State Of Iowa Vs. Kyle Lynn Stone ( 2009 )

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF IOWA
No. 07–1237
Filed April 17, 2009
STATE OF IOWA,
Appellee,
vs.
KYLE LYNN STONE,
Appellant.
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Black Hawk County,
Joseph Moothart, District Associate Judge.
A defendant appeals his conviction for driving while his license was
denied or revoked for an OWI test refusal. AFFIRMED.
Jerald W. Kinnamon and J. Dean Keegan, Cedar Rapids, for
appellant.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Sharon K. Hall, Assistant
Attorney General, Thomas J. Ferguson, County Attorney, and Brian J.
Williams, Assistant County Attorney, for appellee.
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WIGGINS, Justice.
We must decide whether the State can prosecute a driver for
driving while his license was denied or revoked if the Iowa Department of
Transportation (DOT) subsequently rescinds the revocation. Because the
rescission of the revocation does not change the fact the driver’s license
was revoked at the time of the police stop, the State can proceed with the
prosecution. We also hold, under these circumstances, the introduction
of a certified driving record that displayed the subsequent rescission of
the revocation is not relevant to the prosecution and the district court
was correct in ruling the record inadmissible.
I. Background Facts and Proceedings.
A police officer stopped Kyle Lynn Stone on September 14, 2006, in
Waterloo. Officer Newell pulled Stone over for an expired registration tag
on his truck’s license plate. The officer noted the truck was wet on a
night without precipitation and there was a McDonald’s bag with warm
food in the truck. The officer asked Stone for identification and then
checked the status of his driver’s license. That check showed the DOT
had revoked Stone’s license from March 2006 until March 2007 for an
operating-while-intoxicated (OWI) test refusal. The check also revealed
Stone had a temporary work permit. The officer asked for the work
permit, but Stone did not produce the permit or any other
documentation. Stone told the officer that he worked for A-Line Metals
and was on his way home. The stop took place around 7:00 p.m. The
officer placed Stone under arrest explaining that a work permit does not
authorize someone to wash a vehicle or go to McDonald’s.
At the time of the stop in question, Stone had insurance, had an
ignition interlock system in his truck, and had a restricted temporary
work permit. On September 26, the county attorney filed a trial
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information charging Stone with driving while his license was denied or
revoked for an OWI test refusal in violation of Iowa Code section 321J.21.
On October 6, Stone filed a written arraignment and a plea of not guilty
to the charge.
After the written arraignment, on December 8, the DOT sent Stone
notice that it had rescinded his March 2006 revocation. This notice
stated, “The withdrawal of your Iowa motor vehicle privileges due to OWI
test refusal has been rescinded and removed from your record. You are
eligible to operate motor vehicles in Iowa.”
Stone filed a motion in limine asking for the exclusion of any
reference to the driver’s license information that was not contained in the
current certified driving record, claiming that noncurrent information
would not be relevant. Stone also wanted to eliminate any reference to
suspensions or revocations that the DOT had rescinded and removed
from his driving record. In addition, Stone asked to redact or remove
from his certified driving record any reference to revocations that were
rescinded or to his disqualification for a license based on an OWI test
refusal. Finally, Stone requested a jury instruction stating the State had
to prove all elements including this statement: “The revocation of Kyle
Stone’s driver’s license was not subsequently rescinded.”
The State filed its own motion in limine asking the court to prohibit
Stone from referencing the rescission of the revocation of his license that
occurred after September 15, 2006. The State claimed any reference to
the rescission would be irrelevant and confusing to the jury.
The district court ruled Stone was precluded from presenting
evidence of the rescission of the revocation because it was not relevant
and would be confusing. In so doing, the court acknowledged it was
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overruling the defendant’s motion in limine and granting the State’s
motion in limine.
At trial, a driver’s license supervisor from the DOT made an offer of
proof. In the offer of proof, the supervisor testified that a certified driving
record is the official record, and contains personal information,
convictions, arrest dates, revocations, disqualifications, cancellations,
and suspensions. She stated that she believed rescind meant “it’s like it
never happened on the driving record so it’s no longer there.” She
testified the certified driving record the defense provided displayed all
suspensions and revocations for Kyle Stone, but this record did not
include the March 2006 through March 2007 revocation. She testified
that logistically, the rescinded revocation stays in the applicant’s folder,
but it does not “count for . . . a second or subsequent” offense. She also
stated that a certified driving record would be “the most current” and the
most accurate portrayal of Stone’s driving record “[a]t this time.” After
hearing the offer of proof, the court refused to change its prior ruling on
the motions in limine.
At trial, the State presented evidence of Stone’s driving record that
displayed the revocation for an OWI test refusal, but did not display the
later rescission of the revocation. A jury found Stone guilty of driving
while his license was denied or revoked in violation of Iowa Code section
321J.21. Stone appeals the conviction.
II. Issues.
Stone raises two issues on appeal: first, whether the rescission of
his revocation precludes the State from prosecuting him for driving while
his license was denied or revoked for an OWI test refusal in violation of
Iowa Code section 321J.21; and second, whether the court erred in not
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admitting Stone’s driving record that showed his license was not revoked
on September 14, 2006.
III. Scope of Review.
This court reviews standard claims of error in admission of
evidence for an abuse of discretion. State v. Boggs, 741 N.W.2d 492, 499
(Iowa 2007). However, when the admission turns on the interpretation of
a statute, this court reviews the district court decision for errors at law.
Id.
IV. Analysis.
The State charged Stone with violating section 321J.21 of the
Code. It provides in relevant part that
[a] person whose driver’s license or nonresident operating
privilege has been suspended, denied, revoked, or barred
due to a violation of this chapter and who drives a motor
vehicle while the license or privilege is suspended, denied,
revoked, or barred commits a serious misdemeanor.
Iowa Code § 321J.21(1) (2005). To prove Stone’s guilt, the State must
prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant’s license had been
revoked, and the defendant operated a motor vehicle while his license
was revoked. State v. Thompson, 357 N.W.2d 591, 594 (Iowa 1984).1
Both parties acknowledge that a violation of section 321J.21 is a status
offense.
Stone claims the State could not charge him under section
321J.21 because the DOT rescinded his license revocation. He argues
that when the DOT rescinds a revocation, the rescission applies
1This court has already acknowledged, “an individual violates section 321J.21
whenever a motor vehicle is operated outside the scope of a temporary restricted
license.” State v. Schmidt, 480 N.W.2d 886, 887 (Iowa 1992). Thus, Stone’s temporary
work permit does not alter his status as a “revokee” since he was driving outside the
scope of that permit, a finding he does not dispute on appeal.
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retroactively. In other words, a rescission of a revocation means the
revocation never existed.
The DOT rescinded Stone’s revocation pursuant to section
321J.13(6). It provides:
a. The department shall grant a request
for a hearing to rescind the revocation if the
person whose motor vehicle license or operating
privilege has been or is being revoked under
section 321J.9 or 321J.12 submits a petition
containing information relating to the discovery
of new evidence that provides grounds for
rescission of the revocation.
b. The person shall prevail at the hearing
if, in the criminal action on the charge of
violation of section 321J.2 or 321J.2A resulting
from the same circumstances that resulted in
the administrative revocation being challenged,
the court held one of the following:
(1) That the peace officer did not have
reasonable grounds to believe that a violation of
section 321J.2 or 321J.2A had occurred to
support a request for or to administer a
chemical test.
(2) That the chemical test was otherwise
inadmissible or invalid.
c. Such a holding by the court in the
criminal action is binding on the department,
and the department shall rescind the revocation.
Iowa Code § 321J.13(6). Thus, the success of Stone’s argument depends
on the meaning of “rescind the revocation” contained in section
321J.13(6)(c).
The Code does not define “rescind” in relation to the rescission of a
license revocation. Therefore, to determine whether the rescission
applies retroactively, the court must interpret the statute. The purpose
of statutory construction is to determine legislative intent. Auen v.
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Alcoholic Beverages Div., 679 N.W.2d 586, 590 (Iowa 2004). We
determine the legislature’s intent by the words chosen, not by what it
should or might have said. State v. Wiederien, 709 N.W.2d 538, 541
(Iowa 2006). Absent a statutory definition or an established meaning in
law, the court gives words their ordinary and common meaning by
considering the context in which the legislature used the word. City of
Des Moines v. Employment Appeal Bd., 722 N.W.2d 183, 196 (Iowa 2006).
Black’s Law Dictionary defines rescind as: “[t]o abrogate or cancel
(a contract) unilaterally or by agreement” or “[t]o make void; to repeal or
annul.” Black’s Law Dictionary 1332 (8th ed. 2004). The dictionary
defines rescind as to do away with, to take away, remove, take back,
annul, cancel, “to abrogate (a contract) by tendering back or restoring to
the opposite party what one has received from him,” and “to vacate or
make void (as an act) by the enacting or a superior authority; repeal.”
Webster’s Third New International Dictionary 1930 (unabr. ed. 2002).
None of these definitions in a noncontractual setting indicates the word
“rescind” means to retroactively undo all the effects of the initial action
that was later rescinded.
Stone argues the contractual definition is controlling and that once
the DOT rescinded his revocation, it put him in the position as if the
revocation never took place. Stone’s reliance is misplaced.
Rescission, as used in the contractual sense, is an equitable
remedy devised by the law. See Potter v. Oster, 426 N.W.2d 148, 151
(Iowa 1988) (stating “[r]escission is a restitutionary remedy which
attempts to restore the parties to their positions at the time the contract
was executed”). The remedy of rescission does not assume the events
occurring prior to the remedy did not occur. Barlow v. Comm’r of Pub.
Safety, 365 N.W.2d 232, 233 (Minn. 1985).
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A situation more analogous to Stone’s is the legislature’s repeal of
an existing statute. Even though the legislature repeals a law, the repeal
of a law does not “affect any right which has accrued, any duty imposed,
any penalty incurred, or any proceeding commenced, under or by virtue
of the statute repealed.” Iowa Code § 4.1(26).
Prior to the DOT’s rescission of Stone’s revocation, Stone had
notice his driving privileges were revoked, and he knew he could only
drive in situations allowed by his temporary work permit. The only fact
relevant to Stone’s prosecution was the status of his license on
September 14, 2006. The DOT’s rescission of Stone’s revocation did not
change the fact that on September 14, when he was stopped, Stone’s
license was revoked and he was driving his vehicle in a manner not
permitted by his temporary work permit. Consequently, the DOT’s
rescission of Stone’s revocation does not prevent the State from
prosecuting Stone for driving while his license was denied or revoked for
an OWI test refusal.
On appeal, Stone also raises a due process argument under the
state and federal constitutions. In his brief, he cites two Supreme Court
cases dealing with the substantive due process rights of prisoners. In
the district court, Stone’s attorney attempted to raise the due process
issue in the following exchange with the district court:
But for our first three numbered paragraphs in the
Motion in Limine, we would ask that the Court prohibit any
reference at trial to any alleged sanction which is not
contained in the current certified driving record of the Iowa
Department of Transportation and which has been rescinded
by the Iowa Department of Transportation. We would allege
that failure to do so would be contrary to the Sixth and
Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution
and Article 1, Section 8, 9, and 10 of the constitution of the
State of Iowa. And we would also rely on those
Constitutional protections in our motion.
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Thank you.
THE COURT: Okay. What specific Constitutional
protections are you referring to?
MR. KEEGAN: Due process and fair trial.
His attorney did not make any legal arguments or cite any
authority for his position. It is unclear from the record made whether he
was making a substantive or procedural due process argument. By not
specifying the nature of his constitutional claims in the district court,
Stone has failed to preserve error on his constitutional claims. State v.
Hernandez-Lopez, 639 N.W.2d 226, 234 (Iowa 2002) (stating the party
must alert the court to the specific constitutional provisions at issue and
must explain the alleged violations of the provisions). We will not
consider issues, even constitutional issues, which a party did not
properly raise in the district court. State v. Mitchell, 757 N.W.2d 431,
435 (Iowa 2008).
The last issue Stone raises on appeal is the court’s failure to allow
him to introduce his certified driving record, as it existed after the DOT
rescinded the revocation, which showed his license was not revoked on
September 14, 2006. The State brought a record custodian from the
DOT to testify as to the status of Stone’s driving privileges on
September 14. After laying the proper foundation, the custodian testified
the DOT’s records revealed on September 14 Stone’s driving license was
revoked subject to a temporary work permit. We agree with the district
court that the certified driving record showing the DOT had not revoked
Stone’s license on September 14 was inadmissible.
Our rules of evidence define relevant evidence as “evidence having
any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to
the determination of the action more probable or less probable than it
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would be without the evidence.” Iowa R. Evid. 5.401. As we previously
held in this opinion, the status of Stone’s driving privileges on
September 14 is the only relevant fact the State needs to prove to convict
Stone of driving while his license was denied or revoked for an OWI test
refusal. The fact the DOT later rescinded his revocation is irrelevant to
any issue in this prosecution. Therefore, the court was correct when it
did not allow Stone to introduce his certified driving record, as it existed
after the DOT rescission.
V. Disposition.
We hold the DOT’s rescission of its revocation of Stone’s driver’s
license after the date he was charged with driving while his license was
denied or revoked for an OWI test refusal does not preclude the State
from pursuing the charge. We also hold Stone failed to preserve any
constitutional claim on appeal, and the district court did not err in
refusing to admit Stone’s certified driving record that did not show his
revocation. We affirm the judgment of the district court.
AFFIRMED.