Amended June 9, 2015 State of Iowa v. Kevin Deshay Ambrose ( 2015 )

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF IOWA
No. 13–0450
Filed January 2, 2015
Amended June 9, 2015
STATE OF IOWA,
Appellee,
vs.
KEVIN DESHAY AMBROSE,
Appellant.
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Black Hawk County,
Todd A. Geer, Judge.
Defendant appeals convictions and sentences for murder in the
first degree, attempt to commit murder, and felon in possession of a
firearm and challenges instructions to the jury. AFFIRMED.
Mark C. Smith, State Appellate Defender, Vidhya K. Reddy,
Assistant Appellate Defender, and Kevin D. Ambrose, pro se, for
appellant.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Mary A. Triick, Assistant
Attorney General, Thomas J. Ferguson, County Attorney, James J.
Katcher and Linda M. Fangman, Assistant County Attorneys, for
appellee.
2
CADY, Chief Justice.
In this appeal from a conviction for murder in the first degree and
other criminal offenses, we consider claims of trial error based primarily
on jury instructions relating to the order in which the jury was
instructed to consider greater and lesser offenses and various
permissible inferences of malice. On our review, we conclude the
acquittal-first instruction was not prejudicial, and the inference
instructions were not erroneous. We affirm the judgment and sentence
of the district court.
I. Background Facts and Proceedings.
This case arises from a shooting that occurred on May 2, 2012, at
a house in Waterloo shared by Kevin Ambrose and Marlene Buss. They
lived in the house with two of Buss’s three children, Ambrose’s two
children, and Ambrose’s brother, Jeremi Montgomery. Ambrose and
Buss had dated earlier in their lives and reconnected in 2010. They
began living together in 2011. Their relationship included discussions of
marriage. They obtained and framed an unsigned marriage certificate,
purchased wedding rings, and discussed having children together.
At the same time, the relationship between Ambrose and Buss was
strained and involved both physical and verbal confrontations. Buss was
also concerned that Ambrose had personal relationships with other
women. Ambrose would leave the house for days without contacting
Buss. Buss also feared that Ambrose could be violent. Ambrose once
told Buss he would kill her if she ever left him.
On May 1, Buss spent the evening with Undray Reed, the father of
two of her children, following his release from prison. During the
evening, they discussed their children, and Buss told Reed of the
problems in her relationship with Ambrose. Buss returned to the house
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around 6 a.m. on May 2. When Ambrose returned home a few hours
later, he threatened “to do something to” Buss once he found out where
she had been.
Later in the morning, Buss left the house with her two children
because she was afraid of Ambrose. She went to the home of Reed’s
sister. That afternoon, she obtained a no-contact order against Ambrose.
The order also directed Ambrose to vacate the house. The order was
served on Ambrose at the house by two deputy sheriffs at 5:20 p.m. The
deputies remained in the house until Ambrose collected a few personal
belongings and left. Ambrose’s children remained at the house in the
care of Montgomery.
After Ambrose left the house, the deputies contacted Buss and told
her she could return to the residence. Buss returned, but she also
planned to vacate the house because she feared a conflict with Ambrose
would arise despite the no-contact order. She was accompanied by her
mother, Kay Straw. Reed, his sister, his daughter, and Reed and Buss’s
two children also went to the house. They all planned to help Buss
gather her belongings.
Shortly after Ambrose vacated the house, he made a phone call to
Leslie Kingery, the mother of his two children, and asked her to retrieve
some of his belongings from the house, as well as some clothing for his
children. She went to the house with two of Ambrose’s aunts, but was
not permitted to remove any property by Buss and a police officer called
in to assist. Kingery then left with her children and Ambrose’s aunts.
Around the same time, at 5:54 p.m., Ambrose made a phone call to Jodi
Sherburne and told her, “[I]f something happens, please remember that I
love you and [your daughter].” After the phone call ended, Sherburne
called Buss to express concern for her safety. Ambrose called Sherburne
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again at 6:04 p.m. He was upset and told her, “I got to go do what I got
to go do.”
Kingery called Ambrose at 6:19 p.m. and told him she was unable
to retrieve any property from the house. Montgomery then called
Ambrose from the house at 6:25 p.m. This call lasted seventeen
minutes. During the call, the police returned to the house three more
times after Montgomery and Buss started to argue over property Buss
wanted to remove from the house, including a sofa. After Montgomery
refused to allow Buss to remove the sofa and after the law enforcement
officers had left the house, she began to repeatedly cut the sofa with a
kitchen knife.
Around this time, Ambrose returned to the house by entering
through the side door. He was carrying a pistol and a baseball bat. As
he entered, he observed the framed marriage license in a trash can. He
then saw Reed standing in the living room. Ambrose approached him
until he was only a few feet away and pointed the pistol at his forehead.
He said, “You first” and pulled the trigger. The firing mechanism of the
pistol jammed, and the pistol did not fire. Buss began to run out the
front door, as Ambrose worked to dislodge the bullet that had jammed in
the pistol. Ambrose then pursued Buss out the front door and shot her
in the back as she was descending the front steps. She fell to the
ground. Ambrose then stood over her and shot her two more times, once
in the abdomen and once in the buttock as she tried to shield herself
from the attack. She then managed to stand up and run. As she was
retreating from the house, she used her cell phone to call 911. This call
was made at 6:51 p.m.
After wounding Buss, Ambrose entered the front door of the house
and shot Straw twice before exiting the side door. Straw was struck by
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bullets in the back and in the chest. Ambrose jumped over Straw as he
ran out the side door to pursue Reed, who had run from the house.
Ambrose pursued, but was unable to catch up to Reed, and
disappeared from the scene. Between 6:55 p.m. and 7 p.m., Ambrose
called Sherburne seven times. He asked her to pick him up in her car
and told her he had done something stupid. He also called Kingery, told
her that he loved her and the kids and that it was “too late.” Ambrose
called Kingery again the next morning after hiding from law enforcement
officers overnight. He told her there had been an altercation at the house
the night before, and he had blacked out. Police took Ambrose into
custody on May 3.
Straw was pronounced dead after being transported to a hospital.
Buss survived her injuries.
Ambrose was charged with murder in the first degree in violation of
Iowa Code section 707.2, two counts of attempt to commit murder in
violation of section 707.11, and felon in possession of a firearm in
violation of section 724.26. At trial, he argued that Straw’s death was
manslaughter, not murder, because he was overwhelmed by a sudden
passion caused by the day’s events after he entered the house on May 2
just prior to the shooting.
Ambrose objected to a variety of jury instructions at trial. First, he
objected to Instruction No. 53. This instruction told the jury it could
“[c]onsider lesser included offenses of a count only if you unanimously
find the defendant not guilty of the offense charged.” Second, he
objected to Instruction No. 38. This instruction told the jury, “You may
but are not required to infer malice from the commission of Burglary in
the First Degree which results in death, or Attempt to Commit Murder
which results in death.” Third, Ambrose objected to Instruction No. 39.
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This instruction told the jury, “You may but are not required to infer
malice aforethought from the defendant’s use of a dangerous weapon.”
The district court instructed the jury on other inferences and
conclusions the jury was permitted to draw, which Ambrose did not lodge
any objection to at the time. First, Instruction No. 14 told the jury, “You
may, but are not required to, conclude a person intends the natural
results of his or her acts” in deciding whether a person intended to do an
act against the law. Second, Instruction No. 15 told the jury, “You may,
but are not required to, conclude a person intends the natural results of
his or her acts” in determining specific intent. Finally, Instruction No. 37
told the jury, “If a person has the opportunity to deliberate and uses a
dangerous weapon against another resulting in death, you may, but are
not required to, infer that the weapon was used with malice,
premeditation and specific intent to kill.”
Ambrose was convicted of all four counts and sentenced to life in
prison without the possibility of parole for the murder. He was
sentenced to twenty-five years for each of the two counts of attempt to
commit murder, and five years for the count of felon in possession of a
firearm.
Ambrose appealed. He raises three claims. First, he asserts
Instruction No. 53—the jury may not consider a lesser offense unless it
unanimously found him not guilty of the greater offense—was a
misstatement of the law because it precludes a fair consideration and
discussion by the jury of the lesser included offenses. Second, he argues
the instructions concerning the various inferences and conclusions the
jury was permitted to draw were improper because they amounted to
undue comment on the evidence. To the extent that his attorney did not
object to all of the inference instructions, Ambrose claims he was denied
7
effective assistance of counsel. Finally, he contends the trial court never
had jurisdiction over the case because the two counts of attempt to
commit murder in the trial information failed to describe a criminal
offense.
II. Scope of Review.
“We review challenges to jury instructions for correction of errors
at law.” State v. Frei, 831 N.W.2d 70, 73 (Iowa 2013); see also Iowa R.
App. P. 6.907. “Error in jury instructions is reversible only if the error is
prejudicial.” Condon Auto Sales & Serv., Inc. v. Crick, 604 N.W.2d 587,
593 (Iowa 1999). “Errors in jury instructions are presumed prejudicial
unless ‘the record affirmatively establishes there was no prejudice.’ ”
Asher v. Ob-Gyn Specialists, P.C., 846 N.W.2d 492, 496 (Iowa 2014)
(quoting State v. Murray, 796 N.W.2d 907, 908 (Iowa 2011)).
To the extent error is not preserved on an issue, any objections
must be raised within an ineffective-assistance-of-counsel framework.
See State v. Fountain, 786 N.W.2d 260, 263 (Iowa 2010) (“Ineffective-
assistance-of-counsel claims are an exception to the traditional error
preservation rules.”). Claims of ineffective assistance of counsel are
reviewed de novo. King v. State, 797 N.W.2d 565, 570 (Iowa 2011).
III. Error Predicated on Acquittal—First Instruction.
We first consider the claim of error based on instruction to the jury
that it could not consider a lesser included offense until it found
Ambrose not guilty of the greater offense. The State claims Ambrose
failed to preserve error on this issue. Therefore, we first consider if error
was preserved.
A. Preservation of Error. In determining whether Ambrose
preserved error in this case, we begin by considering the rationale
underlying our error-preservation rules. We have previously summarized
8
the importance of our error-preservation rules and the underlying
principles that support them as follows:
Error preservation is important for two reasons: (1)
affording the district court an “ ‘opportunity to avoid or
correct error’ ”; and (2) providing the appellate court “ ‘with
an adequate record in reviewing errors purportedly
committed’ ” by the district court. These principles of error
preservation are based on fairness:
“[I]t is fundamentally unfair to fault the trial court for
failing to rule correctly on an issue it was never given
the opportunity to consider. Furthermore, it is unfair
to allow a party to choose to remain silent in the trial
court in the face of error, taking a chance on a
favorable outcome, and subsequently assert error on
appeal if the outcome in the trial court is unfavorable.”
State v. Pickett, 671 N.W.2d 866, 869 (Iowa 2003) (citation omitted)
(quoting DeVoss v. State, 648 N.W.2d 56, 60 (Iowa 2002)).
In this case, Ambrose initially objected to Instruction No. 53 on the
basis that it was unnecessary because the order of the marshaling
instructions would adequately guide the jury to consider each count by
beginning with the greater offense. The prosecutor responded that the
instruction was necessary because it told the jury it needed to
unanimously decide the greater offense before considering a lesser
offense. Thus, the purpose and effect of the instruction were clearly
identified by the prosecutor. Nevertheless, Ambrose responded that the
general instruction to the jury that they could only convict him of the
degree of crime of which there was no reasonable doubt made Instruction
No. 53 “redundant.” Ambrose then concluded his objection by arguing
the instruction was “duplicative and not necessary.”
The objection made at trial by Ambrose failed to give the trial court
an opportunity to correct the error he now claims on appeal. Ambrose
never alerted the trial court that the instruction constituted a
misstatement of the law by precluding any consideration of a lesser
9
offense until the jury acquitted the defendant of the greater offense.
Moreover, the district court rejected the claim that the instruction was
duplicative by concluding it would help the jury sort through the
charging instructions. The district court never had an opportunity to
consider the underlying legal merits of not allowing the jury to consider a
lesser offense until the defendant was acquitted of the greater offense.
We conclude Ambrose failed to preserve error on this issue. Thus,
we proceed to consider the claim under an ineffective-assistance-of-
counsel framework. See State v. Ross, 845 N.W.2d 692, 698 (Iowa 2014)
(“ ‘[F]ailure to recognize an erroneous [jury] instruction and preserve
error breaches an essential duty.’ ” (quoting State v. Ondayog, 722
N.W.2d 778, 785 (Iowa 2006))).
B. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel. “The right to assistance of
counsel under the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution
and article I, section 10 of the Iowa Constitution is the right to ‘effective’
assistance of counsel.” Fountain, 786 N.W.2d at 265 (quoting Ondayog,
722 N.W.2d at 784). To establish an ineffective-assistance-of-counsel
claim, an applicant must show that “(1) his trial counsel failed to perform
an essential duty, and (2) this failure resulted in prejudice.” State v.
Straw, 709 N.W.2d 128, 133 (Iowa 2006) (citing Strickland v. Washington,
466 U.S. 668, 687, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 2064, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674, 693 (1984)).
The claimant must prove each of these elements by a preponderance of
the evidence. King, 797 N.W.2d at 571.
We can resolve ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claims under
either prong of the analysis. State v. Graves, 668 N.W.2d 860, 869 (Iowa
2003). With respect to the application of the first prong to this case, we
have never addressed the question of whether a jury in a criminal case
must decide a defendant’s guilt or innocence on the greater offense
10
before considering a lesser offense. We recognize the question has been
addressed by other courts across the nation, with a variety of outcomes. 1
1A number of jurisdictions have reached a variety of outcomes when considering
how the jury should be instructed to move from considering the charged offense to
considering lesser included offenses. See David F. Abele, Comment, Jury Deliberations
and the Lesser Included Offense Rule: Getting the Courts Back in Step, 23 U.C. Davis L.
Rev. 375, 379–80 & nn.28–33 (1990) [hereinafter Abele] (compiling cases); Robert
Sheppard, Comment, Double Jeopardy Blues: Why in Light of Blueford v. Arkansas
States Should Mandate Partial Verdicts in Acquit-First Transition Instruction Cases, 83
Miss. L.J. 373, 379–81 & nn.20–27 (2014) [hereinafter Sheppard] (noting the different
approaches to “transition instructions” and compiling cases). The different approaches
include: (1) acquittal-first instruction; (2) unable-to-agree instruction; (3) defendant’s
choice between acquit-first and unable-to-agree instructions; (4) has-not-been-proved
instruction; (5) the court allows the jury to consider the charged offense and the lesser
included offenses together, in whatever order it wishes; and (6) no transition
instruction. Sheppard, 83 Miss. L.J. at 379–81 & nn.22–27.
In jurisdictions that utilize an acquittal-first transition instruction, the judge
instructs the jury to “begin by deliberating the greatest charge first, proceed from one
charge to the next in descending order based on severity, and proceed to discussing the
lesser charges only after the jury unanimously agrees to acquit the defendant of the
greater charge.” Id. at 379.
While the caselaw from the majority of states suggests an acquittal-first
instruction is an acceptable choice for the district court to utilize when charging a jury,
cases from Georgia, New Jersey, Nebraska, and New Hampshire suggest
murder/provocation cases need special treatment. Edge v. State, 414 S.E.2d 463, 465–
66 (Ga. 1992) (finding an acquittal-first felony-murder instruction precludes
consideration of provocation evidence); State v. Trice, 835 N.W.2d 667, 671–72 (Neb.
2013) (same with second-degree murder); State v. O’Leary, 903 A.2d 997, 1000–01 (N.H.
2006) (holding a pure acquittal-first instruction when manslaughter is a lesser included
offense is error); State v. Coyle, 574 A.2d 951, 966 (N.J. 1990) (holding sequential
charges can be misleading in murder cases). Commentators have also noted a
movement away from the acquittal-first approach. Abele, 23 U.C. Davis L. Rev. at 377–
78, 381 (citing seven states that had moved to a disagreement or “unable to agree”
instruction between 1977 and 1989)).
Under an unable-to-agree instruction,
jurors may render a verdict on a lesser-included offense if, after full and
careful consideration of the evidence, they are unable to reach agreement
with respect to the charged crime. Thus, the jury may deliberate on a
lesser offense if it either (1) finds the defendant not guilty on the greater
charge, or (2) after reasonable efforts cannot agree whether to acquit or
convict on that charge.
State v. LeBlanc, 924 P.2d 441, 442 (Ariz. 1996).
Some courts have chosen to allow the defendant to make the choice between the
acquittal-first and the unable-to-agree instructions. The United States Court of Appeals
for the Second Circuit made that decision in United States v. Tsanas premised on the
11
Nevertheless, we can resolve this case under the prejudice prong of an
ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim. Therefore, it is unnecessary for
us to consider if trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance by failing to
argue that the acquittal-first instruction was an improper statement of
the law.
To establish prejudice in the context of an ineffective-assistance-of-
counsel claim, a defendant must show a reasonable probability that the
result of the trial would have been different. King, 797 N.W.2d at 574.
The likelihood of a different result must be substantial, not just
conceivable. Id. at 572. A defendant must show the probability of a
different result is sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.
State v. Clay, 824 N.W.2d 488, 496 (Iowa 2012). This standard requires
us to consider the totality of the evidence, identify what factual findings
______________________
belief that, “[w]ith the opposing considerations [of the acquittal-first and unable-to-
decide instructions] thus balanced,” it could not conclude that “either form of
instruction is wrong as a matter of law.” 572 F.2d 340, 346 (2d Cir. 1978). Therefore,
the court concluded that “[t]he court may give the one that it prefers if the defendant
expresses no choice,” but if the defendant has a preference, “the court should give the
form of instruction which the defendant seasonably elects.” Id. The court reasoned the
defendant should be the one to choose because it is the defendant’s “liberty that is at
stake,” whereas the government’s risk is limited to the defendant’s “readier conviction
for a lesser rather than a greater crime.” Id. While far from the majority, some
jurisdictions have followed the Tsanas court’s reasoning and elect to allow the
defendant to choose the type of instruction given to the jury. See, e.g., United States v.
Jackson, 726 F.2d 1466, 1469 (9th Cir. 1984) (per curiam); Catches v. United States,
582 F.2d 453, 459 (8th Cir. 1978); Wright v. United States, 588 A.2d 260, 262 (D.C.
1991); State v. Powell, 608 A.2d 45, 47 (Vt. 1992).
The has-not-been-proved instruction provides that rather than require an
acquittal, if an element of the charge is not proved beyond a reasonable doubt, then the
jury is to move to the lesser charge. State v. Thomas, 533 N.E.2d 286, 293 (Ohio 1988).
Some courts “allow[ ] jurors to deliberate on greater and lesser offenses in any order but
prohibit[ ] return of verdicts on lesser offenses without first returning a verdict on the
greater offense.” Whiteaker v. State, 808 P.2d 270, 274 (Alaska Ct. App. 1991). And,
finally, some states do not require any specific transition instruction be used by their
courts. Sheppard, 83 Miss. L.J. at 381 & n.27.
12
would have been affected, and determine if the error was pervasive or
isolated and trivial. Everett v. State, 789 N.W.2d 151, 158 (Iowa 2010).
The general justification for permitting a jury to consider lesser
included offenses without first acquitting the defendant on the greater
offense is to insure that the jury fully appreciates and understands the
alternative outcomes at stake and how all the claims of the parties fit
into those alternatives. See State v. Labanowski, 816 P.2d 26, 33–36
(Wash. 1991) (discussing different rules before deciding the unable-to-
agree instruction accurately reflects Washington law). In this case, the
claim of provocation is directed at the lesser offense of voluntary
manslaughter. Ambrose claims the jury would have likely found him
guilty of manslaughter if they would have had the opportunity to
consider the lesser included offense specifically directed at provocation. 2
Provocation is the linchpin of the crime of voluntary manslaughter.
Iowa Code § 707.4 (2011). We recently discussed the concept of serious
provocation in State v. Thompson, 836 N.W.2d 470, 477 (Iowa 2013). We
said:
“The subjective requirement of section 707.4 is that the
defendant must act solely as a result of sudden, violent, and
irresistible passion. The sudden, violent, and irresistible
passion must result from serious provocation sufficient to
excite such passion in a reasonable person. This is an
objective requirement. It is also necessary, as a final
objective requirement, that there is not an interval between
2A person commits voluntary manslaughter when that person
causes the death of another person, under circumstances which would
otherwise be murder, if the person causing the death acts solely as the
result of sudden, violent, and irresistible passion resulting from serious
provocation sufficient to excite such passion in a person and there is not
an interval between the provocation and the killing in which a person of
ordinary reason and temperament would regain control and suppress the
impulse to kill.
Iowa Code § 707.4 (2011).
13
the provocation and the killing in which a person of ordinary
reason and temperament would regain his or her control and
suppress the impulse to kill.”
Thompson, 836 N.W.2d at 477 (quoting State v. Inger, 292 N.W.2d 119,
122 (Iowa 1980)). In Thompson, we held a trial court did not err in failing
to give a voluntary manslaughter instruction based on evidence that the
victim slapped the defendant, argued with him, and made an obscene
gesture before he shot her twice in the head after she had retreated to a
car parked in the driveway of their home. Id. at 475, 478. The defendant
testified he retrieved his rifle and shot her because he could not “take it
anymore.” Id. at 475.
In this case, evidence of serious provocation was based on the
observations made by Ambrose after he entered the house, as well as his
emotional state after he was removed from the house by the no-contact
order and was unable to obtain clothing for his children from the house.
The observations made by Ambrose after he entered the house to support
provocation included the sight of the framed marriage license in a trash
can, damage to a sofa, and the presence of Reed in the house.
The claim of provocation was undermined by ample evidence that
Ambrose planned to engage in some form of extreme violence before
going to the home. He armed himself with a pistol and a baseball bat
before going to the house, and attempted to fire the pistol at a person
promptly after entering the house and announcing, “You first.” See State
v. Holder, 237 Iowa 72, 81, 20 N.W.2d 909, 914 (1945) (holding “ ‘the
provocation must be great . . . to lower the offense’ . . . if . . . the
defendant armed himself for the encounter” (quoting State v. Hockett, 70
Iowa 442, 453, 30 N.W. 746, 748 (1886))). Thus, despite the subjective
claim by Ambrose that the events upon entering the house flamed an
14
irresistible passion that provoked the shootings, there was strong
objective evidence of premeditation.
Additionally, the evidence of provocation was insufficient to excite
sudden, violent, and irresistible passion in a reasonable person. Like
Thompson, the evidence in this case emanated from a historically
troubled relationship, and under all the circumstances, was insufficient
to constitute serious provocation under an objective standard. See
Thompson, 836 N.W.2d at 477–78. Furthermore, there was no evidence
that the murder victim did anything to provoke Ambrose to shoot her.
See Inger, 292 N.W.2d at 122 (recognizing that evidence the victim
assaulted the defendant could establish serious provocation).
Considering all the evidence, there was no reasonable probability
the result of the trial would have been different if the jury could have
considered the lesser included offenses before deciding Ambrose was
guilty of the greater offenses of murder in the first degree and the two
counts of attempt to commit murder. The evidence of guilt was
overwhelming, and the jury would have necessarily considered the
evidence of provocation when considering the state of mind of Ambrose to
support the crimes of murder and attempt to commit murder. The
district court had read all the instructions to the jury before deliberations
began, so the jury would have known of the provocation element of
voluntary manslaughter when it considered the greater offense of murder
in the first degree. Furthermore, the arguments of counsel informed the
jury of the claim of provocation. Overall, our confidence in the outcome
of the trial is not undermined by the acquittal-first instruction under all
the circumstances in this case.
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IV. Error Predicated on Inference Instructions.
We next address the claim by Ambrose that the inference
instructions given to the jury by the district court constituted an
improper comment on the evidence. Ambrose did not object to all of the
inference instructions at trial. To the extent that an objection was not
lodged at trial, Ambrose claims he was denied effective assistance of
counsel. Of course, if the inference instructions were a correct statement
of the law and did not improperly comment on the evidence, no error
occurred at trial, and the claim of ineffective assistance of counsel fails.
See State v. Maxwell, 743 N.W.2d 185, 197 (Iowa 2008).
We begin by recognizing that the five instructions at issue are
generally supported by the law of this state, although not necessarily
directly. See State v. Blair, 347 N.W.2d 416, 421 (Iowa 1984) (“The use of
a deadly weapon accompanied by an opportunity to deliberate is evidence
of malice, deliberation, premeditation and intent to kill.”); State v. Oliver,
341 N.W.2d 744, 747 (Iowa 1983) (“Malice may be inferred . . . from the
commission of a felony that results in death.”); State v. Rinehart, 283
N.W.2d 319, 322–23 (Iowa 1979) (holding as rational an inference that a
person intends the natural and probable consequences that result from
their actions); State v. Smith, 242 N.W.2d 320, 326 (Iowa 1976) (stating
malice aforethought may be inferred from the use of a deadly weapon).
The instructions in dispute are also part of the Iowa State Bar
Association’s Criminal Jury Instructions. See Iowa State Bar Ass’n, Iowa
Criminal Jury Instructions 700.8 (2010) (“If a person has the opportunity
to deliberate and uses a dangerous weapon against another resulting in
death, you may, but are not required to, infer that the weapon was used
with malice, premeditation and specific intent to kill.”); id. 700.9 (“Malice
may be inferred from the commission of (felony) which results in death.”);
16
id. 700.10 (“Malice aforethought may be inferred from the defendant’s
use of a dangerous weapon.”); id. 200.1–.2 (“You may, but are not
required to, conclude a person intends the natural results of [his] . . .
acts.”). Normally, we are slow to disapprove of the uniform jury
instructions. State v. Weaver, 405 N.W.2d 852, 855 (Iowa 1987); see also
State v. Beets, 528 N.W.2d 521, 523 (Iowa 1995) (per curiam).
Nevertheless, Ambrose urges us to reconsider the instructions on
the basis that they constitute an improper comment on the evidence. He
argues that the inference instructions unfairly draw attention to the
evidence and can be viewed as a judicial comment on the evidence. He
asserts that the inferences to be drawn from the evidence should be left
for counsel’s argument.
Generally, the five instructions at issue can be considered together
because the claim of error is basically the same with each instruction.
The undue-comment argument rests in part on the basic legal
proposition that malice may be inferred from all the circumstances of the
case. See State v. Copenhaver, 844 N.W.2d 442, 452 (Iowa 2014) (“We
may infer intent from the defendant’s actions and the circumstances of
the transaction.”); State v. Bentley, 757 N.W.2d 257, 265 (Iowa 2008)
(approving malice instruction). This proposition is not disputed by
Ambrose. Yet, once a jury is informed that malice may be inferred from
all the facts and circumstances, Ambrose claims that more specific
instructions that authorize malice to be inferred from specifically
identified circumstances or acts in the case only draw attention to that
evidence and may even allow the jury to find malice based on evidence
that otherwise would not support the inference. Professor Rigg provides
an illustration of this latter point in his Iowa practice treatise on criminal
law by using the inference of malice based on the use of a dangerous
17
weapon. 4 Robert R. Rigg, Iowa Practice Series™ Criminal Law § 3:5, at
87–88 (2014–2015 ed.). He explained:
A is involved in a fight with B. A is winning the fight
and has knocked B to the ground. B picks up a rock and
strikes A. A dies as a result of being st[r]uck with the rock.
B is charged with murder. The rock is argued to be a
dangerous weapon because it is an instrument which is used
in a manner as to indicate the defendant intends to inflict
death or serious injury and is capable of inflicting death or
serious injury. Using the inference instruction, the
prosecution is free to argue and the jury to conclude that B
was acting with “malice aforethought” even though there is
no evidence of spite, hatred or ill will.
Id. (footnote omitted). Under this illustration, if an instrumentality used
to cause death would not normally be used to cause death and the jury
is instructed it can infer malice from the use of the instrument, the jury
could draw an inference from the mere use of the instrument even
though the actual surrounding evidence would not otherwise support
malice. Id. Thus, the instruction could be used by the jury as a
substitute for a finding of malice based on the evidence. See id. § 3:5, at
88–89; id. § 3:13, at 96–97.
While the argument articulated by Ambrose in this case against
the use of inference instructions generates concerns that must be
carefully considered in each case, the danger identified by Professor Rigg
is not present in this case. Here, Ambrose entered the house in violation
of a no-contact order, and he was armed with a baseball bat and a pistol,
which he repeatedly fired at occupants in the house, as well as one
occupant outside the house who was attempting to run from the
dwelling. Each of the inference instructions were justified by the
circumstances in the case and did not present a danger that the jury
could infer malice from underlying acts identified in the instruction that
would not otherwise support the inference.
18
We have permitted the practice of instructing juries on inferences
of malice from certain evidence since 1858. See State v. Gillick, 7 Iowa
287, 311 (1858) (“Malice is legitimately inferred from the weapon used;
and where the killing is with a dangerous weapon, calculated to produce,
and actually producing death, in the absence of proof that it was
accidental, or upon provocation, the presumption of law is, that the act
was voluntary, and with malice aforethought.”). Inferences are a part of
our law and the practice of identifying specific inferences that may be
drawn from general categories of evidence gives the jury an important
focal point and tightens the analysis to eliminate inferences not
supported by the evidence.
We acknowledge that repetitive instructions may give undue
prominence to certain evidence. Burkhalter v. Burkhalter, 841 N.W.2d
93, 106 (Iowa 2013). However, an instruction is not repetitive if it serves
to clarify a concept or build on a point of law for the jury. Id. at 107.
Here, the district court was required to instruct the jury on all lesser
included offenses to each count. See State v. Anderson, 636 N.W.2d 26,
38 (Iowa 2001) (“Generally, a district court commits reversible error by
failing to instruct the jury on all lesser-included offenses.”). In this
context, the three malice inference instructions were not repetitive, but
each corresponded with an instruction on a specific offense. The first
instructed on permissible inferences in willful, deliberate, premeditated
first-degree murder with specific intent to kill the victim. The next
provided the permissible inferences that may be drawn in a forcible
felony death. The third malice instruction provided the inferences for
second-degree murder malice aforethought. The trial court must walk a
fine line between instructing the jury on all the necessary lesser included
offenses and avoiding a piling-on effect that unduly emphasizes certain
19
aspects of the evidence. In this case, however, each malice inference
instruction included a distinct point of law and applied to a different
offense. The inference instructions did not constitute reversible error.
V. Subject Matter Jurisdiction.
Finally, Ambrose challenges the subject matter jurisdiction of the
district court for the first time on appeal. This pro se challenge is based
on his claim that the two counts of attempt to commit murder set out in
the trial information did not adequately describe a crime under Iowa
Code section 707.11. He does not claim the trial information failed to
provide adequate notice and opportunity to prepare a defense. Instead,
he asserts no criminal offense was described to give the trial court
subject matter jurisdiction of the case.
Subject matter jurisdiction can be raised at any time. State v.
Oetken, 613 N.W.2d 679, 686 (Iowa 2000). However, the trial
information in this case adequately described the proceeding as a
criminal case, which is the type of case the district court has jurisdiction
to hear and decide. See State v. Yodprasit, 564 N.W.2d 383, 386 (Iowa
1997) (citing Iowa Constitution art. V, § 6); State v. Mandicino, 509
N.W.2d 481, 482–83 (Iowa 1993). Ambrose impliedly acknowledged the
criminal nature of the proceeding and the charges against him by failing
to challenge any deficiency or uncertainty in the charges prior to trial.
See State v. Davis, 581 N.W.2d 614, 616 (Iowa 1998) (citing Iowa R.
Crim. P. [2.11(2)(b)]) (recognizing complaints over the sufficiency of
charges need to be raised prior to trial); State v. Hobson, 284 N.W.2d
239, 241 (Iowa 1979) (same). The district court had subject matter
jurisdiction.
20
VI. Conclusion.
We have reviewed all claims of error raised on appeal. We affirm
the judgment and sentence of the district court.
AFFIRMED.
All justices concur except Wiggins and Appel, JJ., who concur
specially, and Waterman, J., who concurs specially.
21
#13–0450, State v. Ambrose
WIGGINS, Justice (concurring specially).
I concur in the majority’s decision. I agree with the majority’s
analysis regarding the jury instruction that the jury could not consider a
lesser included offense until it found Ambrose not guilty of the greater
offense.
I also agree with the majority’s proposition “that the five
instructions at issue are generally supported by the law of this state,
although not necessarily directly.” I also agree the inference instructions
corresponded to the offense charged and the lessor included offenses. I
part way with the majority because the district court failed to tie the
appropriate inference instruction to the applicable crime.
We have said
an instruction embodying a potential comment on the
evidence does not warrant reversal unless the instruction
prejudiced the complaining party. Prejudice results when
the trial court’s instruction materially misstates the law,
confuses or misleads the jury, or is unduly emphasized.
Anderson v. Webster City Cmty. Sch. Dist., 620 N.W.2d 263, 267–68 (Iowa
2000) (citations omitted).
In this case, the instruction telling the jury malice may be inferred
from the commission of a felony which results in death, only applies to
the felony-murder instruction. See State v. Oliver, 341 N.W.2d 744, 747
(Iowa 1983). Yet the court did not limit that inference to the felony-
murder instruction. For this reason, I would find that instructing the
jury without referencing an instruction to a specific charge not only
misstates the law, but it also confuses, misleads, and unduly emphasizes
the State’s argument to the jury. Under other circumstances, I could not
22
be sure the jury did not use this instruction to infer malice in one of the
lessor included offenses.
However, I find this error to be harmless because the jury found
Ambrose guilty of first-degree murder. Thus, the jury did not use the
instruction inferring malice from the commission of a crime to find
malice in the lessor included charges. In the future, I would require any
inference instruction to reference the applicable element of the crime. In
addition, I would not give some of the inference instructions that are
duplicative. The court does not have to give an instruction just because
it appears in the Iowa State Bar Association’s instruction manual. The
court must guarantee defendants a fair trial and not overemphasize the
State’s case.
I also disagree with the statement that “[n]ormally, we are slow to
disapprove of the uniform jury instructions.” First, we do not have
“uniform jury instructions” approved by our court. A committee of the
Iowa State Bar Association writes the instructions. The president of the
bar association appoints the committee members. We do not have any
oversight over the process. Second, we never intended the bar
association’s instructions to have a presumption of correctness. As we
said in a resolution regarding the instructions,
Under Iowa law any jury instructions might be challenged in
the usual manner on appeal to this court. That right of
review on the part of future litigants precludes us from
considering the Plain English Redraft Instructions for official
approval or disapproval. We nevertheless note this newest
contribution of the committee with a deep sense of
appreciation and satisfaction.
Iowa Supreme Ct. Resolution, In the Matter of the Iowa State Bar
Association Uniform Court Instruction Committee (May 6, 1987).
23
As the Supreme Court of the State of Iowa, we cannot delegate our
duty to insure the instructions our courts give to our juries correctly
state the law. Although the bar association does a great service to the
trial courts of this state by publishing its jury instructions, the trial court
has a duty to make sure the instruction conforms with Iowa law.
Accordingly, I would overrule any caselaw that gives these instructions a
presumption of correctness.
Appel, J., joins this special concurrence.
24
#13–0450, State v. Ambrose
WATERMAN, Justice (concurring specially).
I join in the well-reasoned majority decision in all respects. I write
separately to respond to the special concurrence that gratuitously
denigrates the long-standing reliance by the bench and bar on the
uniform jury instructions promulgated by the Iowa State Bar Association
(ISBA). I disagree with my colleague’s assertion that we should “overrule
any caselaw that gives these instructions a presumption of correctness.”
This would include dozens of published decisions of our court and
dozens of decisions of our court of appeals. Stare decisis demands
greater respect for our precedent.
As our court reiterates today, “we are slow to disapprove of the
uniform jury instructions.” See also State v. Beets, 528 N.W.2d 521, 523
(Iowa 1995); State v. Weaver, 405 N.W.2d 852, 855 (Iowa 1987). Indeed,
just two years ago, our court, without dissent on this point, stated,
“ ‘trial courts should generally adhere to the uniform instructions.’ ”
State v. Becker, 818 N.W.2d 135, 143 (Iowa 2012) (quoting State v.
Mitchell, 568 N.W.2d 493, 501 (Iowa 1997); see also State v. Hatter, 414
N.W.2d 333, 336 (Iowa 1987) (same). Why the change of heart today?
“While we normally approve the submission of uniform
instructions,” we are free to find a “particular instruction is faulty.” State
v. McMullin, 421 N.W.2d 517, 518 (Iowa 1988). Everyone knows this.
What some readers may fail to fully appreciate, however, is the
tremendous service the members of the ISBA Jury Instruction Committee
do for our justice system. Without the uniform instructions, trial judges
and lawyers statewide would be burdened reinventing the wheel
researching and drafting ad hoc jury instructions every trial. The
variances in the wording of instructions would increase exponentially,
25
further burdening appellate review. It is far better to have a committee of
dedicated trial judges and lawyers craft uniform instructions to spare
their colleagues that time and trouble. If an appellate court concludes a
particular jury instruction is erroneous, or if our court changes the law
in a manner requiring a revision, then corrections to the uniform
instruction can be readily made and implemented statewide. The value
of our current process is well understood by the bench and bar. It
should go without saying.