State Of Iowa Vs. Matthew Earl Cox ( 2010 )

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF IOWA
No. 07–2083
Filed April 30, 2010
STATE OF IOWA,
Appellee,
vs.
MATTHEW EARL COX,
Appellant.
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Linn County, Robert E.
Sosalla, Judge.
Defendant challenges admissibility of evidence of incidents of prior
sexual abuse with other victims. JUDGMENT REVERSED AND CASE
REMANDED.
Mark C. Smith, State Appellate Defender and David Arthur Adams,
Assistant Appellate Defender, for appellant.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Kevin Cmelik, Assistant
Attorney General, Harold Denton, Linn County Attorney, and Jerry
Vander Sanden, Assistant County Attorney, for appellee.
2
STREIT, Justice.
Matthew Cox was convicted pursuant to Iowa Code sections 709.1,
709.3(2), and 709.4(2)(b) (2005) of one count of sex abuse in the second
degree and one count of sex abuse in the third degree for sexually
abusing his younger cousin. The State presented evidence of Cox’s prior
sexual abuse of two other cousins. Cox appealed, asserting the district
court erred by admitting the instances of sexual abuse against other
victims pursuant to Iowa Code section 701.11 (2007). Admission of prior
bad acts solely to show a general propensity instead of a legitimate issue
violates the due process clause of the Iowa Constitution. Because Cox’s
prior bad acts with different victims are not relevant to a legitimate issue,
section 701.11 is unconstitutional as applied to the facts of this case and
we reverse.
I. Background Facts and Prior Proceedings.
Fourteen-year old J.M. accused her cousin Matthew Cox of
fondling her on several occasions beginning when she was between four
and six years old in about 1996–1998 and raping her beginning when
she was a pre-teen in about 2003. According to J.M., most of these
incidents took place at her grandmother’s house, where Cox lived. The
State charged Cox with sexual abuse in the second degree for acts
between January 1, 2003, and October 31, 2005, and later added a
charge of sexual abuse in the third degree for acts after J.M. turned
twelve.
At trial, T.C. and A.L., two of Cox’s other cousins, testified to prior
sexual contact with Cox. T.C., a female, described two occasions when
Cox forcibly fondled her, once at her grandmother’s house when she was
ten, in about 1998, and once in a car when she was thirteen, in about
2001. A.L., a male and J.M.’s half-brother, described a pattern of abuse
3
that began with inappropriate touching and forced oral sex when he was
around age six, in about 1992, and escalated to incidents during which
Cox forcibly performed anal intercourse with him. A.L. testified some of
these alleged acts took place at his grandmother’s house.
Charges had been filed jointly based on Cox’s alleged abuse of A.L.,
but these charges were severed from those relating to J.M. prior to trial 1.
Cox then filed a motion in limine seeking to exclude prior-bad-acts
evidence under Iowa Rules of Evidence 5.404(b) and 5.403. The State
asserted such evidence was admissible under Iowa Code section 701.11.
Cox argued that section 701.11 only applies to evidence of other sexual
abuse with the same victim and application of section 701.11 here would
be unconstitutional under the Iowa Constitution.
The State argued the prior acts of sexual abuse should be admitted
under section 701.11 because of “common threads” in the testimony: all
of the alleged victims were cousins of the defendant, all were abused as
children or young adults, and all testified to some abuse at the
grandmother’s house. The State also argued the evidence showed the
“defendant’s MO” and “a pattern of behavior,” making it admissible even
under rule 5.404(b).
Ruling in favor of the State, the court concluded the evidence was
admissible under section 701.11 because “the Legislature found it
necessary in sexual abuse cases to make an exception. [The statute]
doesn’t limit it to other sexual abuse against the same victim.” The court
found the evidence relevant and also found the probative value of the
evidence outweighed the prejudicial effect because of the arguments put
forth by the State, including “the similarities,” and because the testimony
1Cox was tried separately for offenses against A.L. and convicted of sexual abuse
in the second degree.
4
“bolsters [J.M.’s] credibility as to . . . her recitation as to the events as
occurred.”
The district court ordered the State to lay the foundation for these
witnesses outside the presence of the jury and again determined the
testimony was admissible. The court gave a limiting jury instruction that
“[e]vidence of another offense for which a defendant is not on trial does
not mean that the defendant is guilty of the charges for which he is on
trial.” The jury returned a guilty verdict, and Cox appealed.
II. Scope of Review.
We review a district court’s evidentiary rulings regarding the
admission of prior bad acts for abuse of discretion. State v. Parker, 747
N.W.2d 196, 203 (Iowa 2008). “An abuse of discretion occurs when the
trial court exercises its discretion ‘on grounds or for reasons clearly
untenable or to an extent clearly unreasonable.’ ” State v. Rodriquez, 636
N.W.2d 234, 239 (Iowa 2001) (quoting State v. Maghee, 573 N.W.2d 1, 5
(Iowa 1997)). However, to the extent a challenge to a trial court ruling on
the admissibility of evidence implicates the interpretation of a statute or
a rule of evidence, our review is for errors at law. See State v. Stone, 764
N.W.2d 545, 548 (Iowa 2009); State v. Jordan, 663 N.W.2d 877, 879
(Iowa 2003). We review constitutional claims de novo. State v. Bumpus,
459 N.W.2d 619, 622 (Iowa 1990).
III. Merits.
A. Prior Bad Acts Evidence. Cox asserts the district court erred
by admitting evidence of his prior acts of sexual abuse under Iowa Code
section 701.11. Cox argues if section 701.11 is read to allow prior bad
acts against individuals other than the victim, it violates the due process
clause of the Iowa Constitution.
5
Under Iowa Rule of Evidence 5.404(b), “[e]vidence of other crimes,
wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove the character of a person in
order to show that the person acted in conformity therewith.” Iowa R.
Evid. 5.404(b). Therefore, such evidence “is not admissible to
demonstrate the defendant has a criminal disposition and was thus more
likely to have committed the crime in question.” State v. Reynolds, 765
N.W.2d 283, 289 (Iowa 2009). The public policy for this rule
“is founded not on a belief that the evidence is irrelevant, but
rather on a fear that juries will tend to give it excessive
weight, and on a fundamental sense that no one should be
convicted of a crime based on his or her previous misdeeds.”
State v. Sullivan, 679 N.W.2d 19, 24 (Iowa 2004) (quoting United States v.
Daniels, 770 F.2d 1111, 1116 (D.C. Cir. 1985)).
However, prior bad acts are admissible if offered for the purpose of
establishing “motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge,
identity, or absence of mistake or accident.” Iowa R. Evid. 5.404(b). “The
purposes listed in [rule 5.404(b)] are not exclusive.” State v. Plaster, 424
N.W.2d 226, 228 (Iowa 1988). A court may admit evidence of prior bad
acts when it determines (1) the evidence is “ ‘relevant and material to a
legitimate issue in the case other than a general propensity to commit
wrongful acts,’ ” and (2) the probative value of the evidence is not
substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice to the
defendant. Reynolds, 765 N.W.2d at 289–90 (quoting Sullivan, 679
N.W.2d at 25).
Iowa Code section 701.11 applies specifically to prior acts of sexual
abuse and provides:
In a criminal prosecution in which a defendant has been
charged with sexual abuse, evidence of the defendant’s
commission of another sexual abuse is admissible and may
be considered for its bearing on any matter for which the
evidence is relevant. This evidence, though relevant, may be
6
excluded if the probative value of the evidence is
substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice,
confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by
considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless
presentation of cumulative evidence. This evidence is not
admissible unless the state presents clear proof of the
commission of the prior act of sexual abuse.
Iowa Code § 701.11(1). Section 701.11 appears to allow introduction of
prior sexual abuse without limiting such evidence to the specific
categories in Iowa Rule of Evidence 5.404(b): “motive, opportunity,
intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or
accident.”
B. Constitutionality of Iowa Code Section 701.11. Cox argues
Iowa Code section 701.11 violates the due process clause of the Iowa
Constitution by allowing a defendant to be tried and convicted based on
a general propensity instead of the charged offense. 2 Article I, section 9
of the Iowa Constitution guarantees that “no person shall be deprived of
life, liberty, or property without due process of law.” Iowa Const. art. I,
§ 9. Although in the past we have interpreted the United States and Iowa
Constitutions “in a similar fashion,” State v. Seering, 701 N.W.2d 655,
662 (Iowa 2005), we “ ‘jealously guard our right and duty to differ in
appropriate cases.’ ” State v. Cline, 617 N.W.2d 277, 285 (Iowa 2000)
(quoting State v. Olsen, 293 N.W.2d 216, 220 (Iowa 1980)), overruled on
other grounds by State v. Turner, 630 N.W.2d 601, 606 n.2 (Iowa 2001).
Cox asserts the history and case law of our state supports an
interpretation of the Iowa Constitution that differs from the
2The State argues this constitutional claim is not preserved because it was not
raised below in the district court. We disagree. Before the district court, defense trial
counsel argued that: (1) the State was seeking to admit the prior bad acts evidence as
propensity evidence to suggest “he did it to others; therefore, he did it here;” (2) Iowa
Code section 701.11 should be interpreted to only apply to allegations of prior sex
abuse against the same victim; and (3) section 701.11 violates due process because it is
overly broad and vague. We hold that counsel’s arguments were sufficient to preserve
this issue for appellate review.
7
interpretation federal courts have afforded the United States Constitution
with regard to this specific issue. Although decisions interpreting the
Federal Constitution are not binding on us with respect to the Iowa
Constitution, such cases may be persuasive. State v. Hoskins, 711
N.W.2d 720, 725 (Iowa 2006).
In State v. Reyes, 744 N.W.2d 95 (Iowa 2008), we examined the
constitutionality of Iowa Code section 701.11 with respect to the
admissibility of other sexual abuse involving the same victim. We
reasoned the evidence was relevant to a legitimate issue because it
“shows the nature of the relationship between the alleged perpetrator
and the victim.” Reyes, 744 N.W.2d at 102. “The evidence was thus not
offered to show a general propensity to be attracted sexually to young
girls, but instead to demonstrate the nature of the defendant’s
relationship and feelings toward a specific individual.” Id. at 103. We
determined the “admission of prior sexual abuse involving the same
victim does not amount to a constitutional violation of due process.” Id.Reyes relied on our prior case law, which “held that prior sexual abuse
was admissible ‘ “to show a passion or propensity for illicit sexual
relations with the particular person concerned in a criminal trial.” ’ ” Id.
at 102 (quoting State v. Spaulding, 313 N.W.2d 878, 880 (Iowa 1981)).
The holding in Reyes was limited to prior incidents involving the
same victim. Id. at 102 n.1. Reyes expressly declined to address
situations involving a different victim. As stated in a footnote, “[w]e
express no view regarding the constitutionality of Iowa Code section
701.11 where the prior acts of sexual abuse involve persons other than
the current alleged victim.” Id. Today, we address the issue purposefully
left unanswered in Reyes: whether admitting a defendant’s other acts of
sexual abuse with a different victim violates due process. We hold the
8
Iowa Constitution prohibits admission of prior bad acts evidence
involving a different victim when admitted solely for the purpose of
demonstrating propensity. Instead, the evidence must be relevant to a
“legitimate issue.”
The United States Supreme Court has not reached, and instead
has expressly reserved, the question of whether a state law admitting
propensity evidence violates the Federal Due Process Clause. Estelle v.
McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 75 n.5, 112 S. Ct. 475, 484 n.5, 116 L. Ed. 2d
385, 401 n.5 (1991). The United States Supreme Court has explained,
however, that admitting propensity evidence raises questions of fair play:
Courts that follow the common-law tradition almost
unanimously have come to disallow resort by the
prosecution to any kind of evidence of a defendant’s evil
character to establish a probability of his guilt. . . . The
inquiry is not rejected because character is irrelevant; on the
contrary, it is said to weigh too much with the jury and to so
overpersuade them as to prejudge one with a bad general
record and deny him a fair opportunity to defend against a
particular charge.
Michelson v. United States, 335 U.S. 469, 475–76, 69 S. Ct. 213, 218, 93
L. Ed. 168, 173–74 (1948) (footnotes omitted). Similarly, in Old Chief v.
United States, 519 U.S. 172, 191, 117 S. Ct. 644, 655, 136 L. Ed. 2d
574, 594–95 (1997), the Supreme Court held a trial court abused its
discretion by admitting the name and factual circumstances of a
previous conviction, even though a prior felony conviction was an
element of the crime charged. The court, citing Michelson, held the
evidence was unfairly prejudicial, explaining, “[t]here is, accordingly, no
question that propensity would be an ‘improper basis’ for conviction.”
Old Chief, 519 U.S. at 181–82, 117 S. Ct. at 650–51, 136 L. Ed. 2d at
588.
9
The Federal Rules of Evidence previously referred to prior bad acts
only in section 404(b), a provision similar to Iowa Rule of Evidence
5.404(b), which prohibited introduction of prior bad acts except in
certain circumstances. Fed. R. Evid. 404(b). In 1994, Congress
expanded the scope of admissible evidence by enacting Federal Rules of
Evidence 413 and 414. Similar to Iowa Code section 701.11, Federal
Rule of Evidence 413(a) provides:
In a criminal case in which the defendant is accused of an
offense of sexual assault, evidence of the defendant’s
commission of another offense or offenses of sexual assault
is admissible, and may be considered for its bearing on any
matter to which it is relevant.
Fed. R. Evid. 413(a). Rule 414 applies to child molestation cases and
permits evidence of the defendant’s commission of other offenses of child
molestation. Fed. R. Evid. 414(a). The United States Supreme Court has
not addressed the constitutionality of these rules. 3 However, federal
courts have generally upheld the admission of evidence under rules 413
and 414. See, e.g., United States v. Castillo, 140 F.3d 874, 881–83 (10th
Cir. 1998).
In United States v. Enjady, 134 F.3d 1427, 1433 (10th Cir. 1998),
the Tenth Circuit held rule 413 does not on its face violate the due
process rights of a defendant, and in Castillo, 140 F.3d at 880, it reached
the same determination with regard to rule 414. In both cases, the
federal rule admitting prior sexual abuse was held to be constitutional
3Federal Rules 413 and 414 were controversial when enacted:
[T]he members of two committees, consisting of 40 persons in all, and
appointed by the Judicial Conference of the United States to examine
Fed. R. Evid. 413 before its passage, all but unanimously urged that
Congress not adopt the rule because of deep concerns about its
fundamental fairness.
United States v. Mound, 157 F.3d 1153, 1153 (8th Cir. 1998) (Arnold, J., dissenting
from denial of rehearing en banc).
10
because of the safeguard of Federal Rule of Evidence 403, which directs
the court to exclude the evidence if it “concludes the probative value of
the similar crimes evidence is outweighed by the risk of unfair prejudice.”
Enjady, 134 F.3d at 1433. In Castillo, the Tenth Circuit held that when
evidence is “so prejudicial that it violates the defendant’s fundamental
right to a fair trial . . . [a]pplication of Rule 403 . . . should always result
in the exclusion of [such] evidence.” Castillo, 140 F.3d at 883 (emphasis
added).
Similarly, in United States v. LeMay, 260 F.3d 1018 (9th Cir.
2001), the Ninth Circuit determined the admission of the defendant’s
other instances of molestation did not violate his due process rights.
LeMay, 260 F.3d at 1026–27. Holding rule 414 does not violate the Due
Process Clause of the Constitution, the court stated, “[a]s long as the
protections of Rule 403 remain in place to ensure that potentially
devastating evidence of little probative value will not reach the jury, the
right to a fair trial remains adequately safeguarded.” Id. at 1026.
State courts have also confronted statutes similar to Iowa Code
section 701.11. Most courts have followed the federal courts’ lead and
held the balancing tests in the state equivalents of Federal Rule of
Evidence 403 maintain the constitutionality of statutes admitting
evidence of prior sexual offenses. See, e.g., People v. Falsetta, 986 P.2d
182, 189–93 (Cal. 1999) (holding state statute admitting propensity
evidence of sex crimes does not violate due process); People v. Donoho,
788 N.E.2d 707, 720–21 (Ill. 2003) (holding state statute admitting
propensity evidence of sex crimes constitutional under the Federal and
Illinois Constitutions).
The Supreme Court of Missouri, however, has declared a law
similar to Iowa Code section 701.11 unconstitutional. See State v.
11
Ellison, 239 S.W.3d 603, 607–08 (Mo. 2007). In Ellison, the court held a
Missouri statute allowing admission of evidence of prior sexual crimes
unconstitutional under the Missouri Constitution even though the
statute contained a balancing clause similar to Federal Rule of Evidence
403. Id. at 606. The court based its holding on two clauses in the
Missouri Constitution which together guarantee “the right to be tried
only on the offense charged.” 4 Id. at 605–06. The court noted the long
line of Missouri cases prohibiting admission of prior criminal acts as
propensity evidence and held “[e]vidence of prior criminal acts is never
admissible for the purpose of demonstrating the defendant’s propensity
to commit the crime with which he is presently charged. There are no
exceptions to this rule.” Id. at 606 (citation omitted).
When we evaluate the constitutionality of rules of evidence based
on due process considerations, “the traditional approach has been to
invalidate an evidentiary rule only if it ‘violates those “fundamental
conceptions of justice which lie at the base of our civil and political
institutions,” which define “the community’s sense of fair play and
decency.” ’ ” Reyes, 744 N.W.2d at 101 (quoting United States v. Lovasco,
431 U.S. 783, 790, 97 S. Ct. 2044, 2049, 52 L. Ed. 2d 752, 759 (1977)).
Cox argues Iowa courts have generally refused to accept the admission of
propensity evidence, and therefore, Iowa Code section 701.11 violates a
fundamental conception of justice under the Iowa Constitution.
The general rule prohibiting propensity evidence was firmly
established in Iowa courts at common law. See State v. Vance, 119 Iowa
685, 686, 94 N.W. 204, 204 (1903) (“The rule as to evidence of similar
One clause provides that “no person shall be prosecuted criminally for felony or
4
misdemeanor otherwise than by indictment or information.” Mo. Const. art. 1, § 17.
The other provides that “in criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the right . . . to
demand the nature and cause of the accusation.” Mo. Const. art. 1, § 18(a).
12
acts at other times and with other persons than those charged in the
indictment is well understood. The state cannot prove against a
defendant any crime not alleged in the indictment, either as foundation
for separate punishment or as aiding the proofs that he is guilty of the
crime charged.”). The courts developed a requirement that evidence of
prior bad acts be relevant “ ‘ “to prove some fact or element in issue other
than the defendant’s criminal disposition” ’ ” and therefore relevant “for a
legitimate purpose” other than propensity to be admissible. Rodriquez,
636 N.W.2d at 239–40 (quoting State v. Castaneda, 621 N.W.2d 435, 440
(Iowa 2001)). After codification of the general prohibition on propensity
evidence in rule 5.404(b), this requirement remains. To be admissible
the evidence must be “ ‘relevant and material to a legitimate issue in the
case other than a general propensity to commit wrongful acts.’ ” See
Reynolds, 765 N.W.2d at 289 (quoting Sullivan, 679 N.W.2d at 25). An
early United States Supreme Court case explained that the common law
rejects prior bad acts as evidence because
[p]roof of them only tended to prejudice the defendants with
the jurors . . . . However depraved in character, and however
full of crime [the defendants’] past lives may have been, the
defendants were entitled to be tried upon competent
evidence, and only for the offense charged.
Boyd v. United States, 142 U.S. 450, 458, 12 S. Ct. 292, 295, 35 L. Ed.
1077, 1080 (1892).
Although historical practice generally excluded propensity
evidence, “[t]he historical practice with respect to the admissibility of
prior sexual acts is ambiguous at best.” Reyes, 744 N.W.2d at 101. We
noted in Reyes that some jurisdictions have developed exceptions that
allow evidence of prior sexual abuse involving children to be admitted,
whereas other states exclude all evidence of prior sexual abuse. See
13
Lannan v. State, 600 N.E.2d 1334, 1338 (Ind. 1992) (overruling Indiana’s
prior use of the “depraved sexual instinct exception” and citing cases
from other jurisdictions both adopting and rejecting the exception); Mary
Christine Hutton, Commentary: Prior Bad Acts Evidence in Cases of
Sexual Contact with a Child, 34 S.D. L. Rev. 604, 614–17 (1989) (noting
states’ different treatment of prior sex acts with children); cf. David P.
Leonard, The New Wigmore: Evidence of Other Misconduct and Similar
Events § 8.5.3, at 543 (2009) (“[C]ourts have long approved admission of
[prior bad acts] evidence in sexual crime and child molestation cases for
at least three reasons, all of which tend toward the same conclusion:
that proof of the crime’s occurrence is exceedingly difficult to muster.”).
This court traced the history of a “lewd disposition” exception in
Iowa in State v. Cott, 283 N.W.2d 324, 327 (Iowa 1979). As Cott
explained:
[E]vidence tending to prove a lewd disposition of the
defendant charged with lascivious acts with a minor was
originally considered relevant only insofar as it showed his
intent solely toward the prosecuting witness. Almost
imperceptibly, the lewd disposition exception was
overextended to permit evidence of the defendant’s acts with
other victims. First, in [State v. Schlak, 253 Iowa 113, 116,
111 N.W.2d 289, 291 (1961)], it crept in as a synonym for
motive. Then, in [State v. Maestas, 224 N.W.2d 248, 250–51
(Iowa 1974)], it was used as an alternative rationale to the
common scheme exception. However, proving lewd
disposition has never been the sole purpose for which this
court has approved the admission of testimony concerning
prior acts with persons other than the prosecutrix.
Id. (emphasis added). Instead of relying solely on a “lewd disposition”
exception, when faced with prior sexual offenses towards one other than
the victim, this court has typically required the challenged evidence to be
“ ‘relevant and material to some legitimate issue other than a general
propensity to commit wrongful acts.’ ” State v. Casady, 491 N.W.2d 782,
14
785 (Iowa 1992) (quoting Plaster, 424 N.W.2d at 229). For example,
evidence of prior sexual abuse of a different victim is admissible when
the identity of an attacker—alleged to be the defendant—is in dispute
and a prior act by the defendant was “strikingly similar” or of a “unique
nature.” State v. Walsh, 318 N.W.2d 184, 185–86 (1982). Such evidence
is also admissible when the defendant is charged for assault with intent
to commit sex abuse and prior similar crimes are used to demonstrate
the element of sexual intent. See Casady, 491 N.W.2d at 785–86
(admitting prior instances of defendant pulling young women into his car
and sexually assaulting them when defendant was charged with intent to
commit sexual assault for a failed attempt to pull a girl into his car);
State v. Spargo, 364 N.W.2d 203, 205, 209 (1985). This court has also
admitted prior sexual acts to rebut a defendant’s claim that the charged
sexual activity was consensual. See State v. Bayles, 551 N.W.2d 600,
604–05 (1996); State v. Tillman, 514 N.W.2d 105, 108–09 (Iowa 1994)
(admitting defendant’s statement to victim that he had previously killed a
woman to rebut claim that sex acts were consensual); Plaster, 424
N.W.2d at 229–31.
This court did allow admission of a prior sexual offense against an
individual other than the particular victim without tying it to a legitimate
issue other than general propensity in State v. Spaulding, 313 N.W.2d
878, 881 (1981). In Spaulding, the court held testimony by the victim’s
sister regarding an incident of sexual abuse could be admitted. Id. This
court referenced a quotation from a renowned treatise stating: “ ‘[C]ertain
unnatural sex crimes are in themselves so unusual and distinctive that
any previous such acts by the accused with anyone are strongly
probative of like acts upon the occasion involved in the charge.’ ”
Spaulding, 313 N.W.2d at 881 (quoting Edward W. Cleary, McCormick’s
15
Handbook on the Law of Evidence § 190, at 449 (2d ed. 1972)). The
dissent in Spaulding noted the quoted passage from McCormick had been
taken out of context and the following sentence was more equivocal,
stating: “ ‘but the danger of prejudice is likewise enhanced here, and
most courts have in the past excluded such acts with other persons for
this purpose. More recent cases show signs of lowering this particular
barrier to admission.’ ” Id. at 883 (quoting Edward W. Cleary,
McCormick’s Handbook on the Law of Evidence § 190, at 449–50) (Allbee,
J. dissenting).
Notably, after Spaulding, this court continued to identify a
legitimate and independent issue on which to base admission of prior
sexual offenses towards one other than the particular victim. See
Bayles, 551 N.W.2d at 604–05 (consent); Casady, 491 N.W.2d at 785–86
(intent); Plaster, 424 N.W.2d at 229–31 (consent); Spargo, 364 N.W.2d at
205, 209 (intent); Walsh, 318 N.W.2d at 185–86 (identity). In State v.
Mitchell (Mitchell I), 633 N.W.2d 295 (Iowa 2001), this court clarified that
testimony of prior sexual abuse of a different victim was not admissible
to bolster the particular victim’s credibility because it was essentially
propensity evidence and therefore did not have an “independent
relevancy.” Mitchell, 633 N.W.2d at 300.
Case law recognizes deep concerns over admission of propensity
evidence, including prior sexual abuse against a victim other than the
one involved in the charged conduct; however, we must determine
whether those concerns are rooted in constitutional protections or simply
an example of the court’s supervisory authority over evidentiary rules.
As noted above, an evidentiary rule violates due process if it “ ‘violates
those “fundamental conceptions of justice which lie at the base of our
civil and political institutions,” which define “the community’s sense of
16
fair play and decency.” ’ ” Reyes, 744 N.W.2d at 101 (quoting Lovasco,
431 U.S. at 790, 97 S. Ct. at 2049, 52 L. Ed. 2d at 759).
In Enjady, the Tenth Circuit summarized the due process
arguments against Federal Rule of Evidence 413: 5 (1) the ban against
propensity evidence has been honored by the courts for a long period of
time, (2) such evidence creates a presumption of guilt undermining the
prosecution’s burden, and (3) the evidence licenses the jury to punish a
defendant for past acts which erodes the fundamental presumption of
innocence. Enjady, 134 F.3d at 1432 (citing Hurtado v. California, 110
U.S. 516, 528, 4 S. Ct. 111, 117, 28 L. Ed. 232, 236 (1884); Estelle, 502
U.S. at 78, 112 S. Ct. at 485, 116 L. Ed. 2d at 403 (O’Connor, J.,
concurring)). The presumption of innocence has been described as “that
bedrock ‘axiomatic and elementary’ principle whose ‘enforcement lies at
the foundation of the administration of our criminal law.’ ” In re Winship,
397 U.S. 358, 363, 90 S. Ct. 1068, 1072, 25 L. Ed. 2d 368, 375 (1970)
(quoting Coffin v. United States, 156 U.S. 432, 453, 15 S. Ct. 394, 403,
39 L. Ed. 481, 491 (1895)). Chief Justice Warren explained the
connection to prior-bad-acts evidence:
While this Court has never held that the use of prior
convictions to show nothing more than a disposition to
commit crime would violate the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment, our decisions exercising supervisory
power over criminal trials in federal courts, as well as
5
Scholars and commentators have argued that admitting propensity evidence in
sexual abuse or assault cases deprives a defendant of his constitutional right to a fair
trial. See, e.g., William E. Marcantel, Protecting the Predator or the Prey? The Missouri
Supreme Court’s Refusal to Allow Past Sexual Misconduct as Propensity Evidence, 74 Mo.
L. Rev. 211, 230–33 (2009) (arguing the U.S. Supreme Court should follow the Missouri
court’s reasoning in rejecting propensity evidence); Jason L. Mccandless, Prior Bad Acts
and Two Bad Rules: The Fundamental Unfairness of Federal Rules of Evidence 413 and
414, 5 Wm. & Mary Bill Rts. J. 689, 711–14 (1997); Louis M. Natali, Jr. & R. Stephen
Stigall, “Are You Going to Arraign His Whole Life?”: How Sexual Propensity Evidence
Violates the Due Process Clause, 28 Loy. U. Chi. L.J. 1 (1996).
17
decisions by courts of appeals and of state courts, suggest
that evidence of prior crimes introduced for no purpose other
than to show criminal disposition would violate the Due
Process Clause. Evidence of prior convictions has been
forbidden because it jeopardizes the presumption of innocence
of the crime currently charged.
Spencer v. Texas, 385 U.S. 554, 572–75, 87 S. Ct. 648, 658–59, 17 L. Ed.
2d 606, 619–20 (1967) (Warren, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part) (emphasis added) (footnotes omitted). Other courts have
similarly pointed to the fundamental principle excluding propensity
evidence:
“ ‘there are few principles of American criminal
jurisprudence more universally accepted than the rule that
evidence which tends to show that the accused committed
another crime independent of that for which he is on trial,
even one of the same type, is inadmissible.’ ”
Hurst v. State, 929 A.2d 157, 162 (Md. 2007) (quoting State v. Taylor, 701
A.2d 389, 392 (Md. 1997)).
Iowa courts similarly ground the rejection of propensity evidence
on “fundamental” concerns of fairness and the presumption of
innocence. The policy against admissibility of general propensity
evidence stems from “ ‘a fundamental sense that no one should be
convicted of a crime based on his or her previous misdeeds.’ ” Sullivan,
679 N.W.2d at 24 (quoting Daniels, 770 F.2d at 1116). “ ‘A concomitant
of the presumption of innocence is that a defendant must be tried for
what he did, not for who he is.’ This concept is ‘fundamental to
American jurisprudence.’ ” Id. at 23–24 (quoting United States v. Myers,
550 F.2d 1036, 1044 (5th Cir. 1977); United States v. Foskey, 636 F.2d
517, 523 (D.C. Cir. 1980)).
This court has also applied the reasoning that general propensity
evidence is fundamentally unfair in the context of prior sexual abuse
involving a different victim. In Cott, this court based its rejection of the
18
“lewd disposition exception” on concerns of “unfairness.” As the court
explained:
A focus on the criminal or aberrant disposition of the
defendant with regard to various victims is exactly the sort of
prejudice which the general rule seeks to avoid. By creating
an exception of this kind, we would seriously erode the
impact of the general rule, proscribing evidence of prior
criminal conduct, in the context of sex crimes. The resultant
unfairness to those accused of sex crimes is self-evident.
Cott, 283 N.W.2d at 327 (footnotes omitted). As one treatise explains,
there is no rationale for treating prior sexual offenses differently than all
other offenses:
Unlike the other purposes for other-crimes evidence,
the sex-crime exception flaunts the general prohibition of
evidence whose only purpose is to invite the inference that a
defendant who committed a previous crime is disposed
toward committing crimes, and therefore is more likely to
have committed the one at bar.
1 Kenneth S. Broun, McCormick on Evidence § 190, at 764 (6th ed. 2006)
[hereinafter McCormick on Evidence].
Based on Iowa’s history and the legal reasoning for prohibiting
admission of propensity evidence out of fundamental conceptions of
fairness, we hold the Iowa Constitution prohibits admission of prior bad
acts evidence based solely on general propensity. Such evidence may,
however, be admitted as proof for any legitimate issues for which prior
bad acts are relevant and necessary, including those listed in rule
5.404(b) and developed through Iowa case law. For example, after this
court held in Mitchell I that evidence of prior sexual abuse of two other
victims could not be admitted to demonstrate witness credibility because
it was “ ‘ “merely a synonym for propensity,” ’ ” see Mitchell I, 633 N.W.2d
at 299 (quoting State v. Glodgett, 749 A.2d 283, 289 (N.H. 2000)),
evidence of that prior sexual abuse was properly admitted on retrial for
19
the legitimate issue of rebutting a defense theory. See State v. Mitchell
(Mitchell II), 670 N.W.2d 416, 421–22 (Iowa 2003).
Our holding today is consistent with Reyes. Prior bad acts
evidence involving the same victim “has relevance on the underlying
criminal charge because it shows the nature of the relationship between
the alleged perpetrator and the victim.” Reyes, 744 N.W.2d at 102. For
example, within the domestic violence context, “the defendant’s prior
conduct directed to the victim of a crime, whether loving or violent,
reveals the emotional relationship between the defendant and the victim
and is highly probative of the defendant’s probable motivation and intent
in subsequent situations.” State v. Taylor, 689 N.W.2d 116, 125 (Iowa
2004). Evidence of prior crimes against the same victim “ ‘furnishes part
of the context of the crime’ or is necessary to a ‘full presentation’ of the
case.” See United States v. Masters, 622 F.2d 83, 86 (4th Cir. 1980)
(quoting United States v. Smith, 446 F.2d 200, 204 (4th Cir. 1971); United
States v. Weems, 398 F.2d 274, 275 (4th Cir. 1968)). Reyes warned,
however, that “[i]n settings involving prior sexual abuse with persons
other than the alleged victim, there is a substantial risk that ‘ “a jury will
convict for crimes other than those charged—or that, uncertain of guilt,
it will convict anyway because a bad person deserves punishment.” ’ ”
Reyes, 744 N.W.2d at 102 n.1 (quoting Old Chief, 519 U.S. at 181, 117 S.
Ct. at 650, 136 L. Ed. 2d at 588). Prior crimes against the same victim
are relevant to a legitimate issue because the later crimes “ ‘do not occur
single and independent—isolated from all others—but each is connected
with some antecedent fact,’ ” whereas acts against a different victim are
“not part of the principal transaction.” People v. Jones, 335 N.W.2d 465,
466–67 (Mich. 1983) (quoting People v. Jenness, 5 Mich. 305, 323–24,
1858 WL 2321, at *11 (1858)).
20
Unlike the federal courts that have considered this issue, we do
not believe evidence of prior bad acts can be admitted for the sole
purpose of showing general propensity even if a trial judge considers the
balancing test found in Iowa Code section 701.11. See, e.g., LeMay, 260
F.3d at 1026. Under the traditional balancing applied when evidence of
prior bad acts is admitted for a legitimate issue other than propensity,
the trial court must weigh the probative value of the evidence as it relates
to the legitimate issue, compared with the unfair prejudice that results
from evidence which may inevitably be considered as demonstrating
propensity. Under the federal courts’ rulings, a trial judge must balance
the probative value of general propensity evidence against the prejudicial
effect of general propensity evidence. Stated another way, that which
makes the evidence more probative—the similarity of the prior act to the
charged act—also makes it more prejudicial. As we explained in
Reynolds, where a prior bad act is “similar to the incident in question, ‘it
would be extremely difficult for jurors to put out of their minds
knowledge that the defendant had assaulted the victim in the past and
not allow this information to consciously or subconsciously influence
their decision.’ ” 765 N.W.2d at 292 (quoting State v. Henderson, 696
N.W.2d 5, 13 (Iowa 2005)).
Iowa Code section 701.11 violates the due process clause of the
Iowa Constitution as applied in this case because it permits admission of
prior bad acts against an individual other than the victim in the case to
demonstrate general propensity. See War Eagle Vill. Apartments v.
Plummer, 775 N.W.2d 714, 721–22 (Iowa 2009) (holding statute
unconstitutional both as applied based on the facts of the case and on its
face). As we previously held, however, the prosecution may
constitutionally introduce relevant history with the same victim under
21
section 701.11. Reyes, 744 N.W.2d at 103. Also, the prosecution may
introduce evidence of prior relevant sexual abuse against a different
victim where the evidence is used to demonstrate a legitimate issue.
C. Applicability to Cox. Here, the evidence of prior sexual abuse
was improperly admitted into evidence as propensity evidence. However,
we must decide whether it could be admitted for a “legitimate issue.” If a
legitimate issue can be identified, we then consider whether the evidence
is unfairly prejudicial compared with the probative value of the legitimate
issue. We address these issues because we do not reverse when evidence
was improperly admitted based on one particular reason if the evidence
could be admitted for other reasons on retrial. DeVoss v. State, 648
N.W.2d 56, 62 (Iowa 2002).
Before the trial court, the State suggested the evidence would be
admissible to show “proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation,
plan and some of the other purposes for which prior bad acts are
admissible.” Therefore, to determine whether these prior bad acts were
admissible, we must consider whether they were relevant to one of these
legitimate issues other than propensity.
1. Opportunity, preparation. Before the district court, the State
listed the exceptions found in rule 5.404(b) and “some other purposes for
which prior bad acts are admissible.” It does not appear that
opportunity and preparation were legitimate issues in this particular
case. The testimony of A.L. and T.C. does not establish opportunity or
preparation for the offense allegedly committed against J.M. because A.L.
and T.C. testified regarding separate incidents at separate times.
2. Common scheme or plan. The State argued to the trial court
that because the victims of the charged and uncharged conduct were all
cousins, and some of the abuse took place at the same location and stage
22
in their lives, it demonstrated a common scheme or plan. The State
argued that although this was not a “signature crime,” it shows a
“pattern of behavior.”
The test for a common scheme or plan is not simply a pattern of
prior bad acts. “Common scheme or plan means more than the
commission of two similar crimes by the same person.” State v. Wright,
191 N.W.2d 638, 641 (Iowa 1971). “Evidence of other crimes should
never be admitted when it appears the defendant committed them wholly
independent of the one for which he is then on trial.” Id. “There must be
some connection between the crimes.” Id; see also 1 McCormick on
Evidence § 190, at 755 (“Although some courts construe ‘common plan’
more broadly, each crime should be an integral part of an overarching
plan explicitly conceived and executed by the defendant or his
confederates.”); Brett v. Berkowitz, 706 A.2d 509, 516 (Del. 1998) (“Mere
repetition of sexual behavior is not evidence of a plan or scheme . . . .”)
In Cott, this court addressed whether sexual abuse of someone
other than the victim of the charged crime could be considered a
common scheme or system of criminal activity. The court rejected that
argument because “[t]he fact that defendant committed crimes of the
same nature against the two girls is insufficient to bring the testimony
within that exception.” Cott, 283 N.W.2d at 328. Such testimony did not
show that one crime “was ‘dependent upon or connected with’ the other,
nor would it ‘complete the story of the crime on trial by proving its
immediate context of happenings near in time and place.’ ” Id. (quoting
Wright, 191 N.W.2d at 641; State v. Wright, 203 N.W.2d 247, 251 (Iowa
1972)).
Here there has been no suggestion of a common scheme or plan
that would necessitate the admissibility of A.L.’s and T.C.’s testimony to
23
complete the story of the crime against J.M. The evidence demonstrates
Cox essentially committed crimes of availability against his cousins,
which demonstrates nothing more than propensity. J.M., T.C., and A.L.
all testified to a pattern of abuse they suffered as children and young
adults, but none of the incidents of abuse against T.C. or A.L. are alleged
to have occurred on the same day or connected to an incident of abuse
against J.M. None of the testimony by T.C. or A.L. was necessary to
“complete the story” of the crimes against J.M. or to provide the
“ ‘immediate context of happenings near in time and place.’ ” Id. (quoting
Wright, 203 N.W.2d at 251).
3. Modus operandi. Although the State stated before the district
court that the additional evidence was “not exactly, I guess, what we
would refer to as a signature crime,” we consider the modus operandi
exception. “Modus operandi is ‘ “a distinct pattern or method of
procedure thought to be characteristic of an individual criminal[] and
habitually followed by him.” ’ ” Plaster, 424 N.W.2d at 231 (quoting
Youngblood v. Sullivan, 628 P.2d 400, 402 (Or. Ct. App. 1981)). Modus
operandi is typically relevant as a subset of identity. Id. at 231 n.1
(“Modus operandi is usually used to establish identity.”); United States v.
Williams, 985 F.2d 634, 637 (1st Cir. 1993) (“Evidence of modus operandi
is admissible under Rule 404(b) to prove identity . . . .”)); Hurst v. State,
929 A.2d 157, 166 (Md. 2007) (“The modus operandi exception is a
subset of the identity exception under Rule 5-404(b).”).
We have also used modus operandi to admit evidence for the
legitimate issue of countering a defense of consent in a sexual assault
case. Plaster, 424 N.W.2d at 231. However, to expand modus operandi
to all similar crimes without requiring that they be offered to
demonstrate a legitimate issue would simply admit prior bad acts to
24
show propensity. See State v. Vorhees, 248 S.W.3d 585, 590–91 (Mo.
2008) (holding modus operandi is only appropriate to demonstrate
identity because modus operandi used to corroborate the victim is “at
base, propensity evidence masquerading under the well-recognized
identity exception”). When modus operandi is used to admit evidence of
prior bad acts as a subset of identity or to negate a defense of consent,
the evidence is relevant to a legitimate issue. When a defendant argues a
crime was committed by another person or when the victim is unable to
identify the defendant, a strikingly similar crime may be admitted to
demonstrate it was the defendant who committed the charged crime.
Here, identity was not at issue because J.M. was able to identify Cox,
and Cox did not raise a defense of mistaken identity. Further, consent
was not an available defense in this particular case, and Cox did not
allege the acts were consensual.
4. Motive, intent. There are numerous ways in which prior sexual
abuse of one other than the victim may become relevant to motive or
intent; however, there is no argument that they are present in this case.
For example, prior bad acts may be relevant to demonstrate motive or
intent when a defendant claims touching was accidental. Cf. State v.
Elston, 735 N.W.2d 196, 200 (Iowa 2007) (noting within the context of a
motion to sever that pornographic images of young females tended to
prove touching of victim was not accidental). Similarly, this court has
allowed evidence of prior bad acts when an individual is charged with
assault with intent to commit sexual abuse. In Casady, 491 N.W.2d at785–86, this court allowed admission of evidence showing the defendant
had previously pulled women into his car and sexually assaulted them in
order to demonstrate the defendant’s intent when he unsuccessfully tried
to pull a girl into his car. In Spargo, 364 N.W.2d at 209, this court
25
admitted evidence of the defendant’s previous sexual activities with
adolescents to support a charge of assault with intent to commit sexual
abuse. Here, however, the State was not required to prove specific
intent, only that the alleged sexual conduct occurred with J.M. See
Lamphere v. State, 348 N.W.2d 212, 217 (Iowa 1984) (“Second-degree
sexual abuse . . . is not a specific intent crime . . . .”); State v. Tague, 310
N.W.2d 209, 211 (Iowa 1981) (rejecting defendant’s argument that intent
is an element of sexual abuse in the third degree); compare Iowa Code
§ 709.8 (elements of lascivious acts with a child include that such acts
were committed or permitted “for the purpose of arousing or satisfying
the sexual desires of either of [the offender or the child]”). The State has
not demonstrated any way in which motive or intent would be supported
by the prior bad acts evidence.
D. Harmless Error. Because we hold the testimony of A.L. and
T.C. was improperly admitted at trial, we consider whether the error was
harmless. To establish harmless error when a defendant’s constitutional
rights have been violated, the State must prove beyond a reasonable
doubt that the error complained of did not contribute to the verdict
obtained. State v. Walls, 761 N.W.2d 683, 686 (Iowa 2009). Cox was
prosecuted for incidents of vaginal rape against J.M. occurring between
January 1, 2003, and October 31, 2005. T.C. testified to two separate
acts of fondling by Cox. A.L. testified to at least five instances of prior
sexual abuse by Cox, including forced oral sex and anal rape. The large
number and variety of prior sex abuse admitted into evidence leads us to
conclude that their admission was not harmless error. Therefore, we
reverse Cox’s conviction and remand for retrial.
Although it does not appear the testimony of A.L. and T.C. was
relevant to any “legitimate issue” and therefore was not appropriately
26
admitted, we express no opinion regarding whether the evidence may
become relevant to a legitimate issue and be admissible on retrial. In
Mitchell I, this court held that evidence of prior sex abuse of individuals
other than the victim of the charged crime could not be admitted under
the theory that it bolstered the witness’ credibility or a lewd disposition
exception. Mitchell I, 633 N.W.2d at 299. However, after retrial, this
court held evidence of prior sex abuse of other individuals was properly
admitted in response to a specific defense theory. See Mitchell II, 670
N.W.2d at 421–22. Based on the record before this court, we hold the
testimony of A.L. and T.C. was not relevant to the legitimate issues
identified in rule 5.404(b); however, we do not opine on whether that may
change as the case proceeds on retrial.
IV. Conclusion.
Admitting evidence of a defendant’s sexual abuse of other victims
under Iowa Code section 701.11 based only on its value as general
propensity evidence violates the due process clause of the Iowa
Constitution. Therefore, it was improper for individuals other than the
victim J.M. to testify regarding prior acts of sexual abuse where there
was no legitimate issue other than propensity to which they were
relevant.
JUDGMENT REVERSED AND CASE REMANDED.
All justices concur except Baker, J., who takes no part.