In re Daniel B. , 231 Cal. App. 4th 663 ( 2014 )


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  • Filed 10/22/14 Modified and Certified for Publication 11/17/14 (order attached)
    IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
    SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
    DIVISION SEVEN
    In re Daniel B. et al., Persons Coming Under                      B254274
    the Juvenile Court Law.
    (Los Angeles County
    Super. Ct. No. DK00453)
    LOS ANGELES COUNTY DEPARTMENT
    OF CHILDREN AND FAMILY SERVICES,
    Plaintiff and Respondent,
    v.
    ANGELA B.,
    Defendant and Appellant.
    APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, Sherri
    Sobel, Juvenile Court Referee. Reversed in part and remanded.
    Debra Dentler, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and
    Appellant.
    John F. Krattli, County Counsel, Dawyn R. Harrison, Assistant County Counsel,
    and Sarah Vesecky, Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent Los Angeles
    County Department of Children and Family Services.
    _______________________
    Appellant Angela B. (Mother) appeals from the juvenile court’s disposition order
    declaring two of her children dependents of the court pursuant to Welfare and Institutions
    Code1 section 300, subdivisions (a), (b), and (j), removing them from the custody of their
    father, and releasing them to Mother with family maintenance services. Mother contends
    that the juvenile court erred in ordering her to participate in a domestic violence support
    group for an open-ended period, and in delegating to the program’s counselors the
    authority to decide how long she would be required to attend the program. For the
    reasons set forth below, we reverse this portion of the disposition order and remand the
    matter to the juvenile court to conduct further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
    FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
    I.     Initiation of the Dependency Proceedings
    Mother and Daniel B. Sr. (Father) are the married parents of two young
    children―Daniel B. Jr. (Daniel) (born June 2012) and Damian B. (born October 2013).2
    Mother also has an older son, Andrew A. Jr. (born May 2003), from a prior relationship.
    Mother and the children lived with Father in a small two-bedroom home, which was
    located on a property owned by the paternal grandparents. This matter came to the
    attention of the Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS) in August 2013
    following a report of domestic violence in the family’s home.
    On August 9, 2013, emergency response personnel were called to the home after
    Father stabbed Mother in her left shoulder with a knife. At the time, Mother was 29-
    weeks pregnant with Damian. When officers arrived on the scene, they observed that the
    master bedroom and the kitchen were in disarray with broken furniture and other broken
    items lying on the floor. Mother was crying and bleeding from her shoulder. After being
    transported to the hospital for treatment, Mother was interviewed by the police. She told
    the officers that, earlier in the evening, she and Father were arguing about his past and
    1      All further statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code.
    2      Father is not a party to this appeal.
    2
    present drug use. Father became angry and pushed Mother against the bedroom
    furniture. Father then grabbed one-year-old Daniel and attempted to leave the home
    with him. Mother believed that Father was under the influence of methamphetamine,
    and fearing that he might hurt Daniel, she took the baby from him. In response, Father
    grabbed a kitchen knife, broke off the tip of the knife on the countertop, and stabbed
    Mother once in her left shoulder as she was holding Daniel. Father then fled the home.
    The police also interviewed two adult relatives who had witnessed the altercation. They
    similarly reported that Mother and Father were arguing in the kitchen when Father
    grabbed a knife and stabbed Mother in her left shoulder as she was holding Daniel. The
    following day, accompanied by Mother and the maternal grandparents, Father turned
    himself in at the local police station and was taken into custody.
    On August 11, 2013, the DCFS interviewed the family about the incident. Mother
    reported that she and Father had been married for four years, and over the course of their
    relationship, Father had pushed her several times during verbal altercations. Mother
    stated that Father would place his open hands against her chest and push her when he
    became angry, and that on several occasions, he caused her to fall back onto the bed. She
    denied that there had been any other forms of domestic violence prior to the August 9,
    2013 incident. Mother stated that, on that occasion, Father began arguing with her and
    accusing her of infidelity in a loud voice. The paternal grandparents and other relatives
    who lived next door overheard the argument and came to the home to try to calm Father.
    Mother and Father continued arguing in their bedroom as she held Daniel in her arms.
    They then moved into the kitchen and a family member took Daniel from her. While
    arguing in the kitchen, Father grabbed a knife from the counter and stabbed Mother on
    her left shoulder blade. She denied that she was holding Daniel when Father stabbed her.
    She also denied any personal history of drug use, but stated that she suspected Father was
    using drugs based on his behavior. Mother expressed that she was willing to cooperate
    with the DCFS to ensure the safety and well-being of her children, and would not allow
    Father back in the home if he were released from custody.
    3
    In his interview with the DCFS, Father denied any history of domestic violence
    with Mother, including any prior incidents of pushing her. Father stated that the first
    time he assaulted Mother was on August 9, 2013, when he stabbed her on her shoulder
    during a verbal altercation. According to Father, he and Mother had been arguing about
    his belief that Mother was ignoring him and wanted to leave him. Family members who
    heard the argument soon arrived at the home. Mother was holding Daniel while she and
    Father argued in the bedroom, but she handed him to a family member as the argument
    continued into the kitchen. At that point, Father grabbed a knife from the kitchen
    counter and stabbed Mother on her left shoulder. He then left the home, but later talked
    to Mother and agreed to turn himself in to the authorities. Father admitted that he had a
    13-year history of using crystal methamphetamine, and that he last used the drug on
    August 5, 2013 when he was outside the home. Father denied ever using drugs in the
    home or in the presence of the children. Father indicated that he was willing to comply
    with the DCFS in an effort to reunite with his family.
    The case social worker also interviewed 10-year-old Andrew, who confirmed that
    he was present in the home during the domestic violence incident. Andrew recounted
    that he and Daniel were in their bedroom with paternal relatives while Mother and Father
    were arguing in the master bedroom and then in the kitchen. He later observed that
    Mother was in pain, but he did not see how she was injured. Andrew denied ever
    witnessing Mother and Father engage in any physical altercations. He stated that he was
    not fearful of either parent, and he wanted to remain living with Mother, but he did not
    know if he wanted Father to return home at that time. The case social worker observed
    that both Andrew and Daniel were clean, dressed appropriately, and appeared to be in
    good physical health with no signs of neglect or physical abuse.
    In addition to these interviews, the DCFS spoke with three paternal relatives who
    were present in the home during the altercation. They similarly reported that Mother and
    Father argued in the master bedroom and kitchen while Andrew and Daniel stayed in
    their room with other family members. They also stated that, after the argument moved
    into the kitchen, Father stabbed Mother on her shoulder with a knife and then fled the
    4
    home. Each of these relatives denied knowledge of any drug use by the parents or prior
    incidents of domestic violence between them. The DCFS also spoke with two maternal
    relatives who stated that they were unaware of any domestic violence or drug use in the
    home, and had no concerns about the care of the children.
    II.    Section 300 Petition on Behalf of Andrew and Daniel
    On August 14, 2013, the DCFS filed a dependency petition on behalf of Andrew
    and Daniel under section 300, subdivisions (a) and (b). The petition alleged that Father
    and Mother had a history of engaging in violent altercations in the children’s presence,
    including the August 9, 2013 stabbing incident, and that Mother had failed to protect the
    children by allowing Father to reside in the home and have unlimited access to them. It
    also alleged that Father had a history of illicit drug use and was a current user of
    methamphetamine, and that he had been under the influence of the drug on prior
    occasions while Daniel was under his care and supervision.
    At the August 14, 2013 detention hearing, the juvenile court ordered that Daniel
    be detained from Father and that both Andrew and Daniel remain released to Mother
    under the supervision of the DCFS. The court granted Father monitored visitation with
    Daniel a minimum of three times a week. The matter was set for a contested jurisdiction
    and disposition hearing.
    III.   October 16, 2013 Jurisdiction/Disposition Report
    In its October 16, 2013 Jurisdiction/Disposition Report, the DCFS stated that the
    children remained in the care of Mother. Father had been released from jail, but was
    currently homeless and residing in his car due to a criminal restraining order issued
    against him. In preparing the report, the dependency investigator conducted individual
    interviews with the family about the allegations in the section 300 petition.
    In his interview, Father maintained that the stabbing on August 9, 2013 was the
    first time that he and Mother had engaged in a physical altercation. Father explained that
    he and Mother used to argue a lot about money because he was unemployed and had to
    stay home with the children while Mother worked. Mother controlled the money and
    5
    would tell Father that he was “worth nothing.” They also argued because Father felt that
    Mother did not pay attention to him. He dealt with the stress of the situation by using
    drugs, and he last used methamphetamine four days before the stabbing. On the day of
    the stabbing, Father was upset because he believed Mother was going to leave him and
    take Daniel with her. He admitted that he stabbed Mother during an argument, but
    insisted it was an accident. Father also disclosed that he had been using drugs since he
    was 18 years old and had used cocaine, rock cocaine, and crystal methamphetamine. He
    stopped using drugs for several years, but then relapsed after Daniel’s birth. Father told
    the dependency investigator, “I can’t say that I wasn’t using drugs while I was taking care
    of my kids, but it doesn’t mean I couldn’t take care of my kids. I was never that high. I
    was still paying attention to them.” Father stated that he wanted the best for his children
    and was willing to do whatever was necessary to get back his family.
    Mother told the dependency investigator, “The domestic violence was usually in
    the form of us arguing, but when I would ignore him is when he would push me. We
    would argue when the kids were sleeping.” Mother recounted that, on the day of the
    stabbing, she told Father that she wanted to leave him and began packing her belongings.
    The confrontation escalated when Mother said that she was taking Daniel with her and
    Father tried to block her from leaving. Mother continued to report that a family member
    took Daniel from her arms before the stabbing. She also said that, when she saw Father
    holding a knife, her only concern was for the children. As Mother described, “My first
    reaction was okay, you are not going to get to the kids. I thought he was going to try to
    take the baby. All I could think was that he was going to have to go through me before
    getting to the baby or Andrew. That is when I got in front of him. I wasn’t thinking
    about me at all. He stabbed me on my left shoulder and took off running.” Mother
    maintained that she did not know Father had a history of drug abuse until a few years
    after they were married. She also stated that she assumed Father was on drugs the day of
    the stabbing based on his behavior, but she had no reason to suspect he had begun using
    drugs again until that day. Both Mother and Father conveyed that they believed they
    could benefit from marriage and family counseling.
    6
    In his interview, Andrew repeated his prior statement that he and Daniel were in
    their bedroom with other family members during the incident. Andrew said that he came
    out of the bedroom when he heard Mother scream, and that he saw Father leaving the
    home and Mother lying on her bed with an injury. Andrew had not had any contact
    with Father since that day, and denied any knowledge of drug use in the home. The
    dependency investigator also spoke with Andrew’s father, who usually saw his son on the
    weekends under an informal custody arrangement with Mother. Andrew’s father was not
    aware of any prior incidents of domestic violence between Mother and Father, and never
    suspected that Father was using drugs.
    The DCFS recommended that the juvenile court dismiss Andrew from the petition,
    declare Daniel a dependent of the court, and order that both children remain placed in the
    care of Mother. The agency noted that there were no safety concerns that would warrant
    the removal of the children from Mother, but it would be premature to release Daniel to
    Father or to allow Father to reside in the family’s home given his unresolved issues with
    domestic violence and drug abuse. The agency also noted that jurisdiction was necessary
    to ensure that Mother had a clear understanding of the cycle of domestic violence and
    was linked to supportive services since both parents had expressed a desire to reconcile.
    The DCFS accordingly recommended that the juvenile court order family reunification
    services for Father and family maintenance services for Mother. The proposed services
    for Mother included parenting education, individual counseling, family preservation
    services, and a domestic violence program for victims.
    IV.    Section 300 Petition on Behalf of Damian
    Mother’s third child, Damian, was born in October 2013. On December 20,
    2013, the DCFS filed a section 300 petition on the child’s behalf under section 300,
    subdivisions (a), (b), and (j). The petition alleged that Damian was at substantial risk
    of harm due to the parents’ history of engaging in violent altercations, including the
    August 9, 2013 stabbing incident which occurred while Mother was pregnant with the
    child. The petition also alleged that Damian was at risk based on Father’s history of drug
    7
    abuse and current use of methamphetamine. At a December 20, 2013 detention hearing,
    the juvenile court ordered that Damian be detained from Father and remain released to
    Mother. The court also ordered monitored visitation for Father as long as the visits did
    not conflict with any criminal protective orders. A contested jurisdiction and disposition
    hearing for both petitions was set for January 31, 2014.
    On January 31, 2014, the DCFS submitted a Jurisdiction/Disposition report for the
    section 300 petition filed on behalf of Damian. The report reflected that, on August 13,
    2013, Father pleaded no contest to charges of assault with a deadly weapon and willful
    cruelty to a child. The report also showed that, on October 25, 2013, the criminal court
    issued a protective order, which permitted Father to be in the presence of Mother and the
    children, but required that his contact be peaceful. The DCFS recommended that Damian
    be declared a dependent of the juvenile court and remain placed in Mother’s care. The
    agency continued to recommend that the court order family reunification services for
    Father and family maintenance services for Mother.
    V.     Jurisdiction and Disposition Hearing
    On January 31, 2014, the juvenile court held the jurisdiction and disposition
    hearing. At the DCFS’s request, the court dismissed Andrew from the section 300
    petition filed on his behalf and then proceeded with the adjudication of the petitions filed
    on behalf of Daniel and Damian. Counsel for the DCFS and counsel for the children
    joined in requesting that the petitions be sustained as pled. Mother’s counsel asked the
    court to strike the language in the petitions alleging that she failed to protect the children
    from the risk of harm posed by Father. Father’s counsel asked the court to dismiss the
    counts alleged under section 300, subdivision (a) concerning Father’s domestic violence
    and the counts alleged under section 300, subdivisions (b) and (j) concerning Father’s
    drug use. The juvenile court sustained the petitions filed on behalf of Daniel and Damian
    as pled, with one amendment reflecting that Father was convicted, rather than arrested, on
    a charge of assault with a deadly weapon. The court declared Daniel a dependent of the
    8
    court under section 300, subdivisions (a) and (b), and Damian a dependent of the court
    under section 300, subdivisions (a), (b), and (j).
    Proceeding to disposition, the juvenile court ordered that both Daniel and Damien
    be removed from the custody of Father and remain placed in the home of Mother under
    the supervision of the DCFS. With respect to family maintenance services for Mother,
    her counsel asked the court: “Your Honor, I am requesting that Mother be allowed to do
    individual counseling to address domestic violence through Family Preservation. Family
    Preservation has already been in the home. I believe the [DCFS] wants Mother to do a
    separate domestic violence, and parenting as well. I don’t believe parenting is necessary
    as well. These children have been with the mother without incident. There is no
    indication that she is neglectful or any issue regarding her parenting of these children.”
    The court stated: “Not a chance. She needs to be in a group. She needs to have other
    people saying to her, you let him back in and you let him back in and you let him back in.
    That doesn’t happen . . . with Family Preservation. They are very nice people. They will
    do individual. No, no, no. She needs to be in a group.” The court also noted that it
    would not be ordering conjoint counseling with Father “until the domestic violence
    treatment program tells me that that is okay to do.” The court then ordered Mother to
    attend a support group for victims of domestic violence, a parenting class, and individual
    counseling.
    Counsel for the DCFS asked the juvenile court if it could clarify the duration of
    the domestic violence program for Mother. The court responded: “No. . . My friends
    who do this for a living say that you can order a 52-week domestic violence treatment
    program for a father. You cannot order support group. That is why when I re-wrote this
    case plan, that is why we didn’t put a time limit in.” Counsel for the DCFS explained
    that he was seeking clarification because, in his experience, a 26-week program would be
    requested “down the road.” The court replied: “No. This is up to the domestic violence
    treatment program and the domestic violence counselors to say how long Mother needs to
    be in. They may say four weeks. . . . They may say a hundred. That is their call, but it’s
    got to be a group.”
    9
    After making disposition orders with respect to Father, the juvenile court told
    Mother: “You are hanging by a thread with these kids. If there is any contact with this
    man, I guarantee you somebody is going to tell the [DCFS], and, if that is the case, your
    kids are gone. Got it?” Mother’s counsel stated that she was noting “Mother’s objection
    to the jurisdictional and dispositional findings.” Following the hearing, Mother filed a
    timely notice of appeal from the juvenile court’s jurisdiction and disposition orders.3
    DISCUSSION
    On appeal, Mother challenges the portion of the juvenile court’s disposition order
    requiring her to participate in a support group for victims of domestic violence. She
    specifically asserts that the juvenile court abused its discretion in ordering her to attend
    an open-ended series of group discussion sessions with other domestic violence victims
    rather than a time-limited domestic violence education class. She also argues that the
    juvenile court abused its discretion in delegating the authority to determine the duration
    of her participation in the support group to the program’s counselors.
    I.     Forfeiture
    As a preliminary matter, we address the DCFS’s contention that Mother forfeited
    her right to argue on appeal that she should have been ordered to attend either a domestic
    violence education class or a fixed number of domestic violence support group sessions
    because she failed to raise those objections to the disposition order in the juvenile court.
    “[A] reviewing court ordinarily will not consider a challenge to a ruling if an objection
    could have been but was not made in the trial court. [Citation.] The purpose of this rule
    is to encourage parties to bring errors to the attention of the trial court, so that they may
    be corrected. [Citation.]” (In re S.B. (2004) 
    32 Cal.4th 1287
    , 1293, fn. omitted.) In
    3      At a section 364 review hearing held on August 1, 2014, the juvenile court
    continued its jurisdiction over both Daniel and Damian and ordered that the children
    remain placed in the home of Mother under the same plan of family maintenance
    services.
    10
    addition, “[g]eneral objections are insufficient to preserve issues for review. [Citation.]
    The objection must state the ground or grounds upon which the objection is based.
    [Citation.]” (In re E.A. (2012) 
    209 Cal.App.4th 787
    , 790.)
    The record in this case reflects that, at the jurisdiction and disposition hearing,
    Mother’s counsel specifically objected to the portion of the proposed case plan that
    required Mother to participate in a domestic violence support group, and requested that
    Mother instead be allowed to address the issues of domestic violence in individual
    counseling. In response, the juvenile court made clear that it would not consider any
    alternative to a support group. As the juvenile court was ordering Mother to participate
    in a support group for victims of domestic violence as well as other programs, counsel for
    the DCFS interjected and asked for clarification on the length of the domestic violence
    program. The court responded that it deliberately had chosen to not put a time limit
    on Mother’s participation in the support group, leaving it instead to the program’s
    counselors.
    On this record, we conclude that Mother’s objection to the order requiring her to
    participate in a domestic violence support group was sufficient to preserve the issues
    raised on appeal. Based on the objection made by Mother’s counsel and the follow-up
    inquiry by counsel for the DCFS, the juvenile court had an opportunity to consider the
    type and duration of the domestic violence program that it was ordering for Mother, as
    well as the discretion that the program would have in setting the terms of Mother’s
    participation. The juvenile court clearly stated on the record that it would not order any
    type of domestic violence program for Mother other than a victims’ support group, nor
    would it specify the number of support group sessions that Mother was required to attend.
    Any further objection to the terms of the order by Mother’s counsel would have been
    futile. Under these circumstances, Mother has not forfeited her arguments on appeal.
    II.    Order for Mother to Attend a Domestic Violence Victims Support Group
    “‘The juvenile court has broad discretion to determine what would best serve and
    protect the child’s interests and to fashion a dispositional order accordingly. On appeal,
    11
    this determination cannot be reversed absent a clear abuse of discretion.’ [Citation.]
    (In re A.E. (2008) 
    168 Cal.App.4th 1
    , 4.) Under section 362, “[i]f a child is adjudged a
    dependent child of the court, . . . and the court orders that a parent or guardian shall
    retain custody of the child subject to the supervision of the social worker, the parents or
    guardians shall be required to participate in child welfare services or services provided
    by an appropriate agency designated by the court.” (§ 362, subd. (c).) Additionally,
    “[t]he juvenile court may direct any and all reasonable orders to the parents or guardians
    of the child who is the subject of any [dependency] proceedings . . . as the court deems
    necessary and proper to carry out the provisions of this section,” including orders “to
    participate in a counseling or education program.” (§ 362, subd. (d).) The case plan
    ordered by the court should be appropriate for each individual family based on facts
    relevant to that family, and should be designed to eliminate the conditions that led to the
    dependency in the first instance. (In re Nolan W. (2009) 
    45 Cal.4th 1217
    , 1229; see also
    § 362, subd. (d) [“[t]he program in which a parent . . . is required to participate shall be
    designed to eliminate those conditions that led to the court’s finding that the child is a
    person described by Section 300”].)
    Mother contends that the juvenile court erred in ordering her to participate in a
    domestic violence support group for an indeterminate period because such order was
    neither requested by the DCFS nor supported by the evidence. Mother acknowledges
    that a “time-limited program of domestic violence education” may have been appropriate
    based on the August 9, 2013 incident, but argues that a “broad, open-ended series of
    group discussion sessions with other domestic violence victims” was not. Contrary to
    Mother’s characterization, however, the altercation during which Father stabbed Mother
    was not the first incident of domestic violence between them. Mother disclosed to the
    DCFS that Father had pushed her on several prior occasions during arguments, and at
    times, he pushed her with enough force to cause her to fall back onto the bed. Mother
    also explained that Father would push her when she tried to end an argument by ignoring
    him, and although Father would eventually calm down, the cycle would repeat itself the
    following day. In addition, Mother admitted that these verbal and physical altercations
    12
    typically occurred while the children were in the home sleeping. Based on these facts,
    the juvenile court reasonably could have found that Father and Mother had a history of
    engaging in acts of domestic violence in the home, which escalated to the point of Father
    stabbing Mother when she tried to leave him.
    The juvenile court also reasonably could have found that Mother was attempting
    to minimize the seriousness of the domestic violence and its impact on the children in
    her interviews with the DCSF. Shortly after the stabbing, Mother and two other family
    members told law enforcement officers that Mother was holding Daniel in her arms when
    Father stabbed her. However, by the time the DCFS interviewed Mother and the paternal
    relatives about the incident, they were reporting that Mother was not holding the child at
    the time and that he was in another room. The juvenile court disbelieved this subsequent
    account in sustaining the dependency petitions, and found that one-year-old Daniel was
    in Mother’s arms when she was stabbed. Moreover, even assuming that neither Daniel
    nor Andrew witnessed the stabbing first-hand, both children were present in the home
    during the ongoing altercation between the parents, which was loud enough to attract the
    attention of relatives outside the home. Ten-year-old Andrew also reported that he came
    out of his room when he heard Mother scream and observed that she was injured and in
    pain. In addition, it is undisputed that Mother was seven-months pregnant with Damian
    at the time of the stabbing and that he was at risk of serious injury during the incident.
    Given that both Mother and Father expressed a desire to reconcile their marriage
    by the time of the jurisdiction and disposition hearing, the juvenile court acted reasonably
    in concluding that Mother’s participation in a group program for victims of domestic
    violence was necessary to ensure the safety of the children. While Mother does not
    dispute that an order requiring her to attend some type of domestic violence program was
    appropriate, she asserts that the juvenile court should have selected a domestic violence
    education class rather than a support group. However, Mother fails to explain how she
    would have benefited more from a class on domestic violence than from a support group
    for victims of domestic violence. She also fails to explain how ordering a domestic
    violence class would have been more consistent with the DCFS’s recommendation that
    13
    Mother participate in a “domestic violence program for victims” than the juvenile court’s
    order that she participate in a domestic violence support group. Section 362 affords the
    juvenile court broad discretion to order the parent of a dependent child “to participate in
    a counseling or education program,” so long as the program is designed to eliminate the
    conditions that led to the dependency in the first instance. (§362, subd. (d); see also In re
    Nolan W., 
    supra,
     45 Cal.4th at p. 1229; In re Christopher H. (1996) 
    50 Cal.App.4th 1001
    ,
    1006.) Based on the history of domestic violence in the home and the seriousness of the
    altercation that led to these dependency proceedings, Mother has failed to show an abuse
    of discretion in the type of domestic violence program selected by the juvenile court.4
    This brings us to the question of whether the juvenile court abused its discretion
    in failing to set a time limit on Mother’s participation in the domestic violence support
    group, or to articulate criteria for determining how long she would be required to attend.
    Mother argues that it was unreasonable for the juvenile court to order her to participate in
    an open-ended program of support group sessions that, in the court’s own words, might
    last four weeks or 100 weeks. The DCFS counters that the juvenile court’s refusal to
    specify the number of support group sessions that Mother was required to attend was
    appropriate because the court reasonably could condition the length of Mother’s
    participation in the group on the progress that she achieved during the sessions.
    The juvenile court did not abuse its discretion by leaving the term of Mother’s
    enrollment in a domestic violence support group open ended. Section 362 does not
    require a juvenile court to place a time limit on a parent’s participation in a counseling
    or education program. It simply requires that the order be “reasonable” in nature and
    4      Mother contends that the juvenile court improperly based its order for a domestic
    violence support group on the out-of-court statements of the court’s personal friends, who
    suggested to the court that victims of domestic violence need group sessions. While the
    court’s statements on this issue are somewhat ambiguous, “‘“[i]t is judicial action and not
    judicial reasoning which is the subject of review”’” on appeal. (In re Jonathan B. (1992)
    
    5 Cal.App.4th 873
    , 876.) In this case, the juvenile court’s decision to order Mother to
    participate in a domestic violence support group (as opposed to a domestic violence
    education class) was a valid exercise of the court’s discretion.
    14
    “designed to eliminate the conditions” that led to the child being declared a dependent of
    the court. (§ 362, subd. (d); see also In re Nolan W., 
    supra,
     45 Cal.4th at p. 1229.) The
    California Supreme Court accordingly has held that an order requiring a parent to attend
    a counseling program for an open-ended period as a condition of visitation is not beyond
    the authority of the juvenile court, nor does it deprive the parent of due process of law.
    (In re Chantal S. (1996) 
    13 Cal.4th 196
    , 208-212.) As the Supreme Court observed,
    “the dependency scheme includes ‘carefully crafted due process protections . . . that
    insure that parental rights are protected along with the physical and mental health of
    children.’ [Citation.]” (Id. at p. 212.) The juvenile court thus reasonably could decline
    to set a time limit on Mother’s participation in the support group, and retain the discretion
    to terminate its order once Mother had made sufficient progress in addressing case issues.
    While we see no abuse of discretion in an order for an open-ended domestic
    violence program, we are concerned that the juvenile court appeared to delegate to the
    program’s counselors the sole discretion to decide the length of Mother’s participation.
    The record reflects that, in response to the DCFS’s inquiry about the duration of the
    domestic violence program ordered for Mother, the court did not simply state that it was
    leaving the term of Mother’s participation in the program open ended or subject to the
    court’s own discretion. Rather, the court stated that it was “up to the domestic violence
    treatment program and the domestic violence counselors to say how long Mother needs
    to be in” the support group, and that “it was their call.” In delegating that authority to the
    program, the court also did not provide any criteria for determining the length of
    Mother’s participation, nor did it establish any guidelines for the program to follow in
    evaluating Mother’s progress. Instead, based on its statements at the hearing, the court
    appeared to leave the determination of an end date for Mother’s participation, as well
    as the basis for that determination, entirely in the hands of the program’s counselors.
    The DCFS suggests that, in making these statements at the disposition hearing,
    the juvenile court merely was requiring that the length of Mother’s participation in
    the support group be determined by her progress in the program, as evaluated by the
    program’s counselors. We agree that the juvenile court has the discretion to make the
    15
    duration of Mother’s participation in the program contingent on her progress. The court
    also has the discretion to rely on the reports and recommendations of the program’s
    counselors, as well as any other relevant evidence, in deciding at what point Mother
    has made sufficient progress in the program to cease her participation. However, the
    final determination of when Mother has satisfactorily completed this portion of her
    case plan must be made by the juvenile court, not by the program’s counselors.
    (Cf. In re James R. (2007) 
    153 Cal.App.4th 413
    , 443 [reversing order delegating all
    decisions on visitation to private placement program because “juvenile court did not
    make an individualized determination based upon the application of the program’s
    policies to this minor, but appears to have completely deferred to the program the
    question of visitation”]; In re Donnovan J. (1997) 
    58 Cal.App.4th 1474
    , 1478 [reversing
    order prohibiting visitation without permission of minors’ therapists because while
    juvenile court “may base its determination of the appropriateness of visitation on input
    from therapists, it is the court’s duty to make the actual determination”].)
    Although the juvenile court’s written order does not make any reference to the role
    of the domestic violence counselors in setting the terms of Mother’s participation in the
    program, the court’s statements at the disposition hearing indicate that it was not merely
    directing the counselors to provide regular feedback on Mother’s progress or to make
    recommendations concerning her continued attendance. Rather, the court was granting
    the program’s counselors unfettered discretion to decide, based on their own criteria,
    when Mother had satisfied this component of her court-ordered case plan. In light of
    these statements, we conclude that the proper remedy is to reverse this portion of the
    disposition order and remand the matter to the juvenile court to issue a new order for
    a domestic violence program for Mother under terms consistent with this opinion.
    16
    DISPOSITION
    The juvenile court’s order requiring Mother to participate in a domestic violence
    victims’ support group is reversed and the matter is remanded to the juvenile court for
    further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
    ZELON, J.
    We concur:
    PERLUSS, P. J.
    
    SEGAL, J.
    
    Judge of the Los Angeles Superior Court, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to
    article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.
    17
    Filed 11/17/14
    CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION
    IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
    SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
    DIVISION SEVEN
    In re Daniel B. et al., Persons Coming Under          B254274
    the Juvenile Court Law.
    (Los Angeles County
    Super. Ct. No. DK00453)
    LOS ANGELES COUNTY DEPARTMENT
    OF CHILDREN AND FAMILY SERVICES,                    ORDER MODIFYING OPINION
    Plaintiff and Respondent,                   AND CERTIFYING OPINION
    FOR PUBLICATION
    v.                                          [NO CHANGE IN JUDGMENT]
    ANGELA B.,
    Defendant and Appellant.
    THE COURT:
    It is ordered that the opinion filed herein on October 22, 2014, be modified as
    follows:
    1. On page 1, second paragraph the name “Debra” is changed to read “Deborah”
    so the sentence reads:
    Deborah Dentler, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant
    and Appellant.
    There is no change in the judgment.
    The opinion in the above-entitled matter filed on October 22, 2014 was not
    certified for publication in the Official Reports. For good cause it now appears that the
    opinion meets the standards for publication specified in California Rules of Court, rule
    8.1105(c), and appellant’s request for publication pursuant to California Rules of Court,
    rule 8.1120(a) is granted.
    IT IS ORDERED that the words “Not to be Published in the Official Reports”
    appearing on page 1 of said opinion be deleted and the opinion herein be published in the
    Official Reports.
    ________________________________________________________________________
    
    PERLUSS, P. J.,                           ZELON, J.                           SEGAL, J.
    
    Judge of the Los Angeles Superior Court, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to
    article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.
    2
    

Document Info

Docket Number: B254274

Citation Numbers: 231 Cal. App. 4th 663

Filed Date: 11/17/2014

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 1/12/2023