Iowa Supreme Court Attorney Disciplinary Board Vs. Jeffrey M. Ireland , 723 N.W.2d 439 ( 2006 )


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  •                IN THE SUPREME COURT OF IOWA
    No. 103 / 06-0649
    Filed November 3, 2006
    IOWA SUPREME COURT ATTORNEY
    DISCIPLINARY BOARD,
    Complainant,
    vs.
    JEFFREY M. IRELAND,
    Respondent.
    ________________________________________________________________________
    On review of the report of the Grievance Commission.
    The Grievance Commission reports that respondent has committed
    ethical   misconduct   and    recommends    a    suspension.     LICENSE
    SUSPENDED.
    Charles L. Harrington and Wendell J. Harms, Des Moines, for
    complainant.
    Jeffrey M. Ireland, Ozark, Missouri, respondent, pro se.
    2
    CADY, Justice.
    The Iowa Supreme Court Attorney Disciplinary Board ("Board")
    charged Jeffrey M. Ireland with numerous violations of the Iowa Code of
    Professional Responsibility for Lawyers. The charges primarily stemmed
    from his neglect of client matters in two cases.              The Grievance
    Commission     (“Commission”)    found   Ireland   violated   the   Code   of
    Professional Responsibility. It recommended he be suspended from the
    practice of law for a period of not less than six months. On our review,
    we find Ireland violated the Code of Professional Responsibility and
    impose an indefinite suspension of not less than three months.
    I. Background Facts and Proceedings
    Jeffrey Ireland is an Iowa lawyer.      He practiced law in Cedar
    Rapids, Coralville, and Panora. Ireland moved from Iowa in December
    2003, and his license was placed on inactive status in February 2004.
    He is not licensed to practice law in any other state. Ireland received a
    private admonition in July 2002 and a public reprimand in December
    2002.    In both instances, he committed neglect by failing to advise a
    client of the move of his law office. Ireland resides in Ozark, Missouri,
    and is employed outside the legal profession.
    Two complaints were filed with the Board by former clients of
    Ireland. These complaints form the basis of these proceedings. The core
    facts surrounding the complaints are not in dispute. The first complaint
    (count I) was brought after Ireland failed to deliver a will to a client.
    Ireland drafted the will for the client in April 2002, and the client paid
    him for his legal services. Ireland kept the original will in his possession
    after it was executed by the client. The client later sought possession of
    the will by writing a letter to Ireland. The letter requested that Ireland
    send the will to her. He did not respond to the letter. Moreover, Ireland
    3
    took no action to comply with the request until the client filed a
    complaint against him more than two years later.
    The second complaint (count II) was brought after Ireland
    neglected a client’s case. Ireland was retained by the client in April 2000
    to pursue a civil rights action against an employer.            The client was
    eventually forced to file a pro se petition with the court in October 2000,
    after she became concerned that Ireland would fail to file the action prior
    to the expiration of the statute of limitations. Ireland then amended the
    petition, and continued to represent the client in the litigation. Over the
    next two years, however, Ireland neglected the case in several ways. He
    was tardy in responding to discovery requests and missed several court
    deadlines for filing matters. He failed to keep his client apprised of the
    case. He also failed to pursue discovery, and failed to attend scheduled
    depositions.    Finally, Ireland failed to resist a motion for summary
    judgment filed by the employer, and the case was dismissed by the court.
    One of the grounds to support summary judgment was that the petition
    was filed beyond the statute of limitations.
    Ireland did not contest the core facts of the complaints. Instead,
    he acknowledged his conduct, and was apologetic for his transgressions.
    He has not practiced law for over three years, and has no plans to return
    to Iowa to practice law.
    II. Commission Proceedings
    The Board charged Ireland with numerous violations of the Code of
    Professional Responsibility.     The violations in count I included DR 1-
    102(A)(6) (conduct that adversely reflects upon fitness to practice law)
    and DR 9-102(B)(4) (failure to promptly deliver client property). 1          The
    1
    Iowa has adopted the Iowa Rules of Professional Conduct, effective July 1,
    2005. However, the conduct in this case occurred prior to July 1, 2005, making the
    Code of Professional Responsibility applicable to these proceedings.
    4
    violations in count II included DR 1-102(A)(5) (conduct prejudicial to the
    administration of justice), DR 1-102(A)(6), and DR 6-101(A)(1) (handle a
    legal matter when not competent), DR 6-101(A)(2) (handle legal matter
    with inadequate preparation), and DR 6-101(A)(3) (neglect of client
    matter). Ireland stipulated that he violated each disciplinary rule, and
    further stipulated to the underlying facts.
    Based on the stipulation, the Commission found Ireland violated
    the specific provisions of the Code of Professional Responsibility.        It
    recommended that he be suspended from the practice of law for not less
    than six months.
    III. Scope of Review
    “We review attorney disciplinary actions de novo.” Iowa Supreme
    Ct. Bd. of Prof’l Ethics & Conduct v. Bernard, 
    653 N.W.2d 373
    , 375 (Iowa
    2002). “We are not bound by the findings of the commission, but we give
    them weight.” 
    Id. IV. Violations
    An attorney who possesses property of a client that the client is
    entitled to receive is obligated to promptly deliver the property to the
    client when the client requests the property. DR 9-102(B)(4). A violation
    of this duty could reflect adversely on the fitness of the lawyer to practice
    law. DR 1-102(A)(6).
    Ireland was in possession of a will belonging to a client. The client
    had paid Ireland for his services in connection with the preparation and
    execution of the will, and she was entitled to possession of the will upon
    request.   Ireland violated DR 9-102(B)(4) when he failed to promptly
    deliver the will to the client after the request was made. His continual
    failure to comply with the duty under DR 9-102(B)(4) reflects adversely
    on his fitness to practice law. See DR 1-102(A)(6).
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    Attorneys are required to act competently. DR 6-101. This duty
    not only includes refraining from taking cases, without associating with
    another competent lawyer, when the lawyer knows or should know that
    he or she is not competent to handle the case, but also includes the lack
    of adequate preparation and neglect of client matters. DR 6-101(A)(1)–
    (3).   Neglect is more than negligence, but involves indifference in the
    failure to advance the interests of the client when action is required.
    Iowa Supreme Ct. Bd. of Prof’l Ethics & Conduct v. Moorman, 
    683 N.W.2d 549
    ,    551   (Iowa   2004).    It   results   from   extreme   inaction   or
    procrastination, and normally involves more than one act or omission.
    
    Id. In this
    case, Ireland violated all three components of the duty to
    practice law in a competent manner. His conduct was also prejudicial to
    the administration of justice, and it adversely reflected on his fitness to
    practice law. See DR 1-102(A)(5), (6).
    V. Discipline
    The Code of Professional Responsibility and the concomitant
    disciplinary system exist to maintain public confidence in the legal
    system and to provide a mechanism for policing poor lawyering. Iowa
    Supreme Ct. Bd. of Prof’l Ethics & Conduct v. Honken, 
    688 N.W.2d 812
    ,
    820 (Iowa 2004).        In determining the appropriate discipline in an
    attorney disciplinary case, we consider a variety of general factors
    including the nature of the violation, the need for deterrence, the need
    for public protection, the preservation of the reputation of the legal
    profession, and the fitness of the lawyer to continue to practice law. See
    id.; Iowa Supreme Ct. Bd. of Prof’l Ethics & Conduct v. Hohenadel, 
    634 N.W.2d 652
    , 655 (Iowa 2001).         We also consider any past history of
    discipline. Iowa Supreme Ct. Bd. of Prof’l Ethics & Conduct v. Lane, 
    642 N.W.2d 296
    , 302 (Iowa 2002). Harm to the client is also a consideration.
    6
    Iowa Supreme Ct. Bd. of Prof’l Ethics & Conduct v. Adams, 
    623 N.W.2d 815
    , 819 (Iowa 2001). Additionally, multiple incidences of neglect are an
    aggravating circumstance to consider.      Iowa Supreme Ct. Bd. of Prof’l
    Ethics & Conduct v. Pracht, 
    656 N.W.2d 123
    , 126 (Iowa 2003).
    When neglect of client matters is the principle violation, we have
    observed that the discipline generally falls within the range of a public
    reprimand to a six-month suspension.       
    Moorman, 683 N.W.2d at 553
    .
    Yet, the discipline imposed in each case depends upon the particular
    facts and circumstances, and this fact-based outcome for each case
    tends to diminish the value of precedent. See Iowa Supreme Ct. Bd. of
    Prof'l Ethics & Conduct v. Eich, 
    652 N.W.2d 216
    , 219 (Iowa 2002).
    Considering all the facts and circumstances in this case, we
    conclude Ireland should be indefinitely suspended from the practice of
    law with no possibility of reinstatement for three months. This case is a
    blend of neglect and incompetence that clearly signals various concerns
    about Ireland’s fitness to practice law.      The neglect perpetrated by
    Ireland on his clients was ongoing and profuse, and followed on the heels
    of prior incidents of neglect visited upon other clients. The stipulation by
    Ireland supports the notion that his conduct adversely reflects on his
    fitness to practice law, and is consistent with his decision to voluntarily
    leave the practice.   Thus, while a suspension may not be required to
    protect the public, it is consistent with the need to maintain the
    reputation of the profession as a whole. It is also consistent with the
    discipline we have imposed in prior similar cases of neglect. See Iowa
    Supreme Ct. Bd. of Prof’l Ethics & Conduct v. Wickey, 
    679 N.W.2d 1
    (Iowa
    2004) (neglect and failure to account to client, together with other
    conduct, warranted six-month suspension); Iowa Supreme Ct. Bd. of
    Prof’l Ethics & Conduct v. Waples, 
    677 N.W.2d 740
    (Iowa 2004) (neglect of
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    client matters warranted six-month suspension); Iowa Supreme Ct. Bd. of
    Prof’l Ethics & Conduct v. McKittrick, 
    683 N.W.2d 554
    (Iowa 2004) (neglect
    of client matter and other associated conduct warranted three-month
    suspension); Iowa Supreme Ct. Bd. of Prof’l Ethics & Conduct v. Frerichs,
    
    671 N.W.2d 470
    (Iowa 2004) (neglect of client matter and failure to
    safeguard client property, together with other conduct, warranted four-
    month suspension); 
    Hohenadel, 634 N.W.2d at 652
    (neglect of two client
    matters warranted four-month suspension).
    VI. Conclusion
    We suspend Ireland’s license to practice law with no possibility of
    reinstatement for a period not less than three months from the date of
    filing of this opinion. The suspension applies to all facets of the practice
    of law. Iowa Ct. R. 35.12(3). Upon any application for reinstatement,
    Ireland shall have the burden to prove he has not practiced during the
    period of suspension and that he meets all requirements of Iowa Court
    Rule 35.13. The costs of this proceeding are taxed against Ireland.
    LICENSE SUSPENDED.
    All justices concur except Hecht, J., who takes no part.