Coles v. State ( 2017 )

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE
DAVID M. COLES, §
§ No. 511, 2016
Defendant Below- §
Appellant, §
§ Court Below—Superior Court
v. § of the State of Delaware
§
STATE OF DELAWARE, § Cr. ID 0301011099 (N)
§
Plaintiff Below- §
Appellee. §
Submitted: June 9, 2017
Decided: July 31, 2017
Before VALIHURA, SEITZ, and TRAYNOR, Justices.
ORDER
This 31st day of July 2017, upon consideration of the parties’ briefs and
the record on appeal, it appears to the Court that:
(1) The appellant, David Coles, filed this appeal from the Superior
Court’s denial of his second motion for postconviction relief. After careful
consideration, we affirm the Superior Court’s judgment.
(2) A Superior Court jury convicted Coles in November 2006 of
Murder in the Second Degree, Possession of a Firearm During the
Commission of a Felony, and Possession of a Deadly Weapon by a Person
Prohibited. In June 2007, the Superior Court sentenced Coles to a total period
of thirty-eight years at Level V incarceration, to be suspended after serving
thirty-four years in prison for a period of probation. This Court affirmed
Coles’ convictions and sentence on direct appeal.1 Coles filed a timely first
motion for postconviction relief under Superior Court Criminal Rule 61,
which the Superior Court denied.2 On appeal, we reversed and remanded for
new postconviction proceedings with appointed counsel.3
(3) Coles’ appointed counsel filed an amended motion for
postconviction relief on his behalf in September 2014. The Superior Court
denied that motion, and we affirmed on appeal.4 In September 2016, Coles
filed his second motion for postconviction relief. The Superior Court applied
the amended version of Rule 61, which became effective June 4, 2014, and
concluded that Coles’ motion was procedurally barred under Rule 61(d)(2).
Thus, the Superior Court summarily dismissed his petition without further
consideration. Coles appeals that judgment.
(4) Coles raises four arguments in his opening brief on appeal. First,
he argues multiple claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. Second, he
contends that the Superior Court erred in applying the procedural bar of Rule
61(d)(2) to his ineffectiveness claims because his postconviction counsel was
1
Coles v. State, 959 A.2d 18 (Del. 2008).
2
State v. Coles, 2012 WL 3541283 (Del. Super. Feb. 29, 2012).
3
Coles v. State, 2013 WL 2966637 (Del. June 12, 2013).
4
Coles v. State, 2016 WL 703128 (Feb. 22, 2016).
2
ineffective in failing to raise these claims in Coles’ first Rule 61 proceeding
and his claims should have been considered in the interest of justice. Next,
Coles argues that the Superior Court erred in failing to consider his self-
defense claim as a claim of actual innocence under Rule 61(d)(2)(i). Finally,
he contends that the Superior Court erred in failing to consider his claim of
error concerning a jury instruction given at trial as a new, retroactive claim of
constitutional law under Rule 61(d)(2)(ii).
(5) We review the Superior Court’s denial of postconviction relief
for abuse of discretion, although we review questions of law de novo.5 Both
the Superior Court and this Court on appeal first must consider the procedural
requirements of Rule 61 before considering the merits of any underlying
postconviction claims.6 Rule 61 was substantially amended in June 2014 with
the adoption, among other things, of new procedural bars for second and
subsequent motions found in Rule 61(d)(2) and referenced in Rule 61(i)(5).
These new procedural requirements apply to any postconviction motion filed
after June 4, 2014.7
(6) Rule 61(d)(2), which became effective June 4, 2014 and applies
to Coles’ second Rule 61 motion filed in 2016, provides that a second or
5
Claudio v. State, 958 A.2d 846, 850 (Del. 2008).
6
Younger v. State, 580 A.2d 552, 554 (Del. 1990).
7
Cannon v. State, 127 A.3d 1164, 1167 n.15 (Del. 2015).
3
subsequent Rule 61 motion shall be summarily dismissed unless the movant
was convicted after a trial and the motion either: (i) asserts that new evidence
exists that creates a strong inference that the movant is factually innocent; or
(ii) asserts a new, retroactive rule of constitutional law that render the
movant’s conviction or death sentence invalid. We conclude that the Superior
Court properly applied this procedural bar to Coles’ second motion and
correctly concluded that the motion failed to assert any claim of new evidence
to establish his innocence in fact or any claim of a new, retroactive rule of
constitutional law that would invalidate his convictions. Contrary to Coles’
assertion, this Court’s decision in Guy v. State,8 which was decided before the
substantive amendments to Rule 61 in June 2014, has no applicability to his
case.
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the judgment of the
Superior Court is AFFIRMED.
BY THE COURT:
/s/ Collins J. Seitz, Jr.
Justice
8
82 A.3d 710 (Del. 2013) (discussing the application of the procedural bars under then-
existing Rule 61 to claims of ineffective assistance of postconviction counsel and
concluding that Guy’s claims were untimely).
4