Tammi Lacy v.State of Indiana (mem. dec.) ( 2018 )

MEMORANDUM DECISION
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D),
FILED
this Memorandum Decision shall not be Apr 30 2018, 6:34 am
regarded as precedent or cited before any CLERK
Indiana Supreme Court
court except for the purpose of establishing Court of Appeals
and Tax Court
the defense of res judicata, collateral
estoppel, or the law of the case.
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Karen Celestino-Horseman Curtis T. Hill, Jr.
Indianapolis, Indiana Attorney General of Indiana
Monika Prekopa Talbot
Supervising Deputy Attorney
General
Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
Tammi Lacy, April 30, 2018
Appellant-Defendant, Court of Appeals Case No.
49A02-1708-CR-1951
v. Appeal from the Marion Superior
Court
State of Indiana, The Honorable Matthew Tandy,
Appellee-Plaintiff. Judge Pro Tempore
Trial Court Cause No.
49G18-1503-F6-8366
Barnes, Judge.
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Case Summary
[1] Tammi Lacy appeals her conviction for Level 6 felony theft. We affirm.
Issues
[2] The restated issues before us are:
I. whether the trial court properly admitted evidence related
to the retail store victim’s internal investigation of the
theft; and
II. whether the trial court properly allowed one of the store’s
detectives to testify as to what he saw on a surveillance
video recording of Lacy’s conduct.
Facts
[3] Lacy was employed as a cashier at an Indianapolis Meijer gas station. In
October 2014, Meijer store detective Andy Neumeister received information
that there were frequent cash shortages at the gas station where Lacy worked.
To determine how this was happening and who was responsible for the
shortages, Neumeister first determined on what shifts the shortages were
occurring and who was working on those shifts. He then reviewed surveillance
video footage from those shifts and saw evidence that Lacy was stealing during
the process of removing money from the cash register and placing it in the store
safe. For example, when reviewing a recording from October 24, 2014,
Neumeister observed Lacy remove $160—eight $20 bills—from the cash
register and place it into a deposit envelope. Before sealing the envelope, Lacy
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went out of the surveillance camera’s view, then returned to the register shortly
thereafter with the envelope sealed. When performing a proper cash deposit, an
employee is supposed to seal the envelope immediately after putting money in
it. Lacy wrote on the envelope that it contained $120 in cash, scanned it, and
deposited it in the safe. Neumeister retrieved this envelope before it was
unsealed and confirmed that it contained only $120, despite Lacy having
originally put $160 in it before leaving the surveillance camera’s view.
[4] On October 25, 2014, Neumeister was watching live surveillance footage of
Lacy and observed her carry out another improper cash “drop” or deposit,
which was $40 short. He and Lacy’s supervisor then went to speak privately
with Lacy. When Neumeister began talking about the frequent cash shortages
at the gas station, Lacy initially said she was aware of them but denied that she
was stealing. However, when Neumeister informed Lacy that her most recent
deposit was $40 short and asked her for the money, Lacy took $40 from her
pocket, gave it to Neumeister, and said, “[T]hat’s all I took today.” Tr. Vol. II
p. 149. Lacy told Neumeister that she could not recall how long she had been
stealing, but that she had used the money for medical bills, rent for herself and
her daughter, a student loan, and paying off $2,000 in credit card debt. When
Neumeister told Lacy that the total amount missing was approximately $4,000,
she expressed surprise that it had been that much. Lacy then handwrote a
confession that she had “taken several thousand dollars from Miejer [sic] and
for reasons I really thought were okay.” Ex. 2. Lacy also signed a printed
confession that Neumeister had prepared, stating in part, “Over the past two
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and a half months I have been taking money from my cash register, via my
drops. Approximately two to three times a week, two or three times a day. . . .
Over that time frame I took approximately $4000.00 dollars.” Ex. 3.
[5] On March 10, 2015, the State charged Lacy with Level 6 felony theft. Lacy
deposed Neumeister on July 25, 2016. During that deposition, Neumeister said
that he “went to our internal audit system and began running shortage reports
for that store or that gas station and started narrowing down, you know, who
was working, when the shortages were occurring, and who was on the
registers,” before viewing surveillance footage from the gas station. Tr. Vol. II
p. 74. As part of discovery, Lacy requested from the State documentation
related to Neumeister’s theft investigation. Specifically, defense counsel
emailed the deputy prosecutor, “The amount is in dispute. At the last taped
statement one deponents [sic] mentioned that there was documentation
showing exactly how much money was taken. . . . Do you have it?” App. Vol.
II p. 56. When the State failed to produce that documentation, Lacy filed a
motion to compel discovery on May 4, 2017. The motion requested that the
State be compelled “to produce the internal investigation documentation and
any other documentation related to this case.” Id. at 54. When the State still
failed to produce this evidence, Lacy filed a motion to exclude it. On June 20,
2017, the trial court held a hearing on this motion, at which the State
represented that it had asked Meijer for the requested documentation four times
but had not received it. The trial court granted Lacy’s motion to exclude
evidence, specifically ruling “that all evidence related to the internal
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investigation, any evidence deriving from the investigation including internal
investigation documentation, and any undiscovered documentation related to
this case be excluded from being introduced at trial.” Id. at 60.
[6] A jury trial was held on July 13, 2017, before a judge pro tempore who had not
ruled on Lacy’s motion to exclude evidence. At the outset of Neumeister’s
testimony, Lacy objected to him testifying about there being any cash shortages
at the Meijer gas station, because his knowledge to that effect was based on
internal reports and documentation that had been excluded by the trial court’s
pretrial ruling and because those reports and documentation were hearsay.
After preliminary questioning of Neumeister, the trial court overruled Lacy’s
objection. It stated in part, “He didn’t rely on those documents to do his
investigation, he created those documents during his investigation. It’s not
based upon hearsay, it’s based upon work that he did.” Tr. Vol. II p. 75. The
trial court did not directly address Lacy’s objection based on the pretrial ruling
excluding evidence.
[7] Later in his testimony Neumeister began referring to what he had seen on the
store surveillance footage. Before doing so, he (through the State’s questioning)
explained that he had been trained on how to use and record from the
surveillance system, that it was in normal operating condition on the days that
he viewed it, that it accurately recorded and reproduced video images, that it
records continuously, and that it stores footage for thirty days. As Neumeister
began describing what he had seen on the surveillance footage, Lacy objected
on the basis that footage had not been introduced into evidence. The trial court
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overruled this objection, ruling that Neumeister could testify as to what he had
seen on the footage without it being introduced. Neumeister testified that he
was able to zoom in and out when watching the footage and that was how he
was able to discern the denomination of bills Lacy was removing from the cash
register and putting in the deposit bag. However, when a DVD recording of the
surveillance footage was introduced into evidence, Neumeister testified that it
was of lower quality than the footage he was able to watch and that recordings
made from the surveillance system were always of lower quality than the
original and lacked the ability to zoom in and out. In fact, it is not possible to
see bill denominations on the DVD recording introduced into evidence due to
its graininess. Lacy objected to the introduction of the DVD recording into
evidence because it was not the same as the original footage, which had not
been provided to the defense in discovery. The trial court overruled this
objection as well.
[8] The jury found Lacy guilty as charged, and the trial court convicted and
sentenced her accordingly. She now appeals.
Analysis
I. General Admission of Evidence Related to Investigation
[9] We first address Lacy’s argument that essentially all evidence related to
Meijer’s and Neumeister’s internal investigation of her theft should have been
excluded at trial, in light of the trial court’s pretrial ruling purporting to exclude
“all evidence related to the internal investigation, any evidence deriving from
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the investigation including internal investigation documentation, and any
undiscovered documentation related to this case . . . .” App. Vol. II p. 60.
Such exclusion would have left the State with virtually no case to present, as no
law enforcement agency conducted an independent investigation in this matter.
[10] We agree with the State that the pretrial ruling was not a final ruling on the
admissibility of the evidence. It was more akin to the granting of a motion in
limine or motion to suppress. A ruling on a motion in limine does not
determine the ultimate admissibility of evidence. Herrera v. State, 710 N.E.2d
931, 936 (Ind. Ct. App. 1999). “If error is committed by the trial court in
admitting evidence that the defendant had sought to be excluded by a motion in
limine, the error is in the admission of evidence at trial, not in its ruling on the
pretrial motion.” Id. Thus, the proper question here is whether the trial court
abused its discretion in admitting evidence at trial.1 Id. A trial court abuses its
discretion in admitting evidence if its ruling is clearly against the logic and effect
of the facts and circumstances before it, or if the court has misinterpreted the
law. Perryman v. State, 80 N.E.3d 234, 247 (Ind. Ct. App. 2017).
[11] The basis of the pretrial ruling excluding evidence was the State’s failure to
provide Lacy with documentation relating to Neumeister’s investigation into
cash shortages at the gas station where she worked. In particular, Lacy wanted
1
Additionally, prior to an entry of judgment, trial courts have the inherent power to amend, modify, or
change an earlier ruling, even if there has been a change of judge between the original and subsequent
rulings. See Serletic v. Noel, 700 N.E.2d 1159, 1161 (Ind. Ct. App. 1998).
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access to Meijer’s internal auditing reports that revealed the shortages and their
extent, which in turn prompted Neumeister’s viewing of the surveillance
footage and his identification of Lacy as the cause of the shortages. Although
those reports were not introduced at trial, consistent with the pretrial ruling,
Lacy asserts that all evidence or testimony flowing from those reports—i.e., the
full extent of Neumeister’s testimony—should have been excluded at trial.
[12] The exclusion of evidence at trial because of a discovery violation by the State
is an extreme remedy that is warranted only if the State’s actions were
deliberate and its conduct prevented a fair trial. Kennedy v. State, 934 N.E.2d
779, 784 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010). Here, although the language of the trial court’s
pretrial ruling admittedly was very broad, the actual information or
documentation that Lacy contended was erroneously not provided to her in
discovery was much narrower. Specifically, as support for her motion to
compel, Lacy attached a copy of an email her attorney sent to a deputy
prosecutor, stating, “The amount is in dispute. At the last taped statement one
deponents [sic] mentioned that there was documentation showing exactly how
much money was taken. . . . Do you have it?” App. Vol. II p. 56. In fact, the
State did not have that documentation because Meijer failed to provide it
despite repeated requests for it; the State did not engage in any deliberate
misconduct in failing to provide this documentation to Lacy.
[13] Given the lack of malfeasance on the State’s part and the relative narrowness of
what Lacy actually requested, it would have been a very draconian measure to
exclude any and all evidence related in any way to Meijer’s and Neumeister’s
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investigation. We also cannot say that the State and Meijer’s failure to provide
the requested documentation prevented a fair trial. Lacy was able to depose
Neumeister and so was able to prepare for trial. The relevance of the reports
that triggered Neumeister’s investigation would have been limited in any event.
Primarily, it was “course of investigation” evidence, or the reason why
Neumeister began his investigation and how he came to focus his viewing of
surveillance videos recorded during Lacy’s shifts. It was the viewing of those
videos that was the crucial evidence of Lacy’s guilt and identified her as a thief,
not the reports that led to the viewing. Despite the pretrial order being in place,
it would have been illogical to prohibit Neumeister from testifying as to what he
discovered during his investigation and the logical conclusions he drew from his
discoveries.
[14] The internal audit reports might have had some evidentiary value as to the total
amount of cash that went missing from the gas station. In order to sustain a
conviction for Level 6 felony theft, as opposed to a Class A misdemeanor, the
State was required to prove that she stole at least $750.00 from Meijer. See Ind.
Code § 35-43-4-2(a)(1). The State established that amount through Lacy’s
confession, plus Neumeister’s testimony regarding how often he saw Lacy
stealing from the cash register over a thirty-day period. The internal audit
reports would have been merely superfluous evidence on that point.2
2
Of course, if the reports revealed that less than $750 was stolen, that would be a different matter. There is
no basis for speculating that they would have done so, however.
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[15] In sum, we conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion in allowing
Neumeister to testify about his investigation, despite the broad pretrial ruling
that arguably could have been read as precluding such testimony. We
recognize that, in discussing Lacy’s objection at trial, the judge pro tempore
only addressed her hearsay objection to the evidence, not her argument about
discovery violations by the State and the pretrial ruling. However, this court
will uphold a correct legal ruling on the admissibility of evidence “even where
based on incorrect, or absent, legal reasoning below.” Reaves v. State, 586
N.E.2d 847, 857 (Ind. 1992).
II. Surveillance Video Recording
[16] Next, we address Lacy’s contention that the trial court erroneously admitted the
DVD recording of the Meijer surveillance footage and erroneously allowed
Neumeister to describe what he saw on the footage. Again, our review of the
admission of evidence is for an abuse of discretion. Perryman, 80 N.E.3d at 247.
To introduce a video recording into evidence, “‘[T]he proponent must produce
evidence sufficient to support a finding that the item is what the proponent
claims it is.’” McFall v. State, 71 N.E.3d 383, 388 (Ind. Ct. App. 2017) (quoting
Ind. Evidence Rule 901(a)). Where, as here, no witness contemporaneously
observed what is depicted on a video, it may be admitted into evidence under
the silent-witness theory. Id. “In order to authenticate videos or photographs
using the silent-witness theory, there must be evidence describing the process or
system that produced the videos or photographs and showing that the process
or system produced an accurate result.” Id. (citing Ind. Evid. R. 901(b)(9)).
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Generally, when a recording has been made by an automatic camera, “‘there
should be evidence as to how and when the camera was loaded, how frequently
the camera was activated, when the photographs were taken, and the processing
and changing of custody of the film after its removal from the camera.’”
McHenry v. State, 820 N.E.2d 124, 128 (Ind. 2005) (quoting Edwards v. State, 762
N.E.2d 128, 136 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002)). If a foundational requirement is
missing, circumstantial evidence may be used to establish that it is more likely
than not that the recording system produced an accurate result. McFall, 71
N.E.3d at 388.
[17] Here, Neumeister testified that he had been trained on how to use and record
from the surveillance system, that it was in normal operating condition on the
days that he viewed it, that it accurately recorded and reproduced video images,
that it records continuously, and that it stores footage for thirty days. He also
testified that the DVD introduced at trial was in fact a recording of the
surveillance footage he had viewed directly from Meijer’s surveillance system,
although it was of a lesser quality than what he was able to see directly from the
system. We are satisfied that this testimony was sufficient to authenticate the
DVD recording of the surveillance footage as a “silent witness” and to make it
admissible under Evidence Rule 901.
[18] Here, however, the question does not really seem to be whether the DVD was
properly admitted. The recording from the Meijer surveillance system is rather
grainy and it is not possible to directly observe Lacy committing theft on it.
Thus, even if the DVD was erroneously admitted it was not prejudicial to Lacy.
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Instead, Neumeister had to testify as to what he could observe when viewing
the clearer surveillance footage at Meijer and had the ability to zoom in and
out. That testimony—along with Lacy’s confessions—is what constituted proof
of her guilt.3
[19] It appears to us that any complaint as to Neumeister’s testimony would be more
accurately framed as a best evidence rule issue, although Lacy did not make an
express objection on that basis.4 Instead, she made a more general objection
about the original video not having been provided to the defense. Generally,
under the best evidence rule, “An original writing, recording, or photograph is
required in order to prove its content unless these rules or a statute provides
otherwise.” Ind. Evid. R. 1002. The rule applies to video recordings. See Wise
v. State, 26 N.E.2d 137, 143 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015) (analyzing admissibility of
copies of cell phone videos under the best evidence rule), trans. denied.5
3
Although it is tempting to say that any admission of Neumeister’s testimony was harmless in light of Lacy’s
confessions, we must keep in mind the corpus delicti rule, as Lacy points out. Under that rule, a person
cannot be convicted solely on the basis of a nonjudicial confession; there must be independent proof of the
corpus delicti, meaning some independent evidence that someone committed the crime charged. Shinnock v.
State, 76 N.E.3d 841, 843 (Ind. 2017). Without Neumeister’s testimony, there is only the challenged—and
never directly admitted—evidence regarding Meijer’s internal audit reports as evidence that a crime was
committed by someone.
4
The State contends that Neumeister’s testimony was harmless error because Lacy did not immediately
object when he first testified regarding what he was able to see on the surveillance footage. This would
appear to be more of a waiver argument than a harmless error argument. In any case, this testimony was
given before it was made clear that the DVD recording of the surveillance footage was of lesser quality than
the footage Neumeister had been able to watch, at which point Lacy objected. We do not believe
Neumeister’s testimony could be said to be harmless error.
5
Prior to 2014, Evidence Rule 1001(2) expressly stated that the best evidence rule applied to “photographs”
and that that term included “videotapes.” The Rule thereafter was amended to state that a “photograph” is
“a photographic image or its equivalent stored in any form” and it no longer expressly mentions video
recordings. Ind. Evid. R. 1001(c). We do not believe that our supreme court intended to exclude video
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Evidence Rule 1003 provides, “A duplicate is admissible to the same extent as
an original unless a genuine question is raised about the original’s authenticity
or the circumstances make it unfair to admit the duplicate.” It was arguably
unfair to admit the DVD in this case because it was of significantly lower
quality than the original viewed by Neumeister, and as a result of that lower
quality the jury was unable to see the evidence of theft that Neumeister
described seeing on the higher-quality original. See Belcher v. State, 797 N.E.2d
307, 309-10 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003) (holding duplicate of document was
erroneously admitted in violation of best evidence rule where duplicate was not
fully legible, including in places that would have been relevant to determining
guilt of defendant).
[20] However, Evidence Rule 1004 states:
An original is not required and other evidence of the content of a
writing, recording, or photograph is admissible if:
(a) all originals are lost or destroyed, and not by the proponent
acting in bad faith;
(b) an original cannot be obtained by any available judicial
process;
(c) the party against whom the original would be offered had
control of the original; was at that time put on notice, by
recordings from the best evidence rule by this amendment absent a clear declaration that videos are not
included within the rule.
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pleadings or otherwise, that the original would be a subject of
proof at the trial or hearing; and fails to produce it at the trial or
hearing; or
(d) the writing, recording, or photograph is not closely related to
a controlling issue.
“Other evidence” to prove the content of an item may include “[t]estimony of a
witness who recalls the content of the writing, photograph, or recording . . . .”
Weissenberger’s INDIANA EVIDENCE COURTROOM MANUAL ch. 1004, p. 361
(2011-2012 ed.).6
[21] Subparts (c) and (d) of Rule 1004 clearly would not apply here. Subpart (b)
generally has been construed to refer to original items that cannot be
subpoenaed because they are outside a court’s jurisdiction, which again does
not appear to have been an issue here. See Weissenberger at p. 362. That
leaves subpart (a) as a possible basis for allowing Neumeister to testify as to
what he saw on the original surveillance video footage. It is unclear whether
the original surveillance footage was “lost” or “destroyed” by the time of trial,
given that the system normally only saved thirty days-worth of footage before it
would record over the older material. However, Neumeister also indicated that
6
Although not yet addressed in Indiana, other jurisdictions have held that a witness may not testify as to
what they saw on a video recording without introduction of the video that the witness actually watched,
unless the requirements of Evidence Rule 1004 or its equivalent are satisfied. See, e.g., T.D.W. v. State, 137
So. 3d 574, 576 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2014); State v. Teague, 64 S.W.3d 917, 922 (Mo. Ct. App. 2002); State v.
Urbaschak, 342 P.3d 1108 (Or. Ct. App. 2015).
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he had made the DVD the day before trial—meaning the older footage would
have been saved somehow on the Meijer surveillance system.
[22] This case presents an unusual circumstance not apparently foreseen by the
drafters of Evidence Rule 1004, both here and in other jurisdictions. That is,
Neumeister’s testimony indicated that it was an inherent technological flaw of
the surveillance system that any recordings made from it were of lower quality
than what can be seen on the system itself. It also does not appear that there
was a practical way for the jury to see the original video, short of a field trip to
watch the recordings directly from the Meijer surveillance system. There also is
no indication that the failure to make a clearer DVD duplicate from the original
video was the result of bad faith on the State’s or Neumeister’s part. Although
this case may not fit precisely within the parameters of Evidence Rule 1004’s
language, we note the following comment by the advisory committee that
drafted Federal Rule of Evidence 1004, upon which Indiana’s rule is closely
modeled: “Basically the rule requiring the production of the original as proof of
contents has developed as a rule of preference: if failure to produce the original
is satisfactorily explained, secondary evidence is admissible.” Fed. R. Evid.
1004 (Advisory Committee notes). Here, the State and Neumeister provided a
satisfactory explanation for why the original video could not be produced (or
reproduced accurately on a DVD). As such, Neumeister could provide
secondary evidence by testifying about what he was able to see on the original
video.
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[23] To the extent there could have been more information presented about the
surveillance video and the circumstances surrounding the DVD’s creation, we
emphasize that Lacy did not make a best evidence rule objection to
Neumeister’s testimony. Thus, the State was not given an opportunity to
provide more of a foundation related to the best evidence rule. See Willis v.
State, 510 N.E.2d 1354, 1357 (Ind. 1987) (noting State could not be faulted for
providing inadequate foundation for introduction of evidence where defendant
did not object on that basis and State was not given opportunity to establish
foundation), cert. denied; State v. Nelsen, 183 P.3d 219, 223 (Or. Ct. App. 2008)
(noting that application of Evidence Rule 1004 is fact-sensitive and government
had not been alerted by defendant’s objection that it needed to further develop
the record on videotape’s admissibility), rev. denied. In sum, given the nature of
Lacy’s trial objection and the record before us, the trial court did not abuse its
discretion in allowing Neumeister to testify about what he was able to observe
on the Meijer surveillance video recordings.
Conclusion
[24] The trial court did not abuse its discretion in allowing Neumeister to testify
about his investigation into cash shortages at the gas station where Lacy worked
and in allowing him to testify as to what he observed on surveillance video
footage. We affirm Lacy’s conviction for Level 6 felony theft.
[25] Affirmed.
Najam, J., and Mathias, J., concur.
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