that he is most likely to have visits with his minor
children off this location. Going into a house where a person
lives, the protected person lives, I think that’s that’s in violation
of the no contact spirit, certainly the [n]o [c]ontact [o]rder.
Again, there is sufficient evidence to find him guilty of this
charge.
(Tr. p. 19).
[14] In sum, the evidence reflects that Mancillas knew that he was not supposed to
arrive uninvited or without any prior arrangement at the residence. The
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indirect contact with Contreras was established when she saw him at the house
and heard his knocking on the door. Therefore, we affirm Mancillas’
conviction.
CONCLUSION
[15] Based on the foregoing, we conclude that the State presented sufficient evidence
to establish Mancillas’ conviction of invasion of privacy.
[16] Affirmed.
[17] Bailey, J. concurs
[18] Pyle, J. concurs in result with separate opinion
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-CR-59 | July 3, 2019 Page 6 of 8
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
Jose Francisco Mancillas, Court of Appeals Case No.
19A-CR-59
Appellant-Respondent,
v.
State of Indiana,
Appellee-Petitioner.
Pyle, Judge, concurring in result with opinion.
[19] I concur in the result reached by my colleagues, but I write briefly to assist the
litigants and trial court. In cases where the State has charged a defendant with
an offense that carries the potential for an enhanced sentence because of a prior
conviction, our supreme court has outlined a better practice when introducing
evidence that may be judicially noticed. The court noted that it might be
minimally sufficient for a court to take judicial notice of publicly available
records as long as it unambiguously identifies those documents. Horton v. State,
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51 N.E.3d 1154, 1155 (Ind. 2016). “But the better approach, when practical, is
to enter the particular documents into the record, so that both the litigants and
appellate courts can know with certainty what evidence the court considered.”
Id.
[20] While neither practice was followed in this case, it does not mean that there
was insufficient evidence regarding the existence of a no-contact order in this
case. As my colleagues point out, the CCS was entered into evidence as State’s
Exhibit 1. It shows that the no contact order from the prior case was issued and
served on Mancillas on January 26, 2018, and that it was issued as a condition
of his suspended sentence. Further, the no-contact order was issued by the
same trial court, but different magistrate, which presided over the trial in this
case. It may be true that had this case been tried before a jury, the State’s
failure to introduce the no-contact order or request the trial court to take
judicial notice of specific records may have been fatal. However, this was a
bench trial. As a result, applying the judicial temperance presumption we can
presume “the trial judge is aware of and knows the law and considers only
evidence properly before him or her in reaching a decision.” Hinesley v. State,
999 N.E.2d 975 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013). The information contained in the CCS
provided sufficient evidence for the trial court to conclude beyond a reasonable
doubt the existence of a no-contact order.
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