United States v. Lorenza Jackson , 663 F. App'x 426 ( 2016 )


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  •             NOT RECOMMENDED FOR FULL-TEXT PUBLICATION
    File Name: 16a0569n.06
    No. 15-5453
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,                        )                FILED
    )            Oct 13, 2016
    DEBORAH S. HUNT, Clerk
    Plaintiff-Appellee,                        )
    )
    v.                                               )    On Appeal from the United States
    )    District Court for the Eastern
    LORENZA JACKSON, aka Lorenzo                     )    District of Tennessee
    Jackson,                                         )
    )
    Defendant-Appellant.                       )
    )
    _________________________________/
    Before: GUY, BOGGS, and GRIFFIN, Circuit Judges.
    RALPH B. GUY, JR., Circuit Judge. Defendant, Lorenza Jackson, appeals the
    district court’s order denying his motion to suppress evidence and its sua sponte
    admission of co-conspirator hearsay testimony. We affirm.
    I.
    Officer Robert Cook witnessed defendant traveling as a passenger without a
    seatbelt. Cook ran the car’s license plate and found that its owner, Katie Miller, had an
    outstanding felony arrest warrant. Cook pulled Miller over and arrested her. He asked if
    she had any contraband, warning that “once she got out to the jail . . . it was a felony.”
    Case No. 15-5453                                                                            2
    United States v. Jackson
    She replied that defendant stuffed something down her pants. Cook asked Miller what
    defendant stuffed down her pants, and she told him heroin.
    While waiting for a female officer to arrive and search Miller, Cook asked
    defendant for his name, date of birth, and Social Security Number. Defendant said he
    had no identification, gave a false name, and “fumbled twice” over his SSN. Defendant
    continued to search around the car despite claiming he had no ID. Cook asked defendant
    to step out of the car and performed a pat down. Cook felt what he identified, based on
    its plain feel, to be a substantial amount of cash in defendant’s pocket. Cook handcuffed
    defendant and temporarily detained him in an officer’s car. Another officer found almost
    50 grams of heroin, some packaged in capsules, on Miller. A drug dog alerted on
    Miller’s car, where officers found scales, baggies, and empty capsules matching those
    found on Miller. Cook searched defendant incident to arrest and found nearly $4,000.
    Miller admitted she was driving defendant around to sell heroin as she had done
    for the past month. She also stated that defendant and his brother, Christopher, stashed
    heroin and considerable cash at an apartment the brothers shared. A search of the home
    and an associated storage unit unearthed over $8,000 and around 280 grams of heroin.
    Officers arrested Cristopher, who pleaded guilty and agreed to testify against defendant.
    A grand jury charged defendant with conspiring to distribute at least one kilogram
    of heroin, 
    21 U.S.C. §§ 846
    , 841(a)(1), 841(b)(1)(A), and possession with intent to
    distribute heroin, 
    21 U.S.C. § 841
    (b)(1)(C). Defendant moved to suppress the cash
    officers seized from his person, arguing that Cook lacked reasonable suspicion to conduct
    Case No. 15-5453                                                                         3
    United States v. Jackson
    a pat down and that the cash was not obviously contraband. The district court denied the
    motion.
    At trial, the government presented the testimony of Miller, Christopher, and
    various officers. Miller testified as to events on the day of defendant’s arrest, while
    Christopher discussed the scope of the conspiracy. Defendant raised no objection to the
    co-conspirator witnesses or their testimony. However, the district court sua sponte stated
    that the government had presented “some evidence of statements that otherwise would
    have been considered to be offered under Rule 801(d)(2)(E) of the Federal Rules of
    Evidence,” and found the government had demonstrated by a preponderance of the
    evidence that a conspiracy existed, defendant was a member of the conspiracy, and the
    statements at issue were made by his co-conspirators in furtherance of the conspiracy.
    Defendant again did not object. The jury found defendant guilty.
    Defendant appeals the district court’s denial of his motion to suppress and asserts
    error in its admission of his co-conspirators’ testimony and Cook’s hearsay testimony.
    II.
    In assessing the district court’s denial of a motion to suppress, we review factual
    findings for clear error and conclusions of law de novo. United States v. Quinney,
    
    583 F.3d 891
    , 893 (6th Cir. 2009). We may uphold the denial on any basis supported by
    the record. United States v. Higgins, 
    557 F.3d 381
    , 389 (6th Cir. 2009).
    Because defendant did not object to the admission of co-conspirator testimony or
    Cook’s alleged hearsay, we review the district court’s admission of such testimony for
    Case No. 15-5453                                                                              4
    United States v. Jackson
    plain error affecting defendant’s substantial rights.      FED. R. CRIM. P. 52(b); accord
    United States v. McConer, 
    530 F.3d 484
    , 500 (6th Cir. 2008). We may exercise our
    “discretion to notice [such] error . . . only if . . . the error seriously affects the fairness,
    integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings.”         Johnson v. United States,
    
    520 U.S. 461
    , 467 (1997) (quotations omitted).
    III.
    a. Motion to Suppress
    An officer may frisk a passenger if the officer has “reasonable suspicion that the
    person subjected to the frisk is armed and dangerous.” Arizona v. Johnson, 
    555 U.S. 323
    ,
    327 (2009). Though officers must have a “particularized and objective basis” for such
    suspicion, United States v. Cortez, 
    449 U.S. 411
    , 417 (1981), they “need not be
    absolutely certain that the individual is armed,” Terry v. Ohio, 
    392 U.S. 1
    , 27 (1968). We
    consider “the totality of the circumstances” in evaluating the reasonableness of an
    officer’s suspicion, Cortez, 
    449 U.S. at 417
    , giving due weight to inferences the officer
    draws in light of their “own experience and specialized training,” United States v. Arvizu,
    
    534 U.S. 266
    , 273 (2002).
    Cook cited five factors he relied on to frisk defendant: (1) Miller’s statement that
    defendant put heroin in her pants; (2) defendant’s extreme nervousness; (3) defendant’s
    use of a false name and hesitancy in giving his SSN; (4) defendant’s unnecessary
    movements searching the car after claiming he had no ID; and (5) Cook’s experience that
    where there are drugs, there are often firearms.
    Case No. 15-5453                                                                          5
    United States v. Jackson
    Defendant challenges Cook’s reliance on Miller’s statement, arguing that it was
    unreliable and self-serving. An officer may base reasonable suspicion on eyewitness
    information if it has sufficient indicia of reliability. Navarette v. California, 
    134 S. Ct. 1683
    , 1688 (2014). Although the government contends Miller’s information was credible
    because it implicated her association with drug trafficking, see United States v. Harris,
    
    403 U.S. 573
    , 583 (1971) (“Admissions of crime . . . carry their own indicia of credibility
    . . . .”), it was also self-serving, deflecting possession and control onto defendant, see
    Wesley v. Campbell, 
    779 F.3d 421
    , 430 (6th Cir. 2015) (“[T]he presumption of veracity
    applies only where the witness is someone with respect to whom there is no apparent
    reason to question the person’s reliability.” (quotation omitted)).      Cook’s preceding
    warning that Miller could face felony charges for any contraband found at the jail also
    hampered the reliability of her accusation.
    Whatever the value of Miller’s accusation in isolation, the totality of the
    circumstances supported Cook’s reasonable suspicion that defendant may have possessed
    a firearm. Although nervousness is often inherent in traffic stops and thus alone an
    unreliable indicator of one’s dangerousness, defendant appeared “real nervous.”
    Compare United States v. Noble, 
    762 F.3d 509
    , 523 (6th Cir. 2014) (“Officer Ray did not
    testify that Noble became noticeably more nervous as the stop progressed.”), with United
    States v. Branch, 
    537 F.3d 582
    , 589 (6th Cir. 2008) (reasonable suspicion where suspects
    “exhibit[ed] extraordinary nervousness that increased as the traffic stop progressed”).
    Case No. 15-5453                                                                       6
    United States v. Jackson
    Moreover, defendant provided Cook with a false name and twice stumbled over
    his SSN, by which Cook could discover his real name. See United States v. Moore, 130
    F. App’x 728, 734 (6th Cir. 2005) (suspect’s provision of false name, among other facts,
    created reasonable suspicion).       Although Cook did not characterize defendant’s
    movements within the car as furtive, officers “must ensure that a suspect’s arms and
    hands do not pose a safety risk,” United States v. Tillman, 543 F. App’x 557, 561 (6th
    Cir. 2013), and “arm movements or the sound of an item being moved” may indicate “an
    attempt to conceal contraband or to reach for a weapon,” United States v. Caruthers,
    
    458 F.3d 459
    , 467 (6th Cir. 2006).
    Lastly, Cook could draw from his experience and training to infer that Miller’s
    alleged possession of drugs created a reasonable likelihood of the presence of a firearm.
    This court has repeatedly held that “officers who stop a person who is ‘reasonably
    suspected of carrying drugs’ are ‘entitled to rely on their experience and training in
    concluding that weapons are frequently used in drug transactions,’ and to take reasonable
    measures to protect themselves.” United States v. Jacob, 
    377 F.3d 573
    , 579 (6th Cir.
    2004) (quoting United States v. Heath, 
    259 F.3d 522
    , 530 (6th Cir. 2001)). The totality
    of the circumstances, including the alleged presence of heroin, gave Cook reasonable
    suspicion that defendant might be armed. Cook’s pat down was therefore justified, and
    the district court rightly dismissed defendant’s motion to suppress the cash thereby
    discovered.
    Case No. 15-5453                                                                          7
    United States v. Jackson
    b. Co-conspirator Hearsay Testimony
    As the district court found, Miller and Christopher’s testimony as to out-of-court
    conspiratorial statements was not hearsay per FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(2)(E) (co-conspirator
    statements made during and in furtherance of conspiracy are not hearsay). See United
    States v. Wilson, 
    168 F.3d 916
    , 920 (6th Cir. 1999) (statements admissible where
    preponderance of the evidence shows a conspiracy existed, defendant was a party thereto,
    and co-conspirators’ statements were made in furtherance thereof). Cook’s testimony on
    Miller’s statements during her arrest was not hearsay under Rule 801(c)(2), as her
    statement that defendant stuffed heroin down her pants was not used to prove the
    accusation, but to explain why Cook patted defendant down. See Biegas v. Quickway
    Carriers, Inc., 
    573 F.3d 365
    , 379 (6th Cir. 2009) (statements offered to show “effect on
    the listener” not hearsay). Even if these statements were hearsay, they were harmless in
    light of Miller’s corroborative testimony. See United States v. Canon, 141 F. App’x 398,
    403 (6th Cir. 2005) (declarant’s “testimony at trial was sufficient to cure any error in the
    admission of the out-of-court statements”).
    AFFIRMED.