State Of Iowa Vs. Gaspar Fidel Gonzalez, Jr. ( 2006 )


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  •                IN THE SUPREME COURT OF IOWA
    No. 75 / 05-1197
    Filed July 21, 2006
    STATE OF IOWA,
    Appellant,
    vs.
    GASPAR FIDEL GONZALEZ, JR.,
    Appellee.
    Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Johnson County, Stephen C.
    Gerard II, Judge.
    The State appeals from the district court’s granting of the defendant’s
    motion to dismiss the trial information.          REVERSED AND CASE
    REMANDED.
    Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Martha E. Boesen, Assistant
    Attorney General, J. Patrick White, County Attorney, and Anne M. Lahey,
    Assistant County Attorney, for appellant.
    David E. Brown of Hayek, Hayek, Brown, Moreland & Hayek, L.L.P.,
    Iowa City, for appellee.
    2
    WIGGINS, Justice.
    In this appeal, we must determine whether the district court correctly
    granted the defendant’s motion to dismiss the trial information charging the
    defendant with sexual exploitation by a counselor or therapist. In its ruling,
    the district court found the defendant’s conduct while working as a
    psychiatric nursing assistant did not fall within the scope of Iowa Code
    section 709.15 (Supp. 2003). Because we find the facts alleged by the State
    in the trial information and attached minutes charge that the defendant
    was a counselor or therapist for purposes of section 709.15 and the
    defendant’s constitutional claims fail, we reverse the district court’s
    granting of the motion to dismiss and remand the case for further
    proceedings.
    I. Background Facts and Proceedings.
    The State charged Gaspar Fidel Gonzalez, Jr. with sexual exploitation
    by a counselor or therapist in violation of Iowa Code sections 709.15(1)(a),
    (b), (f)(3) and 709.15(4).1 The charge was filed in connection with Gonzalez’s
    alleged touching of a female patient’s genital area in his role as a nursing
    assistant in the psychiatric unit of the University of Iowa Hospitals and
    Clinics. Gonzalez entered a plea of not guilty.
    According to the minutes of testimony, a psychiatric nursing
    assistant, “[w]ith supervision from a Registered Nurse, performs specific
    nursing tasks to assist members of the nursing team in providing care and
    monitoring of psychiatric patients.”              The characteristic duties and
    responsibilities of a psychiatric nursing assistant include establishing
    therapeutic relationships, participating in planning patient care appropriate
    1 These citations are set forth in the trial information and appear to refer to the
    2003 Code of Iowa. However, Iowa Code section 709.15 was amended in 2003. See 2003
    Iowa Acts ch. 180, § 65. The corresponding section is found in the Code supplement as
    section 709.15(1)(a), (b), (2)(c), (4)(c).
    3
    for the patient’s condition and age, documenting patient behavior and
    identifying material to report to the registered nurse, providing supervision
    of patients during activities, providing for a therapeutic environment, and
    participating in educational offerings. The minutes further state Gonzalez
    had regular contact with the female patient while she was in the unit.
    Gonzalez characterized their relationship as “a working relationship.”
    Gonzalez filed a motion to dismiss the trial information asserting his
    conduct did not fall within the intended scope of Iowa Code section 709.15
    and the statute is unconstitutionally vague and overbroad as applied to
    him. The district court held an evidentiary hearing on the motion. The
    court sustained the motion and dismissed the trial information, finding
    Gonzalez was not within the purview of the statute because he did not
    directly provide treatment, assessment, or counseling to patients.
    The State appeals.
    II. Issues.
    The issues presented in this case are: (1) whether the district court
    erred in finding Gonzalez’s conduct while working as a psychiatric nursing
    assistant did not fall within the scope of Iowa Code section 709.15; and (2)
    whether Iowa Code section 709.15 is unconstitutionally vague and
    overbroad as applied to Gonzalez.
    III. Scope of Review.
    Our review of a district court’s granting of a motion to dismiss a
    charge in a trial information is for the correction of errors at law. State v.
    Johnson, 
    528 N.W.2d 638
    , 640 (Iowa 1995).           In addition, we review
    questions of statutory interpretation for the correction of errors at law. 
    Id. We accept
    the facts alleged by the State in the trial information and
    attached minutes as true. 
    Id. “We will
    reverse the trial court’s dismissal of
    4
    the charge at issue if the facts the State has alleged charge a crime as a
    matter of law.” 
    Id. Our review
    of a constitutional challenge to Iowa Code section 709.15
    is de novo. State v. Seering, 
    701 N.W.2d 655
    , 660-61 (Iowa 2005). In
    conducting our review, “ ‘we must remember that statutes are cloaked with
    a presumption of constitutionality. The challenger bears a heavy burden,
    because it must prove the unconstitutionality beyond a reasonable doubt.’ ”
    
    Id. at 661
    (citations omitted).    The challenger is required to refute all
    reasonable bases upon which the statute could be declared constitutional.
    
    Id. If the
    statute may be construed in more than one way, one of which is
    constitutional, we will adopt such a construction. 
    Id. IV. Analysis.
    A. Did the district court err in finding Gonzalez’s conduct while
    working as a psychiatric nursing assistant did not fall within the
    scope of Iowa Code section 709.15?
    The State claims the district court erred in finding Gonzalez’s duties
    as a psychiatric nursing assistant did not bring him within the scope of
    Iowa Code section 709.15. A counselor or therapist who commits sexual
    exploitation in violation of Iowa Code section 709.15(2)(c) commits a serious
    misdemeanor. Iowa Code § 709.15(4)(c). Section 709.15(2)(c) provides such
    a violation occurs when there is “[a]ny sexual conduct with a patient or
    client . . . for the purpose of arousing or satisfying the sexual desires of the
    counselor or therapist or the patient or client.” The Code defines “patient or
    client” as “a person who receives mental health services from the counselor
    or therapist.” 
    Id. § 709.15(1)(e).
    A “counselor or therapist” is defined by the
    Code as
    a physician, psychologist, nurse, professional counselor, social
    worker, marriage or family therapist, alcohol or drug counselor,
    member of the clergy, or any other person, whether or not
    5
    licensed or registered by the state, who provides or purports to
    provide mental health services.
    
    Id. § 709.15(1)(a)
    (emphasis added). “ ‘Mental health service’ means the
    treatment, assessment, or counseling of another person for a cognitive,
    behavioral, emotional, mental, or social dysfunction, including an
    intrapersonal or interpersonal dysfunction.” 
    Id. § 709.15(1)(d).
    The crime
    does not include touching as part of a necessary examination or treatment
    provided in the scope of the counselor’s or therapist’s practice or
    employment. 
    Id. § 709.15(2).
    Gonzalez claims “the duties of a psychiatric nursing assistant do not
    fall within the meaning of ‘mental health service’ provided by a ‘counselor or
    therapist’ ” as those terms are defined under Iowa Code section 709.15(1).
    To resolve Gonzalez’s claim, we must interpret this section.             When
    confronted with the task of statutory interpretation, this court has stated:
    The goal of statutory construction is to determine legislative
    intent. We determine legislative intent from the words chosen
    by the legislature, not what it should or might have said.
    Absent a statutory definition or an established meaning in the
    law, words in the statute are given their ordinary and common
    meaning by considering the context within which they are
    used. Under the guise of construction, an interpreting body
    may not extend, enlarge or otherwise change the meaning of a
    statute.
    Auen v. Alcoholic Beverages Div., 
    679 N.W.2d 586
    , 590 (Iowa 2004) (citations
    omitted).
    The interpretation of a statute requires an assessment of the statute
    T
    in its entirety, not just isolated words or phrases. State v. Young, 
    686 N.W.2d 182
    , 184-85 (Iowa 2004). Indeed, “we avoid interpreting a statute in
    such a way that portions of it become redundant or irrelevant.” T & K
    Roofing Co. v. Iowa Dep’t of Educ., 
    593 N.W.2d 159
    , 162 (Iowa 1999). We
    look for a reasonable interpretation that best achieves the statute’s purpose
    6
    and avoids absurd results. Harden v. State, 
    434 N.W.2d 881
    , 884 (Iowa
    1989). We strictly construe criminal statutes with doubts resolved in the
    accused’s favor. State v. Schultz, 
    604 N.W.2d 60
    , 62 (Iowa 1999).
    Iowa Code section 709.15 clearly states any person providing or
    purporting to provide mental health services is considered a “counselor or
    therapist.” Iowa Code § 709.15(1)(a). It is thus necessary to determine if
    the trial information and attached minutes allege facts demonstrating
    Gonzalez was providing mental health services as a psychiatric nursing
    assistant. “ ‘Mental health service’ ” consists of treatment, assessment, or
    counseling for certain dysfunctions. 
    Id. § 709.15(1)(d).
    We have already
    determined the term “does not encompass strictly personal relationships
    involving the informal exchange of advice.” State v. Allen, 
    565 N.W.2d 333
    ,
    337 (Iowa 1997).
    We may consult a dictionary in order to determine the ordinary
    meanings of words used by the legislature. State v. Evans, 
    671 N.W.2d 720
    ,
    724 (Iowa 2003).    The dictionary defines “treatment” as “the action or
    manner of treating a patient medically or surgically”; “treat” means “to care
    for (as a patient or part of the body) medically or surgically,” “deal with by
    medical or surgical means,” and “give a medical treatment to.” Webster’s
    Third New Int’l Dictionary 2434-35 (unabr. ed. 2002).              The term
    “assessment” means “an appraisal or evaluation (as of merit).” 
    Id. at 131.
    The term “counseling” means
    a practice or professional service designed to guide an
    individual to a better understanding of his problems and
    potentialities by utilizing modern psychological principles and
    methods esp. in collecting case history data, using various
    techniques of the personal interview, and testing interests and
    aptitudes.
    
    Id. at 518.
                                         7
    Accepting the facts alleged by the State in the trial information and
    attached minutes as true, Gonzalez’s role as a psychiatric nursing assistant
    is embraced by the legislature’s use of these terms. Gonzalez provided
    “treatment” to the patients because he performed nursing tasks to assist in
    providing care of psychiatric patients, such as establishing therapeutic
    relationships, providing for a therapeutic environment, and participating in
    planning patient care. He provided “assessment” of the patients because he
    performed nursing tasks to assist in monitoring psychiatric patients, such
    as documenting patient behavior and identifying material to report to the
    registered nurse. The treatment and assessment took place in the course of
    Gonzalez’s working relationship with the female patient while she was in the
    psychiatric unit.   Gonzalez’s provision of such mental health services
    qualifies him as a “counselor or therapist” for purposes of Iowa Code section
    709.15. Thus, the facts the State has alleged in the trial information and
    attached minutes charge Gonzalez with the crime of sexual exploitation by a
    counselor or therapist as a matter of law. Accordingly, the State is entitled
    to proceed with its case to prove these allegations beyond a reasonable
    doubt.   A failure of such proof will require the finder of fact to acquit
    Gonzalez.
    We have previously acknowledged the problems that arise in filing a
    motion to dismiss in a civil case:
    “We recognize the temptation is strong for a defendant to strike
    a vulnerable petition at the earliest opportunity. Experience
    has however taught us that vast judicial resources could be
    saved with the exercise of more professional patience. Under
    the foregoing rules dismissals of many of the weakest cases
    must be reversed on appeal. Two appeals often result where
    one would have sufficed had the defense moved by way of
    summary judgment, or even by way of defense at trial. From a
    defendant’s standpoint, moreover, it is far from unknown for
    the flimsiest of cases to gain strength when its dismissal is
    reversed on appeal.”
    8
    Rees v. City of Shenandoah, 
    682 N.W.2d 77
    , 79 (Iowa 2004) (citation
    omitted). Although there are no summary judgment proceedings in criminal
    cases, we find these principles to be equally persuasive in such cases.
    Additionally, we note it is improper for the district court to hold an
    evidentiary hearing on a motion to dismiss based on a claim that the facts
    alleged in the trial information and attached minutes do not constitute the
    offense charged in the trial information. In this circumstance, the only
    relevant inquiry by the court is whether the facts the State has alleged in
    the trial information and attached minutes charge a crime as a matter of
    law.   To conduct an evidentiary hearing only wastes valuable judicial
    resources that the court can use for other matters requiring such a hearing.
    Consequently, the district court erred in granting Gonzalez’s motion
    to dismiss the trial information by finding his alleged conduct while working
    as a psychiatric nursing assistant was outside the scope of Iowa Code
    section 709.15.
    B. Is Iowa Code section 709.15 unconstitutionally vague and
    overbroad as applied to Gonzalez?
    Gonzalez argues Iowa Code section 709.15 is constitutionally infirm
    because it is void for vagueness. Vague statutes are proscribed by the Due
    Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States
    Constitution. State v. Wiederien, 
    709 N.W.2d 538
    , 542 (Iowa 2006). “In
    order to avoid a vagueness problem, a penal statute must ‘define the
    criminal offense with sufficient definiteness that ordinary people can
    understand what conduct is prohibited and in a manner that does not
    encourage arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement.’ ” 
    Allen, 565 N.W.2d at 337
    (citations omitted). If a statute lacks clearly defined prohibitions,
    9
    then it is void for vagueness. 
    Wiederien, 709 N.W.2d at 542
    . The void-for-
    vagueness doctrine protects the following values:
    “First, because we assume that man is free to steer between
    lawful and unlawful conduct, we insist that laws give the
    person of ordinary intelligence a reasonable opportunity to
    know what is prohibited, so that he may act accordingly. . . .
    Second, if arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement is to be
    prevented, laws must provide explicit standards for those who
    apply them. . . . Third, but related, where a vague statute
    ‘abut[s] upon sensitive areas of basic First Amendment
    freedoms,’ it ‘operates to inhibit the exercise of [those]
    freedoms.’ ”
    
    Id. (alterations in
    original) (citation omitted).   Due process requires “a
    standard of conduct be reasonably ascertainable ‘by reference to prior
    judicial decisions, similar statutes, the dictionary, or common generally
    accepted usage.’ ” State v. Baker, 
    688 N.W.2d 250
    , 255 (Iowa 2004) (citation
    omitted).
    In Allen, we rejected a constitutional challenge to Iowa Code section
    709.15 on vagueness and overbreadth grounds because we concluded the
    language of section 709.15(1)(f) (now section 709.15(2)) clearly applied to
    the conduct ascribed to the defendant and that section did not reach a
    substantial amount of First Amendment 
    conduct. 565 N.W.2d at 336-38
    &
    n.1. Although the section at issue dealt with what conduct constitutes
    sexual exploitation by a counselor or therapist, we relied on the definitions
    of “counselor or therapist” as well as “ ‘[m]ental health service’ ” in arriving
    at our rejection of the constitutional claim. 
    Id. at 337-38.
    Here, we must determine what people the statute prohibits from
    engaging in such conduct. The “any other person, whether or not licensed
    or registered by the state, who provides or purports to provide mental
    health services” designation listed in the “counselor or therapist” definition
    clearly identifies the individuals who come within the statute’s prohibitions.
    10
    Iowa Code § 709.15(1)(a). Any person who renders “treatment, assessment,
    or counseling of another person for a cognitive, behavioral, emotional,
    mental, or social dysfunction, including an intrapersonal or interpersonal
    dysfunction” provides “ ‘[m]ental health service.’ ” 
    Id. § 709.15(1)(d).
    There
    is no doubt the language of section 709.15 applies to the services Gonzalez
    is alleged to have provided to the female patient under the facts in the trial
    information and attached minutes.          Therefore, we conclude Gonzalez’s
    vagueness claim is without merit.
    In his motion to dismiss, Gonzalez also asserted Iowa Code section
    709.15 is unconstitutionally overbroad. A statute is overbroad in violation
    of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution if it seeks
    to control or prevent activities subject to regulation in a manner that is
    unnecessarily broad, thereby invading protected freedoms. State v. Reed,
    
    618 N.W.2d 327
    , 331 (Iowa 2000). Gonzalez did not identify a protected
    freedom in his motion to dismiss or in his argument on appeal. Gonzalez’s
    failure to do so causes us to find his overbreadth argument is waived. See
    
    id. at 331-32.
          Accordingly, Gonzalez’s constitutional challenges to Iowa Code section
    709.15 fail.
    V. Disposition.
    Because we find the facts the State has alleged charge that Gonzalez
    was a counselor or therapist for purposes of Iowa Code section 709.15 and
    his constitutional claims fail, we reverse the district court’s granting of the
    motion to dismiss the trial information and remand the case for further
    proceedings.
    REVERSED AND CASE REMANDED.