Iowa Supreme Court Attorney Disciplinary Board Vs. Donna P. Lesyshen ( 2006 )


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  •                IN THE SUPREME COURT OF IOWA
    No. 45 / 05-1954
    Filed April 7, 2006
    IOWA SUPREME COURT ATTORNEY
    DISCIPLINARY BOARD,
    Complainant,
    vs.
    DONNA P. LESYSHEN,
    Respondent.
    ________________________________________________________________________
    On review of the report of the Grievance Commission.
    Grievance Commission reports that respondent has committed
    ethical misconduct and recommends suspension of respondent’s license
    to practice law. LICENSE SUSPENDED.
    Charles L. Harrington and David J. Grace, Des Moines, for
    complainant.
    Donna P. Lesyshen, Waterloo, pro se.
    2
    STREIT, Justice.
    An Iowa attorney with a history of ethical problems is here with
    more ethical violations. The Iowa Supreme Court Attorney Disciplinary
    Board (“Board”) accused Donna Lesyshen of neglecting client matters,
    failing to respond to inquiries from the Board, mishandling trust account
    funds, and inadequate withdrawal.        The Grievance Commission of the
    Supreme    Court   of   Iowa   (“Commission”),   upon   reviewing   a   joint
    stipulation of facts from Lesyshen and the Board, found Lesyshen
    violated the Iowa Code of Professional Responsibility and recommended a
    five-year suspension.     Based on the record before us, an indefinite
    suspension with no possibility of reinstatement for at least two years is
    appropriate.
    I. Background
    Lesyshen was admitted to practice law in 1982. She served as a
    prosecutor in the Black Hawk County Attorney’s office and then as an
    assistant city attorney for the City of Waterloo. Following her tenure as
    assistant city attorney, she entered private practice. She had a general
    practice, which included trial work.        Lesyshen no longer wishes to
    practice law, and she has found other employment. Lesyshen’s license to
    practice law is currently on inactive status.
    This is not the first time Lesyshen has been before this court for
    disciplinary action.    Lesyshen was publicly reprimanded in 1994 for
    aiding the unauthorized practice of law contrary to DR 3-101(A).
    Additionally, in October 1998, we imposed a six-month suspension for
    neglect, forgery, and false notarization.   Iowa Supreme Ct. Bd. of Prof’l
    Ethics & Conduct v. Lesyshen, 
    585 N.W.2d 281
    , 288 (Iowa 1998).
    The Board filed this complaint with the Commission for neglect,
    failure to cooperate with the Board, inadequate withdrawal, and a trust
    3
    account violation. Both parties waived the hearing and agreed to submit
    the matter to the Commission on the basis of the complaint,
    corresponding exhibits, and a joint stipulation that recommended
    Lesyshen’s license to practice law be suspended for a period of four
    years. Based on the joint stipulation, the Commission found Lesyshen’s
    conduct violated the disciplinary rules designated in the complaint, and
    recommended Lesyshen’s license be suspended for a period of five years.
    II. Standard of Review
    We review attorney disciplinary proceedings de novo.          Iowa
    Supreme Ct. Attorney Disciplinary Bd. v. Kadenge, 
    706 N.W.2d 403
    , 405
    (Iowa 2005); Iowa Ct. R. 35.10(1). The Board has the burden to prove
    disciplinary violations by a convincing preponderance of the evidence.
    Iowa Supreme Ct. Bd. of Prof’l Ethics & Conduct v. Williams, 
    675 N.W.2d 530
    , 531 (Iowa 2004).      This burden is “less than proof beyond a
    reasonable doubt, but more than the preponderance standard required
    in the usual civil case.” Iowa Supreme Ct. Bd. of Prof’l Ethics & Conduct
    v. Lett, 
    674 N.W.2d 139
    , 142 (Iowa 2004).           We give respectful
    consideration to the Commission’s findings and recommendations, but
    we are not bound by them. See Iowa Supreme Ct. Bd. of Prof’l Ethics &
    Conduct v. Bell, 
    650 N.W.2d 648
    , 650 (Iowa 2002) (revoking license even
    though Commission recommended five-year suspension). We review this
    matter pursuant to Iowa Court Rule 35.10, and depart from the
    sanctions recommended by the Commission and the joint stipulation.
    III. Factual Findings
    Lesyshen admitted all of the factual claims and ethical violations
    made against her by the Board. We find convincing evidence to prove the
    following:
    4
    A. C.S. Matter
    Lesyshen was appointed to represent C.S. in an appeal from a
    juvenile court order terminating C.S.’s parental rights. Leyshen filed a
    notice of appeal, but she failed to pursue the appeal, resulting in its
    dismissal pursuant to Iowa Rule of Appellate Procedure 6.19. Lesyshen
    claims she was unable to contact her client.     The joint stipulation is
    silent as to how Lesyshen was able to initially contact C.S. to sign the
    notice of appeal, but could not reach her client shortly thereafter. C.S.
    requested that her appeal be reinstated, and the supreme court did so,
    and ordered the district court to replace Lesyshen.    Lesyshen did not
    respond to the Board’s notices of complaint.
    B. J.T. Matter
    Lesyshen represented J.T. in an appeal to the Iowa Supreme
    Court. Lesyshen filed the notice of appeal, but took no further action.
    Lesyshen claims she did not follow through with the appeal because her
    client changed his mind.    Eventually the clerk of the supreme court
    dismissed the appeal for want of prosecution. Pursuant to rule 6.19(3) of
    the Iowa Rules of Appellate Procedure, the clerk forwarded the notice of
    default and order of dismissal to the Board.
    C. Robert Wilson Estate Matter
    Lesyshen was the attorney for the Estate of Robert Wilson. The
    estate was opened so that a parcel of real estate could be sold. Lesyshen
    sold the parcel yet neglected to take steps to close the estate.   Three
    delinquency notices were sent to Lesyshen by the clerk of court.
    Eventually, the court removed Lesyshen and the executor, and ordered
    the estate closed.   Lesyshen did not respond to two complaint notices
    from the Board.
    5
    D. Schares Matter
    Lesyshen represented Melvin Schares in a dissolution of marriage
    action. In May 2002, Lesyshen received a $1200 retainer, but she did
    not deposit it in her trust account. Lesyshen claims this was an error by
    her secretary. The stipulation does not indicate what was done with the
    $1200.     In June 2002, Lesyshen took other employment, and stopped
    working on Schares’ case. In August, Schares filed a complaint with the
    Board. Lesyshen then refunded the unearned portion of the retainer and
    formally withdrew from the case.
    IV. Ethical Violations
    A.    Neglect
    The record supports the Commission’s finding that Lesyshen
    committed professional neglect on numerous occasions.              See DR 6-
    101(A)(3) (providing a lawyer shall not neglect a client’s legal matter); see
    also Iowa Supreme Ct. Bd. of Prof’l Ethics & Conduct v. Moorman, 
    683 N.W.2d 549
    ,   551   (Iowa   2004)   (defining   professional   neglect   as
    “indifference and a consistent failure to perform those obligations that a
    lawyer has assumed, or a conscious disregard for the responsibilities a
    lawyer owes to a client”).
    In the C.S. and J.T. matters, the appeals were dismissed as a
    result of Lesyshen’s neglect. Even though the C.S. case was ultimately
    reinstated, the subsequent reinstatement did not cure the prior neglect.
    
    Id. at 552.
    Regardless of the client’s interest in the case, the onus is on
    the attorney to comply with the deadlines provided in the appellate rules.
    See Iowa R. App. P. 6.19. Unless the court relieves an attorney of his or
    her responsibility to the client on appeal, as an officer of the court, the
    attorney is required to file the appropriate documents and briefs.
    Anything less may be considered neglect. See 
    Moorman, 683 N.W.2d at 6
    552-53 (holding attorney’s failure to comply with rules of appellate
    procedure, as well as subsequent notices to cure the defaults issued by
    the clerk of court, reveals a blatant pattern of neglect and constitutes a
    “conscious disregard” for the responsibilities an attorney owes a client
    and the court). In regard to the J.T. matter, simply because a client does
    not want to pursue the case does not relieve the attorney from taking
    steps necessary to end the matter.      To simply wait for the court to
    dismiss the case for lack of prosecution is neglect, inappropriate, and
    unethical. See DR 6-101(A)(3).
    Lesyshen also neglected the Robert Wilson Estate matter because
    she failed to take steps to close the estate even though she received three
    delinquency notices from the court.     Further, Lesyshen neglected the
    Schares matter when she simply stopped working on the case after she
    changed employment.      In considering the nature of the violations in
    these matters, we note the dilatory handling of client matters is a
    disservice not only to the client but also to the judicial system.
    
    Kadenge, 706 N.W.2d at 408-09
    .
    B. Failure to Cooperate with the Board
    We have repeatedly emphasized how important it is for an attorney
    to cooperate with disciplinary authorities when a complaint has been
    filed against the attorney.      
    Id. at 409.
         Lesyshen was initially
    uncooperative with the Board. She ignored two notices of complaint in
    the C.S. matter.   She also ignored two notices from the Board in the
    Robert Wilson Estate matter.       While the joint stipulation indicates
    Lesyshen eventually cooperated with the Board, her initial lack of
    cooperation wasted the Board’s valuable time and limited assets.        
    Id. Her lack
    of cooperation also prejudiced the Board’s ability to gather all
    pertinent facts regarding the complaints. 
    Id. Such actions
    clearly violate
    7
    DR 1-102(A)(5) (“A lawyer shall not . . . [e]ngage in conduct that is
    prejudicial to the administration of justice.”). Comm. on Prof’l Ethics &
    Conduct v. Bromwell, 
    389 N.W.2d 854
    , 857 (Iowa 1986) (holding failure to
    respond to grievance committee violates the proscription against conduct
    prejudicial to administration of justice).
    C. Trust Account Violation
    Client funds paid to an attorney must be deposited into an
    interest-bearing trust account, rather than the firm’s operating account,
    until they are earned. 
    Kadenge, 706 N.W.2d at 408
    . Lesyshen’s failure
    to deposit Schares’ retainer of $1200 in a trust account violated DR 9-
    102 (failure to deposit advance for fees in trust account). The fact that
    Lesyshen paid the money back to Schares after he filed a complaint is
    not a valid defense or excuse for this ethical violation. Iowa Supreme Ct.
    Bd. of Prof’l Ethics & Conduct v. Stowers, 
    626 N.W.2d 130
    , 133 (Iowa
    2001).
    D. Inadequate Withdrawal
    Lesyshen     clearly   violated       DR   2-110   (withdrawal     from
    representation without completing work, to prejudice of client) in the
    Schares matter.     She found other employment, stopped working on
    Schares’ case, and failed to withdraw properly or notify Schares.         See
    Comm. on Prof'l Ethics & Conduct v. Freed, 
    341 N.W.2d 757
    , 759 (Iowa
    1983) (stating neglect of duties to client is like “a surgeon who, without
    transferring responsibility, drops his scalpel and abandons his patient in
    the course of an operation”).     Lesyshen’s conduct also violated DR 7-
    101(A)(1) (failure to seek objectives of a client), DR 7-101(A)(2) (failure to
    carry out employment contract with a client), and DR 7-101(A)(3)
    (prejudice or damage to a client).
    8
    V. Sanction
    In   the   joint        stipulation,   Lesyshen   agreed    to    a   four-year
    recommended sanction saying she had found other employment and no
    longer wished to practice law. The Commission recommended Lesyshen
    be suspended for a period of five years given the violations that had
    occurred. However, we find, based on the joint stipulation, findings of
    fact,   conclusions        of    law   and     recommendation,     with   its   limited
    explanation of events, a sanction of two years is appropriate.
    When we impose sanctions, we only do so on the evidence before
    us.     We give respectful consideration to the recommendations of the
    Commission, but are not bound by them.                    Comm. on Prof’l Ethics &
    Conduct v. Nadler, 
    467 N.W.2d 250
    , 254 (Iowa 1991). Factors that help
    guide our determination include “the nature of the violations, the need
    for deterrence, protection of the public, maintenance of the reputation of
    the Bar as a whole, and the violator’s fitness to continue to practice law.”
    Iowa Supreme Ct. Bd. of Prof’l Ethics & Conduct v. Ramey, 
    639 N.W.2d 243
    , 245 (Iowa 2002).             Often, the distinction between the punishment
    imposed depends upon the existence of multiple instances of neglect,
    past disciplinary problems, and other companion violations, including
    uncooperativeness in the disciplinary investigation.               Iowa Supreme Ct.
    Bd. of Prof’l Ethics & Conduct v. Sprole, 
    596 N.W.2d 64
    , 66 (Iowa 1999).
    Subsequent to Lesyshen’s two prior ethical violations, Lesyshen
    engaged in client neglect, a trust account violation, and inappropriate
    withdrawal from a client’s case, which caused potential harm to her
    clients. Further, she initially failed to cooperate with the Board, which is
    an additional factor in imposing discipline.              
    Moorman, 683 N.W.2d at 553-54
    . Based only on the limited facts in the record before us, we find
    a suspension for a minimum of two years is appropriate.                       See Iowa
    9
    Supreme Ct. Attorney Disciplinary Bd. v. McCann, 
    712 N.W.2d 89
    , 91
    (Iowa 2006) (imposing a two-year suspension for trust account violations
    and   aggravating   factors   of   neglect);   Iowa   Supreme   Ct.   Attorney
    Disciplinary Bd. v. Sotak, 
    706 N.W.2d 385
    , 386 (Iowa 2005) (imposing an
    indefinite suspension of two years where conduct involved professional
    neglect, misrepresentations, failure to notify clients of attorney’s transfer
    to new law firm, and failure to promptly give settlement check to client);
    Iowa Supreme Ct. Attorney Disciplinary Bd. v. Maxwell, 
    705 N.W.2d 477
    ,
    478 (Iowa 2005) (imposing a one-year suspension for violations stemming
    from neglect and inattention in the representation of three clients, where
    attorney had prior ethical violations).
    VI. Conclusion
    Lesyshen is suspended indefinitely from the practice of law with no
    possibility of reinstatement for at least two years. This suspension shall
    apply to all facets of the practice of law as provided in Iowa Court Rule
    35.12(3) and requires notification of clients as outlined in Iowa Court
    Rule 35.21. Costs are taxed to Lesyshen pursuant to Iowa Court Rule
    35.25(1).
    LICENSE SUSPENDED.