Pagan v. SHHS ( 1994 )


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  • USCA1 Opinion









    May 17, 1994 [NOT FOR PUBLICATION]

    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT
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    No. 93-2299




    FIDEL PAGAN,

    Plaintiff, Appellant,

    v.

    SECRETARY OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES,

    Defendant, Appellee.


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    APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

    FOR THE DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO


    [Hon. Gilberto Gierbolini, U.S. District Judge]
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    Before

    Breyer, Chief Judge,
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    Selya and Boudin, Circuit Judges.
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    Paul Ramos Morales on brief for appellant.
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    Guillermo Gill, United States Attorney, Jose Vazquez Garcia,
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    Assistant United States Attorney, Randolph W. Gaines, Acting
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    Chief Counsel for Social Security, A. George Lowe, Deputy Chief
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    Counsel for Disability Litigation, and Richard Fox, Attorney,
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    Office of the General Counsel, Social Security Division,
    Department of Health and Human Services, on brief for appellee.



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    Per Curiam. Appellant acknowledges that the sole issue
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    involved in the instant appeal was addressed by this court in

    Rodriguez v. Secretary of HHS, 856 F.2d 338 (1st Cir. 1988).
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    Noting that four circuit courts have reached a contrary

    conclusion, he requests that our Rodriguez holding be
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    "revisited." Yet it is "black-letter law that, in a multi-

    panel circuit, newly constituted panels are, with few

    exceptions ..., bound by prior panel decisions closely in

    point." Doughty v. Underwriters at Lloyd's, London, 6 F.3d
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    856, 861 (1st Cir. 1993).

    Appellant has advanced no reason to depart from this

    rule, and we perceive none. It cannot be said that our

    Rodriguez decision has been "undercut by controlling
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    authority, subsequently announced, such as an opinion of the

    Supreme Court, an en banc opinion of the circuit court, or a

    statutory overruling." Metcalf & Eddy, Inc. v. Puerto Rico
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    Aqueduct & Sewer Auth., 945 F.2d 10, 12 (1st Cir. 1991),
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    rev'd on other grounds, 113 S. Ct. 684 (1993). While
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    subsequent amendments to 42 U.S.C. 406(a) & 423(h) have

    tangential relevance to the issue, see Akers v. Secretary of
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    HHS, 966 F.2d 205, 206 (6th Cir. 1992), they fall short of
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    dictating a construction of section 406(b) different from

    that reached in Rodriguez. Likewise, it cannot be said that
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    collateral authority has since emerged of sufficient

    persuasiveness to offer "a convincing reason for believing



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    that the earlier panel ... would change its course." Metcalf
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    & Eddy, Inc., 943 F.2d at 12. The court in Condon v.
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    Secretary of HHS, 853 F.2d 66 (2d Cir. 1988), fully
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    explicated the reasons for adopting a contrary view; the

    ensuing cases largely echo that rationale. And we

    specifically rejected the Condon court's reasoning in
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    Rodriguez.
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    Affirmed.
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